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LORD GREY AND THE WORLD WAR

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AND THE WORLD WAR

BY

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Translated by

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"It is not hard to tell the truth; the difficulty is to get it believed."

VISCOUNT GREY.

PREFATORY REMARKS

AMONG the statesmen whose influence contributed to determine the course of events in Europe in the decade before the outbreak of the world war, no figure has aroused more controversy than that of Sir Edward Grey, now Viscount Grey of Fallodon. To some he still appears a Machiavelli, " perfidious Albion " in the flesh ; to others a sincere and honest citizen, incapable of the political dealings that shun the light or of anything not straightforward. Some see in him a great statesman ; others a bungler, a short-sighted, naïve blunderer, lacking in resolution and much more influenced and pushed by his advisers and subordinates in the Foreign Office, especially Sir Charles Hardinge, Sir Arthur Nicolson, Sir William Tyrrell, and Sir Eyre Crowe, than the world imagines. These conflicting impressions of Grey are both widely held in Britain.

The opportunity of a better assessment of Grey's character and line of thought and policy is afforded by his recently published memoirs, furnished with a large quantity of new documentary material.* I shall try in this book to elucidate in some measure the complications and contrasts in Grey's personality, and it will also be my task to fill in the gaps in Grey's presentation and to correct his mistakes. For more is at issue than the person of the writer of the memoirs. His work will be read by hundreds of thousands, and much that he adduces still represents the view of many millions among his compatriots and the foreign supporters of the Entente policy. It is, indeed, impossible to measure the influence of " Twenty-five Years " on the Anglo-Saxon world : Lord Grey is held in very high repute indeed in Britain, and already in America people speak of a " Grey Myth." †

Grey's Memoirs were completed in the last two years. The difficulty of the task was greatly increased by the conditions

* " Twenty-five Years, 1892–1916," 2 vols., Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1925.

† Harry Elmer Barnes, " The Genesis of the World War," New York, 1926, p. 535. (See also pages xviii, 567, 572–73, 580.) Professor Bernadotte E. Schmitt, of Chicago University, wrote in the New York " Foreign Affairs " for October 1926 : " His book, incomplete as it is on many points, will remain the classic exposition of British policy."

under which it was performed. Grey has suffered since 1918 from an eye trouble which has almost entirely destroyed his capacity to read. He was therefore dependent on the co-operation of an old friend, J. A. Spender. Spender supplied him with the salient letters, reports, and telegrams from the archives of the British Foreign Office, and Grey then selected those which should be published in his Memoirs. Grey praises Spender's impartiality, which, he says, made his help invaluable.* Grey's second wife was also an active helper in the work.

Grey begins his introduction with these words :

> It is of vital importance to the world that there should be a true account of the events that led up to the Great War : without this there can be no right understanding of the causes of the war ; and without such understanding nations will not perceive how to avoid the recurrence of another and greater disaster.

The new generation whose opinions about the war are yet to be formed, and those of the present generation " who are dispassionately and increasingly anxious to discover truth," ought to have " the fullest material " at their disposal, and it is " mainly for these " that Grey wrote his book.†

He does not, however, claim authoritativeness or completeness for his account ; often the man at the centre of affairs is unable to see the wood for the trees, and probably some historian of the future will reach an eminence of view about the war " to which we cannot yet attain." Grey adds further that his book " naturally presents the British view " or his own, but that he has endeavoured " to envisage also the international aspect of the war." ‡

In spite of these limitations, the opinions expressed by Grey in setting down his memories were bound to be read with high expectations for the truths they tell in regard to the origins of the war. But we must not forget that in view of his eye trouble he may be less responsible for striking omissions and grave misrepresentations than his collaborator J. A. Spender,

* Vol. I, p. xix. Grey remarks on page xx that, with two exceptions, all his private papers were left at the Foreign Office. The two exceptions are printed in the Memoirs.

† Vol. I, pp. xv and xvi.

‡ Vol. I, pp. xvi and xvii.

though it must be borne in mind that Grey may not always have followed his friend's advice.

At the end of 1925, when the first three chapters of the present work were virtually complete, I was commissioned to bring out a German translation of the official " British Documents on the Origins of the War (1898–1914)." And as it was decided that the British documents should be prefaced by a volume dealing with the outbreak of the world war, it was convenient to work in these new British documents at the same time in the fourth chapter of the Grey book. The postponement of printing which this involved made it possible not only to deal with all important publications which had appeared since the beginning of 1926, but also to extend the whole work. This was primarily done for the sake of a better understanding of the new " British Documents on the Origins of the War." For these should not be considered in isolation. The crisis of July 1914 was only the sequel and the culminating point of a decade-old, and in part a very much more remote historical process, which in the last resort is of much more importance than the explosion itself. And in this process a decisive part was played by those very years in which Sir Edward Grey filled the office, far more influential than any other, of British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

In my arrangement of the material I have broadly followed Grey's " Twenty-five Years." This applies particularly to the second chapter. It may be felt that much in this chapter should have been deferred to that dealing with the outbreak of the war. But for good reasons I decided to keep to the original arrangement. Among other things this saved me from interrupting the narrative of events in the summer of 1914 by the tedious demonstration that Grey's " free hand " was illusory.

It would be carrying coals to Newcastle for me to waste words here on the importance of the question of war guilt to the German people and to all Europe. I had this consideration always before me in extending the book into a clue to the understanding of the new " British Documents," and from it arose the deliberate incorporation of the mass of footnotes, the fullness of which

may be little to the taste of some readers. Yet they are there for a definite and perhaps not unimportant reason. Many details in the history of the decades before the war are hotly disputed, and it was accordingly advisable to quote, for the incredulous and those who would shut their eyes to the truth, the sources and the evidence that a case is as represented. The footnotes are also intended to serve as a collection of material to facilitate the work of elucidating special questions, though I make no claim to have adduced everywhere the most vital matter ; with the mass of material this would have been beyond human power. The footnotes have been placed at the end of each chapter, so that the general reader will be undisturbed by them.

When Baron Marschall von Bieberstein became German Ambassador in London, in 1912, he reminded Sir Edward in conversation of a sentence in some speech of Grey's which ran as follows (Grey quotes it from memory—Vol. I, pp. 246–47) :

> It is not hard to tell the truth ; the difficulty is to get it believed.

That is indeed, especially in political life, no uncommon thing. In Grey's mouth the phrase gains quite special significance. I have placed it, therefore, as the one appropriate motto, at the beginning of this work ; I am, indeed, very well aware of the international difficulty, at some periods, of getting the truth believed.

HERMANN LUTZ.

MUNICH,
November 1926.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN EDITION

In this British and American edition I have made a few additions. These are taken from fresh material which only came into my hands after the German edition had gone to press; the principal new source was the publication in December 1926 of Volumes 34–39 of the German collection of documents "Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871–1914" ("The High Policy of the European Cabinets, 1871–1914"). Further notes were also added from the new material; but the notes in general have been cut much shorter in the present edition, indications of sources being retained, but actual quotations in many cases omitted; other omissions have been made where the matter had reference only to German conditions.

The British and American edition has thus been brought down to date.

Munich,
August 1927.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations used in referring to the principal literature quoted in the Notes at the end of chapters. The titles of books quoted by the authors' names only, will be found in the list of authorities in the preceding pages.

Ba : Bayerische Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch, edited by Dr. P. Durr, 3rd Edit., Munich 1925.

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Special attention is drawn to Dr. G. P. Gooch's " Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy," London 1927, which gives a brief mention of all the important publications dealing with the history of the events leading up to the world war.

Lord Grey and the World War

CHAPTER I

PREDILECTIONS AND PREJUDICES

1. Up to the Entente Cordiale, 1904.

> If he does not believe what he said, we must take him for a scoundrel. But I know Sir Edward Grey well enough personally to know that at bottom he is a kindly and well-intentioned man, and of very good faith; I am convinced, therefore, that he believed everything he said.
>
> Sir Roger Casement.* (1)

Edward Grey was born in 1862 at the family seat of Fallodon. His father, who sided with France (2) in the war of 1870–71, and who had fought as an officer in the Crimean War, died as early as 1874, and does not seem to have conveyed directly to his son Edward his Francophil inclination; Edward was indifferent at first in foreign politics. His father's place was then taken by his grandfather, Sir George Grey, who had, except for a few years, been a Minister in various Cabinets from 1841 to 1866. The grandfather died in 1882. Edward Grey then inherited the property at Fallodon. In November 1885 he was elected as a Liberal to the House of Commons, of which he remained a member without a break for the next three decades.

In July 1892 the Teutophil Lord Rosebery became Foreign Secretary in the Gladstone Cabinet, and selected Sir Edward Grey as his Parliamentary Under-Secretary, a post which Grey retained under Earl Kimberley until the fall of the Rosebery Cabinet in June 1895. Here Grey begins his own account.

At this period Great Britain was experiencing considerably more friction with France and Russia than with the Triple Alliance, which was regarded as the factor making for peace in

* Retranslated.

Europe, and Grey rightly shows that in the 'eighties and 'nineties, when the Triple Alliance had no effective counterpoise in Europe, Great Britain sided diplomatically with the stronger combination, the Triple Alliance, a fact which does not agree with the theory that Britain always supports the weaker group on the Continent. (3) Great Britain was, indeed, less concerned about the predominance of any *military* Power in Central or Western Europe than about the question which States had the power and possibly the inclination to threaten her Channel and North Sea ports. (4)

Sir Edward Grey entered Office, as he describes, in 1892, without any prepossessions in foreign policy, in this atmosphere of British friendship with the Triple Alliance ; but he suddenly received a shock. At this time British and German firms were applying for railway concessions in Asia Minor, and the British Ambassador in Constantinople was naturally, with the approval of the Foreign Office, supporting his compatriots. " Suddenly," as Grey writes,

> there came a sort of ultimatum from Berlin, requiring us to cease competition for railway concessions in Turkey for which Germans were applying, and stating that, unless we did so, the German Consul at Cairo would withdraw support from British administration in Egypt. Instructions in this sense were actually sent without delay to the German Representative at Cairo, and the German ultimatum was followed—almost accompanied—by a despairing telegram from Lord Cromer pointing out that it would be impossible to carry on his work in Egypt without German support in face of French and Russian opposition.

Grey adds that Germany's abrupt and rough peremptoriness gave him an unpleasant impression. The contention was not in substance absolutely unreasonable ;

> the Germans were, at any rate, entitled to ask that, in return for German support in Egypt, we should not oppose some specified German interests elsewhere. Had this been suggested we could not fairly have refused to consider an arrangement, if one had been proposed, that on the face of it was reasonable. But the method adopted by Germany in this instance was not that of a friend. There was no choice for us but to give way, unless we were ready to face the opening up of the whole Egyptian question without a single Great Power on our side. . . . It (the incident) left a sense of discomfort and a bad taste behind. It exposed rudely the insidious weakness due to our position in Egypt. It was open to Germany to repeat the squeeze, whenever she desired to exclude us from a commercial field in which she was interested. As long as we assumed responsibility for the government of Egypt,

the Capitulations were like a noose round our neck, which any Great Power, having rights under the Capitulations, could tighten at will. In this case the noose had been roughly jerked by Germany. (5)

The incident plainly made a deep impression on Grey. It must be regarded as the starting-point of his whole later attitude towards Germany, and it calls therefore for investigation.

It is well known that after the British occupation of Egypt Prince Bismarck laid down the principle that " In Egypt we are British." This was unreservedly acknowledged in England at the time. Sir William Harcourt, for instance, who was then Home Secretary, said in June 1884 to Count Herbert Bismarck that the German Chancellor had

rendered such services to the British Government in the policy followed towards it in the past two years, that it could never be grateful enough for them,* (6)

and Mr. Chamberlain, President of the Board of Trade, said a few weeks later :

Prince Bismarck has rendered such great services to us that I only hope he will rest assured that there is no country to which we so gladly show favours as Germany. Without Germany's favourable attitude we should have got into great difficulties.* (7)

Favours, however, not only failed to materialize, but by the middle of the 'eighties the British Government showed such opposition and unfriendliness in regard to the modest colonial ambitions of Germany that in the end Bismarck found himself compelled to show a change of attitude in Egypt. He was dissatisfied with the " tenderness " shown by Count Münster, the Ambassador in London, " for British susceptibilities," which only resulted in

the British stiffening their claims under the false impression that we should continue as for years past in making our policy serve British ends without asking anything in return, while Britain treats us with contemptuous ruthlessness in all colonial questions. (8)

Bismarck's complaints, as British historians have admitted, (9) were justified, and there came a change in London. But again and again there was no effective reciprocity. Herbert Bismarck

* Retranslated from the German.

wrote, for instance, on March 26, 1887, to Count Hatzfeldt, who became Ambassador in London in November 1885 :

> If Great Britain is unwilling even to show the measure of complaisance that we ask in fields of so little importance to British power as Zanzibar and Samoa, we shall adjust our attitude accordingly and oppose her where her most vital interests are at stake. In recent years we have found ourselves every few months in the position of having to use a sharp tone in discussing colonial matters with England, and it is nothing short of exasperating to have this occur again and again and to find that the readiness of the British Government to show consideration to us only lasts in the case of the Government up to the first friendly communication from here and in the case of its agents is never evidenced at all. (10)

After Bismarck's dismissal the German Government continued to give ready and continuous support to British policy in Egypt ; indeed, it repeatedly advised the Sultan to maintain " a friendly attitude towards England," and " especially " to seek " an understanding with her in regard to Egypt." (11) And when at the end of December 1892 the Egyptian Government approached the representatives of the Great Powers for permission

> to take from the savings on the conversion of the privileged debt the sum of £E60,000 per annum for the purpose of increasing the army by two battalions of infantry and two squadrons,

Baron Marschall, the Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, at once, without waiting to be asked from London, directed that Lord Rosebery should be informed " that we are ready to give our assent " if the British Government desired it. (12)

The assent was, in fact, given, and it must be admitted that a foreign government could not well show more spontaneous good will. There came, however, to Berlin news that led Marschall to write this to Hatzfeldt on January 7, 1893 :

> Yesterday I sent the following telegraphic instructions to the Imperial Consul-General in Cairo :
>
> > " Should the declaration which you were requested to make in regard to the increase of the Egyptian troops not yet have been made by you in official and binding form, will you please postpone it, as the offensive and inimical attitude of the British Embassy in Constantinople, which defends even French interests against German in all questions of railway construction in Asia Minor, is incom-

patible with the accommodating spirit which has been shown for years past on the German side in regard to British interests, even sometimes when, as in the Eastern Asiatic treaty, they were in competition with German interests. You may also explain to Lord Cromer the reasons for our changed attitude in the future."

Count Leyden replied to-day with the following report :

" Declaration in regard to army increase already transmitted by me in association with Italian colleague by Note ; have, however, acquainted Lord Cromer with contents of telegram No. 2. He sincerely regrets the facts alluded to and will probably report to London as to their results. France meanwhile has vetoed army increase." (13)

That is the German " ultimatum " which Grey remembers !

It does not appear from the German documents that the British Government contested Berlin's statement that the British Embassy in Constantinople was defending even French interests against German. Rosebery paid attention to the German claims, and Berlin took pains as before to use its good offices with the Sultan in England's interest, as the British Foreign Secretary acknowledged as early as January 30, 1893, and repeatedly afterwards, " with special gratitude." * (14) Not only that, but three weeks after the German " ultimatum " he considered the question of close co-operation with the Triple Alliance, to which, as he said in a confidential conversation with the German Ambassador, many people in London " who in the past would have been definitely opposed to so intimate an association had been converted by recent events in Egypt." Lord Rosebery added :

What would be the situation of Great Britain if the Triple Alliance were broken down, and we (British) were then alone in face of the Russo-French group ? † (15)

Egypt was certainly a very vulnerable spot in the British system, and if Germany had been as extortionately inclined as Sir Edward Grey feared she might have profited on a very different scale from threatening this Achilles' heel. Actually it was France whose unfriendly attitude, and not only in Egypt, seriously hampered the work of the Foreign Office. But at this

* Retranslated : the German translation is " ausserordentlich dankbar."
† Retranslated from the German.

period there were already Liberals both within and outside the Cabinet who, in Hatzfeldt's words,

> always urge the cultivation of relations with France, because in their view Britain would then be lifted out of the necessity of leaning on the Triple Alliance and would be able to hold aloof from all European complications. (16)

These Liberals who inclined towards France included, as early as 1893, Sir Edward Grey.

As Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State Grey was, however, independent enough energetically to warn France, in the House on March 28, 1895, to keep her hands off the Soudan and the upper Nile Valley. His firm language produced "a row" in Paris and was disapproved of by some members of the Rosebery Cabinet. The French ignored the warning and subsequently sent out the Marchand expedition. Grey's warning of 1895 proved very serviceable in 1898 in compelling Marchand to retire from Fashoda, (17) and Grey makes the incident the occasion for remarks to which we shall return in dealing with the crisis of July 1914.

Grey admits the justice of the German protest against the British agreement of May 12, 1894, with the Congo State, (18) and proceeds to the matter of the objection raised by Russia, France, and Germany against the Treaty of Shimonoseki. He writes :

> The threat to Japan by the European Powers appeared harsh and uncalled for, and it was repugnant to us to join in it. This decided us to stand aside ; there was certainly no thought in our minds then of a future alliance with Japan. We were moved simply by the feeling of the moment to stand aside from action that seemed to us disagreeably harsh and in which British interests did not require us to participate. (19)

This passage shows unmistakable satisfaction at the fair and high-principled attitude of the British Government. It is worth while, therefore, to point out that the *first* suggestion of intervention by the European Powers came *from the British Government* in a Note of October 7, 1894. The suggestion was that Korea should be declared an independent State under the guarantee of the Powers and that Japan should receive a war

indemnity from China. (20) In Berlin it was regarded as certain that Japan would decline intervention on such terms, and the proposal was regarded as premature. Japan did, in fact, refuse to bow to the " British lust for intervention," and as early as October 12th Lord Rosebery, then Prime Minister, agreed to the German view. (21) London, however, was far from abandoning the idea of intervention ; it remained in touch with Russia especially, and on February 6, 1895, Count Hatzfeldt gained from a conversation with the Foreign Secretary, Lord Kimberley, the impression

> that our participation in the Powers' negotiations is eagerly desired here, and that the British Government, if it could hope for this, would be prepared to see us gain certain advantages, and perhaps give us its assistance. (22)

A few weeks later, however, there came a change in England. It was no longer believed that Russia had any real intention of intervening, and it was feared that Great Britain would be left alone in her opposition to Japan ; there was, moreover, no desire to assist Russia to strengthen her position in the Far East, and with their keen political insight the British observers instinctively appreciated that Japan was developing into a Great Power that would be in the future a valuable buffer against the advance of Russia. (23) Lord Kimberley, however, personally entirely agreed

> with the view that the cession of Port Arthur would virtually result in a Japanese protectorate over China and jeopardize the future existence of that country, and that it would be the prelude to acquisitions of territory by other Powers. (24)

It was desired at that time in Berlin to prevent such acquisitions, (25) and Marschall had accordingly, as early as March 6, 1895, offered friendly advice in Tokio " to accelerate the making of peace and to moderate its terms," adding this plain hint to the Japanese :

> According to the reports we have received, Japanese demand for cession of territory would be particularly likely to provoke intervention. (26)

Japan warmly thanked her German counsellors, (27) but did not take their advice, and on April 8th Russia officially proposed

in Berlin that the Powers should jointly intervene. (28) On the same day, however, a Cabinet Council in London resolved

> that British interests in Eastern Asia would not be so injured by the Japanese terms of peace as to warrant intervention, which could probably only be made effective by the use of force.* (29)

On this day Rosebery even doubted whether Russia would make any protest against Japan's establishment in Port Arthur, and it was nothing but British interests and no such motives as Grey would like to imagine, that led London to hold aloof from an intervention which it had itself been the first to suggest and had urged for some time. (30)

In June 1895 the Rosebery Government resigned, and Sir Edward Grey " left office with the expectation and the intention of never returning to it." In a short reference to the period he writes :

> The general impression left of our position in the world was not comfortable ; we relied on German support in Egypt, and received it ; but we never could be sure when some price for that support might not be exacted. At any moment we were liable to have a serious difference with France or Russia, and it was evident that these differences were not unwelcome at Berlin and to German diplomacy. But I certainly had no idea of a change of policy, and I do not think that my chiefs contemplated anything of the kind—

and Grey adds this rather astonishing sentence :

> In the light of after-events, the whole (British) policy of these years from 1886 to 1904 may be criticized as having played into the hands of Germany. (31)

Was Grey alive to the very harsh judgment which he passed here on the directors of Great Britain's foreign policy in this period ? Or did these words run into his pen from his already distinguishable prejudice against Germany, which later became at times so appallingly evident ? In any case, in the summer of 1895 Grey left office, with a feeling of grave resentment against Germany and a sincere desire to see Britain's relations with France and Russia develop into friendship. He did not himself have the opportunity of influencing the critical turn in British policy that came immediately after the end of the century, but

* Retranslated.

it was entirely in consonance with his own feeling and he warmly welcomed it, with a feeling of " simple pleasure and relief " ! (32)

Grey's intention of " never returning " arose less out of his vexation over his country's uncomfortable situation than from his dislike of town life. His passion for fishing is well known. He published in 1899 a book on " Fly Fishing." But this sport was only one element in his love of the countryside. He had a wide knowledge of bird life, and could tell birds easily by their twitter and song. In short, he was deeply and sincerely a lover of nature, and a number of passages in his work give expression to this love with simplicity and poetic feeling. (33) This is an attractive side of this notable man.

Grey gives only a brief sketch of the decade of his freedom regained, 1895–1905, and has not gone to the Foreign Office records for this period. This, together with his very defective sight, may explain his inadequate acquaintance with the British offers of alliance of 1898, 1899, and 1901. He evidently knows only of Chamberlain's effort of August 1899, given public expression in his Leicester speech at the end of November. It is, however, surprising that Grey makes no mention at all of Chamberlain's Birmingham speech of May 13, 1898, a speech which, through its sharp attacks on Russia and its announcement that Britain could no longer remain isolated but must seek alliances, aroused unusual interest. Did Spender fail to draw Grey's attention to this important omission ? Had neither of the two any knowledge of the Memoirs of Baron von Eckardstein, which had been published years before in an English edition and give a full (though not entirely objective) account of the British-German negotiations of 1898–1901—to say nothing of the German documents ? Or must Grey's ignorance of these negotiations be set down to his personal opposition to the policy and consequent inclination to dismiss from his mind the manifold considerations that made a British-German entente desirable ? Whatever be the explanation, this is in any case a striking gap in his knowledge. (34)

In this section of his work Grey mentions the unfortunate effect of the Krüger telegram—which was indefensible even from the German point of view—the provocative manner in British eyes of the Russian occupation of Port Arthur ; Fashoda ; and

the British-German agreement of 1898 concerning the Portuguese colonies. (35) As Foreign Secretary Grey had to deal with this agreement in 1913–14, and he is therefore acquainted with the essential documents. They made a bad impression on him; Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister, appears to him to have only agreed to the Treaty in deference to German insistence—"pressure would hardly be too strong a word":

> Crudely put, the German insistence was this: "You (Britain) are on bad terms with Russia and on bad terms with France. You cannot afford to be on bad terms with us." (36)

A review of the German documents (37) does, indeed, give no edifying picture of the affair. Portugal and Britain had begun negotiations with one another, and in Berlin there were fears of a one-sided agreement between the two, to the detriment of German interests. There was especially, under Holstein's influence, a lively feeling in Berlin of distrust of Lord Salisbury, and there were occasions when the Kaiser intervened. The German Government put pressure on Portugal at Lisbon to prevent her from dealing alone with Great Britain, and it also worked in Paris for joint action with France. Berlin met British opposition with the suggestion of a general agreement, which Britain would gladly have arrived at in 1901, but failed to secure then, mainly for the same reason—distrust of Salisbury. Great Britain had old treaties with Portugal, and the British disinclination to enter into an agreement concerning the colonies of a friendly Power is easily understood. At the same time the Portuguese Ambassador in London was well acquainted with the course of the negotiations; it would appear from Grey's account that his information did not come from the British side. (38) Yet, as matters stood, it was precisely Britain who had most reason to desire that Lisbon should have knowledge of what was going on. In 1913 Sir Arthur Hardinge told the German Ambassador in Lisbon that the main contents of the agreement of 1898 were communicated "at the time" to the Portuguese Government. (39) The impression is, moreover, difficult to resist that the treaty with Germany was merely a sham on the British side. And in any case the so-called Windsor Treaty of 1899 between Britain and Portugal, which was carefully concealed from Germany, and which Grey does not mention,

virtually superseded the treaty of 1898 with Germany. (40) A scarcely edifying upshot of a deal that could bring little satisfaction to either side.

In regard to the Boer War Grey makes this misleading remark:

> In this instance it was suspected, if not entirely known, that President Krüger had for some time received German encouragement in a policy unfriendly to us. (41)

There is no justification whatever for this suspicion. The unfortunate Krüger telegram, (42) which Grey recalls among other things, was certainly of a nature to give colour to it. But as soon as there came, in the spring of 1899, serious reasons to infer the possibility of hostilities from the communications between the Transvaal Government and the Foreign Office, the German Government found repeated occasions in various ways, mostly through the Dutch Government, but also through the German Consul in Pretoria, for recommending President Krüger to show the needful spirit of accommodation towards the British and to avoid a war which Lord Salisbury himself would have been glad to have avoided, but which, to all appearance, Mr. Chamberlain wanted. Mr. Krüger's hard-headed obstinacy played into the hands of the pro-war elements in Britain, and Krüger was himself largely to blame for the outbreak of war. (43) And when Grey offers in further support of his suspicion " the fact that, when President Krüger came to Europe, it was the German Emperor that he asked to see " (though the Emperor " declined to see him "), Grey is not only in error in regard to this, but is silent on the more important fact that Krüger was twice received by the French President Loubet. Grey's account is thus tendenciously anti-German, and its tendenciousness is increased by his suggestion that anti-British feeling in Germany was stronger than in other countries. (44)

The German Government, indeed, amply made up for its blunder of January 3, 1896, by its whole attitude during the discreditable Boer War, by the Emperor William's visit to England at the end of November 1899, by its rejection of the Russo-French ideas of intervention, and by its refusal to receive a Boer deputation or President Krüger himself; several British Ministers candidly recognized this. Thus, Count Metternich,

writing in March 1900, reports the Prince of Wales as speaking to Members of Parliament in these terms :

> His Majesty the Emperor and the German Government had shown the greatest consideration to Great Britain during the South African War, and had given repeated proof of their sympathy for Great Britain. . . . Britain must not forget that it was owing to the recent visit of His Majesty the Emperor to England and to the attitude of the German Government in general that no intervention had taken place from Britain's enemies. Little attention should be paid in this matter to the German Press ; the main fact remained that the German Government was friendly disposed towards Britain. No one could deny that in the sad days through which Britain had had to pass, the German Government had shown itself a loyal and trustworthy friend. (45)

This gives the very opposite picture to that which Grey, in ignorance of the facts and in prejudice, offers his readers. It is, moreover, an open question whether popular feeling in Germany during the Boer War was actually more hostile to Britain than in France. (46) The Boer War was waged on the British side, in the end, in a way that called forth sharp criticism (47) : it degenerated into a war of spoliation, as a successful war is liable to do ; there was in this case the contributory factor of the attitude of a considerable section of the British public, which regarded the war from the first as a war for the annexation of the Boer Republics. Sir Edward Grey himself belonged to the so-called " Liberal Imperialists," who laid on Krüger the main responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities and energetically supported the war to the end.

After the stoppage of the British-German negotiations for an alliance, Britain concluded her alliance with Japan (1902) and entente with France (1904). Grey writes on this :

> It is interesting to observe that these two steps were apparently not parts of one settled policy. Each was like a first step in a different policy. France and Russia were allies. Protection against their joint fleets was our standard. There were two alternative policies or ways by which we might endeavour to guard against causes of conflict—one was to make an alliance with another Power for protection against France or Russia, the other was by friendly negotiation with these Powers to smooth away and remove possible causes of conflict. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was a step in the direction of the first policy ; the Anglo-French Agreement was a step in the direction of the second. (48)

Grey is right here. The alliance with Japan was a link in the grandiose system of alliances conceived by Chamberlain, a system which was to link up more or less closely Great Britain, Germany—and, with her, naturally, the whole of the Triple Alliance—the United States, and Japan. Germany missed her chance of joining this grouping in the period between the spring of 1898 and the summer of 1901, when Britain was already seriously negotiating with Japan. (49) Germany's situation was misread in Berlin, and the opportunities were overlooked which were to enable Britain to come to an understanding with France and subsequently, as British statesmen found to their surprise, to improve relations with Russia. Looking back, one is sometimes inclined to see in certain events the results of a far-sighted, long prepared, logically developed policy. Actually this is rarely the case. Most of the work of the diplomatists consists of tentative steps forward, often shackled or diverted by unforeseen events, and the statesmen who in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries successfully and confidently pursued a precisely pre-arranged policy may be counted on the fingers of one hand. Nowhere in Europe since the turn of the century have statesmen of more than average capacity been at the helm. The very men, indeed, who showed most confidence in their ability to march straight to a distant goal achieved the most dismal failures. So it was with the unco shrewd "Grey Eminence," Von Holstein, who supposed himself the inheritor of Bismarck's mantle; he had no belief in an Anglo-French understanding and ridiculed the idea of a British entente with Russia, but all his subtle schemes were brought to nought by Russia's defeat in 1904–05. And so it was with Alfred von Tirpitz, a man of great gifts, but blind, and, with his followers, blind to this day to the fact that his navy would never be able to cross the danger zone, since Great Britain simply outbid each of his successive building programmes and welded entente to entente.

After Germany's repeated refusal to grasp their outstretched hand—because Holstein and Bülow imagined that they would fail with France and quite certainly with Russia, and then return to us—the British statesmen concluded the ententes with France and Russia; but to suppose that in doing so they were following out a clearly preconceived plan would be to overestimate their

diplomatic talent, repeating the error of those who think that German policy followed a path mapped out in advance towards a definite, distant, hidden goal. (50) On all sides it was a hand-to-mouth, groping existence, though in its instinctive choice of a promising path, in its use of the opportunities that offered, and in its successful initiative the British diplomacy generally outclassed the German. Grey speaks for pretty well all of the diplomats of our century when he remarks :

> A Minister beset with the administrative work of a great Office must often be astounded to read of the carefully laid plans, the deep, unrevealed motives that critics or admirers attribute to him. Onlookers free from responsibility have time to invent, and they attribute to Ministers many things that Ministers have no time to invent for themselves, even if they are clever enough to be able to do it. If all secrets were known it would probably be found that British Foreign Ministers have been guided by what seemed to them to be the immediate interest of this country without making elaborate calculations for the future. (51)

In this Grey defines the limits especially of his own statecraft. As we have seen, he was strongly pro-French in inclination. But when the Anglo-French Agreement of April 8, 1904, was concluded the road to Russia seemed to be entirely buried under the war which had broken out shortly before in the Far East, in which Britain's ally Japan was victor over the Russians. Had Russia won or even maintained her position in the Far East, those Englishmen who for years had been working for an accommodation with Russia would have found their purpose entirely unrealizable or at least extraordinarily difficult of realization ; for Russia would not have dreamed of drawing back from her expansionist policy in the Far East. It was only the unforseeable crushing defeat suffered at the hands of Japan that opened the way for the British-Russian Agreement of 1907 and for Russia's fatal resumption of her European schemes.

Viscount Grey of Fallodon is unable to say whether the statesmen who made the Anglo-French Agreement of April 1904 had it in their minds that it would develop into a general *diplomatic* alliance with preparations for the contingency of a German attack on France. He himself, in any case, had no such idea when, with pleasure and relief, he read the Agreement.

The causes of friction with France were removed, a danger of war swept away, and

> we should no longer be dependent on German support in Egypt, with all the discomfort that this dependence had entailed. I had no desire to thwart German interests, but we should now be able to negotiate with Germany without the handicap of the Egyptian noose round our necks. (52)

Grey mentions that there was only *one* man " of great position in public life " who disapproved of the Anglo-French Agreement ; he does not mention his name. The man was Lord Rosebery, who in 1892 had made Grey his Parliamentary Under-Secretary. According to Mr. Winston Churchill, Rosebery said at the time :

> My mournful and supreme conviction is that this agreement is much more likely to lead to complications than to peace. (53)

Lord Rosebery remained of this opinion as time went on. (54)

2. Fiction and Fact Concerning German Policy.

At the beginning of December 1905 the Unionist Government resigned. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman was invited to form a Government, and Sir Edward Grey, with no joy and mainly from a sense of duty to his constituents, went to the Foreign Office. Before, however, dealing with this I must refer to three earlier episodes which Grey mentions only later in his Memoirs, but which throw a vivid light on his anti-German attitude : the origin of the war of 1870, the crisis of 1905, and German policy in Turkey since 1895.

The Responsibility for the Franco-German War.

This is what Grey has to say of 1870 :

> Had the crisis (Agadir) (55) led to war, this would have come at the very season that we know was favoured for the purpose by German military leaders in 1870, and that was selected for the menace to France in 1905, and that we believe was decided by the military authorities for war in 1914.

And of the neutrality negotiations of 1912 after the Haldane mission :

> There was no formula that could be trusted to define the real aggressor in advance. The revelation of Bismarck's methods in the

notorious Ems despatch was a warning against the futility of such formulæ.

In a reference to the question of armaments :

> Conscription was the burden laid upon France by the danger of war, by the lessons of history, and by present conditions.

On the crisis of July 1914 :

> The precedent of 1870 was ominous ; we all knew how Prussian militarism had availed itself of this time and season of the year at which to strike. . . . There was, too, the recollection of 1870 and the revelations of the Ems telegram. How could anyone urge on Russia or France that the precaution of mobilization was unreasonable ? (56)

These passages show unmistakably that Grey's view is that Prussia and Prussia alone was responsible for the war of 1870, and for its outbreak at a time convenient to the military authorities, and that the " notorious " Ems despatch played a decisive part in it. In this Grey sets himself in opposition to facts long established beyond possibility of question, facts which are no longer disputed by any serious historian in the world. Even in France it has been admitted for decades past that an overwhelming share of the responsibility for the war attached to the French Government of the day and to the clique surrounding Napoleon III. There are numbers of British witnesses to the true origin of the war of 1870. As is well known, the French Government had already won a striking diplomatic victory through the withdrawal of the candidature of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern to the Spanish throne, but decided to crown its victory by imposing a further humiliation. It demanded an assurance from King William that he would never again permit a Hohenzollern candidature to this throne. When Gladstone, who was Prime Minister at the time, heard this, he wrote to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville :

> It is our duty to represent the immense responsibility which will rest upon France, if she does not at once accept as satisfactory and conclusive the withdrawal of the candidature of Prince Leopold. (57)

France took upon herself this " immense responsibility," long before the Ems telegram could have had any effect. Granville and Lord Lyons, the British Ambassador in Paris, fully shared

Gladstone's view. (58) Bismarck published the Ems telegram in a condensed form ; but

> to describe this as " forgery " is childish ; and there was nothing in the altered telegram untrue to the spirit of the King's action, or to the indignation personally expressed by him. (59)

There is now available a monumental source of information in Hermann Oncken's " Die Rheinpolitik Kaiser Napoleons III von 1863 bis 1870 und der Ursprung des Krieges von 1870–71." (60) Here, we see, as never before, the true motives and the actual causes of the war of 1870–71 laid bare in the State documents of Austria, Prussia, and the central States of South Germany : the historic claims of the French to Rhineland territories, their traditional ambition to dominate a dismembered Germany, and their determined resistance to German unity and to the most elementary right of the German nation to self-determination. Contemporary observers were not unaware of this ; only in the course of decades, under the influence of malevolent propaganda, did the facts gradually suffer an absolutely grotesque distortion.

Oncken's work shows with the utmost clearness that the question of the Spanish throne was, to those in power in France, merely a welcome occasion for the realization of the aims mentioned above and of revenge for Sadowa, through a quick and easy victory. Thus, the Austrian Military Attaché in Paris wrote on July 13, 1870 :

> For six days past interest has been lost here in Prince Hohenzollern's candidature and concentrated on the broad necessity of bringing about war with Prussia and at last having it out with her. (61)

" At last having it out with her ! " For years this had, indeed, been looked forward to with growing impatience, and now it was imagined that the Austrians and Italians could be swept along against the hated Prussia. The newly published documents reveal plainly the relatively unimportant part played by the Ems telegram. The Duke of Gramont declared on July 18th :

> In respect of military preparations we have an advantage of ten or eleven days over the Prussians ; we should have had still more if we had been able to lengthen the duration of the negotiations as we desired ; unluckily there came an actual insult from the King of Prussia, with the result that all negotiations were broken off on the spot. (62)

The alleged insult was the Ems telegram. The real truth was that the insult came from the other side. But the main point is that the French Foreign Minister here described in the plainest of language the actual part played by the Ems telegram. As Hermann Oncken brilliantly writes :

> The Ems telegram thus falls back into secondary rank among the historic events of importance to the question of responsibility, and the French view which clings to the theory of the critical importance of the telegram—one finds the legend still living on in Lord Grey's Memoirs —artificially isolates an incidental diplomatic event in order to make it the key to the catastrophe, instead of viewing it in its actual broad context. The bomb only burst prematurely—or, rather, the French now felt that they must light the fuse earlier than they had intended to. (63)

Oncken's " Rheinpolitik Kaiser Napoleons," in fact, leaves one with the conviction that France has virtually to bear the sole responsibility for the war of 1870–71. Napoleon's war aims of the time also bear witness to this. (64) Finally, Napoleon himself confessed it to a confidant on March 2, 1871 :

> I admit that we were the aggressors. (65)

Germany Set on War in 1905.

The German menace of war in the summer of 1905, in which Grey seems to believe, had no existence. There are good grounds for criticizing Germany's Morocco policy. The French Premier, M. Rouvier, was ready to make reasonable concessions to Germany in return for a free hand in Morocco ; Berlin, for various reasons, was not prepared to accept them, and was more interested in trying to upset the Anglo-French Entente and to punish France. Berlin also had much to do with the fall of Delcassé, a firebrand whom Rouvier was not unwilling to sacrifice. Germany was acting throughout the Morocco affair of 1905–06 under considerable provocation, and in her policy she had the right on her side, but she failed to make the best use of the situation. (66) That Berlin had no intention in 1905 of going to war with France is plain from the unratified treaty concluded between the Kaiser and Nicholas II at Björkö on July 24, 1905, as the Björkö Agreement contemplated bringing in France with Germany and Russia. (67) The political and military leaders in Berlin were no less pacific in 1906. (68) Lord Haldane, the

Secretary for War, who for years was with Grey in the Cabinet, attended the German manœuvres in the autumn of this year, and was readily granted facilities for studying the German war organization in the German Ministry of War. After the world war Haldane gave the following estimate of feeling in Berlin at that time :

> I do not think that my impression was wrong that even the responsible heads of the Army were then looking almost entirely to " peaceful penetration," with only moral assistance from the prestige attaching to the possession of great armed forces in reserve. (69)

Germany's Turkish Policy.

The Armenian atrocities had moved public opinion in 1895 all over Europe, and especially in Great Britain. In this connexion Viscount Grey of Fallodon makes very severe comments on Germany's policy :

> Misgovernment and ill-treatment of Christian minorities in Asia Minor was endemic, outrage and massacre were epidemic ; a very brutal outbreak had occurred in 1895 which had shocked Lord Salisbury, and, as we now know from published German documents, had temporarily disgusted the German Emperor. Constantinople was a sort of cockpit of concessionaires, competing for commercial openings, especially those in Asia Minor. To obtain concessions diplomatic support was necessary ; and, for diplomatic support to be effective, we needed prestige and influence. Abdul Hamid was an adept at playing off one Government against another ; influence could be acquired at Constantinople at a price. The price was friendship to Abdul Hamid, whatever he might do in Turkey ; never to worry him about Armenian massacres ; to protect him in the Concert of Europe from being worried by other Powers. No British Government could pay this price. Lord Salisbury could not have done it, if he would, and he made it evident, after the horrors of 1895, that he would not, if he could. The German Government and the German Emperor paid the price and got the position that Great Britain had once held at Constantinople. German influence, acquired by complacency to Abdul Hamid and backed by the prestige of German armaments, became dominant at Constantinople. British influence declined, British representations about Armenian massacres made us hated, but not feared. Abdul Hamid knew that without European support we could not go beyond diplomatic worry ; for the Fleet could not interfere in Asia Minor, nor could we act alone in a matter that was of European and not separate British interest without provoking the jealousy and counter-measures of other Powers. Public opinion in Britain demanded that we should make representations ; we did so, to the cost of British material interests in Turkey.

The irony of it all was that little or no good was done. We received some diplomatic support from France and Russia, but always within limits that stopped short of practical results. Russia was not willing to push her championship of Christian minorities to effective lengths, unless she was thereby to get political results favourable to herself, such as the opening of the Straits to Russian ships of war. Her championship of Christians in European Turkey in the 'seventies of the last century had ended in her being deprived of the fruits of victory over Turkey; and it was British policy that had taken the lead in restricting these fruits. Great Britain no longer supported Turkey, which Lord Salisbury had denounced as "the wrong horse," but was understood to be unwavering in her desire to keep the Straits closed against ships of war. France had her hands full with her own affairs, and could not afford to provoke friction with dreaded Germany over anything in which French interests were not specially concerned; she had trouble and apprehension enough without that. We, as an island Power, could and did take a lead in protesting against Abdul Hamid's doings, but we could not expect, and did not receive, whole-hearted co-operation from Continental Powers, who feared a European conflagration unless Germany was whole-heartedly with us too; and Germany was Abdul Hamid's friend.

Germany at Constantinople exploited the situation steadily to her own advantage. We sacrificed our influence and material interests in Turkey; we did indeed keep our hands clean and acquit the national conscience, but to do this without effectively helping the objects of our efforts and our sympathy, the Christian minorities in Turkey, was a very barren and unsatisfying result.

German policy seems to have been based upon a deliberate belief that moral scruples and altruistic motives do not count in international affairs. Germany did not believe that they existed in other nations, and she did not assume them for herself. The highest morality, for a German Government, was the national interest; (70) this overrode other considerations, and as such she pursued it at Constantinople. Her policy was completely successful; ours was deadlock and failure. Germany pushed her commercial interests in Turkey; the wealth of Asia Minor was passing into her hands; but she gained these advantages by acting on the belief that morals do not count in policy. It was this mistaken view of human affairs between nations that lost her the war. The very principles and views that for so many years seemed an unqualified success in her Eastern policy had the seeds of destruction in them. Surely the conclusion is irresistible that a policy which rules out all moral purpose except national interest has a fatal lack of what is essential to enduring success.

Those who are so disposed may see, in what is written here, evidence of something that moved us to an anti-German policy. It was not so. The methods by which Germany pushed her policy in Turkey did indeed seem to us cynical, but her success in getting concessions and making Asia Minor a special field for German enterprise we accepted.

There was plenty of room in the world for both British and German enterprise. When German trade was good, British trade was good too. It was the great commercial centres of Great Britain that were most pacific and least anti-German up to the very outbreak of the Great War ; and on the eve of that war we had completed an agreement with Germany about the Bagdad Railway that would have facilitated, and not hindered, that enterprise in Asia Minor on which she set such store. (71)

Thus far Viscount Grey of Fallodon. I have reproduced these pages without abbreviation and in their context, in order to make perfectly clear the line of Grey's thought. I will return later to the final paragraph about the alleged disinterestedness of British policy in face of the German efforts in Asia Minor. Here I am primarily concerned to examine Germany's attitude towards the Armenian atrocities. Grey returns later to the subject in a similar vein, in a footnote in which he mentions an analysis in " The Times " of January 8, 1924, of the German official documents concerning the Armenian atrocities. (72) Must one assume that he is only acquainted with the " Times " article, and not with the documents themselves ?

Englishmen of all parties, whether supporters or opponents of Grey's policy, and foreign diplomats of various nationalities all of whom had opportunities spread over many years of personal contact with Grey and of observing him at close quarters, all assure me that he is a well-intentioned man who honestly holds the views he expresses and does his utmost to say what he regards as the truth. I credit Grey, therefore, with good faith in writing as he has done in the long passage quoted above. It is, moreover, evident that his attitude does not date from the " Times " article, but from the period of the Armenian atrocities, and that it was confirmed by later occurrences of a like nature which have yet to be mentioned.

Grey's contention is that, through protesting against the massacres in Armenia, Britain destroyed her position in Constantinople ; that she received at least a measure of diplomatic support from France and Russia ; that there were substantial reasons why more could not be expected from them ; that Germany, on the contrary, did not move a finger against the atrocities ; that largely in consequence of this the efforts of the other Powers were fruitless ; that Germany took advantage

of the remonstrances of the other Powers to consolidate her own position at the Golden Horn; that Great Britain thus at all events kept her hands clean, while Germany soiled hers with the blood of the massacred Armenians in order to gain economic and political advantages; and that Germany only won her influence in Turkey through her cynical and immoral attitude in Constantinople.

A sound scourging of a contemptible Germany, that was not ashamed to pay "the price" of the friendship of Abdul Hamid.

If Grey's description were true, a patriotic and sensitive German could only say with grief, "We are horrified at the way our political leaders acted; we knew nothing of it, and indignantly cast on them the responsibility, which is theirs and theirs only."

But what was the actual attitude of the German Government at the time of the Armenian massacres of 1895 and 1896? And what did Russia and France do at that time?

An examination of the German documents (73) gives the following answer: At the beginning of December 1894 the British Government invited the Russian and French Governments to take joint steps with it to settle the Armenian question. Britain confined herself to approaching these two Powers "as only they have Consuls at Erzeroum, and the atrocities have been committed in the neighbourhood of that town." (74) Germany, however, did not hold aloof. She urged the Sultan and the Turkish Government many times over to carry through the needed reforms. (75) I will quote one telegram, from Baron von Rotenhan, Acting Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, to Baron von Saurma, the Ambassador in Constantinople, dated July 25, 1895:

> According to our latest information, energetic action on the part of the British Government is inevitable in view of British public opinion, if Turkey does not *soon* (76) respond.
>
> Please give urgent advice, in accordance with former instructions, to the Sultan and the Porte to show readiness to meet Great Britain, in Turkey's own interest. (77)

The words "in accordance with *former* instructions" should be noted as showing that similar instructions had already been sent earlier; and the *urgent* tone of the warning should be noted. The British Government was advised of the step that had been

taken. Count Hatzfeldt telegraphed on July 29, 1895, to the Chancellor, Prince Hohenlohe :

Lord Salisbury, to whom I communicated the contents of the telegram in a confidential private letter, sends me his earnest thanks for my communication and asks me to convey to Your Excellency his sincere thanks for the friendly and valuable intervention in Constantinople. (78)

Four months later, on November 19, 1895, the German Ambassador telegraphed from Pera :

My colleagues (79) took the opportunity of a conversation I had with them to express their satisfaction at the grave warning which, in accordance with your instructions, I had conveyed to the Sultan. None of the Ambassadors, they said, had spoken to him up to now so plainly and candidly, and this language could not but help to bring him to a healthy realization of the position, if he is capable at all of a change of spirit. (80)

Once more express thanks came from the British Government, this time in a Note signed by the British Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, Martin Gosselin :

Her Majesty's Government have heard with much satisfaction of the language used by the Imperial Ambassador at Constantinople to His Majesty the Sultan. It appears that this language has produced an excellent effect, and Lord Salisbury begs me to express to Your Excellency the best acknowledgments of Her Majesty's Government for the friendly support of Germany.

His Lordship is also glad to hear from Count Hatzfeldt that Baron von Saurma has also joined Mr. Herbert in endeavouring to obtain clemency for the insurgents at Zeitoun. A very serious effect would be produced on public opinion if the Turkish troops were permitted to commit barbarities there. (81)

After this affair of Zeitoun the German Ambassador reported on April 18, 1896 :

The 30,000 Armenians who, humanly speaking, were doomed to death, have been saved through the friendly intervention of the German and British Governments, with which the Governments of the other Great Powers subsequently associated themselves. (82)

In these years Sultan Abdul Hamid made several attempts to move the Emperor William and the German Government to a " benevolent attitude " and to induce them to restrain the other Powers " from unreasonable demands." But he had no success. (83) The Emperor frequently noted against these requests " Certainly not " or " That is the limit," and he expressed

his disgust at the atrocities in a whole series of his marginal notes. (84)

Thus, in face of the massacres in Armenia Germany not only did not adopt the infamous attitude attributed to her by Viscount Grey of Fallodon, but actively supported the efforts of the British Government and earned Lord Salisbury's expressed thanks.

Very different was Russia's attitude. Her co-operation was no more than a pretence, and the massacred Armenians were a matter of almost complete indifference to the Tsarist Government. This soon became clear to Sir Frank Lascelles, the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg. Prince Radolin, his German colleague, reported, for instance, on June 10, 1895:

> When the news reached here a few days ago of the Sultan's rejection of the plan of reform for the Armenians, I was at the Club with the British Ambassador and Prince Lobanov. The latter was discussing it pretty light-heartedly when Sir Frank Lascelles whispered in my ear with some bitterness: "We have the Russians to thank for this: they make a show of going with us, while they surreptitiously give the Sultan their support." (85)

The German documents give ample support to this judgment. (86) The Russians themselves were, indeed, incautious or open enough to let the mask fall now and then. Prince Radolin, for instance, found that the following views were held at the end of October 1895 in quarters connected with the Russian Foreign Ministry:

> Russia and France only joined Britain in the Armenian question because both feared that if Britain acted *alone* (87) she might in her indignation take grave steps, such as an ultimatum followed by a naval demonstration and a resort to force (which latter the Russians would not approve). (87) The two Powers had accordingly associated themselves with the British in order to act as a damper and to have a right to exercise moderating influence over the decisions taken. The British policy in Turkey could never find approval in Russia.
>
> This attitude is confirmed by the fact that, as I had the honour to report at the time, the Russian Government has since the spring of this year given the Sultan in private every possible reassurance and encouragement not to take the Armenian reforms too seriously (or if he did, and they were introduced, to extend them to the whole Empire) (87), while in public and officially it has been going hand in hand *with* (87) the British. (88)

The information confided by the Russian Ambassador in Constantinople in the middle of December 1895 to his German

colleague entirely harmonizes with this : " His instructions," he said, " positively required him to give support to the Sultan." (89) France mainly, if unwillingly, followed in the footsteps of her ally. (90) It was, in fact, the Tsarist Government which was the principal obstacle at the time to the effectiveness of the so-called " Armenian Triple Alliance " (Britain, France, and Russia). The main reason for this was the deep mistrust in Russia of the British plans. This mistrust was shared by the German Government. Lord Salisbury seemed to be counting on an early break-up of Turkey, and in the summer of 1895 he had, without mincing matters, made proposals of partition to German statesmen. (91) In Berlin it was feared that this " Balkan conflagration project " would produce a general war. The same view was held in St. Petersburg, whither information as to the British plans had evidently penetrated. Lord Salisbury appears himself to have realized the dangerous nature of the idea ; he said to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London in November 1895 :

> he had no thought of a *démembrement* of Turkey, for this would give the signal for a European war. (92)

As we have seen, however, the German Government was not prevented by its well-grounded fears of the consequences of the destruction of Turkey from taking frequent and energetic steps against the Armenian atrocities. And it was not Germany, as Grey would have it, who sought to profit at the expense of the other Powers from an indulgent attitude towards Constantinople, but Russia. As early as the autumn of 1895 the German Ambassador in Constantinople

> discovered that Russia is adroitly using the present extreme unpopularity of Britain in Turkey to lead the Porte to seek support from Russia. (93)

Confirmation of this is offered by a report made at the same time by the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg :

> The Turkish Ambassador, who is paying me frequent visits, tells me every time how extraordinarily benevolent is the attitude of the Russian Government towards the Sultan, and how concerned the Government seems to be for the Sultan's interests. (94)

Turning from this evidence to the grave charges which Grey has made against Germany in the matter of the Armenian

atrocities, one can only feel amazement at his distortion of the facts —an amazement mixed, for a German reader, with indignation.

Every contemporary statesman and politician must surely have formed a perfectly definite opinion in regard to the Armenian atrocities. It must be assumed that Grey did so too. For it seems hardly conceivable that he relies simply on the " Times " article mentioned above. (95) The article must simply have reinforced a long-standing view of Grey's, and this would explain why he considered it unnecessary himself to refer to the sources. Yet it is customary to verify facts before making such charges as Grey has made. Some allowance must be made in view of his good faith, his lack of knowledge, his almost destroyed eyesight. But not indefinite allowance ; he had at least the services of J. A. Spender. Did Spender fall into the same grave error, and did he too share the view of the " Times " ? However this may be, Lord Grey cannot escape the reproach of having, in a book that will be read by hundreds of thousands, a book that should serve the truth, given currency to a total untruth. Will he now have the sources referred to, realize the injustice that he has done, and make due amends ?

Grey's charges should properly have been directed against Russia, Britain's subsequent ally. But it is quite a mistake to allow oneself such excesses of moral indignation. They tempt to rejoinders, and Great Britain's history has its weak points. I may recall especially the sanguinary story of Ireland, which lasted for centuries and will be remembered for centuries to come ; I may recall the infamous concentration camps of the South African War, and the burnings of farms and homesteads in order the more rapidly to break the brave resistance of a small nation of Whites ; (96) I may recall Denshawai ; (97) I may recall Russia's doings in Persia, which Grey endeavoured to shield as far as possible in face of the indignation in his own country, and to defend (98)—these evil deeds of Tsarist Russia, to whom Grey accorded his aid and friendship, and who had the Jews who dragged out a difficult existence in her confines killed in their thousands in loathsome pogroms—and I think that it would have been better if Viscount Grey of Fallodon had imposed on himself more restraint in his moral indignation.

A reader not of British nationality will be inclined to describe Grey's one-sidedness, as here revealed, as " cant " or disgusting

hypocrisy. But this would be an injustice to Grey and those who think with him. These people are not conscious of hypocrisy. They sincerely believe in their own and their compatriots' moral superiority. In face of the facts this may seem incredible, but it remains true that these people are convinced that they really do belong to a higher order of beings. The explanation of this strange phenomenon, which may actually be observed any day in the Anglo-Saxon world, and especially in England, lies in the faculty acquired in the course of generations of overlooking, in the spirit of the motto " My country, right or wrong," their own taints and shortcomings, while preserving a sharp eye for the taints and shortcomings of others. Any faults discovered or felt to exist are pushed below the surface consciousness by the strong national pride of the race, and with such energy that these instinctively submerged recognitions of faults are in many Britons no longer even subconsciously remembered, but seem to disappear entirely from view and cognizance. A type of this species was Woodrow Wilson, of whom people personally acquainted with him said that he had the faculty of seeing black as white and white as black if this optical illusion suited his mood.

In this characteristic, which gives those who are not British the impression of " British hypocrisy," lies a great source of national strength, namely the unshakable conviction of superiority over other folk and of destination by Providence to act, from generations ago, as administrator of morality and progress for the good of backward peoples. It is impressive to note, in dealing with Englishmen, how they take their superiority for granted—so much so that they seldom make direct reference to it. This conviction of belonging to a higher order of beings is usually revealed only casually and almost unconsciously, often with a naïveté amazing to the observer. And this naïve consciousness of righteousness, this faculty of seeing black as white and white as black, this incapacity of viewing objectively and in its true perspective any matter affecting national interests, these qualities of " cant " Grey clearly possessed and possesses in a high degree ; yet he has a strong sense of his personal honour.

There will be readers, especially German readers, who will consider that in the foregoing I have dealt too tenderly with Grey. I shall, indeed, have in the next two chapters to charge

him with a gross deception of the public, and also with a direct untruth, and in addition to this we shall be faced with things in respect of which it will be difficult to believe that Grey was not, at least subconsciously, aware of his inexactitudes. But we must not be too hasty in judging, and I draw special attention to the quotation at the head of this chapter, in which Sir Roger Casement, that Irish nationalist and Anglophobe, expressed emphatically actually in war-time, when passions were running high, his conviction from personal knowledge of Grey's good faith.

Enough has been said here in reply to Lord Grey's reflections on Germany's attitude at the time of the Armenian atrocities. He brings further charges in connexion with conditions in Macedonia. He writes, for instance, in a chapter on the Bosnian crisis of 1908–09 :

> Prestige and influence in the Balkans were cardinal points of Russian and Austrian policy. Neither could afford to risk its position for philanthropic reasons : each watched the other, and their action in Macedonian diplomacy was conditioned by distrust of each other and anxiety lest one should get an advantage at the expense of the other. Both regarded our activity as a more or less unreasonable encroachment upon a sphere in which they had direct political interests and we had none.
>
> Germany was thinking only of her political influence and the commercial expansion, that depended on it, in Turkey. She would risk none of this for the sake of philanthropy, and took care to handle the subject of Macedonia in such a way that what we or other Powers lost by annoying the Sultan at Constantinople should go to enhance the German position there.
>
> France, just escaped from trouble about Morocco and apprehensive of more to come, wished to avoid trouble elsewhere. She too had her commercial interests at Constantinople, and she was neither inclined nor could she afford to head a crusade against the Sultan of Turkey. (99)

Here again one is struck by Grey's tendency to find excuses for Russia and France and to brand Germany as the real evil-doer. This is the more remarkable in view of the opening sentences in the quotation, which reveal the principal cause of the unsatisfactory progress made with reforms in Macedonia—the rivalry in the Balkans of Russia and Austria-Hungary. (100)

Germany's policy under Bismarck was, as is well known, " Russian in Bulgaria." This applied more or less to Macedonia as well, except for its north-west section, inhabited by Serbs, which was regarded as a contingent heritage for the Kingdom of

Serbia, and, as such, primarily belonging to Austria's sphere of influence. Vienna and St. Petersburg, however, had never seen their way to follow Bismarck's good advice and agree to a division of their spheres of interest in the Balkans. Austria, after the fall of Prince Alexander of Battenberg, pushed forward, against Germany's will, with her schemes in Bulgaria, and Russia replied by intriguing in Serbia. (101) There was thus a gradual inversion of the policy which Bismarck had advised. Towards the middle of the 'nineties, however, when the Macedonian question had begun to occupy the Cabinets once more, after a considerable interval, Russia and Austria, as those most closely interested, agreed on common action. The result was seen in the Agreement of May 8 and 17, 1897, between the two Powers, and in the Mürzsteg programme of October 2, 1903. (102) At this period the Austrian and Russian Governments had their reasons for desiring peace in the Balkans: Austria, under the passive Count Goluchovsky, an ageing State threatened with dissolution, needed quiet; Russia was actively pushing forward to the Far East and especially for this reason needed quiet on her western frontier. Both Governments took up the position that Europe wants to hear nothing of Macedonia, (103) and continually put pressure on Sofia to check the evil of the comitadji in Macedonia, most of which came from Bulgaria. Germany, as the ally of Austria-Hungary and a friendly neighbour of Russia, and as a Power with no interests of her own in the Balkans, naturally adhered to the Austro-Russian Balkan entente. Count Bülow described the attitude of the German Government as follows in December 1902:

> In regard to all Balkan questions German policy continues to be guided by the consideration defined by Prince Bismarck at a Congress sitting in 1878: "We are not here in order to content the Bulgarians but to safeguard the peace of Europe." Consequently we base our judgment of all proposals for improvement on the question whether they seem calculated to work towards settled conditions or to encourage the unruly elements. (104)

In Turkey as a whole, however, German policy under Bülow no longer followed in the track of Bismarck's policy. The change came at the end of the ninteenth century, and became more and more pronounced with the progress of the Bagdad Railway. This great undertaking compelled Germany from considerations

of commercial policy to maintain the strength of Turkey *in Asia*, whereas Russia's interest lay in a weak Turkey that would easily be brought into a position of dependence. It is characteristic that while during the Anglo-German negotiations for an alliance Britain showed good will towards the Bagdad Railway scheme, after the negotiations had come to nought she obstinately opposed it ; this will be returned to later.

The changed situation could not but affect Berlin's attitude to Turkey *in Europe*. The Porte knew, moreover, that Germany was the only Power at whose hand it had no reason to fear grave complications, while Britain and Russia were fairly sitting on its neck. This naturally had its effect on Turkish-German relations. But the situation was not misused in the shameless way assumed by Grey. From large numbers of German Government papers it is plain that in the Macedonian question the Government was primarily guided by *concern for the maintenance of European peace*. (105) For this case was not confined, as in the Armenian question, to agitations of Christians against Turks and repeated frightful massacres of the Christians by the Turks ; in Macedonia Christians were opposed not only to Turks but still more to their own co-religionists ; Macedonians of Bulgarian, Greek, and Serb language and religion lived together, hating and massacring one another no less than the Turk. Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia were consequently all claiming Macedonia. Experience in, for instance, Crete (106) had shown that the intervention of the Powers, while improving the lot of non-Mohammedans under Turkish rule, stimulated the efforts of the peoples affected to regain their independence. The German Government feared, therefore, and rightly feared, that the Macedonian movement might become the cause of a general conflagration in the Balkans, eventually involving the Great Powers. Germany herself was in a doubly dangerous situation as the ally of the Danube Monarchy, whose Balkan interests threatened to draw Germany with it into any Balkan conflagration.

Germany, therefore, acting with the two Powers directly concerned, Russia and Austria-Hungary, followed in regard to Macedonia a conservative and cautious policy. The reform *irade* of December 5, 1902, had the support of the German Ambassador in Constantinople. (107) And as soon as there came an Austro-Russian programme of reforms, in February 1903, instructions

were sent from Berlin to Baron Marschall as follows (February 17, 1903):

> Your Excellency will be acting in accordance with His Imperial Majesty's views if you will emphatically advocate the speedy acceptance of the Russian and Austrian programme of reforms, advancing all the considerations that call for it and pointing out the extreme gravity of the situation. (108)

The " extreme gravity of the situation " lay not only in the danger of an explosion in Macedonia but also in the desires of other Great Powers for more far-reaching reforms. Marschall accordingly informed the Sultan, in accordance with the above instructions, that if he delayed or declined to carry out the proposals,

> any discussion among the Great Powers would lead to an increase in the severity of the proposals, and in no circumstances to any relaxation of them. (109)

A few days later an irade from the Sultan announced the acceptance of the projected reforms. And so long as the plans of reform seemed to be calculated to maintain peace in the Balkans and to improve conditions in Macedonia without infringing the Sultan's sovereign rights, they were always supported in Constantinople by the German Government. (110) This applied especially to the Mürzsteg programme, against which the Sultan, disregarding the repeated urgent advice from Berlin, obstinately set his face, until at last he accepted it at the end of November 1903.

It may be objected that Germany only urged this or the other reform on the Porte in order to prevent more drastic reforms. This was not so. If the Powers made more far-reaching demands there was always reason to fear that the Sultan's resistance would be carried so far as to make necessary measures of compulsion which might result in grave European complications. There were occasions on which the Turkish statesmen declared that they had only given way because the pressure called for by other Powers had not been applied. (111)

The German Government also worked steadily to induce Turkey loyally to carry out the Mürzsteg programme, and took part in the reorganization of the gendarmerie. (112) Later, however, considerable additions were made to the Mürzsteg pro-

gramme, and it was proposed to hasten action under it ; differences of opinion then arose between the Russo-Austrian Entente and Germany. A strong movement began in Britain in favour of more effective and more far-reaching reforms, and under her new Anglophil Foreign Minister, Alexander Isvolsky, Russia followed suit, especially after her defeat in the war with Japan. Isvolsky already had one foot in the British camp when the Austro-Russian Entente in the Balkans completely broke up over the Sandjak railway project of Baron Aehrenthal, the Austrian Foreign Minister. (113) The German Government decided to give its support to Austria in the Macedonian question.

The fact must not be misread that between 1905 and 1908 Germany frequently opposed plans for reform in Macedonia that went beyond the Mürzsteg programme, and was often compelled to give way to the pressure of the " Entente Powers " (Russia and Austria). (114) It is true that Berlin desired " not to abandon the Entente Powers, but to spare the Sultan as much as possible," and that Secretary von Schoen said in November 1908 :

> Throughout we have given only reluctant support to the reform ideas of the Powers. (115)

An examination of the German documents shows that this statement of Schoen's is too drastic and summary ; but it contains a substantial element of truth in respect of the years 1905 to 1908. At the same time, the judicial reforms were the only ones on which no agreement was reached between the Powers. (116) Baron Marschall was authorized on February 3, 1908, to sign the Note on judicial reforms, but was as far as possible to make use of it only if compelled to do so by the attitude of the other Powers. (117) Baron Marschall, a trained lawyer, discovered objectionable points in the project ; the other Powers took these less seriously, but attached great importance to the reforms themselves.

In London, St. Petersburg, and Vienna there was considerable irritation over this. The mistrust already beginning to be felt in those capitals of German policy in Constantinople grew stronger. It was added to by such misrepresentations as that Germany had a hand in the Sandjak railway project, and Marschall's attitude in the question of judicial reform appears

everywhere to have deepened the belief that Germany was pursuing selfish interests of her own and was for this reason the real drag on the reforms in Macedonia. (118)

Sir Edward Grey's motives are well described in a report, quoted in the German documents, from Wilhelm von Stumm, the German Chargé d'Affaires in London, dated December 30, 1907 :

> Sir Edward Grey is treating the Macedonian question as a separate question, isolated from the many other British interests in Turkey, and he is guided by the sincere desire to contribute to the best of his belief to an improvement of conditions in the Balkans. It is a firmly rooted idea with him that the comitadji evil in Macedonia is at the root of all the trouble, and that it must in some way be countered. . . . Sir Edward Grey's latest proposals are certainly little calculated to increase sympathy for the British in Constantinople. Sir Edward himself is not at all unaware of this. Count Benckendorff told me that when he pointed out to Sir Edward Grey that his proposals involved very big demands on the Sultan, the Foreign Secretary admitted this, but remarked that he saw no other way out : in view of the constantly recurring atrocities which were exciting the public opinion of Europe, something had to done. (119)

Grey's disinterested zeal for reform here expressed is entitled to all honour, and it is intelligible that he should be vexed at the obstacles which did in fact exist in Berlin. But his mistrust went far too far. His proposals were cut down in St. Petersburg also, (120) and if Grey imagines that his friends among the Powers were equally disinterested and humanitarian in their Balkan policy his error is absolutely unintelligible in a statesman. All the Powers concerned in the agitation for reforms in Macedonia were guided primarily by their political interests, exactly as Grey himself was in his wide support of French policy in Morocco and of the still worse Russian policy of strangulation in Persia. Finally it must be borne in mind that it was much easier for Britain than for Germany to keep out of any Balkan complications.

During these years Marschall's reports from Constantinople undoubtedly exercised great influence over the Imperial Government. Count Metternich, the German Ambassador in London, who observed the British irritation and watched affairs from the British point of view, repeatedly urged a more yielding attitude. (121) Prince Bülow remarked that there was " much truth " (122)

in what Metternich wrote. Marschall upheld his policy in a long and important communication, dated July 6, 1908, from which I take the following extracts :

Our principal concern in the Macedonian question must be to endeavour *to prevent a Balkan conflagration, or at least to postpone it as long as possible.* (123) For a catastrophe in the Balkans, however one may conceive it, brings European peace into the gravest danger. . . .

Count Metternich has, it appears, one comfort in the matter of a Balkan conflagration. He considers that experience has shown that the imposition of reforms against the will of the Sultan has not at once brought war and a Balkan conflagration, as has from time to time been prophesied. I do not know who has made this prophecy of an immediate Balkan conflagration as the result of reforms. It has not been made by me. I did predict, five years ago, that the Christian nationalities would see in the reforms proposed by the Great Powers to be imposed on the Sultan a weakening of Turkish domination, would foresee its early end, and would find in this an incentive to the utmost possible extension of their ethnographic zone. This prediction, that the reforms would result in sanguinary struggles between the Christian nationalities, has been fulfilled to the letter, not because I am a prophet, but because in the East reforms imposed by the Great Powers and national excesses always stand in the relation of cause and effect. No one will question the fact that this struggle of nationalities has considerably added to the gravity of the Macedonian question.

In another passage in his report the Ambassador issues a warning in regard to German policy : " It would be dangerous to accustom the Sultan to the idea that we reject every reform proposal coming from elsewhere that is inconvenient to him." If the danger exists of our " accustoming " the Sultan to anything, there must be precedents of this nature. I know nothing of any. I have, indeed, read here and there in English papers that the German policy is to reject everything which does not please the Sultan. But that was the opposite of the real facts. We have not only not rejected every proposal that was inconvenient to the Sultan, but on the contrary we have, through our influence with him, carried through proposals which were very painful to the Sultan. I may recall the Mürzsteg programme. Everybody knows in Constantinople that it was I who at the last moment got the Sultan to agree to accept these proposals. This happened in a memorable audience, not without its dramatic incidents, which lasted until 1 a.m. After forty-eight hours the Sultan issued the desired irade. In the question of the setting up of an international financial commission we urgently advised the Sultan to give way, and this spring we did the same, and with success, when His Highness was unable to bring himself to agree to the prolongation of the service of the reform agents to seven years. The above warning from Count Metternich that we should not reject every reform proposal that is inconvenient to the Sultan has therefore *no basis whatever in fact.*

The same applies to the remark that " it is not for us to furnish, each time a reform is proposed, legal proof of its inadmissibility under Turkish canon and secular law and an assurance that the Sultan will never accept it." We furnished proof of this in *one single instance* only, a special question in regard to which legal arguments can scarcely be considered out of place, the judicial reforms. The draft Note with which we had to deal in this case related *exclusively* to Turkish law, canon and secular. I may recall the fundamental change proposed in the draft in the competence of the Sheriat courts. Apart from this, the secular and religious elements in Turkish justice are so intermixed that no person of weight can discuss a reform of Turkish justice without examining the question whether it is possible for the Sultan to accept certain provisions or not as Caliph.

Here again, it is true, Count Metternich has one thing to console him. " The Sultan always says ' never ' until he feels a gentle pressure from all sides." This has been so in many instances. It was not so in the case of financial control. And the method will certainly fail if there is any idea of inducing him to infringe the religious law, as, for instance, was proposed in the judicial reforms. No one acquainted with the governing conditions will dispute this point. (124) But why have we in general raised the question from time to time whether the Sultan will be ready to accept some proposal of reform? Count Metternich seems to assume that it has only been done out of friendship for the Sultan. This is an *entire mistake*. In my view every Great Power which pursues a conservative policy in the Balkans is bound conscientiously to consider that question, without any personal regard for the Sultan. For on the reply to it depends the question whether the putting into execution of proposals for reform requires force or not. Every application of compulsion against the Sultan entails grave risks. It excites the Christian population, it sets in motion the Mussulman element, and according to the method of execution it may gravely disturb the relations between the Powers.

It is, moreover, my opinion that the question whether in the end the Sultan will accept a proposed reform or not is a secondary matter. In my view we should determine our attitude to all Macedonian proposals, in association with our Austro-Hungarian allies, entirely on the merits of the question, and if the case calls for it we should not hesitate to reject a proposal if it appears to us dangerous to carry it into effect. I include in this category the programme of making Macedonia " independent of the Palace." . . . I consider that programme as in itself *a danger to peace*. . . . The plan of divesting the Sultan of part of the armed forces under his control, as put forward in the first British proposal, was simply the outcome of a whole system, the ultimate aim of which is the separation of Macedonia from Turkey. . . . Once this door is opened there will be no stopping. A Macedonia independent of Turkey will be only a short transitional stage. The Sultan will not be *permitted* to rule, the Great Powers, however many civil agents they may send out, will not be *able* to rule there. The centrifugal forces

will go to work with redoubled energy. Here again I am no prophet. I will only recall the example of Eastern Roumelia. There there were constitutional conditions such as Britain wants to set up in Macedonia to-day. There is, however, one point at which the comparison is faulty. It was possible to get rid of the autonomy of Eastern Roumelia and still preserve peace. If a " Macedonia independent of the Sultan " collapses, that will mean a Balkan conflagration. (125)

One may have what opinion one likes of Marschall von Bieberstein; but no one can deny the statesmanlike outlook, the deep insight, and the moral earnestness in this communication. It was in point of fact mainly over Macedonia that in 1913 Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia sprang at one another's throats, and no one acquainted with the conditions will be satisfied that the Balkan settlements of 1919 hold the promise of eternal peace.

Some historians will perhaps consider that Marschall, who had done so much to foster Turco-German friendship, was too concerned for the maintenance of *European* Turkey, that he showed too strong personal opposition to the reforms, as Count Metternich assumed, and that he might without serious risk to German interests have met the other Powers in a more accommodating spirit. But even those who take up this standpoint will find in Marschall's defence of his position no trace of the cynical amorality which Grey contemptuously attributes to Germany's Turkish policy.

For that matter, even British experts have recognized that Grey's policy had its defects. Thus Wilhelm von Stumm wrote to Prince Bülow on May 16, 1908:

I recently met Lieutenant-Colonel Fairholme, who served until a few years ago with the Macedonian gendarmerie, and is now often consulted by the Foreign Office on Macedonian matters. He described Sir Edward Grey's reform plans as absurd and entirely impracticable. He had often, he said, talked to the Imperial [German] Ambassador in Constantinople on the Macedonian question, and entirely agreed with Baron von Marschall's views. The British enthusiasm for reform was the work of British Members of Parliament who went for a fortnight's stay in the Balkan Peninsula and then considered that they had mastered the Macedonian problem. He entirely shared Baron von Marschall's view that the best solution would be to build a wall round Macedonia and let the various nationalities settle the future among themselves. (126)

A direct consequence of the continual intervention of reforming Powers, and of the Reval interview, which was connected

with it, was the Young Turkish movement, (127) which began at Monastir on July 3, 1908, and in a few weeks compelled the Sultan to restore the Constitution of 1876. The Powers were mutually agreed to hold up their plans of reform. Berlin hastened to convey to the Sultan

> the best wishes of His Majesty the Emperor in regard to the reforms begun, and the hope that the act of statesmanlike wisdom which he had performed would conduce to the well-being of Turkey. (128)

But the Young Turks, as is well known, were strongly drawn towards the democracies of the Western Powers. And Sir Edward Grey himself was far from rejecting the unanticipated opportunities that showed themselves. We find the revulsion in British policy aptly described in a report from Count Metternich of August 1908, not without a gentle sarcasm :

> After the Bulgarian and Armenian atrocities first Gladstone, then Salisbury and with him all Britain went against Turkey. There were no deep-laid political grounds for this. The massacring was enough. Since the vistory of the Young Turks, Britain has suddenly remembered that she has never been anti-Turkish but only anti-Sultan Abdul Hamid. " The Times " talks unctuously of Britain's traditional friendship for Turkey, and the other papers chime in in chorus. Sir Edward Grey gives his blessing to the Young Turks, withdraws all plans of reform, and declares that British policy desires nothing more wholeheartedly than Turkey's regeneration through herself. In Constantinople itself the population receives the newly installed British Ambassador with ovations ! The Turks also are happy to recall the old British friendship. (129)

In his remark that Britain had suddenly remembered " that she has never been anti-Turkish but only anti-Sultan Abdul Hamid," (130) Metternich touched the sore spot from which, to all appearance, Grey's detestation of Germany's Near East policy arose. In Great Britain, where there is never any reluctance to moralize, the person and the governmental methods of Abdul Hamid were hated and loathed. And as the Emperor William II often made a display of his friendship for this man, the British feelings in regard to Abdul Hamid were gradually extended to the Emperor William and his Turkish policy. Naturally the German Government's " friendship " was not at all for Abdul Hamid but for Turkey, or, more accurately, for Turkey in Asia. And in truth the Sultan was much more the " friend " of the

Emperor William than the Emperor of the Sultan. (131) We read, for instance, in a report of Marschall's, dated May 1898 :

> German policy has never sought " influence " at the Golden Horn in the sense in which for decades France, Russia, and Britain have in turn exercised it. In this self-denial lies the peculiarity and the security of our position here. People say " The Sultan fears Russia " and add " and loves Germany." We may accept that. The Sultan has above all a warm friendship for His Majesty the Emperor, our gracious Sovereign, for whom he is full of sincere admiration and gratitude. Hand in hand with this goes the sympathy of the Mussulman population for the German nation ; it is based on confidence that Germany, as she is bent on peace, stands for the maintenance and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and that our economic undertakings do not aim at the exploitation of the country but at its well-being. (132)

Here we see the reasons why Turkey turned away from Britain and towards Germany. Judging from the passages here quoted, Viscount Grey of Fallodon is determined to see the reasons in German complaisance towards the Sultan at a time when Britain especially was making herself more and more unpopular with the Sultan by her continual representations against the Armenian and Macedonian atrocities. According to Grey, the German Government pursued a policy that was unscrupulous to the point of blood-guiltiness in its greed for political and economic gain. I have shown that, both in regard to the Armenian atrocities and the question of reforms in Macedonia, this grotesque and deeply wounding conception is baseless. And it is indeed astonishing that a man like Grey, who was active in political life for more than thirty years, was Parliamentary Under-Secretary under Rosebery and Kimberley in 1892–95 and British Foreign Secretary from December 1905 to December 1916—it is indeed astonishing that a man of such schooling should fail to recognize the true and perfectly manifest reasons for Turkey's attitude since the end of the nineteenth century.

As far back as the Berlin Congress of 1878 Britain was Turkey's real protectress, though no disinterested one, seeing that she secured the gift of Cyprus for her good offices ; and at that period Britain even guaranteed Turkey's Asiatic possessions. But there then came, one after the other, the occupation of Egypt in 1882 ; the repeated refusals from London to name any definite date for the evacuation of Egypt ; Salisbury's open

abandonment of Turkey and his plans of partition, not even kept secret ; the setting up of a sort of British Protectorate over Koweit on the Persian Gulf, the Anglo-French agreement concerning Egypt, and finally the Anglo-Russian agreement concerning Persia. The Turks would indeed have been more than blind if they had failed to see the dangers which had been threatening them from England since the 'nineties, especially when the British move for a rapprochement with Russia became known—Russia, with her century-old ambition for the annexation of Constantinople and the Straits. Unlike other Powers, " the Germans came to Turkey with clean hands " :

> Their Government had never despoiled the Ottoman Empire of territory. . . . Germany, it appeared, was the only sincere and disinterested friend of the Ottoman Empire ! (133)

Such was the situation when the Bagdad Railway was being begun. The economic purpose of the railway was to open up " one of the most important undeveloped regions of the world." Germany's political aims in Turkey " were not concerned with colonization or conquest " ; nor with a protectorate ; Germany was working simply for " the economic, military, and political renaissance of Turkey-in-Asia." The Bagdad Railway achieved all that was claimed for it by its sponsors. It was exactly what Turkey needed. (134)

The Young Turks, who at first ostentatiously showed their inclination towards Britain and France, soon discovered that these Powers and their ally Russia had no good intentions towards them. The Young Turkish Revolution was much less a democratic than a nationalist movement, and this could not suit Great Britain, Russia, and France, with the many Mohammedan subject peoples in their empires.

> For Germany, on the other hand, Turkish nationalism held no menace. So far from desiring a weak Turkey—as did most of the other European Powers—her policy in the Near East was based upon the strengthening of Turkey. . . . If the Turkish programme discomfited the Entente Powers, that was to Germany's advantage in the great game of world politics ; therefore Germany could afford to support the Young Turk Government. As in the days of Abdul Hamid, Germany appeared to be the only friend of the Ottomans. (135)

Thus, by the spring of 1911, Germany had recovered her former position in Constantinople, especially as the Entente

Powers were unwilling to provide for the financial needs of the Young Turks, the Bagdad Railway being regarded with disfavour. (136) " The economic prospects of Turkey," however, " never were brighter than they were just before the outbreak of the Great War," and this thanks primarily to the Bagdad Railway. (137)

It should be observed that all this refers solely to Turkey *in Asia*, the national homeland of the Ottomans, and not to Turkish possessions in Europe or Africa. For a long time, since about the date of the Berlin Congress, Germany had recognized Italy's reversionary claim to Tripolitania, and in the Balkan War of 1912–13 she did not move a finger to save to Turkey any of her European territory. On the contrary, Germany was working loyally with Britain to avoid European complications.

The very fact that in 1908 the Young Turks threw themselves first into the arms of Britain and France and were warmly received by them, but by 1910 were already turning back, disillusioned, to Germany, should have brought home to Lord Grey the truth that the grounds he alleges for Germany's growth of influence and Britain's loss of influence in Constantinople are baseless and senseless and are evidence of a strong bias in judgment and feeling. The account given so far of Grey's Memoirs, and the reply to them, so far as a reply was necessary, reveal at the same time the strong predilection for France and Russia and the appalling prejudice against Germany with which in December 1905 Sir Edward Grey entered on his eleven years' control of Great Britain's foreign policy.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. Sir Roger Casement, " Gesammelte Schriften," Second Edition, Diessen vor München 1917, p. 170. Compare C. J. O'Donnell, " The Lordship of the World," 3rd Edition, London 1925, pp. 25, 30.

2. Vol. I, p. xxii.

3. Vol. I, pp. 4–8.

4. The Canadian writer John S. Ewart has well shown this basic element in British policy in his important work " The Roots and Causes of the Wars (1914 to 1918)," 2 vols., New York 1925, pp. 693–718.

5. Vol. I, pp. 9–11 ; see also p. 33. Words in brackets Lutz's.

6. " Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871–1914," edited by J. Lepsius, A. Mendelssohn Bartholdy and Fr. Thimme, Vol. 4, Berlin 1922, document 747 (in future quoted as " G.P."). Harcourt had spoken in similar terms in January 1883 to Herbert Bismarck (document 735).

7. G.P., doc. 748.

8. G.P., doc. 749.

9. W. H. Dawson, " The German Empire, 1867–1914," Vol. II, ch. 17, " The Colonial Era " (Allen & Unwin, London 1919). G. P. Gooch, " History of Modern Europe, 1878–1919," pp. 99–109 (Cassell & Co., London 1923).

10. G.P., doc. 810. See Vol. 4, chh. xxi and xxiii *passim*.

11. G.P., Vol. 8, doc. 1812. See also doc. 1784, 1790, 1798, 1806, 1821, and the whole of Vol. 8, ch. liii (Berlin 1923).

12. G.P., doc. 1814.

13. G.P., doc. 1816, 2017.

14. G.P., doc. 1823, 1830, 1845.

15. G.P., doc. 1823. Word in brackets Lutz's.

16. G.P., doc. 1835. Rosebery was for a moment greatly incensed at the German " change of front " (doc. 1818, 2017); but this soon passed. The effect on Grey was of quite a different order and became deep rooted. See on this point E. F. Henderson in the New York " Nation," October 14, 1925 (" The Superficial Grey "), and Dr. N. Japikse in " Mededeelingen van het Nederlandsche Comité tot Onderzoek van de Oorzaken van den Wereldoorlog," Hague, April–June 1926, pp. 34–35.

17. Vol. I, pp. 19–21, 39–41.

18. Vol. I, p. 22. Cf. " Die Grosse Politik," Vol. 8, doc. 2031 *sqq*.

19. Vol. I, pp. 23–24; see also p. 49.

20. G.P., Vol. 9, doc. 2215. Cf. doc. 2217 and chh. lvii *passim*.

21. G.P., doc. 2216–27; p. 244, footnote ***; p. 245, footnote **.

22. G.P., doc. 2223, 2230.

23. G.P., doc. 2234, 2239. O. Franke, " Die Grossmächte in Ostasien von 1894 bis 1914," Braunschweig 1923, pp. 64 *sqq*.

24. G.P., doc. 2234.

25. G.P., doc. 2235–36.

26. G.P., doc. 2226, 2246, 2306.

27. G.P., p. 253, footnote *. The indecision of the British attitude was calculated to encourage Japan to adhere to her demands.

28. G.P., doc. 2237.

29. G.P., doc. 2239.

30. G.P., doc. 2241. Cf. doc. 2236, p. 264.

31. Vol. I, p. 33. Words in brackets Lutz's. Cf. Vol. II, p. 43.

32. Vol. I, pp. 49–53.

33. Vol. I, pp. 21, 26–34, 127–29, 139–42; Vol. II, pp. 87–92.

34. Vol. I, pp. 36, 41–44. Grey's suggestion on page 44 that among other things the German naval construction prevented the renewal of the negotiations of 1899 for an Anglo-German Alliance is incorrect, as London again sought an alliance with Germany in 1901, although by then the building of a fleet had begun.—For the negotiations for an alliance see G.P., Vol. 14, ch. xci; Vol. 15, ch. ci; Vol. 17, ch. cix (Berlin 1924); Freiherr von Eckardstein, " Lebenserinnerungen und Politische Denkwürdigkeiten," 3 vols., Leipzig 1919, 1920, 1921; Eugen Fischer, " Holsteins Grosses Nein," Berlin 1925; H. Rothfels, " Zur Beurteilung der englischen Vorkriegspolitik " in the " Archiv für Politik und Geschichte," Berlin, December 1926, pp. 599 *sqq*.; Fr. Stieve, " Deutschland und Europa, 1890–1914," Berlin 1926, pp. 45

sqq.; "British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914," Vols. I and II, London 1927; G. P. Gooch, "Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy," London 1927, pp. 23 *sqq.*; G. Lowes Dickinson, "The International Anarchy, 1904–1914," London 1926, pp. 60–62, 261.

35. Vol. I, pp. 37–41, 45; see also p. 303.

36. Vol. I, p. 45. Word in brackets Grey's.

37. G.P., Vol. 14, ch. xcii.

38. Vol. I, p. 45.

39. G.P., Vol. 37, document 14684.

40. G.P., Vol. 14, doc. 3876, 3879; footnote ** on p. 359; Vol. 31, doc. 11344; Vol. 37, doc. 14684, 14686, 14688–90, 14692, 14695, *sqq.*—Vol. 31, ch. ccxliv and Vol. 37, doc. 14656, 14656 Anl. II, 14661–2, 14664, 14668, 14672, 14674, and 14696 show that Grey had sincere conscientious scruples. He worked with a determination to find a settlement of the question of the Portuguese colonies which should be satisfactory to Germany without betraying the century-old alliance with Portugal.

41. Vol. I, p. 47; Vol. II, p. 43.

42. G.P., Vol. 11, ch. lxiii; Fr. Thimme, "Die Krüger-Depesche," in "Europäische Gespräche," 1924, no. iii, and articles in the "Archiv für Politik und Geschichte" for March 1924, June–July 1924, and August 1925.

43. G.P., Vol. 15, chh. ci, cii, ciii; Vol. 17, ch. cxi. Compare Gooch, "Revelations," p. 169.

44. Vol. I, p. 46.

45. G.P., Vol. 15, doc. 4475; see also expressions of thanks from British Ministers in doc. 4400, 4401, 4409, 4410, 4411, 4433, 4448, 4458, 4485.

46. Mr. Chamberlain, in a public speech at Leicester on November 20, 1899, took the Paris Press sharply to task for its attacks on the "sacred person of the Queen," adding that Britain had reason to congratulate herself that the worst excesses had not appeared in the German Press.—Quoted by Count Montgelas in the "Kriegsschuldfrage," May 1926, p. 286.

47. G.P., Vol. 17, doc. 5067, 5069, 5073.

48. Vol. I, p. 48.

49. Grey writes (p. 49): "The recollection of the diplomatic coercion of Japan in 1895 by Russia, Germany, and France, and of British refusal to join in that coercion, made the Anglo-Japanese Alliance an easy, almost an obvious transaction." This is not quite correct, as Japan desired Germany's adhesion to the alliance. (G.P., Vol. 17, ch. cx; E. Fischer, "Holsteins Grosses Nein," pp. 216 *sqq.*; Dickinson, "The International Anarchy," p. 292; see also note 34 above.)

50. Cf. Gerhard Ritter, "Bismarcks Verhältnis zu England und die Politik des 'Neuen Kurses,'" in "Archiv für Politik und Geschichte," June–July 1924, pp. 511 *sqq.*

51. Vol. I, p. 6.

52. Vol. I, pp. 51–53.

53. Quoted by Dickinson, "The International Anarchy," p. 113. Cf. Grey, Vol. I, p. 53, and Churchill, "The World Crisis, 1911–1914," London 1923, p. 22.

54. Metternich reported from London in the summer of 1908: "Lord Rosebery . . . is the only one among the outstanding British statesmen who has expressed strong disapproval of the development of British policy and the Agreement with France." Rosebery said, among other things, to the German Ambassador: "It is fortunate that the Ententes need not as yet be necessarily regarded as directed against you. If Germany should become

convinced that British policy is tightening the circle round Germany, the situation becomes hopeless. It is absurd to pursue a policy towards Germany as if it was a question of a country like Serbia."—G.P., Vol. 24, doc. 8219. And Count Mensdorff, the Austrian Ambassador in London, reported on August 7, 1914: "Lord Rosebery came to me to-day. As always, full of sympathy and understanding for our cause. Rightly finds Russia mainly to blame in this crisis."—"Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges 1914," Part III, Vienna 1919, doc. 159.

55. Word in brackets Lutz's.

56. Vol I, pp 239–40, 253, 281, 324, 331; cf. p. 91 and Vol. II, p. 54.

57. Quoted in J. H. Rose, "The Development of the European Nations, 1870–1914," 5th Edition, London 1916, p. 46.

58. Thus, Lyons said to Gramont on July 12, 1870: "If war came now, all Europe would say that it was France's fault." And later, when Thiers pressed Lord Granville to intervene in favour of vanquished France, he refused, for "the French acted against our advice in beginning an unjustified and aggressive war." These and other similar expressions of opinion of Gladstone, Granville and Lyons are quoted in John S. Ewart, "The Roots and Causes of the Wars," pp. 663–65.

59. Sir Adolphus William Ward, "Germany 1815–1890," 3 vols., Cambridge 1916–1918, Vol. II, p. 442. Similar judgments in C. Raymond Beazley, "Nineteenth Century Europe and Britain," London 1922, pp. 179–81; J. W. Headlam, "Bismarck and the Foundation of the German Empire," London 1899, pp. 338–40; Rose, *op. cit.*, p. 45. Ewart, the Canadian historian and jurist, comes to a different conclusion; from his examination of the facts, pp. 618–20, he concludes that Bismarck transmitted the Ems telegram correctly to Abeken, but added a sentence which was untrue and which he was not authorized to add.

60. Three vols., Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart 1926.

61. Oncken, Vol. I, p. 106. This military attaché reported early on July 12th: "There is absolute determination here on war. . . . Count Bismarck is reduced now to the choice between war and a second Olmütz."—Vol I, p. 108.

62. Oncken, Vol. I, p. 110. Rose, *op. cit.*, writes, p. 45, footnote: "Bismarck, of course, wanted war; but so did Gramont, and I hold that *the latter* brought it about."

63. Oncken, Vol. I, p. 111.

64. Oncken, Vol. I, pp. 114–119.

65. Quoted in Oncken, Vol I, p. 114. Ewart (p. 675; see notes 58 and 59 above), after a very thorough analysis based mainly on French sources, comes unreservedly to the conclusion that "France was the aggressor in 1870." (Pp. 573–676.) Cf. G. Demartial, "L'Evangile du Quai d'Orsay," Paris 1926, p. 167; "Les Carnets de Georges Louis," Paris 1926, Vol. II, p. 96.

66. G.P., Vol. 20, Parts I and II; Vol. 21, Part I (Berlin 1925). I return to the Morocco crisis in Chapter 3.

67. G.P., Vol. 19, ch. cxxxviii.

68. The only doubt is as to Holstein's secret intentions. According to Eckardstein, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, "Die Isolierung Deutschlands," he wanted war with France. Cf. "Les Carnets de Georges Louis," Vol. I, pp. 133, 220; Thomas Rhodes, "The Real von Kühlmann," London 1925, p. 60. But Holstein's statements in G.P., Vol. 21, doc. 7055 (March 4, 1906), are entirely in conflict with this view. In March Prince Bülow took over the whole question of the conference, and in April Holstein resigned. See Vol. 21, pp. 338–39,

footnote *, and especially the Kaiser's marginal notes on document 7252, pp. 566–67. In any case, the fact remains that Bülow and the Kaiser had no desire for a breach and succeeded in avoiding one.

69. " Before the War," London 1920, p. 26.

70. Grey writes, Vol. I, p. 6, that British Foreign Ministers have been guided in their work by Britain's " immediate interest."

71. Vol. I, pp. 131–34.

72. Vol. I, p. 193.

73. G.P., Vol. 9, ch. lvi ; Vol. 1, chh. lx–lxii ; Vol. 12, chh. lxxii and lxxiii.

74. G.P., Vol. 9, doc. 2190, 2191.

75. See, for example, G.P., Vol. 9, doc. 2189, 2202, 2203 ; Vol. 10, doc. 2395, 2401, 2402, 2407, 2412, 2414, 2425, 2430, 2432, 2433, 2467, 2481, 2483, 2487, 2510, 2517, 2522, 2528, 2529, 2535 ; Vol. 12, doc. 2897, 2904, 2907, 2913. This list does not claim to be complete.

76. The word " soon " given prominence by spacing in the original.

77. G.P., Vol. 10, doc. 2401.

78. G.P., Vol. 10, doc. 2403.

79. The reference is especially to the representatives of the British, Russian, and French Governments.

80. G.P., Vol. 10, doc. 2522.

81. G.P., Vol. 10, doc. 2467, Anlage.

82. G.P., Vol. 10, doc. 2487.

83. G.P., Vol. 9, doc. 2187, 2188, 2203 ; Vol. 10, doc. 2407, 2414, 2415 ; Vol. 12, doc. 3093 ; cf. Vol. 10, doc. 2439.

84. G.P., Vol. 9, p. 228 ; Vol. 10, pp. 49, 85, 94, 102, 119, 120, 133, 134 ; Vol. 12, pp. 18, 19, 20, 22, 26. In the matter of the Armenian reforms of 1913–14 the German Ambassador in Constantinople repeatedly gave energetic support to the claims of the Armenians ; Jagow also was for reforms : G.P., Vol. 38, ch. cclxxxix ; especially doc. 15287, 15299, 15316, 15334, 15375. Finally, during the world war Germany brought pressure to bear against the Armenian horrors : J. Lepsius, " Deutschland und Armenien 1914–1918," Potsdam 1919 ; Gooch, " Revelations," p. 130.

85. G.P., Vol. 9, doc. 2208.

86. G.P., Vol. 9, doc. 2179, 2180, 2192, 2197, 2199, 2205, 2206, 2112 ; p. 197, footnote * ; Vol. 10, doc. 2399, 2411, 2436, 2443, 2445, 2446, 2479, 2536 ; Vol. 12, doc. 2883, 2908, 3067, 3073, 3074, 3078, 3080, 3094, 3118, Anlage.

87. The words " alone " and " with " emphasized in the original. Words in brackets in the original.

88. G.P., Vol. 10, doc. 2446.

89. G.P., Vol. 10, doc. 2479.

90. E.g., G.P., Vol. 9, doc. 2205 ; Vol. 10, doc. 2399, 2479 ; Vol. 12, doc. 2908.

91. G.P., Vol. 10, ch. lx and doc. 2436, 2468, 2472, 2473. Lord Grey writes in Vol. I, pp. 300–01, of the " extraordinary suspicion "

> with which the most innocently well-meant proposals of Lord Salisbury about Turkey were regarded by German Ministers and officials in 1895–96. Cf. Vol. II, p. 50.

Judging from the German documents, Lord Salisbury's proposals were anything but " most innocently well-meant " ; the British Prime Minister seriously considered the division of Turkey, including her Asiatic territory, into spheres of influence, which would virtually have amounted to partition. This is the

view of Dickinson, pp. 26–27, 66–67, 119 footnote 3, 158 footnote 3, and Japikse, p. 36. Cf. Stieve, " Deutschland und Europa," pp. 30–31.

92. G.P., Vol. 10, doc. 2468.

93. G.P., Vol. 10, doc. 2445. British historians have plainly indicated that it was chiefly Russia who hampered British action ; see the " Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783–1919," Vol. 3 (1866–1919), Cambridge 1923, pp. 233–37 (by W. H. Dawson), and G. P. Gooch, " History of Modern Europe, 1878–1919," London 1923, pp. 239–44.

94. G.P., Vol. 10, doc. 2446.

95. Asquith, in 1902, told Metternich that the campaign of " The Times " was in his view an absolute international danger, poisoning the relations between Britain and Germany in a way which might have grave consequences in the future. Englishmen, generally ignorant of foreign countries, mainly drew their information about foreign affairs from " The Times " (G.P., Vol. 17, doc. 5083 ; chapter cxi in this volume contains further material). Grey as Foreign Secretary was unquestionably influenced by " The Times " articles, as, for instance, during the Agadir crisis, because he was in sympathy with the line taken by that paper ; cf. G.P., Vol. 32, doc. 11633 ; Vol. 34, doc. 13252 ; Grey, Vol. II, p. 49.

96. See J. A. Spender, " The Life of the Right Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, G.C.B.," 2 vols., London 1923, Vol. I, pp. 322 *sqq.*, " Methods of Barbarism " ; C. J. O'Donnell, p. 60. O'Donnell's book gives many examples of Britain's treatment of Ireland. Its author is an Irishman, but feels wholly a " British Imperialist " (pp. 15, 135).

97. Grey, Vol. I, pp. 134–39 ; Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, " My Diaries," Part II, London 1920, pp. 152–54, 158–60, 162–64, 167, 169, 170–71, 185, 197–98, 204, 213, 304.

98. See Bertrand Russell, " Justice in War Time," London 1924, pp. 163 *sqq.* ; Dickinson, p. 280.

99. Vol. I, pp. 173–74.

100. Grey sees this quite plainly—Vol. I, p. 259.

101. Cf. G.P., Vol. 10, doc. 2489. For Bismarck's Balkan and Turkish policy, see *Ibid.*, Vols. 2 and 3, Vol. 4 chh. xxv–xxix, Vol. 5, Vol. 6 chh. xxxvii, xxxviii, xlii, xliii.

102. G.P., Vol. 12, doc. 3126 ; Vol. 18, doc. 5612.

103. G.P., Vol. 12, doc. 2978.

104. G.P., 18, doc. 5499. For the Macedonian question after 1890 and Germany's Balkan and Turkish policy, see G.P., Vol. 10, ch. lxii ; Vol. 12, chh. lxxv, lxxvi, lxxviii–lxxxiii ; Vol. 18. chh. cxvii–cxix ; Vol. 22, chh. clx–clxiv ; Vol. 25, ch. clxxxvii–cxci ; Vols. 26, 27, 30, 33–36 ; Vol. 37, Part 2 ; Vol. 38.

105. G.P., Vol. 18, doc. 5469, 5482, 5495, 5527, 5541, 5543, 5557, 5567, 5614, 5634 ; Vol. 22, doc. 7400, 7432, 7495, 7585, 7670, 7674, 7687, 7704, 7705, 7707, 7719 ; Vol. 25, doc. 8787, 8831, 8832, 8834, 8839, 8841, 8849, 8853, 8859. The list makes no claim to completeness.

106. For the Cretan question see G.P., Vol. 12, chh. lxxvii, lxxx, lxxxi ; Vol. 22, doc. 7360, 7370 ; Vol. 27, chh. ccviii, ccix.

107. G.P., Vol. 18, doc. 5481.

108. G.P., Vol. 18, doc. 5513.

109. G.P., Vol. 18, doc. 5515.

110. For German representations in Constantinople, 1903 to 1908, see G.P., Vol. 18, doc. 5530, 5533, 5619, 5626 ; Vol. 22, doc. 7412, 7520, 7527, 7529, 7530, 7539, 7540, 7545, 7547, 7550, 7554, 7555, 7557, 7559, 7560, 7563,

7566, 7568, 7569, 7570, 7572, 7574, 7575, 7579, 7582, 7619, 7646, 7681, 7686, 7688, 7690, 7710, 7716, 7729, 7731, 7740; Vol. 25, doc. 8789, 8841, 8846, 8860, 8865.

111. E.g., G.P., Vol. 22, doc. 7668.

112. G.P., Vol. 18, p. 405, footnote *. For convenience of reference I deal at once with the German policy of reform in Turkey up to the completion of the reforms in the summer of 1908. For the other questions concerning Turkey, such as the Bosnian crisis, the Straits, the obstacles put in the way of the Bagdad Railway by the Entente Powers, Tripoli, and the Balkan wars, see the third chapter.

113. G.P., Vol. 25, doc. 8699, 8772, 8774, 8778, 8831, 8834, 8854. For the British attitude see G.P., Vol. 22, doc. 7408, 7585, 7644, 7709, 7721, 7745; Vol. 25, doc. 8699, 8717, 8756, 8765, 8780, 8791, 8809, 8865, 8867.

114. G.P., Vol. 22, doc. 7401, 7411, 7462, 7480, 7489, 7495, 7504, 7506, 7507, 7567, 7571, 7670, 7685, 7687, 7698, 7701, 7704, 7706, 7707, 7709, 7710, 7729, 7731, 7734, 7739.

115. G.P., Vol. 22, doc. 7552; Vol. 26, doc. 9229.

116. G.P., Vol. 22, ch. clxiv.

117. G.P., Vol. 22, doc. 7731.

118. G.P., Vol. 22, doc. 7432, 7495, 7526, 7566, 7567, 7640, 7644, 7697, 7709, 7719, 7734, 7740, 7744–45; Vol. 25, ch. clxxxvii, and doc. 8780, 8791, 8809, 8815, 8823, 8840, 8844, 8847, 8849, 8850, 8851, 8859, 8863, 8868, 8884.

119. G.P., Vol. 22, doc. 7721; cf. doc. 7725.

120. See e.g., Isvolsky's summing up, G.P., Vol. 25, doc. 8849.

121. G.P., Vol. 25, doc. 8780, 8833.

122. G.P., Vol. 25, pp. 502–03, footnote *; Bülow's remarks in Vol. 22 on doc. 7511 and in Vol. 26 on doc. 8985; Vol. 30, doc. 11021, 11026, 11049 ("Turkish advocate"); Vol. 38, doc. 15376 ("as Turkified as Marschall") also Vol. 25, doc. 8698, 8699, 8713.

123. This and all other italics Marschall's.

124. The Note on judicial reforms did not reach the stage of transmission to the Porte. G.P., Vol. 25, doc. 8731; cf. Vol. 22, doc. 7745. Marschall's French colleague Constans apparently condemned the judicial reforms even more energetically than Marschall himself.—G.P., Vol. 22, doc. 7720, 7726, 7730, 7732, 7735.

125. G.P., Vol. 25, doc. 8834. Grey describes Marschall's policy in Constantinople as "unscrupulous and detestable": Vol. I, p. 246. During his short period as Ambassador in London Marschall formed "a good impression" of Grey.—G.P., Vol. 31, doc. 11433.

126. G.P., Vol. 25, doc. 8791; cf. doc. 8773.

127. Sir Charles Hardinge admitted in August 1908 that the Reval meeting considerably hastened the outbreak of the Young Turkish movement. G.P., Vol. 25, doc. 8901. Gooch confirms this in "The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy," Vol. III, p. 400.—For the interview, see G.P., Vol. 25, ch. clxxxix.

128. G.P., Vol. 25, doc. 8888; see also doc. 8885–87.

129. G.P., Vol. 25, doc. 8906; see also Vol. 26, doc. 9056, 9182.

130. At bottom British detestation of Abdul Hamid had little to do with Britain's anti-Turkish policy. In the spring of 1909 the English even tried to maintain Abdul Hamid on the throne.—G.P., Vol. 27, doc. 9600, 9789, 9978; also Vol. 25, doc. 8899.

131. At the time of the Armenian atrocities the Emperor William wrote of the Sultan on one report, "A loathsome creature!" (G.P., Vol. 10, p. 133),

and on another "The Sultan must be deposed!" (G.P., Vol. 12, p. 20; similarly on p. 22).

132. G.P., Vol. 12, doc. 3340. Similarly in doc. 3341 (3350).

133. Edward Mead Earle, "Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway. A Study in Imperialism," New York 1923, p. 65.

134. *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 123, 126, 234. The obstacles placed in the way of the Bagdad Railway by the Entente Powers will be dealt with in Chapter III.

135. *Ibid.*, p. 223. Cf. G.P., Vol. 27, doc. 9709, 9789, 9794, 9815, 9978, 10006, 10012; Vol. 34, doc. 12754.

136. Earle, pp. 224–25. The Turkish anger was deepened by the realization that the Powers who were opposing the Bagdad Railway were the same Powers who believed that the Sick Man was on his death-bed, and were interested in the division of his heritage. From these Powers Turkey could accept no wardship! (p. 229). Cf. Blunt, *op. cit.*, p. 337.—For German policy in Turkey, see also Ewart, *op. cit.*, pp. 200–22.

137. Earle, p. 234.

CHAPTER II

SIR EDWARD GREY'S "FREE HAND"

Preliminary Question: A Statesman?*

> There were many such irreconcilabilities in Grey's record, and the Germans attributed them to bad faith. They believed him to be a liar, deliberately seeking to humiliate them and to arrange a combination for their defeat. They did not understand that he was just a muddle-headed, ill-instructed, well-meaning English gentleman, unfit for his position and quite unable to break through the poisonous net of intrigue and diplomatic custom in which European foreign relations were enmeshed. . . . In fine, he is a man whose mental processes all belong to the past and who will never understand that he was, because he could not think clearly, one of the chief architects of the war.
>
> Hamilton Fyfe. (1)

The British witnesses to Sir Edward Grey's ignorance of business, his slowness of perception, and his inadequacy as a statesman are too many to be left out of account. These criticisms were not long in making an appearance when Grey became Foreign Secretary, they stuck to him during his career, and they have now cropped up in various quarters since the publication of his reminiscences. (2) The witnesses of pre-war days call for special attention. The Diaries of Wilfrid Scawen Blunt provide plenty of material. In October 1906 H. N. Brailsford, then on the staff of the "Tribune" and "Daily News," said to Blunt that Grey

> knows absolutely nothing of foreign affairs. Grey has only once been abroad and then only to Paris, and he speaks not a word of French or any foreign language. Haldane manages all that for him. His strength is that he is good-looking, with an imposing manner and an appearance of common sense and honesty which the House of Commons likes. (3)

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* The chapter "Sir Edward Grey's 'Free Hand'" appeared in Part 4–5 (April-May 1926) of the "Archiv für Politik und Geschichte," Berlin, with the exception of a few not unimportant later additions, especially from M. Poincaré's new work, and of the important addendum on pages 105 *sqq.*, dealing with the principal material in the new "British Documents on the Origins of the War."

An entry of January 1911, after a visit of Blunt's to Lord Weardale, says :

> He looks upon Grey as an ignorant commonplace man, quite incapable in foreign affairs ; (4)

old Sir Horace Rumbold had "a poor opinion of Grey." (5) In October 1911 Blunt asked the Hon. Mark Napier what he thought of Grey.

> He said he had seen much of him formerly on political platforms, and that he used to be a stupid fellow and a dull speaker, but had "greatly improved," he was ignorant and a second-rate man, though personally charming and most distinguished. (6)

Finally, Ramsay MacDonald said to Blunt on July 22, 1914, that he had "no high opinion of Grey's intelligence." (7)

Blunt has quoted only one different opinion of Grey in his Diaries, from Winston Churchill, when First Lord of the Admiralty. After a few days' stay with Churchill in October 1912, Blunt wrote :

> Winston, however, will not hear of Grey as being other than a splendid specimen of an Englishman, the best of the type, and they are evidently close friends, indeed Grey is Winston's son's godfather. (8)

It is not surprising that Blunt entirely shared the view of the great majority and repeatedly expressed it in his Diaries. The most notable instance is the following passage from a letter of Blunt's to W. T. Stead, of the "Review of Reviews," in regard to the Italian atrocities in Tripoli :

> Sir Edward is neither brutal by nature nor callous, but he is singularly ignorant of any country but his own, and he is entirely without imagination, and woefully ill-advised by his subordinates. (9)

We shall be further concerned with two of these comments—Grey's lack of imagination and the influence of his advisers.

It will be asked at once, if Grey was really so unequal to his office, as people who knew him were declaring years before the war and have done since, how was it that he ever became Foreign Secretary and held the office through eleven years filled with crises ? To this one hears two different replies. One is that in December 1905 Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman had no

choice but Grey after Lord Cromer had declined Office owing to ill-health. According to J. A. Spender, a large part of the public counted on Grey becoming Foreign Secretary, and his omission from the Government would have been "a serious matter"; "there was no other obvious candidate for the post." (10) Hamilton Fyfe writes in similar terms—Grey's fellow-Liberals overcame his reluctance to take office by persuading him

> that he was indispensable to the nation. They believed in him because they were entirely ignorant of world-politics, and because he could look as if he knew all about them. From the moment of his becoming a Minister he was a disaster, yet he was never found out by the House of Commons, and is still spoken about with respect. Few understand what schoolboy conceptions of the world and its peoples that noble brow and those deep-set melancholy eyes conceal. (11)

Save for some exaggeration in Fyfe's "schoolboy conceptions," I think Spender and Fyfe are right.

The other explanation is given especially by Sir Roger Casement, of whom we saw in the first chapter that even during the war he had absolute confidence in Grey's good faith. Casement wrote:

> At bottom a peace-loving, homely, quiet man, he came to an office for which he was entirely unsuited, and mainly for this reason. The powers that guided the destiny of the State had no use for an able man. . . . I should not regard him as the stage villain of the piece; as he once said of himself, he is "*a fly on the wheel of State*," the victim rather than the defender of the aims of British Imperialism. These aims were already fixed and the driver of the coach of State was already at his post when . . . Sir Edward Grey mounted the coach. Instead of driving it himself, he was taken up as a passenger.* (12)

I do not think the view is tenable that Grey was made Foreign Minister because of his incapacity, in order to be a "teachable and obedient tool" * (13) in the service of the actual wielders of power. It does seem true—more of this later—that Grey was greatly under the influence of his advisers, especially the permanent officials in the Foreign Office. (14) Blunt has averred this once or twice. (15) But had Blunt, the hot opponent of Grey's policy, heard anything of Grey being from the outset the selected tool of powerful elements working in the background

* Retranslated.

(and a rumour of this could hardly have failed to reach him from his many sources of information), we should certainly find the rumour noted in his Diaries. Bernard Shaw too, that very keen observer, says nothing as to this.

If an ignoramus was for eleven years Foreign Secretary of the greatest empire in all history, and during that period remained in Office for two years after the outbreak of a life and death struggle, it will be reasonable to view with scepticism the tales of his ignorance. Yet Spender and Fyfe have told us that in 1905 the Liberals had no other choice but Grey, that a large section of his Liberal colleagues counted on him, and that he "could look as if he knew all about" his subject, namely world politics; from Blunt and others we learn that Grey's candid and winning manner and his imposing presence exercised a quite unusual influence over the Lower House. (16) Finally it is clear that Grey became Foreign Secretary much against his will, and entirely from a sense of duty, that his office was a burden and a trial to him, and that all the time his heart longed for the trees and the birds and the trout stream. (17)

It is certainly nothing unusual, especially of late years, for unqualified persons to push their way, fully believing in their capacity, into important posts. But it must be very unusual for people who are conscious of real capacity and who are offered a post suited to it to accept it so unwillingly as Grey did. Is not the explanation an unconfessed but instinctively felt sense of inadequacy for the task? Hamilton Fyfe asks:

> Will it not be pleaded in his defence that he was aware of his own insufficiency and tried to avoid the responsibility of being Foreign Minister? (18)

Let us defer our answer until after further enquiry.

The Development of a Legacy.

As a "Liberal Imperialist" Sir Edward Grey opposed Campbell-Bannerman's "pro-Boer" attitude, and he shared the view of his friends Haldane and Asquith that the leadership of the Liberals in the Lower House, which had been in Campbell-Bannerman's charge, ought now to be transferred into "more robust and stronger" hands—those, that is, of Asquith. Grey

accordingly made this change the condition of his entry into the Government in December 1905, and he states that the Prime Minister " took in good part " (19) all that he, Grey, had to say to him as to this. This, however, is not correct. J. A. Spender, who was then a link between the negotiators, and kept a diary, writes that Campbell-Bannerman was " greatly wounded " by Grey's ultimatum, and did not conceal his " indignation." (20) The incident is worth attention, as it throws light on the relations between the two antagonists in the Liberal Party and may help to explain Grey's attitude in an important matter of foreign policy at the beginning of his period of Office (see below). Grey gave way when Campbell-Bannerman refused to go to the Lords ; but the " affront " was certainly not calculated to draw the two men closer together. In the spring of 1908, after Campbell-Bannerman's death, Blunt made this entry in his Diary on a visit from Brailsford :

> Grey was persuaded to withdraw his objection on condition he should be allowed his own way absolutely in foreign affairs, and he had ever since been extremely jealous of Bannerman, a jealousy which had accentuated his obstinacy in pursuing imperialist lines. (21)

Spender writes that in the end Grey came in unconditionally ; (22) but Grey's later autocratic behaviour suggests that Blunt's entry contains something of the truth.

When Sir Edward Grey took up his office, on December 11, 1905, he found already in existence the Anglo-French Agreement of April 8, 1904, on Egypt, Morocco, Siam, Newfoundland, etc., an agreement entirely to his taste, but not converted into an Entente until the following year, when Germany tried " to shake or to test the strength of the Anglo-French Agreement." (23) There is no denying that when the German Government advised the Emperor William to land at Tangier on March 31, 1905, it was partly moved by the intention here alleged. And it is also substantially true that this German counter-move—which, for that matter, was well justified—cemented the Entente together. The Agreement in itself only provided for British *diplomatic* support of French policy in Morocco, and Grey now discloses the fact, of which Delcassé had exaggerated the significance, that the British and French naval and general staffs had already discussed plans for joint operation " in the event of war being forced

upon France" under his predecessor, Lord Lansdowne, "when the German pressure was menacing." The naval staffs had been in direct communication, the military staffs through an intermediary; Lansdowne had made it clear, however, that Britain was not *committed* to armed support. (24) As is well known, on the day of his fall, June 6, 1905, Théophile Delcassé laid before the French Cabinet papers from England which in his view contained a British promise to send the navy against Germany in the event of war and also to land 100,000 men in Schleswig-Holstein. Lord Lansdowne categorically denied the existence of this alleged British offer, but to the end of his life Delcassé persisted in his version. Dr. G. P. Gooch, on the strength of information from the British Foreign Office, has also declared that the offer existed only in Delcassé's imagination and was without doubt to be traced to obiter dicta of certain persons in high places, who had merely expressed their own personal belief. Gooch refers incidentally to a passage in which Eckardstein states that on the way from Biarritz to London King Edward told French Ministers that in case of need Great Britain would intervene on their side. (25)

Grey's disclosure of the fact that under Lansdowne the naval staffs of the two countries had already been in direct communication with one another, permits a further possible explanation. On the British side the negotiations were conducted by Sir John Fisher, the First Sea Lord. (26) Fisher would have been glad of the first opportunity to "Copenhagen" the German fleet, as he more than once proposed to King Edward, and it was his pet idea to land 100,000 men in Schleswig-Holstein, or still better on the Pomeranian coast. (27) It is probable, therefore, that Delcassé was placing reliance on the declarations and plans of that hotspur Fisher, of which Lansdowne may have had no knowledge and certainly gave no official confirmation.

Grey's first knowledge of his predecessor's action came on December 30, 1905, from Colonel Repington, who had long been a close personal friend of Major Huguet, the French Military Attaché in London. Huguet had told Repington of the concern at the French Embassy "because Sir Edward Grey . . . had not renewed the assurances given by Lord Lansdowne." Grey wrote back at once from Fallodon that he had not "receded

from anything which Lord Lansdowne said to the French," and had " no hesitation in confirming it." (28)

The French disquiet was due to the approaching Algeciras Conference, due to begin on January 16, 1906. On January 10th Grey had an important conversation with Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador. Cambon said that he did not believe that the German Emperor desired war, but that " His Majesty was pursuing a very dangerous policy " ; and he asked whether Great Britain was prepared, in the event of aggression against France by Germany, to render to France armed assistance. At this time a General Election was in progress and the Ministers were dispersed in their constituencies. Grey said, therefore, that he could not reply to Cambon's question until the elections were over. He stated, however, as his personal opinion,

> that if France were to be attacked by Germany in consequence of a question arising out of the Agreement which our predecessors had recently concluded with the French Government, public opinion in England would be strongly moved in favour of France.

Cambon said that a promise of neutrality did not satisfy him ; he would therefore repeat his question after the elections. In the meantime he urged that the communications between the military and naval experts should go on. (29)

It was Grey's conviction that in the event in question Britain must hurry to France's aid, and that " pro-French feeling in Britain would be very strong," so strong probably as to insist on intervention. And he said to himself that

> modern war may be an affair of days. If there were no military plans made beforehand we should be unable to come to the assistance of France in time, however strongly public opinion in Britain might desire it. (30)

That is quite logical. Grey spoke to his friend Haldane, then Secretary of State for War, and Haldane " authorized " him to say to Cambon that the " communications " from general staff to general staff, which until then had been conducted through an intermediary, namely Colonel Repington, " might proceed between the French Military Attaché and General Grierson," the British Chief of Staff, " direct," as had already been done between the two naval staffs. (31)

Grey told Cambon this on January 15, 1906. He had copies of the record of his conversations of January 10th and 15th with Cambon sent to Campbell-Bannerman and Lord Ripon, the senior Minister available in London. Campbell-Bannerman wrote to him on the 14th that there was "time for reflection," as the French could not "expect an answer during the elections"; things, moreover, appeared "to be looking a little more favourable, and therefore" there was "less urgency." On the 21st, evidently, as his biographer thinks, disturbed as to the interpretation which might be put upon the "communications," he wrote to Grey:

> When would you like to have a Cabinet? Would 30th, 31st, or 1st do? Would you like the answer for the French to be confirmed by a Cabinet before it is given? (32)

Lord Ripon was also aware of the difficulty of the situation. He wrote to Lord Fitzmaurice, then Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that the French people seemed to be expecting armed assistance from Britain if the Morocco Conference broke down and serious trouble with Germany arose. He continued:

> If that occurs and we decline, as I think we ought to decline, to go farther than diplomacy will reach, I cannot but fear a cry of Perfide Albion! and a destruction of the present friendship between the two nations. The situation requires great wariness, but we may trust to Grey for that. (33)

Did Grey justify this confidence? From his last letter to his wife, which reached Fallodon too late to be read by her, it appears that he regarded his task as "tremendously difficult." (34) As always, he wanted to discuss things with her. But Grey did not do what in the situation should have been done, and should, indeed, in view of the attitude of the Prime Minister and Lord Ripon, have been a matter of course: he avoided a Cabinet Meeting and did not take his colleagues into his confidence. Further still, in a third interview with Cambon on January 31st Grey went beyond the view which he had expressed before. He said to the French Ambassador:

> I had taken an opportunity of expressing to Count Metternich my personal opinion, which I understood Lord Lansdowne had also expressed to him as a personal opinion, that, in the event of an attack

upon France by Germany arising out of our Morocco Agreement, public feeling in England would be so strong that no British Government could remain neutral. (35)

As a matter of fact Grey had said as much to the German Ambassador as early as January 3rd; Count Metternich had replied that Lansdowne had spoken of the impossibility of remaining neutral " in the event of an unprovoked attack by Germany on France "—adding the comment that " of course the question of what was unprovoked was one of interpretation. " (36)

It is quite clear that Grey spoke to Count Metternich about the possibility of British aid for France in more decided terms than Lansdowne had done in the preceding summer. But what is more important is that in a conversation with Cambon Grey went beyond his attitude of January 10th (" public opinion strongly moved in favour of France ") and held out the prospect, though speaking only for himself, of *armed British intervention.* Grey did this against the advice of Ripon, quoted above, and Earl Loreburn, another Minister in the Campbell-Bannerman Cabinet, writes :

Those who remember the House of Commons elected in January 1906, and its strong resentment at the Imperialist War in South Africa, will by no means agree that public opinion would in 1906 have rallied to the material support of France. It would have been vehemently opposed to it. . . . Our obligations concerning Morocco . . . were strictly confined to diplomatic support. . . . One can imagine the lively satisfaction of M. Cambon at discovering in the new Liberal Minister a man so well disposed towards his overtures. (37)

Let us bear in mind till later this strong expression of divergence of view, delivered as the calm judgment of a friend of Campbell-Bannerman. For the moment we must return to Grey's conversation with Cambon on January 31st, as it defines the attitude which Grey, as he himself writes, took up up to the outbreak of the world war. Grey

pointed out to Monsieur Cambon that at present French policy in Morocco, within the four corners of the Declaration exchanged between us, was absolutely free, that we did not question it, that we suggested no concessions and no alterations in it, that we left France a free hand and gave unreservedly our diplomatic support on which she could count; but that, should our promise extend beyond diplomatic support, and should we make an engagement which might involve us in a war, I was sure my colleagues would say that we must from that time be

consulted with regard to French policy in Morocco, and, if need be, be free to press upon the French Government concessions or alterations of their policy which might seem to us desirable to avoid a war. (38)

In these words Grey made it clearly understood that it was more to the advantage of the French to dispense with an official British declaration; they would so be able to proceed with more independence in regard to Morocco, and would need in the end to make fewer concessions, perhaps none at all; should Germany then attack France "without provocation," Grey regarded British intervention as following necessarily. It is, moreover, quite clear from Grey's words that he could not count with any certainty on his colleagues' acquiescence. He said to Cambon that

much would depend as to the manner in which the war broke out between Germany and France

—raising at once the question of Belgium, which was already under discussion in Brussels with the British Military Attaché there; and Grey added:

I did not think people in England would be prepared to fight in order to put France in possession of Morocco. (39)

Cambon, evidently acting on instructions, had tried to secure "some form of assurance," but Grey replied that he could not give this without submitting the matter to the Cabinet; they would certainly consider the matter of sufficient gravity to call for a written engagement, and its formulation would raise difficulties. With this Cambon expressed himself as satisfied. He could, indeed, in Earl Loreburn's view, be well satisfied with Grey's attitude, and Grey himself bears witness to the satisfaction of the French Ambassador. (40)

Grey takes great pains in his Memoirs to make his reasons understood for not bringing the matter before the Cabinet. But his explanations do not satisfy anyone acquainted with the circumstances here described. Here again, as in the House of Commons on August 3, 1914, he relies on the contention that it would have been impossible to summon a meeting of the Cabinet during the elections, as he himself was only at the Foreign Office three days in the week, and the remaining days in his constituency, and other Ministers were in a similar situation.

Apart from Campbell-Bannerman, Grey only took his friend Haldane, and presumably Asquith, into his confidence. Here is what Loreburn has to say as to this :

> Sir Edward's phraseology rather conveys that his selection of confidants was casual. But Mr. Asquith and Lord Haldane were with himself Vice-Presidents of the Liberal League, a continuation of the Liberal Imperialist movement which had supported the South African War and opposed Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman on that subject.
>
> There was no difficulty whatever in summoning the Cabinet during the Election to consider so grave a matter. A good many members of the Cabinet were in London or within an hour of it, while those whom he consulted were at a distance. And there are railways and post offices in Great Britain. (41)

It must also be mentioned that on the very day on which Grey had this long conversation with Cambon, January 31, 1906, *there was a meeting of the Cabinet.* This beyond question was the right occasion on which the Cabinet should have been informed of the matter. If Cambon came *before* the meeting, Grey could easily have asked him to come back after it or on the next day. Grey was still in London on February 1st. Loreburn was thus quite right in saying that the withholding of the matter from the knowledge of the Cabinet must have been deliberate. (42)

Loreburn also expresses strong doubts whether Campbell-Bannerman was fully informed of the scope and significance of what had happened. (43) Ponsonby, who was then the Prime Minister's private secretary, stresses this. Ponsonby has stated that Campbell-Bannerman was never on friendly terms with Grey or Haldane and never consulted them ; had the Prime Minister realized the importance of the matter, he would certainly not have said nothing about it to his friends Loreburn and Morley. (44)

J. A. Spender subsequently maintained in his biography that Campbell-Bannerman was kept informed from the first. In any case we have the statements of Campbell-Bannerman already quoted, and there is a further letter from him to Lord Ripon dated February 2, 1906, which runs as follows :

> The secretary (Grey's private secretary) said that Cambon appears satisfied. But I do not like the stress laid upon joint preparations. It comes very close to an honourable undertaking : and it will be known on both sides of the Rhine.
>
> But let us hope for the best. (45)

Is one to infer that the Prime Minister was in fact fully informed of the matter ? I hardly think so. For Spender states that Bannerman gave his consent to the " communications " on the understanding that they were *provisional and precautionary* measures, and that the Government was not bound by their results. (46) Grey's own view was that it was not bound. But the essential point is that these " provisional " measures were continued without a break from January 1906 up to the outbreak of the world war ! Campbell-Bannerman clearly had in mind the existing situation, i.e. merely the Algeciras Conference. Moreover, it is only in evidence that the Prime Minister received copies of the Grey despatches mentioned above. There is no evidence that Campbell-Bannerman had sufficient knowledge of the substance of Grey's conversation with Haldane in the middle of January ; and there is, especially, nothing to show that the Prime Minister ever learned of the important military conversations in Brussels which began on Haldane's initiative in January 1906 and went on uninterruptedly until April.

On February 1, 1906, Grey was called to the death-bed of his wife, who had been thrown from a carriage while driving. Spender writes :

> When Sir Edward returned ten days later, the crisis had passed and the question of military preparations had ceased to be urgent. (47)

In saying this Spender gives the definite impression that as the crisis was apparently over the military " conversations " were no longer of importance, and that the Cabinet was therefore no longer concerned with it. He clearly accepts Grey's official version. But the statement that the crisis was over before the middle of February is *quite wrong*. Grey himself, in a very grave conversation with Metternich on February 19th, spoke of the " deadlock " arrived at and of the possible rupture of the negotiations, and once more hinted at British intervention. (48) The crisis over the question of police grew worse, and was at its worst about the middle of March. Grey himself gives a full account of it. (49) Spender thus seems to be glozing over the matter. Earl Loreburn points out that from February 1st the weekly meetings of the Cabinet were regularly held. (50) Grey failed to take advantage of them.

Looking back in the light of riper experience, Grey now admits that the Cabinet should have been consulted. But the reason that he gives for not having done so in 1906 is entirely unconvincing. He considered it would be useless to expect and unreasonable to ask the Cabinet to authorize him to give the French any promise. And he clings to his contention, many times repeated, that he kept Britain's hands completely free. (51) Of this more later. The first question is why Grey kept the matter secret.

His plea of inexperience must be admitted. Grey was particularly inexperienced in military matters. But if we consider the account given above—Grey's attitude towards Campbell-Bannerman ; the revelation that the latter expressed uneasiness in regard to the military conversations, and that Lord Ripon also was unwilling to go beyond diplomatic support of France ; the knowledge that Campbell-Bannerman's friends in the Cabinet would certainly support his view and Lord Ripon's ; Grey's strong sympathy for France, his feeling of obligation to come to her aid in a war " forced " on her, a feeling, as Earl Loreburn points out, by no means shared by British public opinion at the time—we are bound to feel a conviction that Grey's main reason for not placing the matter before the Cabinet was a foreboding that the majority of the Cabinet would not agree with his point of view. (52)

However this may be, one thing is certain. In these first important actions and omissions during his period of Office as Foreign Secretary Grey inaugurated that double policy of commitment in honour and preservation of a nominally " free hand " which, though not so intended, became an element of grave danger to peace. It was a policy of concealment and enforced deception, embarked on through inexperience and weakness, through decided partiality and an innate tendency towards autocracy ; a two-edged policy incapable of straightforward defence and necessarily ending in mystification. It was a fatally indefinite policy, but it was persisted in with remarkable adroitness and consistency for more than eight years, through a series of grave crises, amid uneasiness on the part of Grey's colleagues and of Parliament, until on August 3, 1914, overwhelmed by the turn of events, he lifted a corner of the veil—still clinging to the fiction of the " free hand " and still concealing the

essence of the situation—and unwillingly disclosed the outlines of the truth.

On the afternoon of February 1, 1906, Sir Edward Grey received a telegram saying that his wife, to whom he had been married for twenty years, had been thrown from a carriage near Fallodon. She died on February 4th without regaining consciousness. Grey's few lines on the tragedy show plainly how deeply the memory of it affects him to this day. He had always been in the habit of discussing everything with his wife, and she had apparently had considerable influence on his decisions. (53) The joy of life had been destroyed. "For some time, to the one left alone, the past seemed more real than the present. Thought was arrested and work was crippled." People who had to deal with Grey at the time sometimes felt that his soul was turned to stone. There was universal sympathy for him. He suggested to Campbell-Bannerman that he should resign, but he encouraged him to remain in Office. (54)

There can be no doubt that the shock of his wife's tragic death contributed to Grey's allowing matters, as already described, to drift.

The Military "Conversations" and the Letter to Cambon.

The Algeciras Conference came to its end. Grey considers that those Ministers who attended the Committee of Imperial Defence must gradually have learned of the fact of the military conversations. But there is no further mention of them in his papers until 1911. (55) Meanwhile in 1908 Campbell-Bannerman had died and Asquith had become Prime Minister. Grey wrote to him on April 16, 1911 :

> Early in 1906 the French said to us, "Will you help us if there is war with Germany?"
>
> We said, "We can't promise, our hands must be free."
>
> The French then urged that the military authorities should be allowed to exchange views, ours to say what they could do, the French to say how they would like it done, if we did side with France. Otherwise, as the French urged, even if we decided to support France, on the outbreak of war we shouldn't be able to do it effectively. We agreed to this. Up to this point C.-B., R. B. H., (56) and I were cognizant of what took place—the rest of you were scattered in the Election.

The military experts then conversed. What they settled I never knew—the position being that the Government was quite free, but that the military people knew what to do, if the word was given.

Unless French war plans have changed, there should be no need of anything further, but it is clear we are going to be asked something. (57)

The last sentence referred to a report from the British Ambassador in Paris. Search has been made for this report in the archives of the Foreign Office, but it has been impossible to identify it. There is no difficulty, however, in guessing its contents. The French were preparing, in open contravention of the Act of Algeciras, to march on Fez, which they reached on May 21, 1911. The British were evidently expecting Paris to ask whether they would give France material support if war with Germany ensued. Grey writes :

The situation was precisely the same as at the time of the Algeciras Conference ; we could give no pledge. But the military conversations must naturally have been active. (58)

On September 5, 1911, six weeks after Lloyd George's threatening speech at the Mansion House, Asquith wrote to Grey :

Conversations such as that between General Joffre and Colonel Fairholme seem to me rather dangerous ; especially the part which refers to possible British assistance. The French ought not to be encouraged, in present circumstances, to make their plans on any assumptions of this kind.

Grey replied on September 8th :

It would create consternation if we forbade our military experts to converse with the French. No doubt these conversations and our speeches have given an expectation of support. I do not see how that can be helped.

The note ended with the reassuring information that the German negotiations with France appeared to be " going to enter upon exceedingly tedious but not dangerous ground." (59)

The essential facts revealed by this exceedingly important correspondence are that Asquith, who had been Prime Minister since the spring of 1908, evidently had no definite knowledge of the military " conversations " begun in 1906 until April 16, 1911 ; that Grey never learned what the British and French military experts had settled between themselves, and apparently had no

desire to know, regarding it as a purely military matter which did not concern him, and desiring also to be in a position to say that the Government was free; that the French, on beginning a move in Morocco which tore up the Act of Algeciras, expected a German protest, and the British apparently had the same expectation; that Asquith, now better informed, found the "conversations" "rather dangerous" and feared that they might encourage the French; that Grey anticipated French "consternation" if the "conversations" were stopped, and so admitted that the British Government was already committed to the French Government through the "conversations"; and that Grey had further to admit that the "conversations" had had the effect of giving the French "an expectation of support," deepening the commitment already incurred.

Grey emphasizes, quite rightly, that

> these letters relate, not to a *general* expectation on the part of France that military support would be forthcoming, but to an expectation concerned only with the Agadir crisis. (60)

But this limitation, as we shall see, does not by any means dispose of the existence of the *general* commitment.

The Agadir crisis, Grey proceeds, brought the military "conversations" into prominence; "they must have been familiar to several members of the Cabinet in discussion at the Committee of Imperial Defence," and in any case the fact of their taking place became known in 1912 "to other members of the Cabinet":

> Those Ministers who had not been directly informed of them were entitled to know exactly how we stood with the French. There was no reluctance to have the whole matter discussed at the Cabinet. The only difficulty arose from the thing having gone on so long without the Cabinet generally being informed. Ministers who now heard of these military conversations for the first time suspected that there was something to conceal. If the conversations really did not commit the country, as I stated, why should the knowledge of them have been withheld? There was a demand that the fact of the military conversations being non-committal should be put into writing. I had the impression that some Ministers, who had not been members of the Committee of Defence, expected some demur to this, and were suspiciously surprised at the immediate assent to the proposal given by myself and Asquith. I had made it so plain to Cambon that the Government must remain absolutely free and uncommitted, that I

anticipated no difficulty whatever in getting a satisfactory exchange of notes with him on behalf of ourselves and the French Government. I knew he understood and accepted the position, and would make no difficulty; and, if there had been any doubt raised, I was prepared to contend that the military conversations must stop and not be resumed till the condition of them was made clear. I therefore agreed, readily and at once, to the proposal that this condition should be put in writing.

We proceeded to draft the letter in the Cabinet, and again I thought I was conscious of a little surprise that words unqualified and explicit were agreed to. The letter, as approved by the Cabinet, was signed and given by me to Cambon, and I received one in similar terms from him in exchange. From that time onwards every Minister knew how we stood. (61)

Let us take note of the following points in connexion with this interesting narrative: The Ministers who in 1912 were still unaware of the fact of the conversations taking place were entitled, in Grey's view, to be informed of it; as the "conversations" had been proceeding since 1906, it follows that they should have been informed from the beginning; Grey gives no explanation of the way the Ministers who had been left in the dark learned the facts; he connects the matter with the Agadir crisis, which will not do, for the text of the letters was drafted at once in the first sitting of the Cabinet and the Grey-Cambon letters are dated November 22 and 23, 1912, a whole year after the crisis was over; (62) Grey himself had not felt called on to enlighten his colleagues as to the "conversations," so that the initiative in the Cabinet discussion must have come from another source; and the Ministers who had not been informed before were naturally thoroughly suspicious, but their doubts were set at rest by Grey and Asquith.

Lord Grey does not say how the discussion arose—he does not even say he has forgotten, but leaves the point untouched—and we have to turn to Raymond Poincaré for further information. Poincaré connects the Grey-Cambon exchange of letters with the Anglo-French naval agreement of September 1912, which will be dealt with later. He writes:

We were unable, as a matter of fact, to modify the distribution of our naval forces and abandon the protection of the Channel and Atlantic coasts unless we could be assured that in case of peril there would be conversations on the attitude and, if need be, on the measures to be taken.

Apparently on Cambon's suggestion, Poincaré authorized the proposal to the British Foreign Secretary of an exchange of letters :

> Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey accepted in principle this idea . . . and on October 30, 1912, the British Government at a Cabinet Council adopted a text in conformity with M. Cambon's suggestion and setting forth precisely that if war appeared to be inevitable the two Governments would bring into operation the military and naval conventions eventually drawn up by the two general staffs. (63)

This throws a different light on Grey's incomplete and, on some essential points, misleading narrative ; and one is involuntarily reminded of Poincaré's decided objection to an Anglo-German formula of neutrality which was considered by the London Cabinet, of which Isvolsky, the Russian Ambassador in Paris, gave such a revealing report on December 5, 1912. Isvolsky wrote that Poincaré

> declared to the British Government that the British signature to a treaty of this sort with Germany would destroy at a blow the existing Franco-British relations, since there existed no written agreement of a general political character between France and Britain. (64)

It can scarcely be wrong to assume that there was some connexion between the suspicion in Paris of the Haldane mission with its possible consequences and the Grey-Cambon exchange of letters. (65) However this may be, Poincaré now had, in this exchange of letters, the " written agreement of a general political character " of which he had so felt the want at the time of the Anglo-German neutrality negotiations in the spring and summer of 1912. For the final paragraph of Grey's letter ran as follows :

> I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the general staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them. (66)

It is true that the letter opened with the statement that the consultations that had taken place between the naval and military experts of the two countries did not restrict the freedom of the

British and French Governments to decide whether or not they would assist one another by armed force. But while Grey's assurances to Cambon in 1906 and 1911 had been *personal* and merely from man to man, France now had a written engagement committing the British Government to discuss with France the joint measures to be adopted in the event of French apprehension of " an unprovoked attack " or, and this is the most important point in the letter, French expectation of " something that threatened the general peace." No wonder Grey thought that Cambon " would make no difficulty " and that Cambon very wisely did make none (even apart from the fact that, according to Poincaré, Cambon and Grey had already discussed the wording). The simple agreement concerning Morocco, engaging Britain to give merely *diplomatic* support, had now been developed into an Entente, covering *everything* " that threatened the general peace " and thus no longer restricted to a German attack on France. Again and again Poincaré wrote with deep satisfaction that the exchange of letters had " strengthened," " sanctified," " confirmed " the Entente. (67) And Paul Cambon actually brought forward the letter on July 30, 1914, though there had been no sign of a German " attack " on France or march through Belgium. It is only astonishing that the members of the British Cabinet took the drafting of the letters so casually. One is compelled to ask, especially in view of the resignation of several members of the Cabinet in August 1914, Was the Cabinet placed in autumn 1912 in full possession of information, was it frankly told of the *scope* of the military " conversations," which had grown into a real military *convention* ; was it, especially, made aware of the *naval agreement* already existing with France, dealing with the naval strength of the two Powers in the Mediterranean and on the northern coast of France, the agreement which, as early as August 2, 1914, was already forcing Great Britain to come into the war ? Questions to which as yet no answer can be given.

The Nature of the " Conversations."

In " Twenty-five Years " Grey keeps to the phrase " conversations " of the British and French naval and general staffs ; he very rarely writes of " discussions " and still more rarely of

"plans." In his famous speech in the House of Commons on August 3, 1914, moreover, he gave it to be understood that these "conversations" had remained confined to the two crises over the Morocco question. This, at all events, he no longer adheres to in his Memoirs. But there is a method, a tactical purpose, in this continual reference to mere "conversations." For what were these "conversations"?

At the end of December 1905 Major Huguet, the French Military Attaché in London, said to Colonel Repington that in the event of war the Germans would probably attack France "through Belgium." (68) Quite clearly Grey was aware of this; on January 9, 1906, he wrote to Campbell-Bannerman that the War Office must be ready to decide on its attitude in the event of war with Germany, "if, for instance, the neutrality of Belgium was violated." (69) Repington had at once "urged" the French "not to dream of violating Belgium," and Huguet had "assured" Repington on January 5th "definitely" that France would not. (70)

In the middle of January 1906 the British Military Attaché in Brussels began the well-known negotiations with the Belgian Chief of Staff, which lasted until April 1906 and were described by the Belgians themselves as concerned with "Conventions anglo-belges." The British were not to march into Belgium until *after* Belgian neutrality had been violated by Germany. During the negotiations the two general staffs exchanged important information. The Belgians, in doing this in an entirely one-sided way, and making no similar agreement with Germany to cover the case, which was also feared by leading Belgians, of a French invasion of Belgium, undoubtedly violated the *spirit* of their neutrality. This was no justification of Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality in 1914. The propaganda use made during the war of the "Conventions anglo-belges" as a justification of Germany's action (71) was a mistake.

Haldane found in January 1906 that if war came Great Britain would only be able to place some 80,000 men on the Continent, and it would take more than two months to reach even this small figure. (72) By the end of 1910 he had solved the problem which faced him in 1906—how a force of 160,000 men could be concentrated "at a place of assembly to be opposite the Belgian frontier," "which had been settled between the staffs of France and Britain," in order to operate jointly with the

French armies, " with the assistance of Russian pressure in the East." (73) Haldane's studies in the late summer of 1906 at the German Ministry of War had, as he himself admits, substantially facilitated his task. (74) Be it noted that from 1906 onwards the British counted on the co-operation of the *Russian* army in the East, (75) and that the " conversations " did not come to an end, as Grey first gave to be understood, with the termination of the Algeciras crisis, in April 1906, but were continued, although there was no further serious tension between Germany and France until the summer of 1911. In the midst of the Agadir crisis of that summer the French Chief of Staff was able to say to his Russian colleague at a conference between the French and Russian general staffs that on and after the twelfth day of mobilization the French army would be in a position

> to take the offensive against Germany—with the assistance of the British army on its left wing. (76)

And the minutes of a similar conference held exactly two years later, in August 1913, read :

> Telegraphic communications between the Russian and French general staffs can be made by the British cables with British assistance. The agreements with London have just been concluded, (77)

—clear enough evidence of the growing intimacy between the British and *Russian* military authorities.

In conversation with the diplomats of the friendly Powers Sir Edward Grey did not always use the cautious euphemisms which we find in his public speeches and his Memoirs with regard to what was going on between the British and French general staffs. Even then, however, he only spoke of an " arrangement " and of " agreements." (78) In Paris no reason was seen for such discretion. Thus Isvolsky reported to Sazonov on December 5, 1912, two months after the outbreak of the Balkan War :

> Since the beginning of the present crisis M. Poincaré has continually been urging the London Cabinet to engage in confidential discussions in order to gain a clear knowledge of the attitude which Britain proposes to take up in the event of a general European conflict. As to this Britain has hitherto entered into no engagement. The London Cabinet answers again and again that its attitude will depend on circumstances,

and that the question of war or peace would be decided by public opinion. On the other hand, every conceivable possibility has been examined by the French and British general staffs, and not only has this gone on without intermission but the existing naval and military agreements have quite recently been considerably extended, so that the Anglo-French military convention is now worked out in every detail like the Franco-Russian, and equally exhaustive. The only difference is that the former only bears the signatures of the Chiefs of the two general staffs and is thus hardly binding on the Government. A few days ago General Wilson, (79) the British Chief of Staff, came secretly to France, and on this occasion various remaining details were worked out. For the first time, apparently, the work was joined in not only by the military but by other representatives of the French Government. (80)

This passage clearly shows once more the ambiguous position in which Great Britain had been placed by Grey's indecision. London was unable either to say Yes or No, but the relations between the military authorities were growing still more intimate, and now " other representatives of the French Government " were associated with the matters agreed on. Britain's entry into the war depended on " circumstances " and on public opinion. On what " circumstances " ? There was war in the Balkans, with consequent risk of a sudden breach between Russia and Austria, entailing German and French participation in hostilities. Here, as in 1914, there was no question of an " unprovoked " attack by Germany on France, but simply that of the play of alliances. In the Balkan war, as in 1914, we were simply experiencing " something that threatened the general peace," and from this example it is very evident how greatly the exchange of letters between Grey and Cambon extended Britain's commitments.

And Grey's modest " conversations " ? By the end of 1912 they were in reality an Anglo-French military *convention*, " worked out in every detail," and " exhaustive." Raymond Poincaré, indeed, to whom we have already been indebted for other valuable information not to be found in Grey's utterances, speaks in his latest work not of *a* military convention but of military *conventions*, in the plural ! (81)

The Obligations of an Alliance.

Now for the naval " conversations." Their first beginnings need not concern us further. After the failure of the Haldane

mission and the British inability up to the summer of 1912 to induce Berlin to stop naval construction, there came a definite change of policy. Britain decided, in agreement with France, on a redistribution of her fleets; her battleships were to be transferred from the Mediterranean to the North Sea, and France, abandoning the defence of her Northern and Western shores, was to send all her capital ships into the Mediterranean. The First Lord of the Admiralty was then the clear-sighted Winston Churchill. He was one of the few who were acquainted with the military "conversations" and realized their effect. Later he wrote as follows on the introduction of this policy:

> A step of profound significance and of far-reaching reactions. Henceforward the relations of the two staffs became increasingly intimate and confidential. . . . Mutual trust grew continually in one set of military relationships, mutual precautions in the other. However explicitly the two Governments might agree and affirm to each other that no national or political engagement was involved in these technical discussions, the fact remained that they constituted an exceedingly potent tie. (82)

Churchill clearly foresaw the effect that the joint naval steps now agreed on would have. We read in his book:

> The moral claims which France could make upon Great Britain if attacked by Germany, whatever we had stipulated to the contrary, were enormously extended. Indeed my anxiety was aroused to try to prevent this necessary recall of our ships from tying us up too tightly with France and depriving us of that liberty of choice on which our power to stop a war might well depend. When in August 1912 the Cabinet decided that naval conversations should take place between the French and British Admiralties, similar to those which had been held since 1906 between the general staffs, I set forth this point as clearly as possible in a minute which I addressed to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary.

The principal passages in this minute of August 23, 1912, to Asquith and Grey ran as follows:

> The point I am anxious to safeguard is our freedom of choice if the occasion arises, and consequent power to influence French policy beforehand. That freedom will be sensibly impaired if the French can say that they have denuded their Atlantic seaboard, and concentrated in the Mediterranean on the faith of naval arrangements made with us. This will not be true. If we did not exist, the French could not make better dispositions than at present. . . . Neither is it true that we are relying on France to maintain our position in the Mediterranean. . . .

If France did not exist, we should make no other disposition of our forces.

. . . If we were attacked by Germany, we should not make it a charge of bad faith against the French that they left us to fight it out alone ; and nothing in naval and military arrangements ought to have the effect of exposing us to such a charge if, when the time comes, we decide to stand out.

This is my view, and I am sure I am in line with you on the principle. I am not at all particular how it is to be given effect to, and I make no point about what document it is set forth in. (83) But [consider] how tremendous would be the weapon which France would possess to compel our intervention, if she could say, " On the advice of and by arrangement with your naval authorities we have left our Northern coasts defenceless. We cannot possibly come back in time." Indeed [I added somewhat inconsequently], (84) it would probably be decisive whatever is written down now. Everyone must feel who knows the facts that we have the obligations of an alliance without its advantages, and above all, without its precise definitions.

Churchill continues in his book :

The difficulty proved a real one. The technical naval discussions could only be conducted on the basis that the French Fleet should be concentrated in the Mediterranean, and that in case of a war in which both countries took part, it would fall to the British Fleet to defend the Northern and Western coasts of France. The French, as I had foreseen, naturally raised the point that if Great Britain did not take part in the war, their Northern and Western coasts would be completely exposed. We, however, while recognizing the difficulty, steadfastly declined to allow the naval arrangements to bind us in any political sense. It was eventually agreed that if there was a menace of war, the two Governments should consult together and concert beforehand what common action, if any, they should take. The French were obliged to accept this position and to affirm definitely that the naval conversations did not involve any obligation of common action. This was the best we could do for ourselves and for them. (85)

The final sentences refer to the Grey-Cambon letters, which the usually open Churchill curiously does not actually mention. Here we have British confirmation that the exchange of letters arose out of the naval convention ; it is possible, however, that the impulse to the exchange of letters did not come entirely from Poincaré and Cambon but also from Winston Churchill. The main question is, When the letter to Cambon was under discussion, were all the members of the Cabinet informed of this important minute of Churchill's ? In any case we must keep in mind that Asquith and Grey were urgently warned by their

colleague that in spite of reserves made on paper, they were in actual fact taking on themselves " the obligations of an alliance " in the naval agreement. (86)

The " Obligation of Honour "—A Gross Deception.

Unlike the military " conversations," Grey at least once (perhaps more than once, but we have at present no document to show it) gave the naval " conversations " their true name. At the end of May 1914 he said to the Russian Ambassador, Count Benckendorff, that the British naval staff had the agreements concerning the navy which had been worked out jointly by France and Britain. (87) If then, as we saw from his letter to Asquith, Grey had in April 1911 no knowledge of what the two general staffs had been conversing about, he knew at all events that there was a regular naval *agreement* between Britain and France ; he spoke even of agreements in the plural. In the American edition of the Siebert documents the word used is " conventions." (88) Yet, four weeks later, he assured Lichnowsky that there existed as yet neither an alliance nor a convention between Britain on the one part and France and Russia on the other. (89)

Was this simple lying ? To maintain this would be an injustice to Sir Edward Grey's complicated nature and his involved processes of thought. The agreements with France were merely technical, merely special agreements between expert officials, with which he had no direct concern ; in his view they did not affect his province, the political relations of the Empire. His exchange of letters with Cambon bore witness that there existed *no political agreement*, that Great Britain was free. . . .

Grey is by no means alone in this imaginative declaration. Asquith also holds firmly to it, and with them both millions of Englishmen who refuse to be argued out of this cherished tradition.

Let us first consider the military conventions. The material available does not, it is true, enable incontrovertible proof to be brought that the military " conversations " absolutely bound Britain. Churchill, however, was of the opinion that " they constituted an exceedingly potent tie " between Britain and France. Another Minister in the Asquith Cabinet, Earl Loreburn, went still further. He was outraged at the deliberate

withholding of the fact that " conversations " were taking place from the Cabinet, to which he had belonged from December 1905 until June 1912 ; he himself had, as a Minister, never heard anything about them. In 1919, when he was still only incompletely informed as to the scope of the " conversations," he wrote :

> We were brought into the war because Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey and their confidants, by steps some of which are known while others may be unknown, had placed us in such a position toward France, and therefore also toward Russia, that they found they could not refuse to take up arms on her behalf when it came to the issue, though till the end they denied it to Parliament, and probably even to themselves. . . We went to war unprepared in a Russian quarrel (90) because we were tied to France in the dark. . . . In effect it (Grey's policy) left the peace of Great Britain at the mercy of the Russian Court. (91)

As early as December 1914 the " Spectator " wrote :

> If Germany had tried to invade France by the direct route instead of by way of Belgium, we should still have been under a profound obligation to help France and Russia. It is useless to tell us that we were free to act as we pleased. . . . All our dealings with France—our sanction of her line of policy, our military conversations with her staff, our definite association with her acts abroad—had committed us to her cause as plainly as though we had entered into a binding alliance with her. And what is true of our understanding with France is true in a scarcely less degree of our understanding with Russia (92)

Other papers have expressed similar judgments. (93) Morel paid special attention to this side of the history of the events leading up to the war. (94) He shared Loreburn's indignation at the concealment from Parliament and the public, and he showed the psychological nature of the commitment in the following emphatic passage :

> Between diplomatists " conversations ' signify discussion, negotiation—talk, in short, which may have its sequel in acts, but which may not. " Conversations " between military men belonging to different countries who have to work out . . . practical details relating to the movement of large bodies of troops, are *acts* involving further acts, setting in train complicated and delicate machinery in a hundred different centres. When two Governments authorize their Military and Naval Staffs to " converse " as to eventual military and naval action against a common potential foe, they set in motion the entire mechanism of their fighting services. A relationship of a particularly intimate char-

acter is thereby set up which reacts, and is bound to react, in an infinity of direct and indirect ways, upon the policy of the two Governments. Mutual obligations—in a material, if not in an official sense—are incurred. The Governments which authorize such " conversations " have taken a definite step which they can only retrace at the expense of turning friendly relations into unfriendly ones . . . (95) When they (" conversations ") consist, as they do and must consist, of a careful survey of the actual field of potential operations ; of the selection of points for concentration and defence ; of the selection of ports for disembarkation ; of the settlement of a multitude of plans, interlinked one with the other, vitally affecting the disposition of both armies—their binding character is apparent. (96)

The justice of this must be clear to anyone who has any acquaintance with these matters. Sir William Tyrrell, Grey's private secretary, was perfectly aware of it. Prince Lichnowsky reports him as saying in the spring of 1914 to a British journalist that there were signs that French military circles thought it was worth while to try to get a military convention, and as adding :

This, however, is impossible, as a military convention always includes a political engagement of some sort.* (97)

British historians have admitted the far-reaching commitment involved in the " conversations "—among them C. R. Beazley, (98) Dr. G. P. Gooch, (99) G. Lowes Dickinson, (100) the Canadian John S. Ewart, (101) Bertrand Russell, (102) Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, (103) Bernard Shaw. (104) Winston Churchill, in his quite un-English outspokenness, pregnantly summed up the situation in August 1914 :

It is true to say that our Entente with France, and the military and naval conversations that had taken place since 1906, had led us into a position where we had the obligations of an alliance without its advantages. . . . We were morally bound to come to the aid of France. (105)

It was still possible to point with a show of justice, as Grey did and continues to do, to his repeated reservations and especially to the Cambon letter, and to declare that the Government *was* free. But even those who actually think that it was, but admit the play of their own natural feelings in considering the matter, must allow that at least a *moral obligation* had been created.

* The words quoted from Sir William Tyrrell are a retranslation from German.

Grey will not have even this. He writes with reference to the last days before the outbreak of war :

> In that week the most pressing appeals were made to us to promise help, but not once in all the arguments used to me did either the French or Russian Governments or their Ambassadors in London say or imply that we were under any obligation of any kind. The appeal was made to our interest ; it was never suggested that our honour or good faith was involved. (106)

Grey is in error here—greatly in error. It is true that the *official* documents say—as yet—nothing to contradict him. But, indeed, it is not usual for diplomats to hold a pistol at one another in this way. Yet Paul Cambon did so at one agitated moment. Later, in conversation with an Englishman, he said :

> On the morning of Saturday, August 1st, there had been another Cabinet meeting. Afterwards, I saw Grey, who told me that their Government had not been able to decide upon intervention in the war. He spoke very gravely. I replied that I could not and would not tell my Government that. (107) "After all that has passed between our two countries," I exclaimed, "after the withdrawal of our forces ten kilometres within our frontier . . . ; after the agreement between your naval authorities and ours by which all our naval strength has been concentrated in the Mediterranean so as to release your fleet for concentration in the North Sea, so that if the German Fleet sweeps down the Channel and destroys Calais, Boulogne, and Cherbourg, there can be no resistance, you tell me that your Government cannot decide upon intervention ? How am I to send such a message ? It would fill France with rage and indignation. My people would say you have betrayed us. It is not possible. I cannot send such a message. It is true the agreements between your military and naval authorities and ours have not been ratified by our Governments, but there is a moral obligation not to leave us unprotected." (108)

Cambon, speaking from memory, may have rather dramatized this scene, but even if this is so he has given further evidence of the extent of Grey's error. On the morning of August 2, 1914, just after he had been with Grey, Cambon, whose discretion Grey so praised, said to a friend :

> I do not know whether we shall have to-night to strike the word "honour" out of the English vocabulary. (109)

Another member of the French Embassy in London has since borne witness to this phrase of Cambon's. (110)

Many Englishmen in high places felt the obligation of honour towards France. Grey's friend Winston Churchill, as we have seen, considered that Britain was " morally bound " to come to the aid of France. Lord Lansdowne spoke in the Upper House on August 6, 1914, of Britain's " sacred obligations." Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, who had such intimate glimpses of events through his relations with leading personalities, knew it :

> The obligation of fighting in alliance with France in case of a war with Germany concerned the honour of three members only of Asquith's Cabinet, who alone were aware of the exact promises that had been made. (111)

Grey can, indeed, be contradicted on this point out of his own mouth ; it is only necessary to read through his speech in the Commons on August 3, 1914. Austen Chamberlain, too, in the Lower House, said on February 8, 1922, as Leader of the House :

> There was not a word on paper binding this country, but in honour it was bound as it had never been bound before. (112)

G. P. Gooch has summed up the matter admirably as follows :

> A policy of limited liability is easy to define, but difficult to execute. Sir Edward Grey declared, on August 3rd, that every Member could construe the case for himself ; but his whole speech breathed the conviction that we should be for ever disgraced, if we left France in the lurch. The assurances that we were unpledged were formally correct, but inaccurate in substance. " There was a moral obligation not to leave us unprotected," declares M. Paul Cambon, who was in a position to know. " We were tied to France inextricably," wrote an acute critic, (113) " tied by countless invisible threads such as fastened down Gulliver while he slumbered in the land of little men." Mr. Lloyd George himself afterwards came to feel that we had not been really free. " We had a compact with France," he declared on August 7, 1918, " that if she were wantonly attacked we would go to her support." Mr. Herbert Samuel at once interposed that there was no such compact or contract obliging us to fight ; and the Prime Minister, accepting the correction, confessed that the word " compact " was too strong. " In my judgment," he added, " it was an obligation of honour." And such will doubtless be the judgment of History. (114)

" Obligation of honour "—such is the verdict of history. Viscount Grey of Fallodon, and a continually dwindling group around him, still disagree. Lack of sense of honour ? Hypocrisy ? Insincerity ? No : self-suggested blindness, tactics, and system.

John S. Ewart, the Canadian lawyer and historian, has plainly shown how in the crisis of July 1914 Grey repudiated all liability towards France (115)—excepting the obligation to defend her Northern and Western shores (of which more later). Thus when the crisis came Grey recognized no commitment arising out of the *military* agreements, and no obligation of *honour*. How could he do this? Was he entirely faithless?

Let us try to understand his line of thought, or rather his mind and his soul. In January 1906 he began the "conversations" on the condition that the Government must remain free. In doing this he had the feeling that he was keeping something from his colleagues which, as he now admits, they had a right to know. The more this feeling oppressed him, and at moments of grave crisis the feeling must have been strong, the more he clung to the contention that the Government was free. He said it a dozen times to the French; he believed it himself; he fairly hypnotized himself into the conviction that "My hands are free." He took no interest in the military "conversations" —deliberately. (116) He had no intention of knowing what was going on. To know might have wrecked his peace of mind, which was virtually undisturbed. From the need of self-protection (a necessity to weak natures) he built round himself a sort of wall covered with big letters—"the Government is free." During the Balkan crisis of 1912 he sighed with relief when at last the Cabinet became acquainted with the "conversations"; for now he had it in black and white—"the Government is free," and the Cabinet now shared his responsibility. So he suggested to himself that the shadow was a reality, and he was honourably convinced of his personal unfettered state while actually, as Gulliver in Lilliput, he was bound captive by a thousand threads.

Hence, too, his repudiation of British liability in the crisis of July 1914, sure of his just dealing, sure of his uprightness and good faith.

The observer from outside, dispassionate and without entanglements, sees that the words and deeds of such men are in more or less flagrant contradiction with realities. He says to himself, "This man is not genuine, he is hypocritical, insincere." The subject of this judgment has no personal sense of shortcoming; auto-suggestion has made his honour subjectively immaculate. (117)

Sir Roger Casement, arch-Anglophobe as he was, bore witness of his own knowledge that Sir Edward Grey sincerely believed all that he said.

Yet the fact has been pointed to by some people that on August 3, 1914, in reading in the House of Commons his letter to Cambon, Grey omitted the important final passage, and this has been taken as evidence of bad faith. It was agreed in the letter that should there be reason to expect an unprovoked attack or " something that threatened the general peace," the British and French Governments were immediately to discuss the measures to be taken in common ; and the final passage ran :

> If these measures involved action, the plans of the general staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

As Grey always spoke only of " conversations," and, moreover, gave the impression on August 3, 1914, that they had belonged to the period of the Morocco crises, it has with good reason been concluded that he *deliberately* suppressed the final sentence, as otherwise it would have been evident that instead of mere " conversations " there existed " plans of the general staffs " in complete readiness for putting into operation. So far as I know, the first person to draw attention to this was Francis Neilson, who until 1915 was a member of the Lower House and went in that year to America. (118) The matter was exhaustively dealt with by E. D. Morel in " The Secret History of a Great Betrayal," (119) and finally Ewart (120) came to the same conclusion as Morel.

Grey states that the charge of omitting the final sentence only reached his ears in 1923, and that his first impulse was " to deny the thing as impossible." He found, however, that it was so.

Grey had been interrupted in the reading of the letter by Lord Charles Beresford, who had asked the date of the letter. He says that this interruption may have caused the omission, or that perhaps he thought the last sentence unimportant ; he was in any case unconscious of an omission. (121)

Grey is certainly in error in describing the final sentence as unimportant. There are other things which he describes in his book as unimportant ; we shall be concerned with them later.

As, however, there is no definite knowledge of the circumstances in which the sentence was omitted, I leave this matter for the present. I have less hesitation in doing so inasmuch as another passage in Grey's speech in the Commons, taken in connexion with his Memoirs, provides evidence of a gross deception which it is difficult to suppose to have been unconscious. After telling the elected representatives of the nation that he left it to each of them to judge for himself as to the extent of the obligation entailed by friendship, he continued :

> The French Fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the Northern and Western coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French Fleet being concentrated in the Mediterranean, the situation is very different from what it used to be, because the friendship which has grown up between the two countries has given them a sense of security that there was nothing to be feared from us. The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French Fleet is in the Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries.

In this speech Grey had already referred several times to the " conversations " between the military and naval authorities of the two countries, but each time he had emphatically declared that no obligation was imposed by them on Great Britain. And Grey took care not even to hint that the concentration of the French Fleet in the Mediterranean, with the consequent exposure of the Northern and Western coasts of France, *was the result of an agreement between the two naval staffs*. We may recall the urgent warning in Churchill's minute of August 1912 to Asquith and Grey that Great Britain's hands must be kept free, and his statement as First Lord of the Admiralty that it was not true " that we are relying on France to maintain our position in the Mediterranean " ; we may recall Churchill's declaration in advance that whatever might be " written down now," that is, whatever reservation might be made as to the Government's free hand, Britain would have " the obligations of an alliance." In spite of this, Grey, two years later, left it to be supposed that the distribution of the fleets had arisen simply from the feeling of friendship of confidence and security, which had grown up between the two countries. We may also recall that as recently as May 1914 Grey had said to Count Benckendorff that the British naval staff had the agreements concerning the navy which

had been worked out jointly by France and Britain—and the most indulgent observer will have no alternative but to declare that in speaking on this occasion on August 3, 1914, only of "friendship," "security," and "confidence," Sir Edward Grey consciously concealed from his countrymen and from the world the critical fact that at least on this point of the naval agreement a situation had arisen in which Great Britain was bound to intervene on the side of France. Grey was aware of this situation. (122) For less than twenty-hour hours before this the Cabinet had authorized Grey to give Cambon the assurance

> that if the German Fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British Fleet will give all the protection in its power. (123)

This assurance amounted in point of fact to Britain's entry into the war, before the German ultimatum had been issued in Brussels. (124) Cambon was quite clear as to this. He wrote later in his Memoirs :

> I was satisfied that the game had been won. A Great Power does not go to war with half measures. The moment it decides on carrying on war at sea it has no choice left but to prosecute it on land as well. (125)

Grey, indeed, has himself admitted the justice of this inference. After saying in his speech of August 3rd that his feeling was that Britain could not look on with arms folded while the undefended coasts of France were being bombarded ; that, moreover, the situation in the Mediterranean might become threatening for British interests ; and after reading to the House the assurance given to Cambon, he said that Britain could only keep outside the war if she immediately issued a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. This, however, was impossible, for—

> We have made the commitment to France that I have read to the House which prevents us from doing that. (126)

Thus Grey knew very well on August 3rd that the promise to France had made British neutrality impossible. Here stands plainly revealed the enormous breach in Grey's "free hand" bulwark, behind which he has sought in vain to shelter himself. The breach was so great that even Grey saw it in alert

moments ; he must have seen also that this breach, quite apart from the thousand smaller breaches of the military " conversations," made of his desperate bulwark a heap of ruins once it felt the impact of harsh reality. Since 1906, however, he had again and again denied all obligations and promised Parliament to keep Britain's hands free ; on this August 3rd, therefore, he found himself compelled to commit a gross deception, talking of " friendship " and keeping back the fact of the naval convention. This inevitably and finally shatters belief in Grey's good faith.

There is no restoring that belief from Grey's own explanations in his Memoirs. For in this book Grey *entirely omits all mention of the naval convention* of September 1912, (127) of which his friend Churchill gives so interesting an account ; he keeps carefully to the fiction that there was nothing beyond " conversations," or at most " consultations " ; he protects himself, so to speak, against the term " conventions " (which is contained in the Siebert documents) with the remark that he had no knowledge of the term applied by the naval and military authorities ; they had in any case no binding effect. But shortly afterwards he makes the following admission :

> The disposition of the British and French naval forces—the latter being in the Mediterranean, leaving all the north coast of France exposed to the German Fleet—was evidence that there was some arrangement between British and French naval authorities. (128)

All this makes a lamentable impression. Lord Grey, however, fails to see that his reference to the " evidence " of some " arrangement " is a finishing stroke administered by his own hand to his insincere declaration of August 3rd about " friendship " determining the distribution of the fleets.

In this matter, indeed, Viscount Grey of Fallodon makes yet further self-exposures. He mentions, to begin with, that the suggestion of the protection of the French coasts did not emanate, as might have been supposed, from the Francophil group in the Cabinet, but came " spontaneously from the anti-war quarter and was based, first, simply on the ground of feeling and sentiment." He continues :

> But on consideration it was reinforced by a very powerful argument of a different kind . . . the French Fleet was in the Mediterranean ;

the main British Fleet in the waters of Great Britain. The French north and west coasts were therefore left entirely without naval defence. Had not the naval conversations then placed France (if we stood aside) at a positive disadvantage ? Had they not, in fact, created an obligation, in spite of express stipulations that they were not to do so ? This consideration did not originate the suggestion of guaranteeing the French north and west coasts, but it clinched it. (129)

Unfortunately we are not told who was the anti-war Cabinet Minister who made the suggestion ; nor when it was made. The date, however, is of special importance. For, as we saw above, after the meeting of the Cabinet on August 1st, Cambon expressed indignation at its indecision, and Grey called up the picture of the destruction of Calais, Boulogne, and Cherbourg. We know also from the French Yellow Book that Grey—*also after a Cabinet meeting on August 1st*—said to Cambon that he would

propose to his colleagues that they should declare that the fleet will oppose the passage of the German squadrons through the Straits ; or, if they passed the Straits, any demonstration on the French coasts. (130)

Herein lies, plain for all to see, the direct connexion between Cambon's protest and Grey's admission of the implications of the naval convention. Ten years later Grey declares that the proposal for the protection of the French coasts came from the anti-war quarter of the Cabinet on the ground of feeling and sentiment. This amounts to a statement that Grey himself had no direct connexion with the proposal. This is inconsistent both with the official account given by Cambon and with his subsequent unofficial narrative. (131)

Lord Grey has a peculiar habit of representing things which do not fit in with his own conceptions as of little importance. Thus he describes the final sentence in his letter to Cambon as unimportant ; the secret clauses of the Anglo-French Morocco Agreement of 1904, in his view, did not greatly matter ; the military and naval " conversations " were and are in his eyes without political significance. These tactics of brushing aside whatever is inconvenient to him, and of silencing the voice within, appear again at the end of his account of the promise of protection given to France on August 2, 1914 :

This naval point ceased to have any direct influence on the decision of the British Government. But the Belgian point had then become paramount, and the naval point was therefore no longer a decisive one. (132)

Here Lord Grey comes into direct conflict with his declaration of August 3, 1914, in the Commons; he then brought forward the protection of the French coast as the *first* reason, and the Belgian question, which had not then become critical, as "also" a reason for the impossibility of declaring British neutrality. There is thus not only a striking conflict between Grey and Cambon but a still more remarkable conflict between Sir Edward Grey in 1914 and Lord Grey in 1925. Such is the end of the efforts of the noble lord to infuse with a semblance of life his fiction of the maintenance of freedom of action.

Quite apart from these inconsistencies, Grey himself bears witness that the suggestion of giving France naval protection was "reinforced by a very powerful argument of a different kind," the naval "conversations," and that this consideration "clinched the matter." He thus admits once more as clearly as could be, as in his speech of August 3rd, the obligation arising out of the "conversations." And he seems to be so entirely in the thrall of the fixed idea of the "free hand," as not to see that, as in 1914, so here his admission is a cut at his bared Achilles heel, so that henceforth, incurably wounded, he must limp for ever through world history.

Addendum.

The reader will have observed that the foregoing pages make no reference to the new official British documents on the outbreak of the world war. (133) With the exception of a few additions from other recent publications, I have purposely left this chapter as it stood in December 1925—before the publication of these new Foreign Office documents. It seemed desirable to deal separately with the new British material in order to show whether or not it bears out what has already been said. The result is given below. We must glance first at the period before the Serajevo murder.

In May or June 1914 the German Government had learned of the negotiations between London and St. Petersburg for a naval convention (see Chapter III), and rumours of them in the Press had greatly disturbed German public opinion. No trust was placed in a démenti of Grey's in the Commons. Grey found it necessary to tell the German Ambassador on June 24th that he did not wish to mislead him by making him think

> that the relations that we had with France and Russia were less cordial and intimate than they really were. Though we were not bound by engagement as allies, we did from time to time talk as intimately as allies. (134)

And on July 9, 1914, Grey said to Lichnowsky that he must not

> be taken as meaning that no conversations had taken place between the Military and Naval authorities of France and Russia and ourselves. There had been some conversations from time to time : they began in 1906. But everything had been on the footing that the hands of the Governments were quite free. Indeed, if such conversations took place, it was not necessary for me to know what passed. The thing which concerned the Government and myself, and which it was necessary for me to keep in our hands, was whether we should or should not participate if a war arose. If we made any Agreement that entailed obligations upon us, it would not be a secret Agreement. I was pledged to Parliament not to make a secret Agreement of this kind and any such Agreement that was made would be laid before Parliament. (135)

This was entirely in harmony with Grey's attitude as we know it. He said nothing of the Anglo-French naval agreement —of course not : his hands were free. Yet, how did Grey's " conversations " work out in actual fact, according to the new material before us, in the crisis of July 1914 ?

There was an important conversation between the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg and the Russian Foreign Minister on July 25, 1914, at which the French Ambassador was present. Paléologue assured Sazonov that France placed herself unreservedly on Russia's side. Sazonov asked Buchanan for a similar assurance, but, as in a former conversation on the day before, (136) Buchanan declined to give it. Paléologue said to Buchanan that

> the French Government would want to know at once whether our (British) Fleet was prepared to play part assigned to it by Anglo-French Naval Convention. (137)

J. W. Headlam-Morley, the editor of the "British Documents," says with regard to this :

> In raising this question the French Ambassador was acting without instructions from his Government. It was merely a private observation arising out of his own personal interpretation of the situation.

This is quite true, and in point of fact the French Government did not raise the question until July 30th or August 1st. At the same time, Paléologue's words to Buchanan, spoken before the Serbian reply to the Austrian Note was known, are very significant : they clearly illustrate the conception which French official circles had of the naval convention into which Britain entered in 1912.

On July 30, 1914, Paul Cambon reminded Sir Edward Grey of the exchange of letters of November 1912. He did so on instructions from M. Viviani, the French Foreign Minister. (138) Grey said to him that the Cabinet was to meet on the following morning, and that he would see Cambon again in the afternoon of July 31st. (139) According to Cambon's report, however, Grey did not confine himself to these few words ; he added that he thought (with Cambon and the Quai d'Orsay) that

> the time has come to examine all the hypotheses and to discuss them together. (140)

The conversation must have taken place on the morning or at latest the afternoon of July 30th. On the 28th there had been critical developments in Berlin and St. Petersburg : Berlin had begun to put increasing pressure on Vienna in order to avoid graver complications ; Sazonov, with the military leaders in St. Petersburg, steered from that day with increasing resolution for world war. (141) In London the situation was misrepresented and in some measure misunderstood. But on the 30th there was no question of a German attack on France, though the situation mentioned in the Grey-Cambon exchange of letters—"something that threatened the general peace"—did exist ; it was not then clear, however, from which side the threat would mainly come. The bringing up of the letter by the French Government and Grey's willingness to enter into the question of its application thus show clearly how Lansdowne's Entente of 1904 had been developed through Sir Edward Grey's policy,

and especially the military and naval " conversations " which he had sanctioned, so that what was originally merely an agreement affecting Egypt and British *diplomatic* support of France in Morocco now closely approached an alliance in scope.

Grey's reply on July 31st " greatly disappointed " Cambon. The Cabinet had come to the conclusion that day, said Grey, that the Government " could not give any pledge at the present time." No British treaties or obligations were up to then involved. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium, Grey said, might be " an important factor in determining our attitude." Cambon repeated his question whether, if Germany attacked France, Britain would help her. Grey adhered to the reply he had given, adding :

> The latest news was that Russia had ordered a complete mobilization of her fleet and army. This, it seemed to me, would precipitate a crisis, and would make it appear that German mobilization was being forced by Russia. (142)

An exceedingly important sentence, suppressed in the British Blue Book of 1914. The order in which Russia and Germany mobilized was a crucial matter, and on July 31st Grey saw how matters actually stood. He rightly felt that the German mobilization, which was not ordered until 5 p.m. on August 1st, two full days after the Russian, " was being forced by Russia "—an admission of the utmost importance.

It should be observed that Cambon made no attempt to excuse the Russian mobilization ; instead he urged on the British Foreign Minister the injury that would be done to British interests if " France should be crushed by Germany " ; and he asked whether Grey " could not submit his question to the Cabinet again." To this Grey gave an indefinite answer ; Sir Arthur Nicolson gave a much more unequivocal assent. (143)

The Cabinet meeting on the morning of July 31st had disclosed to Sir Edward Grey and those Ministers who shared his attitude a very serious situation from their point of view : the overwhelming majority of the Cabinet was unable to resolve on active support of France. On that day, apparently shortly after the meeting of the Cabinet, (144) Sir Eyre Crowe, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, submitted a Memorandum to Sir

Edward Grey which is one of the most important of the new British documents. As will be shown in Chapter III, Sir Eyre Crowe exercised very considerable influence, so that the part he played in the Foreign Office may be compared with that of Holstein at the Wilhelmstrasse. Mr. Headlam-Morley in his introduction eulogizes the qualities and the sense of responsibility of Sir Eyre Crowe, and draws attention to this Memorandum as "specially remarkable." (145) The passage that concerns us here runs as follows :

> The argument that there is no written bond binding us to France is strictly correct. There is no contractual obligation. But the Entente has been made, strengthened, put to the test and celebrated in a manner justifying the belief that a moral bond was being forged. The whole policy of the Entente can have no meaning if it does not signify that in a just quarrel England would stand by her friends. This honourable expectation has been raised. We cannot repudiate it without exposing our good name to grave criticism.

Crowe opposed the contention (probably advanced at the Cabinet meeting) that "England cannot in any circumstances go to war"; to endorse this contention "would be an act of political suicide," and the question at issue was not whether Britain could but whether she "should go into the present war." This was "a question firstly of right or wrong, and secondly of political expediency." The Memorandum then concludes :

> If the question were argued on this basis, I feel confident that our duty and our interest will be seen to lie in standing by France in her hour of need. France has not sought the quarrel. It has been forced upon her. (146)

As we saw, on July 31st the Foreign Office was aware of the precipitate Russian general mobilization. Grey, moreover, said to Cambon on August 1st that France was being drawn into the war by her alliance with Russia. (147) In Chapter IV the question will be discussed how and why the quarrel was "forced" on France. Here we are only concerned with the question of Britain's "free hand." On this it is quite conclusive that the influential Sir Eyre Crowe, who had full access to the most confidential sources of information, was convinced that "a moral bond" had been forged between Britain and France; that the "honourable expectation" had been raised that "in a just quarrel England would stand by her friends"; (148) that

Britain could not repudiate this without exposing her "good name to criticism"; and that Britain's "duty" (in addition to her interest) lay in "standing by France in her hour of need."

Sir Eyre Crowe was thus in entire agreement with Winston Churchill, with Lloyd George, with Earl Loreburn, with Lord Lansdowne, with Paul Cambon, with Austen Chamberlain, to name only leading Ministers and diplomats, (149) and after Crowe's declaration it becomes yet more incredible that Lord Grey should to this day try to deny any sort of bond, any sort of moral commitment, and any obligation of honour towards France. (150)

On July 30, 1914, France had brought forward the Grey-Cambon exchange of letters; on August 1st she brought forward the naval convention. It was a readier means than the letters of involving Britain in the impending war. Sir Arthur Nicolson sent on August 1st this Memorandum to Sir Edward Grey:

M. Cambon pointed out to me this afternoon that it was at our request that France had moved her fleets to the Mediterranean, on the understanding that we undertook the protection of her Northern and Western coasts. As I understand you told him that you would submit to the Cabinet a question of a possible German naval attack on French Northern and Western Ports, it would be well to remind the Cabinet of the above fact.

Grey put the following note on this:

I have spoken to the P.M., and attach great importance to the point being settled to-morrow. (151)

On that same August 1st, however, Grey had to say to the French Ambassador, after another meeting of the Cabinet, that Britain was not in a position at the moment to promise assistance to France: Germany would agree not to attack France if France remained neutral in the event of war between Russia and Germany, and if France could not it was because of her alliance with Russia. Cambon refused to transmit this reply to Paris, and pointed out that

The French coasts were undefended. The German Fleet might come through the Straits any day and attack them.

Grey replied that that might alter public feeling in Britain, and so might a violation of the neutrality of Belgium; Cambon could say that the Cabinet had not yet taken any decision on these points. (152)

Sir Edward Grey informed Sir Francis Bertie, the British Ambassador in Paris, of this conversation both by telegram and by letter on August 1st. (153) In the letter he wrote that Cambon had "very strongly" urged on him the British "obligation" to help France if she was attacked by Germany. Grey strongly contested the obligation, and said:

> It was most unreasonable to say that, because Frence had an obligation under an alliance of which we did not even know the terms, therefore we were bound equally with her, by the obligation in that alliance, to be involved in war.

M. Cambon admitted "that there was no obligation of this kind." The emphasis lies, of course, on "*this kind.*" Britain had certainly undertaken no obligation *arising out of France's obligations under her alliance with Russia.* But the question is, Had Cambon admitted that Britain had no obligation of any other kind towards France? The answer to this is to be found in Cambon's interview at a later date with an Englishman, quoted on page 97 above. The final passage may be repeated here:

> How am I to send such a message (of British non-intervention for the time being)? (154) It would fill France with rage and indignation. My people would say you have betrayed us. It is not possible. I cannot send such a message. It is true the agreements between your military and naval authorities and ours have not been ratified by our Governments, but there is a moral obligation not to leave us unprotected.

There is no question that the two accounts, Grey's and Cambon's, refer to one and the same interview on August 1st. Everything points to it having been an excited, even a stormy interview. It is, of course, possible that Cambon did not use such forthright language to Grey as his later account suggests; for Cambon knew exactly how to handle Grey. (155) For that matter, there are very many diplomatic interviews of which those directly involved have given widely divergent accounts; the British documents before us have some examples of this. What matters is less what were Cambon's actual words to Grey than

his conviction of Great Britain's *moral obligation.* Of this there is no possibility of doubt.

The essential points in the description here given of the proceedings of August 1st are Sir Arthur Nicolson's substantiation of the " fact " of the " understanding " under which Britain took over the protection of the northern and western coasts of France ; Grey's admission that the defencelessness of the French coasts " might alter public feeling in Britain " ; and his attachment of " great importance " to this point being settled on the following day. He also promised Cambon on August 1st that he would ask the Cabinet " to consider the point about the French coasts." (156) On August 2nd he gave the French Ambassador an aide-mémoire in which the first sentence ran as follows :

> I am authorized to give an assurance that if the German Fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping the British Fleet will give all the protection in its power. (157)

This assurance was qualified by certain reservations, but it amounted virtually to Britain's entry into the war, as already shown on pages 102–03. Paul Cambon himself wrote at a later date,

> I was satisfied that the game had been won.

It is plain that the new Foreign Office material now made available confirms the evidence of the non-existence of Sir Edward Grey's " free hand." Further, *Sir Eyre Crowe's Memorandum has indelibly affixed a British official seal to the fact of the actual commitment of Britain to France.*

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. Hamilton Fyfe, " The Making of an Optimist," London 1921, pp. 43–44.
2. Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, " My Diaries," Part II, London 1920, in many places ; Sir Roger Casement, " Gesammelte Schriften," Second Edition, Diessen vor München 1917, chapter " Sir Edward Grey," pp. 161–75 ; W. N. Ewer, the foreign editor of the " Daily Herald," in a review (October 2, 1925) of Grey's work, which concludes with Newton's " Diamond, Diamond, how little thou knowest what thou hast done " ; Hamilton Fyfe, pp. 40–44

(Fyfe worked in close association with Lord Northcliffe); Arthur Ponsonby, in a review of Grey's book in "The New Leader," November 13, 1925; Bernard Shaw, "Common Sense about the War" (Supplement to the "New Statesman," November 14, 1914), pp. 7, 8, 26; Bernard Shaw, "Peace Conference Hints," London 1919, pp. 24–26. These are only a selected few. Among leaders of the Labour Party one may often hear the view expressed that Grey was not equal to his post, and that he himself fails to this day to realize what he did and what others suggested to him. It is of interest to note that the London correspondents of the "Frankfurter Zeitung" (November 4, 6, and 7, 1925, first morning edition) and the "Münchner Neueste Nachrichten" (October 11, 1925) share this view. It is true that most of the British Liberal and Conservative papers in reviewing Grey's Memoirs declared him to have been a great Foreign Minister and a man whose whole energies were bent on world peace. But according to Dr. O. Gaupp, who for many years has been the London correspondent of the "Münchner Neueste Nachrichten," this was only done in order to bolster up the official story of the origins of the war. One thing is certain—that in conversation many Liberals and Conservatives express the same views as those here quoted.

C. J. O'Donnell, formerly a Member of Parliament, describes Grey as "inexperienced" and "stolid" ("The Lordship of the World," p. 12). Dr. Japikse, in "Mededeelingen van het Nederlandsche Comité," etc., April–June 1926, p. 33, calls him "a man of limited capacity, without much insight"; Jagow described him in January 1914 as "a naïve statesman."—G.P., Vol. 37, doc. 14692.

3. Blunt, "My Diaries," p. 160.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 351.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 352.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 382.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 446.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 416.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 471; see also pp. 252, 322, 385, 434, 447. E. F. Henderson, in an important study, privately printed in 1924, "The Verdict of History: The Case of Sir Edward Grey," makes the foregoing quotations from Blunt, and mentions that Whitman had the same idea of Grey (pp. 19, 37). On p. 181 Henderson writes that Grey was neither a bold nor a bad man, but the opposite—"a timid, good man." * But that very circumstance was "much worse, much more dangerous." * "Sir Edward was the last man in the world to whom the fate of a great people should have been entrusted." *

Henderson's estimate is entirely agreed with by Professor Harry Elmer Barnes, in "The Genesis of the World War," New York 1926, pp. 565–66, 580, where he speaks in strong terms of his ignorance and stupidity.

10. J. A. Spender, "The Life of the Right Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, G.C.B.," 2 vols., London 1923, Vol. 2, p. 194.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
12. Sir Roger Casement, pp. 167–68, 170; italics Casement's.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 161.
14. This will be dealt with further in Chapter III.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 213, 321.
16. Blunt, pp. 357, 385, 434. Arthur Ponsonby, Parliamentary Under-Secretary in the MacDonald Cabinet, in "The New Leader," November 13, 1925.

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* Retranslated.

17. Fyfe, p. 40; Spender, pp. 196–97; "Frankfurter Zeitung," November 6, 1925, first morning edition, "Fünfundzwanzig Jahre."

18. Fyfe, p. 40. Cf. O'Donnell, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

19. Vol. I, pp. 62–63.

20. Spender, Vol. II, pp. 193–94. Cf. Asecretis, in "Europäische Gespräche," July–August 1924, p. 343.

21. Blunt, p. 210.

22. Spender, Vol. II, p. 197.

23. Vol. I, p. 71; see also pp. 53, 112–13.

24. Vol. I, pp. 74–76.

25. "Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783–1919," Vol. III, 1866–1919, Cambridge 1923, pp. 342–43; Gooch, "Revelations," p. 167. Cf. J. A. Spender, Vol. 2, p. 248; Asecretis, "Tanger, heute wie vor Zwanzig Jahren" and "Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman," in "Europäische Gespräche," Jan.–Feb. 1924 and July–Aug. 1924; R. Poincaré, "Les Origines de la Guerre," Paris 1921, p. 79; Poincaré, "Le Lendemain d'Agadir," Paris 1926, pp. 187, 221 (174).—M. Dupuy, a Minister in the French Government, mentioned on one occasion "the British defensive and offensive alliance with France, drafted at Britain's desire under Delcassé"; the proprietor of the Paris "Matin" has spoken in similar terms; Baron von Eckardstein was convinced that a British offer of an "offensive and defensive alliance" had been made. Sie G.P., Vol. 20, doc. 6752, 6853, 6859; also doc. 6847, 6854, 6876, 6887, 6888; Vol. 21, doc. 7205. Besides Lansdowne, Sir T. Sanderson, Under-Secretary of State, dismissed the offer of assistance as a fable—see Vol. 20, doc. 6858, 6860, 6864, 6873. In Berlin the view was inclined to be held that Edward VII had made promises in Paris.—Doc. 6863, 6873; see also doc. 6879, and Chapter III, note 11, below.

26. Vol. I, pp. 76, 88.

27. Lord Fisher, "Memories" and "Records," London 1919; cf. Grey, Vol. I, p. 118, and G.P., doc. 6887.

28. Lieut.-Colonel Repington, "The First World War, 1914–1918," 2 vols., London 1921, Vol. I, ch. i. Cf. Grey, Vol. I, pp. 71–99, and Spender, pp. 248–58.

29. Vol. I, pp. 72–74.

30. Vol. I, p. 75.

31. Vol. I, p. 76.

32. Spender, Vol. II, pp. 252–53.

33. Quoted by Spender, Vol. II, p. 251.

34. Vol. I, pp. 81–82.

35. Vol. I, pp. 78–79. Grey went so far although he knew that the British General Staff was not ready for intervention.—Vol. I, p. 103.

36. Vol. 1, pp. 82–83. Cf. G.P., Vol. 20, doc. 6860; Vol. 21, doc. 6923. Apparently Grey expressed a yet greater measure of readiness to face the idea of war to various other persons; for the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires in London reported to Brussels on January 14, 1906: "Recently the Foreign Secretary has said several times to the various Ambassadors accredited to London that Great Britain has entered into engagements with France in regard to Morocco, which she will carry out in the fullest measure, at all costs, even should a Franco-German war ensue."—"Belgische Aktenstücke 1905–1914," Berlin 1915, doc. 15.

37. Loreburn, "How the War Came," London 1919, pp. 77–78. According to the German documents, feeling against Germany was considerably stronger in England in the summer of 1905 than during the Algeciras

Conference, which corresponds with Earl Loreburn's view. See G.P., Vol. 20, doc. 6652, 6657, 6712, 6726, 6741, 6752, 6844, 6846, 6849, 6855, 6858, 6859, 6863, 6864, 6867, 6870, 6881 ; Vol. 21, doc. 6923, 6946, 7180, 7206, 7211 ; Vol. 22, p. 494, footnote * ; Vol. 24, p. 494, footnote * ; Vol. 28, doc. 10255, 10348. Cf. Dickinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 133–34.

38. Vol. I, p. 79.

39. Vol. I, pp. 80–81.

40. Vol. I, pp. 87–88.

41. Loreburn, p. 80.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 81. Gooch remarks that Grey's " neglect to consult the Cabinet was a grave offence against the theory and practice of Ministerial solidarity."—" Cambridge History," Vol. III, p. 347, footnote.

43. Loreburn, p. 105.

44. Lujo Brentano, " Der Weltkrieg und E. D. Morel," Munich 1921, p. 54. Brentano's account is based on information supplied by Ponsonby.

45. Spender, Vol. II, p. 257. Words in brackets Lutz's.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 253.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 258.—On p. 253 Spender mentions that Campbell-Bannerman discussed the question of the military conversations with Haldane at the end of January. We read, however, nowhere of *what* Haldane said.

48. G.P., Vol. 21, doc. 7018.

49. Vol. I, pp. 104–12. G.P., Vol. 21, chh. clii, cliii. Dickinson, pp. 139–49, 152, deals fully with the police question as the " crucial point " in the Conference.

50. *Op. cit.*, p. 80, footnote.

51. Vol. I, pp. 77, 81–82, 85–87, 99, 251, and in many other places.

52. Grey writes, Vol. II, p. 1, that much of the working of the mind is subconscious. Perhaps he had in mind his concealment of the " conversations." Japikse, *op. cit.*, p. 33, considers that " subconscious influences " may have played a part with Grey.

53. Vol. I, pp. 100–02.

54. Vol. I, p. 101.

55. Vol. I, p. 93.

56. Campbell-Bannerman and Richard Burdon Haldane. Thus Asquith was not in the secret, though Grey maintained in the House of Commons on August 3, 1914, that he consulted Asquith in 1906. It may be observed that Spender has nothing to say as to this.—Haldane, Grey's most intimate friend, declared at the end of January 1907, in conversation with Count Metternich, that he did not know " whether non-committal conversations between British and French military persons had taken place or not." * He admitted the possibility " that a general staff officer of one country might have discussed warlike eventualities with a general staff officer of the other country." * He, Haldane, " had, however, no knowledge of it." * Berlin was very sceptical as to this. With the information that we now have Haldane's statement will be found altogether astonishing. See G.P., Vol. 21, doc. 7205, 7211, 7232. Haldane's attitude may be contrasted with the openness shown to Haldane by the Ministry of War in Berlin in the autumn of 1906 in giving him assistance in his task of reorganizing the British Army.

57. Vol. I, p. 94.—It appears from page 242 that Grey was uninterested up to the time of the Agadir crisis in the results of the " conversations," but assumed that the general staffs " were remaining in close touch."

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* Retranslated from Metternich's report.

58. Vol. I, pp. 94–95.

59. Vol. I, p. 95.

60. Vol. I, pp. 95–96. The word " general " italicized by Grey.

61. Vol. I, pp. 96–97.

62. Earl Loreburn, for instance, had heard nothing of the " conversations " up to his resignation in June 1912.

63. " The Origins of the War," London 1922, pp. 72–73. The curious fact that Grey was able at once to place before the Cabinet Council the draft of a letter which he knew that Cambon would accept, of course lends support to Poincaré's narrative. Recently, in " Le Lendemain," pp. 214 *sqq.*, Poincaré has amplified his earlier account of the origin of the exchange of letters and of their direct connexion with the naval agreements. From this account we must take the following as established : Cambon, greatly disturbed by the Haldane Mission (which will be dealt with in Chapter III), proposed to Sir Arthur Nicolson in April 1912, with Poincaré's assent, to make an exchange of declarations—mentioning the precedent of Lansdowne's action in 1905. Nicolson was in favour of the proposal, but said that Grey would have to place the matter before the Cabinet, in which there were certain members who were in sympathy with the Labour Party. On this the matter was allowed to drop (*op. cit.*, pp. 173–74). The naval agreements brought it up again. Cambon now, in September 1912, urged that France could not leave her shores exposed without being informed of British intentions in the event of German " insultes." Sir Edward Grey considered this reasonable, but pointed out that Britain could undertake no obligations without Parliamentary sanction. On this Cambon, again pointing to the Lansdowne " projets," spoke to Grey in similar terms to those used in April to Nicolson. At the end of October Cambon placed a definite draft before the British Foreign Secretary. Grey had meanwhile consulted with Asquith, who was concerned for Parliamentary rights in the matter. Eventually he yielded to Grey's pressure on two conditions ; there was only to be an exchange of personal letters, and their text must be approved by the Cabinet. Approval was given on October 30, 1912 (*ibid.*, pp. 214–20).

64. " Diplomatische Schriftwechsel Iswolskis," Vol. II, doc. 608. Poincaré's intervention was completely successful : " The London Cabinet declined the German proposal, greatly to the dissatisfaction of Berlin."

65. This has since proved to be correct ; see note 63, above.

66. Vol. I, pp. 97–98. For the significance of this letter, see also Loreburn, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

67. " Le Lendemain," p. 223 (also p. 186) ; " Les Balkans en Feu," p. 350. Note the fundamental divergence between Grey's and Poincaré's accounts : Grey suggests that the exchange of letters was the result of British initiative in order to establish Britain's " free hand " ; according to Poincaré the initiative was French, to *tie* British hands by a written engagement in view of the naval consultations. Bernadotte E. Schmitt finds virtually no difference between the last paragraphs of the two letters and the political clauses in the Franco-Russian Alliance.—" American Historical Review," April 1924, p. 459.

68. Repington, Vol. I, ch. i.

69. Vol. I, p. 118.

70. Repington, Vol. I, ch. i.

71. Bernhard Schwertfeger, " Der Geistige Kampf um die Verletzung der Belgischen Neutralität," Berlin 1919. See the " Conventions " section, on pp. 142–51. The negotiations were continued in September 1906 during the French manœuvres and in April 1912 in Brussels.—*Ibid.*, pp. 150–53.

72. Haldane, " Before the War," p. 32.

73. *Ibid.*, pp. 31, 33.

74. See ch. i and ch. ii, note 56.

75. Haldane definitely confirmed this in an interesting letter to " The Times " (December 16, 1918) ; the letter is quoted in Ewart, p. 515.

76. " Schriftwechsel Iswolskis," Vol. I, doc. 117.

77. *Ibid.*, Vol. III, doc. 1040.

78. Thus in September 1912 to Sazonov at Balmoral and in May 1914 to Count Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador in London. See " Schriftwechsel Iswolskis," Vol. II, doc. 508 ; Siebert, " Diplomatische Aktenstücke," pp. 814–15. According to Isvolsky, Grey spoke in Paris in April 1914 of the " land and marine conventions worked out by the general and naval staffs " (S.I., Vol. IV, doc. 1327) ; but it is not certain whether Isvolsky gave exactly Grey's words. In regard to the *naval* agreements Grey seems to have been more open with his friends—not, of course, with the public. (See below.)

79. As to General Wilson, see Churchill, " The World Crisis 1911–1914," p. 53.

80. S.I., Vol. II, doc. 608. Cf. Vol. IV, doc. 1344 ; Haldane, p. 35 (" contract ") ; " Documents relatifs aux Négociations concernant les Garanties de Sécurité contre une Agression de l'Allemagne," Paris 1924, no. 23 ; Poincaré, " Le Lendemain d'Agadir," pp. 183–84.

81. " Le Lendemain," pp. 182 (contents of chapter), 214. Charles-Roux, who was formerly in the French Embassy in London, also speaks repeatedly of the " accords militaires " in his article " Veillée d'Armes à Londres, 22 Juin–4 Août 1914," in the " Revue des deux Mondes," August 15, 1926, pp. 727, 729–31, 737, 739.

82. *Op. cit.*, p. 32.

83. This may be a reference to the subsequent Grey-Cambon exchange of letters.

84. Words in brackets added by Churchill in his book.

85. *Op. cit.*, pp. 92–94. The exact date of this naval convention is not known. It was concluded in September 1912 ; cf. " Schriftwechsel Iswolskis," Vol. II, doc. 429.

86. According to the German documents, Vol. 31, ch. ccxlviii, at the time of the transfer of the British Mediterranean Fleet there was a good deal of discussion in the British Press of the question of an Anglo-French Alliance. The " Manchester Guardian," June 13, 1912, expressed the view that the transfer to France of the defence of British interests in the Mediterranean must necessarily lead to an Anglo-French Alliance (doc. 11573). For the Anglo-French Naval Convention, see also Vol. 39, doc. 15595–96, 15621–22, 15622 Anlage ; Charles-Roux, *loc. cit.*, pp. 729, 742.

87. Siebert, pp. 814–15 ; cf. S.I., Vol. IV, doc. 1327, 1344.

88. " Entente Diplomacy and the World. Matrix of the History of Europe, 1909–1914," New York 1921, doc. 847.

89. Siebert, German edition, pp. 823–24 ; " Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch," Berlin 1919, Vol. I, doc. 5.

90. Loreburn is in error here. See Chapter III.

91. *Op. cit.*, pp. 183, 17, 107. Words in brackets Lutz's.

92. Quoted in Morel, " Truth and the War," 3rd edition, London 1918, pp. 190–1.

93. " The Candid Quarterly Review," May 1915 : " The story in brief is one of action—hidden from all and especially from the Cabinet—secretly taken from 1906 to 1911, and bringing England to unavoidable war in 1914."

" Morning Post," May 24, 1916 : " Sir Edward Grey made a show of consulting Parliament when the country had already been committed to the Entente policy and, indeed, to the war." Both quoted in Morel, pp. 273, 286.

94. " Truth and the War," especially chh. xxxiii, xxxiv ; " The Secret History of a Great Betrayal," London 1923.

95. I may recall Grey's own fear of French " consternation " if the " conversations " were stopped.

96. " Truth and the War," pp. 39–40, written in the autumn of 1914. The word " acts " italicized by Morel ; word in brackets Lutz's.

97. G.P., Vol. 39, doc. 15862. Military and naval conventions with France had been in existence for years when Tyrrell said this ; can he have been entirely without knowledge of them ? In 1887–88 the Austrian Government suggested discussions between the German and Austrian General Staffs ; Prince Bismarck then took up a very different attitude to Sir Edward Grey's. Bismarck took steps to repudiate responsibility, for the Foreign Office and for himself, " for the political consequences of this military conversation " ; he scented in the Austrian proposal a desire to upset the alliance, and went so far as to irritate the Emperor Francis Joseph, who in January 1888 expressed to the German Ambassador in Vienna his " regret that the conversations which he had proposed between the two general staffs had virtually met with a refusal from us."—G.P., Vol. 6, doc. 1163–97.

98. Preface to Morel's " Secret History."

99. " History of Modern Europe," pp. 558–59. " Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy," Vol. III, p. 508.

100. " The International Anarchy," pp. 398, 405, 470–71, 480.

101. *Ibid.*, pp. 111–31, 140, 528–48.

102. " Justice in War Time," London 1924, p. 123.

103. *Ibid.*, p. 450.

104. " Peace Conference Hints," p. 23.

105. *Op. cit.*, p. 205.

106. Vol. I, p. 85 ; also p. 340, especially in regard to the crisis in July 1914.

107. For this reason the documents contain nothing on the matter.

108. " The Times," December 22, 1920.

109. *Ibid.* General Wilson's attitude in September 1911 had given the French General Staff the confident expectation that, in the event of an attack on France, Britain would intervene.—Poincaré, " Le Lendemain," p. 184. Cf. A. Fabre-Luce, " La Victoire," Paris 1924, pp. 176–77.

110. According to Charles-Roux, p. 739, H. Wickham Steed, then Foreign Editor of " The Times," called on Cambon on July 31, 1914, and asked him what he intended to do. Cambon replied, " J'attends de savoir si le mot honneur doit être rayé du vocabulaire anglais."

111. *Op. cit.*, p. 450.

112. Quoted in Ewart, p. 122 ; on p. 118 the opinion of Major-General Sir George Aston is quoted.

113. Footnote by Gooch : " In ' The Candid Review,' edited by Mr. Gibson Bowles."

114. " Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy," Vol. III, p. 508 ; cf. Gooch, " Revelations," pp. 146, 178. Earl Loreburn, for years Grey's colleague in the Cabinet, has laid strong emphasis (*op. cit.*, pp. 225–26, 243), on the obligation of honour towards France ; so also W. H. Dawson in " Richard Cobden and Foreign Policy," London 1926, pp. 261, 264–65, 269, 271, 274–76, 278–79, 288–89 (" secret agreements . . . having all the moral and binding force of a military alliance "). The obligation of honour is also

admitted by Dickinson, p. 470 ; O'Donnell, p. 103 ; Barnes, p. 516 ; S. B. Fay, in K.F., December 1926, p. 902. See also Japikse, p. 32 ; P. Renouvin, " Les Origines Immédiates de la Guerre," Paris 1925, p. 221 (The British Government felt bound by the conventions) ; Charles Seymour in " The Intimate Papers of Colonel House," 2 vols., London 1926, Vol. I, pp. 244, 283 (Britain morally bound). See especially the Addendum to this chapter.

115. *Op. cit.*, pp. 115 *sqq.*

116. According to Charles-Roux, p. 729, Sir Arthur Nicolson, Permanent Under-Secretary since 1910, pushed on the negotiations of the general staffs " with all his energy " ; can he too have been uninterested in the nature of the " conversations " ? It is improbable.

117. Auto-suggestion, the source of definite impressions in contradiction with reality, is much more widespread than is generally supposed. Judges and doctors are well acquainted with it. Everyone knows of the medical treatment by suggestion, producing beneficent subconscious auto-suggestions or driving out harmful ones. What we find so unpleasant in Englishmen, and feel to be " cant " and hypocrisy, may be described as national auto-suggestion.

Earl Loreburn mentions, *op. cit.*, p. 134, " the faculty of believing what you wish to believe," and says on p. 16 that Grey " no doubt believed " in his free hand. Count Metternich reported on January 3, 1906, that Sir Edward Grey impressed him as " a straightforward, open man," " of whom one knows what one has to deal with " ; on August 1, 1908, he found him " an honest and peaceable opponent." Prince Lichnowsky frequently mentions Grey's " open," " honourable and straightforward " nature. G.P., Vol. 21, doc. 6923, 7100 ; Vol. 24, doc. 8219 ; Vol. 34, doc. 12979 (but see the Emperor William's final notes on doc. 13252 !) ; Vol. 37, doc. 14700, 14923 ; Vol. 38, doc. 15319. Cf. Barnes, p. 566 ; Dickinson, p. 35 ; Japikse, p. 33.

118. " How Diplomats Make War," New York 1915.

119. London 1923, pp. 11 *sqq.*

120. *Op. cit.*, pp. 118, 185, 541.

121. Vol. II, pp. 16–17.

122. See Appendix to this chapter.

123. Vol. II, pp. 299–301.

124. Earl Loreburn, p. 2 : " That definite promise of armed naval support against Germany which irrevocably pledged us to war." See also Loreburn, pp. 212–13 ; Shaw, " Common Sense," p. 8 ; Henderson, pp. 203, 205. Churchill, pp. 201–02, is also clear as to this. See also Ewart, pp. 122, 129, 140, 187 ; Barnes, p. 452 ; Dickinson, pp. 405, 480 ; Gooch, " Cambridge History," p. 502 ; Fabre-Luce, pp. 228–29 ; Renouvin, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

125. " Revue de France," July 1, 1921. Cf. " Carnets de Georges Louis," Vol. II, p. 150 ; Charles-Roux, p. 742.

126. Vol. II, p. 307 (157). Grey added : " We have got the consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from an unconditional neutrality." Grey thus gave the obligation to France first place ; Belgium " also " had to be considered—a secondary consideration. In Vol. II, p. 10, Grey points out that in his speech in the Commons on August 3, 1914, he carefully distinguished between his personal view and the mind of the Cabinet. The fact should be noted, therefore, that Grey here says " we." Grey made the declaration quoted in the House of Commons, although the German Ambassador had already officially informed him that in the event of British neutrality Germany would not approach either the Channel or the north coast of France. Grey informed the House of this, but added the significant words that this was

" far too narrow an engagement for us." It has quite naturally been concluded from this that Grey had no intention in any case of letting slip the obligation of the defence of the shores of France as a ground for going to war. See " Die Deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch," doc. 669, 676, 714–15, 746. The Emperor William regarded the rendering of the German Fleet impotent against France as a British act of war.—Von Tirpitz, " Deutsche Ohnmachtspolitik im Weltkriege," Hamburg 1926, pp. 24–25.

127. Dr. Japikse also finds it " very striking " that Grey makes no mention of this distribution of the fleets.—*Op. cit.*, p. 32.

128. Vol. I, p. 295 ; see also pp. 285, 290–91.

129. Vol. II, pp. 1–3. Words in brackets in quotation Grey's.

130. French Yellow Book, doc. 126. Cf. British White Book, doc. 148.

131. French Yellow Book, doc. 126. " The Times," December 22, 1920. I draw attention to the fact that Cambon declined to report the attitude of the British Cabinet to Paris. Grey's statement may be true that the proposal was put forward in the way he describes. In that case chance came to his aid. At the same time he gave the promise mentioned on Cambon's representations, and quite evidently *before* any suggestion from elsewhere.

132. Vol. II, p. 3. It will be shown in Chapter IV, " The World Conflagration," that for the British Government Belgium was *not* the deciding reason for Britain's entry into the war.

ADDENDUM.

133. " British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914." Vol. XI, " The Outbreak of War. Foreign Office Documents, June 28–August 4, 1914. Collected and arranged with Introduction and Notes by J. W. Headlam-Morley, Historical Adviser to the Foreign Office." London 1926. (Referred to in these notes as " B.D.")

134. B.D., 4. Grey expressed himself a shade more clearly to Colonel House : " as if they had an actual written alliance."—" The Intimate Papers," Vol. I, p. 285. For the British-Russian Naval Convention, see B.D., 5, 6, 7, 32, 39, 41.

135. B.D., 41.

136. B.D., 101.

137. B.D., 125. Word in brackets Lutz's. The passages quoted above appeared also in the British Blue Book of 1914.

138. Poincaré, " Le Lendemain," p. 222. French Yellow Book, 1914, German edition (" Das Französische Gelbbuch 1914," edited by A. von Wegerer, Berlin 1926), No. 101, p. 126, footnotes ** and ***.

139. B.D., 319.

140. French Yellow Book, No. 108. (English edition published in 1914 by " The Times," under the title of " France and the European War.") Charles-Roux also, p. 737, confirms that Grey admitted the exchange of letters on July 30.

141. See Chapter IV.

142. B.D., 367.

143. B.D., 367. French Yellow Book, No. 110.

144. This may be seen from the order of the documents.

145. B.D., pp. vii–viii.

146. B.D., 369.

147. B.D., 426, 447.

148. Note the plural. Crowe may have meant the French. More probably, however, he had France *and Russia* in mind.

149. Cf. section " The ' obligation of honour ' " in this chapter.

150. Mr. Headlam-Morley refers to Grey's Memoirs as showing that Grey was in substantial agreement with Sir Eyre Crowe's Memorandum. I do not take that to mean that Grey, who gave permission for the publication of the Memorandum (B.D., p. viii), now admits in retrospect the commitment and obligation of honour. Lord Grey is hardly likely ever to do that.

151. B.D., 424. Hitherto unpublished.

152. B.D., 426. Hitherto unpublished.

153. Telegraphic communication—B.D., 426. Letter—B.D., 447.

154. Words in brackets Lutz's.

155. Charles-Roux, p. 739.

156. B.D., 426.

157. B.D., 487. See also 495, 536, 566.

CHAPTER III

THE PILING OF THE FAGGOTS

> To remodel the anti-German combination so as to substitute America for Russia. . . . Such a remodelling was beyond Sir Edward Grey's capacity, and highly uncongenial to his class traditions and sympathies as a typical British Junker. He took to the Russian Alliance as a duck takes to water. . . . He was a busily agreeable drifter, trusting to amiable conferences to smooth over difficulties, and compliant with established power to such a degree that not even the Denshawai atrocity in Egypt nor the outrageous proceedings of the Russians in Persia had moved him to make himself disagreeable to the Anglo-Egyptian officials or to the Russian court, even though the cost of his compliance was the infamy of his country.
>
> BERNARD SHAW. (1)

THE MOROCCO CRISES.

THE political status of Morocco was defined by the international Madrid Convention of 1880, the principal parties to which were France, Great Britain, Italy, and Spain. The Convention declared the Sultan's complete sovereignty, the integrity of his country, and the right of most-favoured-nation treatment for all the Powers represented. In 1890 Germany concluded a Commercial Treaty with the Sultan, but only ratified it after the other Powers had been informed and raised no objection.

Britain recognized German rights in Morocco by repeatedly holding out the prospect of important concessions on the Atlantic coast of Morocco during the negotiations for an alliance in 1898–1901. But Germany was entirely passed over in the Anglo-French Agreement of April 8, 1904. In that agreement Britain waived her interests in Morocco in consideration of a free hand in Egypt. France expressly declared that she had " no intention of altering the political status of Morocco." Secret articles in the Agreement, however, provided for the partition of Moroccan territory between France and Spain, and on October 3rd these two Powers concluded a secret agreement (communicated to Britain) as to the manner of partition, issuing at the same time

a public joint declaration that the two Powers " remain firmly attached to the integrity of the Moorish Empire under the sovereignty of the Sultan." The Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish Secret Articles made of the international Madrid Convention of 1880 and the public declarations of Britain, France, and Spain a " scrap of paper." (2)

At first the German Government raised no objections, though it had already observed with uneasiness that British freedom of trade in Morocco was guaranteed only for thirty years. Then, in the autumn of 1904, the existence of secret articles became known. Finally, in February 1905, a French representative in Fez demanded a number of reforms which plainly revealed the French intention of setting up a protectorate. Were this done it would mean, under France's familiar colonial policy, the economic exclusion of all other Powers. Germany then decided to act. With some difficulty Count Bülow persuaded the Emperor William to land at Tangier (March 31, 1905), and at Berlin's instigation the Sultan asked for a fresh conference to be called. There followed the overtures of Lord Lansdowne, then Foreign Secretary, to M. Delcassé, the French Foreign Minister, Delcassé's fall (worked for but not actually demanded by Berlin), the efforts of M. Rouvier, the French Prime Minister, to come to a direct understanding with Germany, the ill-advised German refusal, and the Algeciras Conference.

Dr. G. P. Gooch has given the following account of the situation :

> The root of the trouble lay in the fact that M. Delcassé had not purchased Germany's assent in advance. The good will of Italy had been bought by recognition of her claims to Tripoli, that of Great Britain by assent to her position in Egypt, that of Spain by the hypothetical reversion of the northern littoral. Germany, it is true, was not a Mediterranean Power ; but her commerce was rapidly developing and her pride was morbidly sensitive. " With incredible blindness," wrote M. René Millet, " the Government took precautions with everybody except the only one of its neighbours whom it had serious cause to fear." (3) M. Delcassé, echoed M. Hanotaux, offered Germany a pretext for conflict, and chose the moment when Russia was locked in deadly conflict in the Far East. (4) In England, Mr. Gibson Bowles had foretold that Germany would send in her bill. It is regrettable that the British Cabinet did not perceive—or at any rate did not help France to perceive—the wisdom of securing German consent by a *solatium*. Though the Secret Treaties of 1904 reserved no share for Great Britain

in the contingent partition of Morocco, and though it has been argued (5) that it was reasonable for the contracting parties to make alternative arrangements in the event of Morocco collapsing from internal weakness, our share in a transaction which suggested double-dealing involves the British Government in partial responsibility for the crises of 1905 and 1911. (6)

The double-dealing evidenced in the discrepancy between the published agreements and declarations and the secret clauses is no longer disputed by anyone acquainted with the facts. Yet, to one's astonishment, one finds Grey writing as follows on the Anglo-French Agreement of April 1904 :

> It was all made public, except a clause or two of no importance, which were not published at the time, owing to regard, as I suppose, for the susceptibilities of the Sultan of Morocco : even these were published a few years later. (7)

Grey was not responsible for the agreements ; he had inherited them from Lord Lansdowne. But in 1906 he was, of course, thoroughly familiar with them, and his statement that the secret clauses were " of no importance " is an excellent example of his habit of dismissing any inconvenient fact as unimportant. The truth is that the secret clauses were in flat contradiction of the published statements of the facts made by France, Britain, and Spain ; (8) they formed the treaty basis on which France and Spain built up their dominion over Morocco ; and they were the main reason for the German counter-moves in Tangier, Algeciras, and Agadir.

Grey's addition that " these were published a few years later " is also misleading. It suggests that the Governments concerned published the secret clauses shortly after 1904. The truth is that they were not published until November 1911, when they appeared in the " Temps " and the " Matin." By then they had achieved their purpose—the Franco-Spanish protectorate over the Sultanate. From 1904 to 1911 the world was deceived as to the true character of the agreements. The principal sufferer was Germany. In the absence of knowledge of the secret clauses, Germany's line of action was condemned as unjustifiably provocative, though in point of fact it was Germany who was offered provocation.

Grey has himself given plain evidence of the double-dealing. He read the secret clauses as they were undoubtedly meant to

be read from the first by the parties to the agreements, saying to Cambon on January 31, 1906, that he left the French complete freedom in Morocco and gave them unreserved diplomatic support ; but that he did not think that

> people in England would be prepared to fight in order to put France in possession of Morocco. (9)

Thus according to Grey's own words the French acquisition of Morocco was the purpose of the agreement ; it could only have been so, for otherwise the French would have abandoned their old-standing rights in Egypt for nothing. All the more astonishing is the noble lord's contention that the secret clauses were of no importance.

Grey honourably fulfilled his promise to the French. As we saw, he was even prepared to give them armed support if the Anglo-French deal over Morocco—a country which belonged to neither of them—resulted in " unprovoked " German aggression against France. He was quite indignant when, owing to a misunderstanding, at the critical moment in March 1906 the French imagined that London was changing its attitude. (10) He was certainly a sincere and loyal friend.

However, Grey wanted a peaceful ending to the conference. He even suggested, in a letter to Campbell-Bannerman, dated January 1906, that a port on the west Atlantic coast of Morocco might be assigned to the Germans ; this would, perhaps, " solve all the difficulties of the Morocco Conference." He did this although he knew that up to then the British policy had been " to prevent Germany getting a port anywhere." He was not then aware that his predecessor, Lord Lansdowne, had already pressed the French under no circumstances to let the Germans have a port in Morocco. (11) Nor did they.

Meanwhile the conference once more confirmed " the threefold principle of the sovereignty and independence of His Majesty the Sultan, the integrity of his dominions, and economic liberty without any inequality," and the concluding Article 123 of the Act of Algeciras laid down that if existing treaties were found to conflict with the Act, the stipulations of the latter should prevail. This superseded the secret agreements as to the partition of Morocco, and no signatory Power was able to change the status quo without the consent of the others. (12)

Here was an admirable opportunity for Grey to withdraw with dignity from the double game which, it is true, he did not initiate, but he had continued out of friendship to France and loyalty to his obligations. Nothing now prevented him from declaring in Paris that the Act of Algeciras had clearly produced a new situation, and advising France to come to an understanding with Germany, offering her fair compensation. But advice on these lines would have been distasteful to Sir Edward, and probably the idea never occurred to him; for in spite of the international Act of Algeciras he considered the French entitled to use the opportunities that came of pocketing their share of the swag under the agreement of 1904.

Then ensued in August 1907 the brutal French bombardment of Casablanca, and in the autumn of 1908 there occurred in the same port an incident with deserters that aroused a great deal of excitement. (13) Prince Bülow declared at once, on September 28, 1908, that the incident "ought to be brought to an early conclusion with good will and without sharp practice on either side." Both on the French and the German side there had been violence. The incident was closed by an award of the Hague Court of Arbitration. The German proposal to recognize Mulay Hafid, the Sultan's brother and rival, in August 1908 aroused a good deal of resentment in Britain and France; the German Government, however, took up in the end a very conciliatory attitude, and as the Bosnian crisis had broken out none of the Great Powers desired serious complications. Good will on both sides not to make too much of the points of difference thus enabled the French and German Governments to arrive at an agreement in regard to Morocco on February 8, 1909. In this France once more reiterated her attachment to the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Morocco; Germany recognized France's "special political interests" in Morocco, and the two Powers agreed to economic co-operation in that country. The agreement, however, was never more than a paper transaction. The French showed no readiness to share economic opportunities with Germany. Even the colonial editor of the "Temps," then M. Philippe Millet, admitted that the Germans had good reason to feel bitter disappointment at the years of French procrastination and the failure to observe the agreement of February 1909. (14)

The occupation of Casablanca and a wide area round it by French troops was itself a violation of the Act of Algeciras, and there were others. Germany let them pass. When, however, the French, on very thin pretexts, proposed to march on Fez, Berlin urgently and repeatedly warned them against doing so. Grey also had doubts :

> If France took action, Spain was sure to do something in order to assert her influence. The whole Moroccan question would then be reopened. (15)

Nevertheless he publicly defended the march on the Moroccan capital in April and May 1911, which tore the Act of Algeciras into shreds. The Spaniards, among others, were of this opinion, and began accordingly in May a military occupation of the Moroccan territory within their sphere of influence. This produced the comic result of a protest from the French Foreign Minister, who warned the Spaniards on June 8th that " even a temporary military occupation would be an infringement of the Act of Algeciras ! " (16)

The Foreign Office showed the same unequal standards in its judgment of the German counter-move. There had been no necessity whatever for the march on Fez, but France had begun it in spite of the grave warnings from Berlin. Her Government appeared to be prepared to negotiate in regard to compensations, but Berlin remembered the unkept agreement of 1909, and very reasonably felt that fresh negotiations were unlikely to produce any adequate result unless it had the weapon of a pledge in hand. The French quite understood the " *Panther* spring " on Agadir on July 1, 1911, as a demand for serious negotiations for compensation, and at first took it fairly calmly. Not so London. Sir Arthur Nicolson said to the German Ambassador, " You are violating the Act of Algeciras," and Sir Edward Grey, who had himself foreseen that the French action would reopen the whole Moroccan question, now blamed Germany for creating " a new situation " ! (17) The Foreign Office had completely turned the facts upside down.

It should be noted that M. Caillaux, then Prime Minister of France, admitted that the sovereignty and integrity of Morocco as guaranteed by the Act of Algeciras could only be regarded as destroyed. The French Ambassador in Berlin, M. Jules Cambon,

was quite clear as to this, and so, evidently, was King George. Grey, however, expressed to Count Metternich on July 24th doubts " whether and to what extent " the Act had been infringed by the French ! (18)

It must be assumed that the British Government was not accurately informed at the time as to all that had been going on between France and Germany since February 1909 in the matter of Morocco ; otherwise Grey could hardly have observed to the Russian Ambassador in September 1911

> that the whole matter might have been settled if the Germans had gone to the French, when the latter reached Fez, and told them quietly that Germany must have a settlement. (19)

Clearly Grey supposed that the French would show a readiness that the German experience had proved non-existent. He appears to have to this day the same one-sided conception of the Agadir crisis as in 1911. (20) It must, however, be admitted that the German action must have seemed decidedly brusque, considering that only ten days before Kiderlen-Wächter had said to Jules Cambon, who was going to Paris, that he hoped he would bring something back with him. The result of this suggestion should certainly have been awaited. (21)

On July 1, 1911, Metternich had made clear in London what the despatch of the *Panther* meant : the German Government were ready to endeavour to find with the French and Spanish Governments " a definite solution of the Morocco question " ; the existing difficulties were " not insurmountable " ; and British assistance towards this end " would be gladly welcomed." (22) On July 4th Grey made certain objections ; he had to take into consideration not only his treaty obligations to France but also British interests in Morocco. (23). This was a plain hint that London would not tolerate Germany's obtaining a foothold in Morocco. Berlin had no such aim. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador in Berlin, was able to report to Paris on July 9th that the German Government " renounced all territorial claims in Morocco " and sought " colonial satisfaction in the Congo " by agreement with the French Government. (24) Franco-German negotiations began on this basis ; at Germany's request they were to be secret. Jules Cambon, however, reserved France's right to keep her friends and allies informed. (25)

Grey, however, was incurably suspicious of Germany. He admitted her right to compensations, as did Churchill, (26) but considered that she had opened the question " in the worst possible way " in sending the *Panther* to a port which was closed commercially and so, in Grey's view, making it clear that the protection of commercial interests was only a pretext. (27) It was, indeed, a threadbare pretext of very much the same character as those on the strength of which France and Spain had embarked on their illegal military occupation of Morocco. Grey, however, saw only Germany's proceedings. He immediately suspected that evil designs underlay the despatch of the *Panther*. Even in his Memoirs he dwells at length on " the real motive that underlay " her despatch to Agadir. Was it a second attempt to break the Entente Cordiale ? Or was the motive even to launch out into war with France ? And Grey noticed that the season was the very one which was selected by the bellicose German military leaders in 1870 and 1905. (28)

These grotesque suspicions of Grey's were deepened when he received no word from Berlin in reply to his communication of July 4th to Count Metternich. It was true that he had not expressly asked for a reply, but he regarded it as unusual for nothing to happen after a communication of such a nature. (29) It must be admitted that the German Government would certainly have been well-advised to give the Foreign Office another explicit assurance that it had no intention of injuring British interests ; and a hint of the understanding arrived at between Germany and France on July 9th might have had considerable effect in calming fears. (30) Instead, Grey's suspicions deepened with every day's silence, though he was kept continually informed by France of the progress of the negotiations begun with Germany. It remains, however, an unknown point how far Paris took the Foreign Office into its confidence. In any case the Russian Ambassador in London learned on July 19th from Nicolson and the French Chargé d'Affaires " that Germany is claiming a large part, if not the whole, of French Congo." (31) On the same day Grey telegraphed to Sir Francis Bertie, the British Ambassador in Paris :

> Since France considers that the demands made upon her by Germany are greater than she can consent to, it is evident that the French Government should now make counter-proposals which will embody

what concessions in the French Congo she is prepared to grant. Any concession there considered reasonable by France could not be objected to by us. (32)

Be it observed that in both cases only French Congo is mentioned: not a word of Morocco! Obviously, too, not a word from Paris to suggest that the German demands touched any British interests. Yet Grey was haunted by the idea of a partition of Morocco with Germany. (33) On July 20th "The Times" stated that Germany was making "pretensions so far-reaching . . . so extravagant . . . no French Government could for a moment entertain them . . . no British Government could consent to suffer so great a change to be made in the distribution of power in Africa, even were a French Government to be found feeble enough to sanction it"; and it spread the "rumour" that German marines had landed at Agadir. On this Grey, apparently entirely under the influence of this tendencious news, asked the German Ambassador to see him on the 21st. He identified himself with the news in "The Times" and hinted that it might become necessary to take some steps to protect British interests. Count Metternich said that he knew nothing of any German intention to establish a naval base in Morocco; he also refused to admit that the German demands were inacceptable. After Metternich's report of this rather excited interview Berlin at once sent a conciliatory message. (34) Grey, however, had not waited for this. On the same afternoon Lloyd George, who was also disturbed by the situation, saw him with the draft of a speech which, with Grey's consent, he intended to make on the following day, July 21st, in the Mansion House. Grey "cordially agreed." He thought what Lloyd George proposed to say was "quite justified" and "salutary." So Lloyd George hurled the well-known threatening speech across the Channel. (35)

It is obvious that Grey ought to have delayed the speech until he had heard from Berlin. That, clearly, could not have been until the morning of the 22nd. Lloyd George's speech was based on information received from the French Government. (36) This evidently referred to two conversations between Jules Cambon and Kiderlen-Wächter in Berlin on July 15 and 20, 1911. In the first the German Secretary of State had demanded as compensation the whole of French Congo; in the second, dissatisfied with the French attitude, he had threatened to return

to the Act of Algeciras, adding: " and if necessary we will go jusqu'au bout." Kiderlen-Wächter's downrightness and occasional vehemence were well known, and the conversation of July 20th ended more conciliatorily than it began. (37) There was no question of an " inacceptable " demand from France as supposed by Grey, " The Times," and other critics. The official news from Paris had clearly magnified matters, probably with the intention of getting Britain to put pressure on Germany. Lloyd George's speech thus had no sound basis, and in any case it was entirely inopportune.

Yet Lord Grey is capable even to-day of maintaining " that the speech had much to do with preserving the peace in 1911," by warning Berlin not unduly to stretch the bow! The truth is that nothing brought such danger to peace as this speech. (38)

It may fairly be doubted whether Grey is really convinced of what he says here. To justify himself he needs, of course, a militaristic and truculent Germany. But we are astonished to find that in his Memoirs the noble lord *has made no mention whatever of his important conversation with Metternich on July 21st*, in which Metternich made reassuring statements which shortly afterwards were given full official confirmation. This silence is the more striking since in a defence of his policy in the House of Commons at the end of November 1911 Sir Edward gave a full account of the conversation of July 21st. (39)

After the Mansion House speech it was due to her self-respect that Germany should avoid creating the impression that she had recoiled before this British warning. On July 24th Grey and Metternich had another interview, and a further one on the 25th. Both were sharp in tone, and after the second Grey, clearly in a great state of excitement, received his colleagues Lloyd George and Churchill, whom he had asked to see him, with these words (Grey does not mention this scene):

> I have just received a communication from the German Ambassador so stiff that the Fleet might be attacked at any moment. I have sent for McKenna to warn him! (40)

Grey reproduces his notes of the two interviews with Metternich on July 24th and 25th, (41) and it is astonishing that Sir Edward took them to mean that the British Fleet " might be attacked at any moment " by Germany. So grotesque an

exaggeration was only possible in a man impregnated with mistrust of Germany and no longer able, or hardly so, to judge calmly of the Morocco question and the general situation. (42)

Britain, as a matter of fact, began now to arm. (43) But it would be mistaken to conclude that Grey intended war. His attitude, as here described, was only dictated by his ingrained fear of German ill will and violence. As weeks passed Sir Edward grew calmer, and in the middle of August 1911 he made this admission to Count Benckendorff :

> I do not believe that the Emperor William wanted war when this incident arose ; and I do not believe that he wants war now *—

a view which the Russian Ambassador shared. (44) And in the end Grey even persuaded the French to give way to some extent. At the beginning of September 1911 he said to Paul Cambon :

> Personally, it seemed to me that, geographically, climatically, and generally, Morocco was of so much greater importance to France than the French Congo that it would be a pity for France not to increase her offer of territory in the French Congo, if necessary, and if she could get a clean and definitive arrangement as to Morocco. Could she not, for instance, give the triangle for which Germany asked up to the river Alima ? (45)

If only Grey had talked to the French in this style since 1906 ! Instead, in 1911 he was more French than the French. (46) And his advice came too late to be of practical value. For, when Lord Grey writes that the end of the Agadir crisis " was almost a fiasco for Germany," and when he continues, very truly, that its consequences went underground and reappeared later on, (47) he seems entirely to overlook the fact that his own attitude contributed greatly to this dangerous situation. To this day he is unaware of it. He did the right thing ; with one or two exceptions he always did ; in this conviction Grey, confined in his narrow circle of ideas and sympathies, will remain to the end. Or, as Hamilton Fyfe, a former close collaborator with Northcliffe and a man who knows Grey well, wrote as long ago as 1921 :

> Grey could not see, he does not see to this day, that he is as deeply disgraced by his acquiescence in the breaking of the Pact of Algeciras

* Retranslated.

as Bethmann-Hollweg was by the defence he set up for the German invasion of Belgium. He would be angry if he were accused of cheating at cards or deceiving an acquaintance over a trifle. Yet he is unable to recognize that his deception of the House of Commons and the nation was equally disgraceful. He still thinks he did all he could to avoid war. (48)

As in 1906, so in the Agadir crisis Sir Edward took up the standpoint that in the event of war between France and Germany Britain must go to France's aid. (49) Ewart makes this just observation :

> The great significance of that attitude was, and is, that (as in 1914) the merits of the quarrel were immaterial. Whether France or Germany was right, the British Government was determined to support France. (50)

It is certainly possible to find much to criticize in Germany's Moroccan policy. It had its share in the responsibility for the crises which arose. But in 1905 and 1911 it was Germany who suffered provocation, and on both occasions she had the right on her side. (51) That very fact should have excited Grey's strong sympathy, since he was always an upholder of moral justice and was very sensitive to a violation of right. Though, as we shall see yet again, only when the violation of international right was the work of the Central Powers.

Persia.

Britain and France struck up their friendship mainly at the expense of suffering Moroccans ; Britain and Russia at the expense of suffering Persians. In the former case Grey was a willing accomplice in the violation of international treaties—the Madrid Convention of 1880 and the Act of Algeciras of 1906. In the latter he unwillingly broke a treaty of his own with Persia, concluded jointly with Russia.

An Entente with Russia was the logical continuation of the Entente with France. But it was not easy to achieve, for

> Russian despotism was repugnant to British ideals, and something was constantly happening in Russia that alienated British sympathy or stirred indignation. (52)

For instance, the restriction of popular rights, the treatment of the Poles, and the pogroms among the Jews. Grey prudently

refrained from making representations in St. Petersburg with regard to these because on a former occasion the Russian Government had retorted with remarks about the state of Ireland. (53) The difficulty of living in glass houses.

The Russian defeat in the war with Japan paved the way for the British designs. There had been co-operation already at Algeciras ; and France did her best to further the good cause. Russia, her internal difficulties overcome, turned again to her European projects. And on August 31, 1907, Great Britain and Russia signed their Agreement on Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet.

Britain's main object was to assure herself once for all against " further Russian advances in the direction of the Indian frontier." (This was the main purpose of the Agreement ; together with the exclusion of Germany from Persia as far as possible—of this more later. The Entente had, of course, a different purpose : the removal of the danger of Russian opposition and the acquisition of Russian support in the event of war ; Grey tells us nothing as to this.) Britain obtained the lion's share of the advantages of the Agreement. Grey was aware of this and was accordingly ready to discuss the question of the Straits, of such vital interest to Russia. (54) The advantageous Agreement had been the work largely of the Anglophil Foreign Minister, Isvolsky.

It had long been the aim of British policy to maintain Persia as an independent buffer State. (55) This remained Grey's purpose. But his efforts failed entirely. The parties to the Agreement expressly declared their attachment to Persia's independence and territorial integrity, (56) but in St. Petersburg this was regarded as an empty phrase, and the sphere of influence accorded to Russia was regarded as a future Russian arena.

Grey himself seems to have had some hope that the Russians would in future have more respect for Persia's independence and integrity. (57) But this is simply evidence of his naïveté. Wilfrid Scawen Blunt at once expressed the suspicion that this " abominable " affair amounted to a partition of Persia, and he found this view confirmed by events. (58) Lord Curzon, formerly Viceroy of India and later Foreign Secretary, commented on the Agreement as follows, in February 1908, undoubtedly expressing the real views of most diplomats :

I am almost astounded at the coolness, I might even say the effrontery, with which the British Government is in the habit of parcelling out the territory of Powers whose independence and integrity it assures them, at the same time, it has no other intention than to preserve. (59)

Brailsford, on the other hand, said to Blunt that it was Grey's " stupidity and ignorance " that were to blame rather than ill will; Grey really believed in the Russian promise. (60) It is worth noting that Blunt considered that King Edward had arranged the deal with Russia with Sir Charles Hardinge's assistance, and that Grey had only been their " mouthpiece." (61) Bertrand Russell, a sharp critic of Grey's policy, and especially his policy in Persia, also speaks of Grey's " almost incredible ignorance " of Persian affairs as tending to prove that Grey left British policy in that part of the world to " subordinates." (62)

Grey excuses himself by saying that when the Agreement was made the integrity and independence of Persia " did not in practice exist." (63) What, however, did the situation become *on the basis of the Agreement*—under Grey's eyes and with his assistance ? After four years " more than half of Persia had been absorbed by Russia, and more than half the remainder " by Britain. (64)

It is true that Sir Edward again and again made very serious representations in St. Petersburg concerning the brutal Russian methods in Persia ; but this was not done from sympathy with the Persian victims of Russian massacres and hangings, (65) or from indignation at the violation of the joint British-Russian Agreement with Persia, but simply from concern at the growing public indignation in Great Britain, which threatened the destruction of the British Entente with Russia. For a proper judgment of Grey's Persian policy one must turn to the documents published by B. von Siebert. (66) There we read, for instance :

Sir Edward Grey is not concerned with the consideration that the Russian Government aims at infringements of Persia's integrity or independence—so far as these terms had any meaning in practice for the two Powers. This consideration is, however, certainly the fundamental one for the Opposition. (67)

This was written at the beginning of December 1911 by Count Benckendorff ; the British-Russian declaration concerning

Persia's independence and integrity had by then been for a long time a scrap of paper in the Foreign Office. And, as we see, Grey's only thought was for the Opposition.

Grey did much more. Morgan Shuster, whose task it was to restore order in the Persian finances, wanted to put Major Stokes, the British Military Attaché, in an important post ; Stokes sent in his resignation in order to take it up. But the Russians had no desire to see Persia's finances reorganized (just as the French had had none in Morocco) ; they wanted a weak Persia, as the French had wanted a weak Morocco, and they complained to Grey of Shuster's intrigue. Grey, as Benckendorff reported, " at once took the requisite action " :

> He went so far as to take a step of questionable legality—he refused to allow Stokes to resign. (68)

So also with Shuster. Grey considered him the right man for the post. (69) But he did not suit the Russians, and Grey accordingly joined them in bringing him down. He did so, certainly, with great reluctance. But in his weakness he offered the uninspiring spectacle of an unwilling and probably a secretly ashamed marionette, dangling at the end of a Russian wire. The Russians observed this with satisfaction. Sazonov, the new Foreign Minister, wrote as early as October 10th :

> These considerations are of great importance to us, for we may be certain that the British, in their pursuit of political aims of vital importance in Europe, will if necessary forgo their interests in Asia simply in order to keep the Agreement with us which is of such importance to them. Naturally we can profit by this—e.g. in our Persian policy. (70)

The Agreement was indeed the basis of the Russian understanding with Britain, (71) and Grey knew exactly how to use his unusual authority in the Lower House to calm the public excitement, to find excuses where possible for the Russian activities, and to maintain the Entente in its integrity, even to bring it in increased strength out of the ordeal by fire. Grey was so attached to this Entente that he would have resigned rather than give it up. And that would have meant an inevitable approach, as desired by many people, to Germany.

Grey's embarrassment is plainly to be observed in the pages which he devotes to the Persian question. And once more, as

in 1910 and 1911, he softens the tale for the Russians as far as he can. According to him, Isvolsky and Sazonov as Foreign Ministers were entirely innocent of the encroachments in Persia, the blame for which belonged entirely to the arbitrary and undisciplined Russian agents in Persia, whom St. Petersburg tried in vain to hold in check. (72) But Grey is very careful to think the best of his friends—an admirable trait, but with the drawback that it is apt to lead to biased judgments.

Persia followed Morocco in sealing the intimate union of the Entente. As Mr. Gooch writes :

> Though we were allied to no Power except Portugal and Japan, and in theory retained perfect liberty of action, we had now half unwittingly, but not the less irrevocably, thrown in our lot with France and Russia. (73)

The Bosnian Crisis.

In his chapter on Persia Grey makes the notable revelation that as early as the autumn of 1906 he was prepared to discuss the question of the Straits, in which Russia was so vitally interested ; for Grey regarded the Agreement of 1907 as unduly advantageous for Britain, who gave nothing and gained security for India. This may be taken as evidence that Grey really believed that the Russians would not further infringe Persia's independence and integrity.

It seemed to Grey in 1906–07 better not to bring the question of the Straits into the Asiatic Agreement, and he discussed the matter with Count Benckendorff. (74) The difficulty in Grey's view was that the question of the Dardanelles concerned " the other Powers of Europe "—a reflection which does not seem to have disturbed him in connexion with the international Act of Algeciras. But it is easier now to understand why Isvolsky in 1908, as Foreign Minister, concluded the agreement at Buchlau with Baron Aehrenthal ; he had reason to count on Grey's assent. Grey himself writes of Isvolsky :

> He may have had this in view from the beginning, and may have allowed himself to be compromised by Aehrenthal about Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to raise the question of the Straits with effect ; or he may have rushed to it for compensation, after finding himself compromised. (75)

The first of these suppositions is certainly the likelier. It was, in any case, of no interest to Grey which was the right one. He had foreseen that, if friendly relations were to be maintained with Russia, Britain must give up " the policy of blocking her access to the sea," and he was ready to discuss the question. " But the moment was very inopportune." The Young Turks were in power, the detestable Abdul Hamid was overthrown, and the Young Turks counted on British support. Isvolsky had not made sufficient allowance for this. His disappointment in London was great. He represented emphatically to Grey the unfortunate consequences in regard to Anglo-Russian relations

> if, once more, when there was an opportunity of settling the question of the Straits in favour of Russia, England opposed, and this time her opposition alone prevented a settlement. (76)

Grey, however, did not move from his position. He told Isvolsky of the unfavourable impression created by the action of Russian officers in northern Persia, and even Isvolsky's assurances of the entire change of Russian feeling towards Turkey—" they did not wish to have Constantinople for themselves," but to leave it in the hands of " a peaceful and well-governed Turkey " —did not move him. He insisted that it would create a lamentable impression if Russia appeared to be trying to make capital out of the situation.

Agreement proved impossible owing to the fundamentally opposed views of the two Powers in regard to the opening of the Straits. Russia wanted them opened only for her warships and those of the Black Sea border States, while Britain also wanted liberty to use them in the event of war. Grey reminded Isvolsky of his (Grey's) earlier conversation with Count Benckendorff :

> The proposal then had been that . . . other Powers should have liberty to send their vessels of war into the Straits without going into the Black Sea. (77)

The last six words were, of course, intended to disguise the possible use of the provision to Russia's detriment.

Eventually Isvolsky was given a memorandum, which " partially, though not completely, pacified " him. (78)

The documents which Grey has published help to light up the background of Buchlau. Isvolsky had himself suggested the agreement, no doubt under the influence of the meeting of

King Edward and the Tsar at Reval in June 1908, which had revealed such friendly feelings towards Russia on Great Britain's part. He had, however, negotiated with Baron Aehrenthal with very little circumspection, and Aehrenthal had not left him time for the needed sounding of the courts mainly affected. But Grey's documents strengthen the impression produced by the documents already published by Dr. M. Boghitchevitch, that in Paris Isvolsky had been far less indignant at the smartness of the Austrian Foreign Minister than when his plans finally came to grief in London. (79)

Grey was indignant at Aehrenthal's stroke, and his view of it remains unchanged. He writes :

> . . . it was the alteration of a European Treaty to which other Powers as well as Turkey were parties. To us the territorial changes were indifferent : it mattered not to us that Austria should annex instead of merely occupying Bosnia and Herzegovina ; but, besides sympathy with the new hope in Turkey, we felt that the arbitrary alteration of a European Treaty by one Power without the consent of the other Powers who were parties to it struck at the root of all good international order. We therefore took a very firm stand on principle, and said that, though our interests were not involved, we would not recognize Austria's action, and the change she had made, till all the other Powers who were parties to the treaty were ready to do so. (80)

Sir Edward recalled on October 5, 1908, a day before the declaration of annexation, the fact that Austria-Hungary was a party to the Treaty of London, and consequently to the Protocol of January 17, 1871, which is attached to it, and he telegraphed to the British Ambassador at Vienna :

> In this it is stipulated that the engagements into which any Power has entered can only be broken or modified with the full assent of the Contracting Parties, and after a friendly agreement has been arrived at. A deliberate violation or alteration of the Berlin Treaty, undertaken without previous consultation with the other Powers, of which in this case Turkey is the most affected, could never be approved or recognized by His Majesty's Government. This should be represented to the Austrian Government, and you should impress upon them how necessary it is that their decision to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina should be reconsidered. (81)

It would be possible warmly to acknowledge this just attitude of Grey's, and to rank him as a pattern of a present-day statesman for his protection of the sanctity of treaties—if some of

Grey's actions did not flatly contradict his fine words. What had preceded this? His Majesty's Government, who could "never approve or recognize" the "deliberate violation or alteration" of a treaty "without previous consultation with the other Powers," had taken an active part in 1904 in violating by secret clauses the international Madrid Convention of 1880, of which Great Britain herself was a signatory. It did this jointly with France and Spain at the expense of Morocco and of a country closely interested in Morocco, Germany—both also signatories of the Madrid Convention. His Majesty's Government allowed this to be done, although it knew that Germany's rights would be seriously infringed—rights that Britain had herself recognized. And Sir Edward Grey? As we saw, in 1906 he gave the secret clauses the exact meaning that France's imperialists, who talked openly of the "Tunisification" of Morocco, gave them. Yet more—although the Act of Algeciras, of which His Majesty's Government was a signatory, expressly affirmed the sovereignty and independence of Morocco and expressly declared to be obsolete all earlier treaties that conflicted with the Act, Sir Edward Grey in 1911, as British Foreign Minister, gave open approval to the totally unnecessary French march on Fez and, relying on the secret clauses, gave his best diplomatic and moral support to his friends; he was even ready, if war came over this flagrant breach of treaty, to give material support to the treaty breakers. And then Persia! Grey may sincerely have hoped that the Russians would keep the secret treaty and respect Persia's independence and integrity; when they went ravaging and burning through northern Persia, when they interfered continually in the internal affairs of the country, to bring it to destruction through its own weakness, did Grey give them any hint that His Majesty's Government could never approve or recognize the deliberate violation of a treaty of which it was a signatory? Did he not in actual fact show complaisance towards these cynical breakers of treaties and give friendly heed to their wishes, though they belied Grey's signature to the treaty and his public declarations?

And it is *this* Grey who pronounces moral judgments on the Austro-Hungarian breach of the Treaty of Berlin! A breach there had certainly been, but the only Power whom it actually injured, Turkey, received substantial financial compensation and

full liberty of action in the Sandjak of Novibazar, over which Austria had maintained rights of occupation since 1878. But what did the Moroccans, their rights violated with Grey's help, receive? A remnant of them is fighting to this day (82) for freedom. And what did the Persians, oppressed with Grey's help, receive? Their lot was not lightened until Russia's collapse.

Yet other acts of oppression during the world war may be laid to Lord Grey's charge. Does he not see that this assumption of his to-day of self-righteousness holds up not only his own person but the British Government to the scorn of the whole world? Does he not see that all who are acquainted with the facts—and their number is growing from day to day—are bound to feel that the attitude here described is simply one of intolerable hyprocrisy, the wretched posing of a Pharisee?

No, Viscount Grey of Fallodon does not see it. He does not consider himself a hypocrite. Not in the slightest. He would be honestly indignant at so unjust an idea. He is merely living under unusually acute self-deception, which at times makes him see black as white and white as black; in good faith in his accuracy of vision, since it is so that he *wants* to see. In him the national faculty of Britons of seeing their own nature and doings as far above comparison with those of other people is particularly deeply imprinted. On top of this there come his deep prejudices and predilections, his warm feeling of loyalty—for his friends. No! Subjectively Grey is no hypocrite; subjectively he is sincere. He only gives the world around him an impression of hypocrisy.

The war was still raging when Bertrand Russell, a savant who can see things with a clarity that few of his countrymen possess, concluded his section on Persia with the words:

> Righteousness cannot be born until self-righteousness is dead. (83)

Grey, I fear, with all his gifts will hardly be able to help righteousness to more than a feeble life.

Lord Grey declares that he had no intention of making difficulties for Austria. On October 5, 1908, he advised the Turkish Ambassador against war, and suggested money compensation. Shortly afterwards he said to Isvolsky that he might count on his diplomatic support but not armed support. (84)

When the crisis began to take a dangerous aspect, at the end of February 1909, Grey warned St. Petersburg to decide whether in the event of war it intended to support Serbia or not; Grey himself spoke plainly against war. (85) He writes very truly:

> The probability is, that if Russia had told Serbia from the first that she must not expect more than economic concessions, the situation would never have become dangerous. (86)

Isvolsky's cardinal fault at that period was his indecision, which continually encouraged the Serbs to maintain a provocative attitude, until on March 21, 1909, the situation had become so grave that the German Government felt impelled to send to Isvolsky a communication little removed from an ultimatum (87) in order to prevent war. At the moment the Russian Foreign Ministry was relieved by Germany's "friendly" move, which ensured peace, but this intervention was never forgotten or forgiven. Sir Arthur Nicolson, the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, sent a long report at the end of March 1909, in the course of which he wrote:

> I have been assured, by those who have witnessed many various phases in the recent history of Russia, that there has never previously been a moment when the country had undergone such humiliation, and, though Russia has had her troubles and trials, both external and internal, and has suffered defeats in the field, she has never had, for apparently no valid cause, to submit to the dictation of a foreign Power. (88)

This was not only Isvolsky's feeling but that of all Russian leaders, and Grey is right in drawing a parallel between the Bosnian crisis and that of 1914. "Russia could not afford a second blow such as that of 1908–09." Only, what was wanting in 1914 was not alone, as Grey claims, a "wise and strong restraining hand" in Germany (89)—from July 28th onwards Germany put increasing pressure on Vienna in the effort to hold it back—but also the "wise and strong restraining hand" of Great Britain in St. Petersburg, as we shall see.

At the time of the Bosnian crisis and later two unjust accusations were made—one that Grey worked for war (90), and the other that the whole affair was Germany's work. Berlin was at first incompletely acquainted with Vienna's intentions, and only received full information at the same time as the other Powers.

It is questionable, however, whether Bülow would have advised against Aehrenthal's step. In the summer of 1908 he took up the peculiar standpoint that

> Our attitude in the East and especially in the Balkan peninsula, where we are only pursuing economic aims, is and will remain primarily dependent on the desires, needs, and interests of our close ally and friend Austria-Hungary. (91)

Following this policy, Bülow repeatedly gave Aehrenthal full liberty of action during the Bosnian crisis. (92) It would be mistaken to infer that Bülow had any intention of going to war. He worked for compromise, and believed that Russia was unable and the other Powers unwilling to fight. His rather irresponsible complaisance was the result of anxiety over Germany's isolation —an isolation which he had largely contributed to bring about— and of gratitude for Vienna's support at Algeciras and in the naval question. (93) Then as in 1914 Berlin allowed itself to be guided by Vienna.

For William II the declaration of annexation came as a complete surprise ; he was horrified at Vienna's precipitate action, and later described it as filibustering. (94)

Looking back now, one can only regard Aehrenthal's precipitate action as a grave mistake. The usual explanation that the Young Turkish revolution and the elections for the new Parliament had made it necessary to define the situation in the two provinces, which Austria-Hungary had administered since 1878, is unconvincing. (95) And in giving up Novibazar Aehrenthal let go an important pledge, (96) without making any real change in conditions by the annexation. Some historians praise the act as a feat which showed the world that the Dual Monarchy could still play an active part. To this one can only reply by asking what was the use of a strong-handed action of this sort, if it brought an incurable breach, and indeed, as events showed, a mortal one. For Bosnia and the world war are closely connected, just as Morocco and the world war. Austria-Hungary brought down on herself Isvolsky's revenge and Serbia's hatred, and Germany found it necessary from love of peace and in Nibelung loyalty (the latter expression might have been avoided) to protect Vienna, an action which Russia never forgave.

EDWARD VII—INCOMPLETE DOCUMENTS—" ENCIRCLEMENT."

Lord Grey eloquently defends King Edward from every reproach.

> The idea that King Edward was a busy intriguer who used these visits for political ends, particularly for that of " encircling " Germany, was a fiction, but it became an article of faith in Germany. (97)

According to Grey, the King read all important papers, but did not care for long and sustained discussion about large aspects of policy, and never for a moment did he suggest that British policy should be given a point against Germany. Grey mentions that a legend arose that British policy was due to his initiative, instigation, and control, but declares that this was not so in his experience. (98)

In " Twenty-five Years," indeed, Edward VII figures as a harmless, genial traveller for pleasure, who was uncomfortable if other people could not enjoy the good things in life like himself.

Certainly the King has been greatly misrepresented. But Grey seems to me to go to the other extreme. The Belgian diplomats, at all events, thoroughly distrusted King Edward, and the documents available bear witness to his active participation in political affairs. (99)

It is not quite clear why Grey denies that the King used his visits for political purposes. Obviously he did as other monarchs did—possibly as a tiresome duty. I am of opinion that the King (who at the turn of the century was inclined towards an Anglo-German Alliance) did not aim at war or desire actually to push Germany to the wall or to wreck her alliance with Austria ; (100) he was content with inflicting diplomatic defeats on her and strengthening her opponents. For the rest, there was no need for him to encourage Grey to oppose Germany ; Grey had been doing so on his own initiative from 1906 onwards, energetically as he may deny any such purpose.

In forming a judgment of Edward VII the " Diaries " of Wilfrid Scawen Blunt must not be overlooked. Through certain mutual friends who enjoyed the King's confidence he knew a great deal of the King's private life—more than he could tell. By nature and in habit King Edward was inclined to ensue peace, he helped to end the Boer War and he desired to bring

peace in Ireland. From 1903 onwards he brought his influence to bear in foreign affairs. In July 1907 old Horace Rumbold said to Blunt :

> His Majesty insists now on making all important diplomatic appointments himself, and busies himself much more than ever the old Queen did in the foreign policy adopted. This works sometimes for good, sometimes for harm. . . . Hardinge, of the Foreign Office, is his special man, going everywhere abroad with him, and fulfilling the functions hitherto appertaining to the Secretary of State as Cabinet Minister.

Blunt greatly regretted the King's death. In publishing his " Diaries " he wrote of him :

> He was essentially a cosmopolitan, and without racial prejudice. . . . He wanted an easy life, and that everybody should be friends with everybody. . . . The death of Edward VII was a misfortune for English diplomacy and the peace of Europe. Although in some ways he had launched the Foreign Office on an adventurous course by the two ententes for which he was primarily responsible, that with France about Morocco and that with Russia about Persia, his influence with the Government had been a steadying one, and it is probable that if he had lived another ten years the supreme catastrophe of a European war would have been avoided. He knew what was going on in the various Courts of Europe far better than did our professional diplomatists, and his disappearance from their counsels left the supreme direction of our foreign policy uncontrolled in the hands of Grey, whose ignorance of foreign affairs was really astonishing, knowing as he did no foreign language, (101) and having made hardly so much as a holiday tour in Europe. . . . Consequently from this point onward, the year 1910, our English policy on the Continent exhibited a series of blunders of the most dangerous kind, leading by a logical sequence in four years' time to England's entanglement in a war. . . . (102)

We have not sufficient material to judge with certainty how great was the personal influence of King Edward VII through various channels over the Foreign Office. We can also only conjecture the extent of the influence exerted by Foreign Office officials over Sir Edward Grey. I have no doubt that it was considerable. There was, for instance, Sir Eyre Crowe, who died recently. He was almost always at work at the Foreign Office, and in January 1912 he became Assistant Under-Secretary of State. This son of a German mother was one of the most poisonous enemies of Germany. At his death " The Times " mentioned a memorandum which Crowe wrote on the German peril and through which he " is believed to have greatly impressed

not only Sir Edward Grey but the Cabinet, in regard to the orientation of British foreign policy during the critical years which preceded the Great War. . . . Before the war he drew up a plan for seizing German ships in British ports, and with great difficulty induced Ministers to consent to it when war broke out." Leo Maxse, the violently anti-German editor of the "National Review," wrote: "In the days when I knew Crowe, his views upon Germany were indistinguishable from my own, and he expended himself in the thankless task of endeavouring to invigorate British policy and in preventing Ministers from kow-towing to Germany. . . . May I advise anyone who wants corroborative evidence of what I say to consult any competent French diplomatist who has come in contact with Sir Eyre Crowe during any international crisis?" (103) The memorandum mentioned by "The Times" is known to a small circle in England; we may make its acquaintance when the British archives are opened. It is said that in the Foreign Office Crowe played as influential and as little known a part as Holstein at the Wilhelmstrasse. Then there was Sir William Tyrrell (who also had relatives in Germany), Grey's private secretary; those who know him say that he had the same fear of Germany's military power before the world war that he has had of France's since 1919. Then Sir Charles Hardinge, the official companion of Edward VII on his journeys, of whose influence Blunt tells; (104) and Sir Arthur Nicolson, whose pro-Russianism was notorious. He had given evidence of it as Ambassador in St. Petersburg during the Bosnian crisis. In the summer of 1910 Nicolson came to the Foreign Office as permanent Under-Secretary of State—simply, as King George said to Count Benckendorff, in order to draw still closer the happy relations existing between Russia and England. (105) Of Sir Arthur Nicolson the Italian Foreign Minister, the Marquis di San Giuliano, said at the beginning of 1914 to the German Ambassador in Rome "on the strength of the most definite information,"

> that he is a fanatical and irreconcilable opponent of Germany, and that he is always bringing his considerable influence in London to bear in this direction. (106)

These were the men to whose advice Grey listened, and who evidently suggested to him more than he himself realizes. (107)

Hardinge, as is the usual custom, used to send to Grey reports of the King's visits and the political conversations that took place. Grey assures us that these reports fully and accurately described what took place. Grey publishes Hardinge's report on the Reval meeting of June 1908, so far as concerns the relations between the Great Powers. (108) We possess also Isvolsky's report on the same occasion, (109) and a comparison reveals an interesting detail. Hardinge said that the British Government were inspired with no hostile feelings towards Germany, but that it was

> impossible to ignore the fact that, owing to the unnecessarily large increase in the German naval programme, a deep distrust in England of Germany's future intentions had been created. This distrust would be still further accentuated with the progress of time, the realization of the German programme, and the increase of taxation in England entailed by the necessary naval counter-measures. In seven or eight years' time a critical situation might arise, in which Russia, if strong in Europe, might be the arbiter of peace, and have much more influence in securing the peace of the world than at any Hague Conference. For this reason it was absolutely necessary that England and Russia should maintain towards each other the same cordial and friendly relations as now exist between England and France, which in the case of England and Russia are, moreover, inspired by an identity of interests of which a solution of the Macedonian problem was not the least. (110)

Isvolsky's account is shorter ; the corresponding passage in it runs as follows :

> " Nevertheless," said Sir Charles Hardinge to me, " it is impossible not to see that if Germany continues her naval armament at the same increased pace, in seven or eight years there may arise in Europe an extremely disturbing and strained situation ; then Russia will without doubt be the arbiter of the situation ; and for this reason we are anxious, in the interest of peace and the maintenance of the balance, for Russia to be as strong as possible on land and sea."

Here Hardinge's " if strong in Europe "—which may also be applied to the internal situation in Russia after the revolution—is transformed into a direct invitation to enormous military and naval arming. Isvolsky proceeds :

> Sir Charles returned several times to this point, and clearly desired it to be understood that he was giving expression not to his personal opinion but to the definite political conviction of the London Cabinet. (111)

It is inconceivable that Isvolsky can have invented the British incitement to arm. Colour is, in fact, lent to his account by the fact that at the interview in Reval Sir John Fisher, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Sir John French, Inspector-General of the Forces and later Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force, were present, and both came into touch with the Russian Minister of War and the Navy. (112) We have thus the interesting fact that Hardinge " returned several times " to an important argument in talking to the Russian Foreign Minister, but only gave Grey a distant suggestion of it in a small incidental clause in his report ! Sir Edward, however, is convinced that Hardinge always *fully* and *accurately* described what took place on the harmless jaunts of the pleasure-loving King.

Once the British archives have been thrown open, we shall be in a position to compare other reports of Hardinge's with the Russian versions. Meanwhile the instance just quoted is enough to substantiate Blunt's view.

The Hardinge-Isvolsky case also shows that the one-sided opening of archives has not yet revealed the whole truth. Grey himself furnishes an example of this. Sazonov's report of September 1912 on his visit to Balmoral is very well known. Professor M. Pokrovsky first published it in the weekly " Pravda " of March 2, 1910. According to this report Grey declared " without flinching "

> that if the occurrences in question [i.e. the European war] should take place, England would make every effort to deal Germany's power the most painful blow,

and King George had used even more drastic words :

> We shall sink every single German merchant ship we shall get hold of.*

Grey now reproduces his own record, which contains important reservations ; these were not quoted either by Sazonov or Pokrovsky. Grey said :

> The question of whether we went to war would depend upon how the war came about. No British Government could go to war unless backed by public opinion. Public opinion would not support any aggressive war for a revanche, or to hem Germany in, and we desired to see difficulties between Germany and other Powers, particularly

* Quoted in English by Sazonov.

France, smoothed over when they arose. If, however, Germany was led by her great, I might say unprecedented strength, to attempt to crush France, I did not think we should stand by and look on, but should do all we could to prevent France from being crushed. That had been our feeling at the time of the Algeciras Conference in 1906 and again last year. (113)

It is entirely reasonable to suppose that Grey made these reservations, which accord, indeed, with his general attitude. Only, this attitude did not withstand the test of 1914.

Grey declares that the Germans worked up the theory of their " encirclement " for propaganda purposes. (114) The word is a little too dramatic perhaps, taken literally, to be accepted as a historic generalization. Germans have found that Germany " encircled " herself, or rather shut herself out of the circle. Grey even thinks, however, that the German Government cannot seriously have believed this theory. It seemed " incredible that they should not realize that, if Germany had alliances, other countries must have them too. . . . After the Triple Alliance was formed Russia was isolated, France was isolated, Britain was not only isolated, but in constant danger of war with France or Russia." The Franco-Russian Alliance and the entente of Great Britain with the two Powers were simply, in his view, expedients for release from this situation. (115) This argument reduces itself to the question of the purpose for which the alliances and ententes were concluded, or, rather, of the way they worked out. For the Russo-French Alliance was originally purely defensive ; but in the course of years it underwent transformations, so that in the end it came to mean Constantinople and the Straits for Russia, Alsace-Lorraine for France. (116) The British Entente with France and Russia also aimed primarily at the removal of points of friction with these Powers. It had, however, a second purpose—*to shut Germany out of Morocco and Persia as far as possible.*

It was not so with the Triple Alliance. Germany's alliance with Austria-Hungary was warmly welcomed by Lord Salisbury. (117) He also regarded Italy's adhesion to it as a further security for the peace of Europe. This was so much the case that between 1898 and 1901 the British Government repeatedly made overtures to Germany and so indirectly to the Triple Alliance. The Alliance had no acquisitive purpose but aimed

at securing its members' European possessions. (118) As such it at no time stood in the way of the colonial ambitions of France, Britain, and Russia, but on various occasions actually furthered them. In this lies the enormous difference between the development of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. (119)

Lord Grey does not see this. As Foreign Secretary he realized that the isolation of Germany would mean an actual danger to peace, and he always opposed any idea of isolating Germany. (120) It is true that the British Government did not work for the isolation of Germany alone but of the Triple Alliance, or rather of Germany and Austria-Hungary, for from 1902 onwards Italy stood with a foot in either camp and developed into a welcome " deadweight " in the Triple Alliance. (121) So clearly did these features of British policy stand out that the Belgian diplomatists in London and Paris frequently wrote openly about them, (122) and the shrewd and exceedingly well-informed Wilfrid Scawen Blunt gave to the second volume of his " Diaries," covering the period 1900–14, the title of " The coalition against Germany." If the expression " encirclement " smacks too much of the chase, there seems fair reason to attribute the purpose of *isolating the Central Powers*.

Grey, however, would even like to persuade us that he was not anti-German, that he had no part in denying Germany " a place in the sun." He felt uncomfortable at the idea of offering opposition to German plans even where they did not interfere with British interests. And he points, with unconcealed satisfaction at the non-existence of his alleged hostility to Germany, to the Bagdad Railway, concerning which an agreement actually reached the initialling stage shortly before the world war which, he says, " would have facilitated and not hindered " this undertaking. (123)

We have seen that in 1906 Sir Edward Grey was inclined to hand over to Germany a port on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. He wrote to Campbell-Bannerman :

> In more than one part of the world I find signs that Germany is feeling after a coaling station or a port.

British policy had been everywhere to prevent Germany from getting this. Grey thought the view tenable that ports and other

possessions scattered over the world were at the mercy of the Power that had command of the sea—at the mercy, that is, of Great Britain. It might turn out that a German port in Morocco would solve all the difficulties of the Algeciras Conference. Unfortunately Lord Lansdowne had already frustrated these good intentions of Grey's by urging the French in April 1905 on no account to concede a port in Morocco to Germany. Grey presumes, no doubt rightly, that this was due to British naval opinion. (124) Fisher, the man who wanted to " Copenhagen " the German navy in peace time, and who directed all his energies to the coming war with Germany, had been First Sea Lord since October 1904. (125)

In 1906 Grey had also said to the German Ambassador, on behalf of the British Government,

> that we shall not use the Anglo-French Entente against German policy or interests. (126)

But the course of the two Morocco crises, especially of the Agadir crisis, offered no recognizable confirmation of the good will originally shown. As early as the autumn of that same year 1906, during the negotiations with Russia concerning Persia, Grey made no secret of his disinclination to advance German interests. It will be remembered that in the partition of Persia a " neutral " zone was left, and Sir Arthur Nicolson placed a draft agreement before Grey on November 4th. Grey replied as follows on the 6th :

> . . . I should, however, omit the last paragraph from the draft which you propose. It is not essential to an arrangement with Russia that we should each of us become parties to a promise to prevent third Powers from obtaining concessions in the parts of Persia in which we have each of us respectively renounced influence ourselves. It would be enough that we should each agree not to seek or maintain influence in the specified district reserved for the other. After our arrangement with Russia was completed, we could obtain from Persia an undertaking not to make concessions which would have any political character to a third Power in our specified district. Russia could do the same for herself, and it would follow, from the arrangement which we and Russia had made, that neither of us would oppose the other in making these separate arrangements with the Persian Government.
>
> Such a settlement between Russia and us would give absolutely no opportunity or pretext to any other country for saying that the settlement had infringed the principle of the open door. (127)

An interesting document. Nicolson thus originally aimed at an agreement excluding other Powers from economic and political influence in any part of Persia, even the neutral zone. And Grey's objection was merely that this would infringe the principle of the open door ! Germany, of course, was mainly aimed at. This is clear from Sazonov's report to the Tsar on his visit to Balmoral in the autumn of 1912 :

> With regard to the neutral zone I said that we should probably be compelled sooner or later to revise our mutual relationship in regard to it, in the direction of its abolition, since, as matters stood, access to the neutral zone was open to all and it had no protection from encroachments from other quarters. We must of course take care to secure Persia's recognition of any such agreement, since an unrecognized agreement would be without practical effect. Grey expressed his assent to this in principle. He suggested a means of excluding once for all the undesired German encroachments on the neutral zone—Russia to receive from the Persian Government an option for the construction of the railway line from Teheran to Ispahan and Britain and Russia jointly for the line from Ispahan to Mohammera. Obviously the securing of the prior right in the construction of these lines will not entail an obligation on either of the two States to carry out the undertaking at all costs ; the intention would only be to exclude Germany from the neutral zone, where after such an agreement there would not remain a single concession that offered any sort of temptation to the Germans. (128)

As mentioned above, Grey has referred to the existence of considerable gaps in this report of Sazonov. But in the present instance all his efforts in this direction would fail ; for we have too much confirmatory evidence. Thus Count Benckendorff wrote in the middle of August 1910 :

> Britain is less interested in what happens in Persia than in preventing every Power except Russia and Britain from playing any part in Persia. This refers above all to Germany and Turkey—of course, for political reasons. (129)

He wrote also at the end of February 1911 :

> The British-Russian Convention, the text of which was deliberately so drafted as to make protests from other Powers impossible, aimed—I think this is incontestable—at the same purpose which has often appeared, the combining of our efforts to prevent Germany from obtaining a footing in Persia. . . . (130)

Certainly the anti-German intention of the British-Russian Agreement is incontestable. And in this case Germany preferred to make the best of it. (131)

Grey also discusses the German demand for " a place in the sun." It was the expression of a rather vague and rather sentimental conception, but it was an expression that summed up a national need. Grey found difficulty in seeing how to satisfy it. If tropical Africa was meant, Germany already had her place in the sun there. " What Germany really wanted was a place in a temperate climate and a fertile land, which could be peopled by her white population and be . . . under the German flag," and Great Britain " had no such place to offer." " Translated into terms of practical application," the place in the sun " became two things—Walfisch Bay and the Bagdad Railway. But Walfisch Bay belonged to South Africa " ; about the Bagdad Railway Grey came to an agreement shortly before the war. (132)

In all this it is evident that Grey has not grasped the actual sense of the phrase " a place in the sun." It had nothing to do with the tropics and little with the desire of some Germans for a territory suitable for white colonization ; Asia Minor, for instance, was not of serious importance for this purpose. The " place in the sun " was more of a synonym for " Weltpolitik." Germany, a young State with a surplus of energy, was determined to play an active part in world events on the scale due to her capacities and her achievements. She was determined to be in the front rank with other Powers, not only in art, music, and literature, but in great economic enterprises, in the tasks of the spread of civilization. She meant to gain distinction not only in science but in trade and industry, the natural aim of strength and youth. In this urge to business activity, which was bound to be particularly marked in a country with an annual increase of population of 800,000, and especially in an age of general " Imperialism," Germany felt the need for more freedom of movement, for wider fields of activity, for opportunities of work. She could not but observe that most of the other Great Powers, the British Empire, Russia, France, were incomparably richer in colonial possessions, and sat comfortably at an overloaded table in the sun. In comparison with them Germany was poorly provided. In this situation she had to look on while Great Britain, France, and Russia shared together yet further territories,

especially Morocco and Persia. It was at such points that they were robbing Germany of a " place in the sun."

In reply to the charges of hostility to Germany which were made against Grey, especially around 1911, by a considerable section of British public opinion, (133) he makes much of the Bagdad Agreement which was ready for signature in 1914. But he forgets the important point that British policy, in unison with that of Russia and France, placed all possible difficulties in the way of the Bagdad Railway, although at the beginning of the century Britain had been offered a profitable share in it, and although the railway promised substantial economic advantages to the British Empire. (134) So marked was British hostility that the American writer Edward Mead Earle, who devoted a book to the study of the question, heads his eighth chapter " Great Britain Blocks the Way." (135) The first breach, in fact, in the united opposition of Russia, Britain, and France was made by the Potsdam Agreement between Russia and Germany of 1910–11—to Grey's decided mortification; not until then was Germany able to arrive at a separate agreement with each of the three Powers. Earle, who is by no means a pro-German writer but simply an unbiased historian, writes of the London Agreement of 1914:

> Had the agreement been reached ten years earlier, it might have avoided estrangement between the two nations. Had it come at almost any other time than on the eve of the Great War, it would have been a powerful stimulus to Anglo-German rapprochement. . . . Above all, British opposition to the Bagdad Railway, which had been so stubbornly maintained since 1903, was to be a thing of the past. (136)

It was with the Bagdad Railway as it had been with Morocco and Persia. Germany was obstructed and elbowed aside. The natural result was a bitter indignation which piled many a faggot around the stake which flamed up in 1914. British policy under Sir Edward Grey had its good share in these causes of the war. We may conclude this section with the words of Count Benckendorff, who for many years was Russian Ambassador in London, in a report of February 1912:

> On the other hand, Sir Edward Grey has always denied, both in public and in conversation with me, that he aimed at isolating Germany. He has said repeatedly to me that any attempt to break up the Triple Alliance would be a mistake. In his view the isolation of Germany would mean an actual danger to peace.

Nevertheless it is true that every time the German Government wanted to push its interests in territories where other Powers had interests it found itself opposed not by one or another of the Powers but by a group of Powers. . . .

Britain stands at the head of an enormous colonial Empire . . . is satiated with territory. . . .

Germany's situation is in a certain measure the opposite of Britain's. In the Morocco crisis the German Ambassador declared to the British Minister, " The world is being shared out, we are more hemmed in than any of the others, we too have a claim to a share in the spoil," and there was some truth in these words.

. . . Germany is not without ambition to increase her colonial possessions ; but she prefers the method of penetration, mainly by undertaking big enterprises, and in these she meets with continual opposition from Britain. It is true that Russia's weight counts for a great deal, but in overseas questions Britain, even alone, is the greatest obstacle.

The most striking evidence seems to me to be the Bagdad Railway. In my view the part which this enterprise plays in world policy is much more important than might at first sight be imagined. The interest which it arouses in Germany is universal. The finance of almost the whole of Europe, even Britain, is involved in the project. And yet it is mainly Britain that puts obstacles in the way.

It is often said in England . . . that one of the main difficulties in the way of a British-German understanding is the want of a basis in the absence of negotiable objects. This view seems to me an exaggeration ; I think the Bagdad Railway might easily form such a basis. Several subjects for negotiation have already been found—but Britain's international obligations, and especially her lack of inclination to negotiate, have never permitted these subjects to be pursued. (137)

Here we have, incidentally, evidence that in many quarters in Great Britain the British trade jealousy acted to some extent as an influence for war, (138) while outside Europe Germany stood for the " open door." This applied in 1910–13 especially to Chinese affairs. Germany was as a rule the only European Great Power that gave loyal support to the efforts in this direction of the United States ; the other Powers, especially Russia and Japan, followed the familiar policy of annexation. (139)

Competitive Armaments—The Haldane Mission.

Grey considers that in 1914 the German military party " chose the time and precipitated the war " ; but that, he considers, was not " the real and final account of the origin of the Great War " :

> The enormous growth of armaments in Europe, the sense of insecurity and fear caused by them—it was these that made war inevitable. (140)

What has to be said in regard to the charge against the German military party of precipitating the world war will be said in discussing the crisis of July 1914. The view that armaments make war inevitable is widely shared. It is impossible to bring definite proof or disproof of this theory. It may be argued against it that Germany, looked at askance by many people in other countries as a military State, had no war for forty-four years (with the exception of the campaign against the Hereros in South-West Africa), while all the other Great Powers waged wars in this period in Europe or for colonial expansion.

According to Grey, it was " Germany, more than any other nation, who had forced the pace in armaments, first in armies and then in navies " :

> If war were really inevitable, it was Germany who had the largest share of responsibility for producing the state of affairs that made war inevitable. (141)

Grey sees armaments in a double light—as a measure of precaution, for defence, and as preparation for a war, for aggression. The reader is left in no doubt as to Grey's estimate of the purpose of the armaments of the two groups of Powers.

Here we must deal separately with land and naval armaments. " Militarism " was general. France was the most militarized State in Europe, and in regard to percentage of men serving, accumulation of war material, peace and war strengths, and expenditure on armaments, Germany was far outmatched by other States. (142) It cannot, however, be denied that in Germany the note of militarism was discernible or that military influences played a part in the policy of the Reich. (143) At the same time, we may recall that British naval circles influenced the Foreign Office, setting themselves against the acquisition of coaling stations by Germany.

John S. Ewart, a Canadian enquirer with a singular capacity for objectivity, has recently gone thoroughly into the question of militarism and armaments. His view is that militarism in the United Kingdom was and is regarded as of God, and militarism in Germany as of the devil, and he adds :

Very clearly, if British statesmen were determined to "crush militarism," there was plenty of work for them in the British Isles.

Ewart shows that Germany *up to 1912* "*was not responsible for the* '*race of armaments.*'" (144)

In the question of militarism attention must be paid above all to geographical situation. Lord Grey does not do this. He is as unable to do it as most of his compatriots, who are familiar only with quite different conditions. Lloyd George—before the war—was a notable exception: in a speech at Queen's Hall at the end of July 1908, and again in the "Daily Chronicle" on New Year's Day, 1914, he energetically defended the German military preparations as in the nature of things. (145) This side of the question may be left to Ewart's summing up:

That there were more militarists in Germany than in the United Kingdom is probably true, but that was not because Germans are Germans, but because of their geographical situation. If the British people had lived in Central Europe instead of upon two islands, they would not have become dominant upon the seas. They would, I believe, have achieved corresponding position on land; and that would not have been accomplished without the development of militaristic spirit. Prussia was essentially a military state in the days of Frederick the Great. Frederick dead, his spirit and system relapsed. That they revived may justly be attributed to the French victories under Napoleon. That they recurred under Bismarck was due, to a large extent, to a natural desire for release from the predominance of Austria. And it is not probable that in similar circumstances the British people would have exhibited the submissive docility of the Chinese. That British security lies in command of the water, and that German security lies in strength upon the land, sufficiently explains the difference in their attitude. It explains also why one rails at the militarism of the other. . . .

If militarists were somewhat plentiful in Germany while rare in the United States, the explanation again is geography and environment. Suppose that to the north of the United States there were one hundred and seventy million partially educated Slavs, governed by ever-changing autocrats, and with a history of imperialistic expansion comparable to that of the United Kingdom. Suppose that to the south were forty million French—rich, cultured, brave—nursing resentment for the forcible annexation of Texas and California. Suppose that Cuba was the richest nation in the world; that she possessed one-fifth of the earth's surface; that she dominated the seas, including the Atlantic and Mexican Gulf coasts. And suppose that, instead of being bounded on east and west by vast oceans, there were on one side some Scandinavian nations, including an angry Denmark, and, on the other, Italian

and Balkan States awaiting a favourable moment to disintegrate the only American ally. If that were the environment of the United States, is it probable that among her people there would have been fewer men of militaristic type than in Germany ? (146)

In regard to German naval armaments I am convinced that the Tirpitz policy was a mistaken one. Germany certainly had at the beginning of the century a real need of a stronger navy. " Long before Englishmen had begun to suspect the designs of the German navy, Germans had felt alarm at the strength of the British fleet," wrote Dr. Gooch, accurately describing the situation ; and he regards the illegal stoppage of the " Bundesrath " during the Boer War as " a milestone in European history." (147) But Tirpitz's enormous battle fleet, more or less openly measured against the British navy, was bound to awaken British concern and resistance, and to be regarded in Britain as more and more dangerous as it approached completion. Tirpitz well realized this, for he constantly spoke of crossing the danger zone for the German navy, giving expression to the idea that the British might feel tempted to surprise and destroy the German navy. Finally even Tirpitz had to agree to a ratio of 16 to 10. Even then the danger zone had not, of course, been crossed, nor could it be so long as the British had the determination and the ability to maintain their naval preponderance. Of their ability to do so there is no doubt. (148)

In view, therefore, of Britain's special situation it must be admitted that the German naval policy since the beginning of the century was a substantial contributory cause of the war, and the economic competition between the two peoples cannot rightly be placed instead in the foreground. The British offers of alliance of 1898 to 1901 were sincerely and seriously meant, and had they been accepted we might have enjoyed the same advantages as France and pre-war Russia did later. Certainly there was commercial jealousy of Germany in England—the Versailles Treaty showed that plainly enough—which counts as one of the thousand and one causes of the war ; but the decisive factor in British hostility towards Germany was not these economic questions but the battleships.

The German documents offer overwhelming evidence of this. Thus on March 14, 1907, Commander Coerper, the German Naval Attaché in London, reported :

Germany's constantly increasing sea power is the greatest obstacle to Britain's political freedom of action. That is the central factor in the unsatisfactory relations between the two nations. All the other frequently mentioned causes—rivalry in trade, industry and shipping, attitude in the Transvaal War, and so on—are secondary. (149)

Britain's alarm at the German naval construction began to be noticeable early in 1907, and grew at a rate that began seriously to disturb Prince Bülow. There is no doubt that in 1908 and 1909 Bülow shared Coerper's view, in common with almost the whole of the German diplomatic corps. Bülow gave early and serious consideration to the question of a remedy, and Bethmann Hollweg with him. Coerper's successor, Commander Widenmann, made a similar report to his predecessor's on October 30, 1911 :

It cannot too frequently be pointed out that only one factor is of *permanent* interest in Germany's relations with Britain. This is the growth of the German fleet. Britain's attention is permanently fixed on it. (150)

Count Metternich, the German Ambassador in London, noted on this :

This is a truth which no one can disguise from himself if he looks around him in Britain with clear vision ; it is a truth which I have represented for years. . . .

The material now available is more than sufficient to confirm Commander Widenmann's contention that the naval question was at that time the " corner-stone " of British-German relations. (151)

The reactions of the Agadir crisis ; the recognition in Britain that Grey's policy of Ententes had brought the country to the brink of the abyss ; the British and Russian difficulties about Persia, which had nearly led to a breach ; and the outbreak of the Tripolitan War, increased the readiness of the British Government to try to reach an understanding with Germany. London was primarily concerned with the naval question, Berlin with a political agreement with England. The result was the Haldane mission of February 1912.

From as early as 1908 Bülow and Bethmann Hollweg had been trying to come to an understanding with London. On

May 5, 1910, Sir Edward Grey wrote to the British Ambassador in Berlin :

> The attention of public opinion here is concentrated on the mutual arrest or decrease of naval expenditure as *the* test of whether an understanding is worth anything.

A further point was the difficulty with regard to any general political understanding :

> We cannot sacrifice the friendship of Russia or of France. There is no intention of using either for aggressive purposes against Germany. When Germany settled her difficulty with France about Morocco, not only was I free from jealousy, but I had a sense of absolute relief. I had hated the prospect of friendship with France involving friction with Germany, and I rejoiced when this prospect disappeared. My attitude is the same with regard to Germany's difficulty with Russia about Persia. (152) Also, I am quite sure that neither France nor Russia wishes to quarrel with Germany : indeed, I know that they wish to avoid a quarrel. So on this ground I am quite easy. (153) But I cannot enter into any agreement with Germany which would prevent me from giving to France or Russia, should Germany take up towards either of them an aggressive attitude such as she took up towards France about Morocco, the same sort of support as I gave to France at the time of the Algeciras Conference and afterwards until she settled her difficulty with Germany. Any agreement which prevented the giving of such support would obviously forfeit the friendship of France and Russia, and this is what makes me apprehensive of trouble in finding a political formula. (154)

In this document there appear plainly the two points on which the Haldane mission was to be wrecked : The naval question and Grey's excessive anxiety to avoid sacrificing the least iota of his political friendships. These were friendships which, in spite of his denials and his confirmed belief to this day, worked palpably against Germany ; and in these friendships Grey saw the safety of the Empire which was in his care ! (155)

Several times in his book Lord Grey complains of the distrust with which he was often faced in his period of office, and which poisoned the political atmosphere. (156) Thus, for instance, Salisbury's plan of 1895 to partition Turkey, of which there is ample documentary evidence, King Edward's political activities, the anti-German tendency of British policy since 1903, and so on, were purely baseless German suspicions. Grey has no feeling of himself harbouring unjust suspicions. And one thing

is true: towards his friends he showed, as will appear more than once again, a credulity absolutely astonishing in an experienced statesman. Germany, however, was a different matter altogether. The "Nation" wrote in June 1908 that Grey seemed to be entirely obsessed by the fear of war; to see in Germany's ambitions a danger to the peace of Europe and to be setting up one obstacle after another for them. (157) Beyond question Grey was greatly influenced by men behind him. But the extent of his mistrust of Germany is specially clearly shown in a further letter of his to Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador in Berlin, in October 1910. Bethmann had suggested that France and Russia should be drawn into any naval agreement. Grey agreed at once, as he regarded a *political* agreement as only possible if these two Powers were brought in. He wanted, however, also to bring Austria-Hungary and Italy into a naval agreement and a political understanding; then the six European Great Powers would be bound. He proceeded in his letter to Goschen:

> If we can avoid treading upon French corns with regard to Alsace and Lorraine, I believe that five of these Powers would welcome such an Agreement, and a diminution of naval expenditure; for not one of these five Powers has designs of aggrandizement, and they all desire peace. But on Germany's part such an Agreement would mean the renunciation of ambitions for the hegemony of Europe. The way in which she receives the proposal, if it is eventually made, will be a test of whether she really desires peace and security from all attack for herself, or whether she has ambitions which can be gratified only at the expense of other Powers. (158)

Thus in the autumn of 1910 Grey did not attribute plans of expansion and consequently of war to any one of the Great Powers except—Germany! According to him Great Britain, Russia, France (through a benevolently blind eye), Austria-Hungary, and Italy were absolute lovers of peace; only German ambition was suspected of aiming at "European hegemony"! Boundless trust on one side, abysmal mistrust on the other. It is strange to find Grey complaining of the extent to which baseless mistrust poisoned the political atmosphere! To this day he fails to see the grossness of his error on both sides, of the excessive trust on one side and the excessive mistrust on the other.

No wonder it proved impossible to reach an agreement amid this appalling mistrust—that of Grey and his subordinates and followers was paralleled on the German side by the hardly less mistrust of the Tirpitz group. Professor Lowes Dickinson excellently laid bare the kernel of the matter as early as 1916 :

The Germans offer to reduce their naval programme, first, if England will promise an unconditional neutrality ; secondly, when that was rejected, if England will promise neutrality in a war which should be " forced upon " Germany. Thereupon the British Foreign Office scents a snare. Germany will get Austria to provoke a war, while making it appear that the war was provoked by Russia, and she will then come in under the terms of her alliance with Austria, smash France, and claim that England must look on passively under the neutrality agreement ! " No, thank you ! " Sir Edward Grey, accordingly, makes a counter-proposal. England will neither make nor participate in an " unprovoked " attack upon Germany. This time it is the German Chancellor's time to hang back. " Unprovoked ! Hm ! What does that mean ? Russia, let us suppose, makes war upon Austria, while making it appear that Austria is the aggressor. France comes in on the side of Russia. And England ? Will she admit that the war was ' unprovoked ' and remain neutral ? Hardly, we think ! " The Chancellor thereupon proposes the addition : " England, of course, will remain neutral if war is forced upon Germany ? That follows, I presume ? " " No ! " from the British Foreign Office. Reason as before. And the negotiations fall through. How should they not under the conditions ? There could be no understanding, because there was no confidence. There could be no confidence because there was mutual fear. There was mutual fear because the Triple Alliance stood in arms against the Triple Entente. What was wrong ? Germany ? England ? No. The European tradition and system. (159)

To-day it would be necessary to go further and to say with Ewart that the Haldane mission was " foredoomed to failure " " because of British commitments to France." (160) Grey naturally does not think so. He writes :

The upshot was that the Germans were not really willing to give up the naval competition, and that they wanted a political formula that would in effect compromise our freedom of action. We could not fetter ourselves by a promise to be neutral in a European war. We had, indeed, no intention of supporting France, and still less Russia, in a war of aggression : we had a very real determination not to support any aggressor, and we were ready to say so. But there was no formula that could be trusted to define the real aggressor in advance. The revelation of Bismarck's methods in the notorious Ems despatch was a warning against the futility of such formulæ. We were bound to keep

our hands free and the country uncompromised as to its liberty of judgment, decision, and action. (161)

It is not true that Bethmann Hollweg's final formula of neutrality in the event of a war not provoked by Germany would have compromised Great Britain's freedom of action. Unlike Cabinets, public opinion is not always clear at first as to the side from which aggression has actually come, and London could thus at any time have twisted the formula as it liked. This formula, if published, would have compelled the Powers on both sides—Triple Entente as well as Triple Alliance—to proceed with extreme caution, and would thus have been an important contribution to the maintenance of peace.

But, as we know from various documents, the main argument brought forward by Grey was not decisive. Grey was so good and true a friend of the French that whenever Edward VII or British statesmen visited Germany he always had the French assured that the visits had not " any new political significance." (162) Grey also recalls that he informed Paul Cambon of Haldane's intended visit and " assured him that we should do nothing with Germany that would tie our hands." (163) According to Cambon, indeed, Grey told him that there was no intention of entering into negotiations ; the British only desired to learn the intentions of the German Government and to obtain details of its naval programme ! A further circumstance revealed by Poincaré shows that Grey's heart was not in the neutrality negotiations with Germany. At the end of 1912 Sir Francis Bertie, the British Ambassador in Paris, took a quite remarkable step : he privately advised Poincaré to give instructions for London to be spoken to firmly, so that the " mistake " should not be made which Bertie apprehended. Poincaré intervened with entire success on March 29th, and Grey and Nicolson felt " relieved " at the failure of the negotiations ! (164)

It is clear, therefore, that Grey had no intention of committing himself to neutrality in a European war. Or, to quote Winston Churchill, who here again uses more direct language than his colleague :

This last condition . . . might well have been held to deprive us of the power to come to the aid of France in a war " forced," or alleged to be " forced," upon Germany as the result of a quarrel between Austria and Russia. (165)

In other words, if Austria and Russia came to blows, no matter on which side the provocation lay, and Germany fulfilled her duty as an ally towards Austria-Hungary, Britain, with her pretended " free hand," intended to give France armed support if she went to Russia's assistance. The occasion for the general slaughter was of relatively little importance. It was important that France should not offer evident provocation ; but if the case could be so represented as to make France and Russia appear to be the parties attacked, Great Britain was certainly on their side. And for this London kept its hands free.

The episode of the failure of the Haldane mission may thus probably be attributed to two causes of nearly equal relevance : the disinclination of Grey and his supporters to move a hair's breadth from their close union with France and Russia for the sake of a lessening of the tension with Germany and the greater security of world peace which that would entail, and the disinclination of Tirpitz and his supporters adequately to modify their mistaken naval policy.

It is worth noting that Grey makes no mention of the Hague Peace Conference. He appears always to have viewed it with great scepticism. In March 1907 one of his friends said that Grey " followed Campbell-Bannerman's disarmament ideas only with great reluctance and without conviction, and would be glad of a colourable excuse for retreat."

Similarly the German Chargé d'Affaires was convinced that the British Government had no belief " in the possibility of a practical outcome of the Conference " in the matter of disarmament. (166)

Germany's attitude at the Hague was foolish ; it invited suspicion, but had at least the quality of sincerity. Britain was unprepared to give up the right of capture at sea, which was incompatible with the existing rules of naval warfare, and brought down upon herself well-grounded criticism. (167)

Grey mentions Churchill's " naval holiday " plan, (168) but passes entirely over the notorious naval scare of 1909. This was staged by responsible Ministers, Members of Parliament, and leaders of British public opinion with the quite baseless contention that secret and accelerated building was going on in

Germany over and beyond the official naval programme. Churchill denied this and considered the excitement in naval circles overdrawn. After the war he wrote :

> The gloomy Admiralty anticipations were in no respect fulfilled in the year 1912. The British margin was found to be ample in that year. There were no secret German Dreadnoughts, nor had Admiral von Tirpitz made any untrue statement in respect of major construction. (169)

Alan Burgoyne, M.P., editor of the " Navy League Annual," described the " naval panic " as " one of the most portentous pieces of Parliamentary humbug ever practised upon the electorate." (170) It had, however, the further effect of greatly exciting British animus against Germany and must be taken into account among the many causes of the war. The spectre of invasion was constantly called up by certain men in high places, such as Lord Roberts, in order to win support for conscription ; here was another cause ; it was also painted in by novelists and playwrights and was fruitful of fear and hatred and rage. Yet the authorities, particularly the members of the Imperial Defence Committee, were very soon well aware that a German landing on British shores was out of the question. Churchill says outright :

> Once the Fleet was concentrated in its war station, no large army could be landed in the British isles. " Large army " was defined for this purpose as anything over 70,000 men. More than that we guaranteed to intercept or break up while landing. (171)

Tripoli—The Balkan Wars—Yawning Gaps.

Lord Grey writes in introducing the subject of the Balkan Wars :

> First Austria moved, and annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina. Then Italy conquered Tripoli. Finally Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro made a league, and fell upon Turkey. The cause was just : it was the emancipation of the Christian subjects of Turkey in South-east Europe. . . .
>
> Austria's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was the first disturbance of the status quo of Turkey ; Italy's conquest of Tripoli was a shock to it ; the Balkan Allies destroyed it. The enhanced position of Serbia, consequent upon the victories of the Balkan Allies, made Austria sensitive and apprehensive. Finally came the murder of the Archduke Franz-Ferdinand, and Austria, in the excitement that followed, launched

the ultimatum to Serbia that precipitated the Great War. This was the chain of events that began with the Turkish Revolution and led straight to the catastrophe of 1914; but the cause of the Great War lies deeper than this chain of events, and must be discussed elsewhere. (172)

This account has in it two gaps of some importance, which are not filled in anywhere else in "Twenty-five Years": the omission of Morocco in the chain of events that led to the downfall of Turkey, and the omission of the important fact that the Balkan Alliance came into being under Russia's patronage, and while primarily aimed against Turkey was also aimed against Austria-Hungary.

The casual treatment of the Tripolitan War is surprising. Grey thinks that this war did more to destroy the status quo in Turkey than did the annexation of Bosnia. It might therefore have been expected that he would have expressed at least the same disapproval of the Tripolitan adventure as of the Bosnian crisis, and in any case would have shown more indignation than over the violation of the Berlin Treaty of 1878, which had already been violated by other Powers. A word of sharp indignation would have been the more in place in Grey's mouth, since if the annexation of Bosnia produced a serious crisis, at least it did not bring war, and as is generally agreed by historical writers Italy had hardly the shadow of a ground for her raid on Tripoli.

Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, in the letter to W. T. Stead of 1911 already mentioned, reveals the true reason why Sir Edward Grey in 1911 and 1912 and Lord Grey to-day shuns the awkward subject:

England is in reality the Power more than any other responsible for the partition of North Africa, the cause of the present trouble and Italy's excuse for aggression. . . . Our position in Egypt, our agreement with France seven years ago about Morocco, are sufficient proof, even without the all but certainty we have that Sir Edward Grey was secretly cognizant this summer of the intended raid on Tripoli, and consented to and approved it. (173)

The direct connexion between the French protectorate over Morocco and Italy's action cannot, indeed, be left out of account. It is true that the Central Powers had long recognized by treaty Italy's ultimate reversionary claim to Tripoli, as France (1900–01) and Britain (1902) did later and finally Russia (1909). But

Morocco gave the impulse to annexation. (174) For Delcassé had promised the Italians a free hand in Tripoli in return for his own free hand in Morocco. Sir Edward Grey was, of course, aware of this, and as the Anglo-French secret clauses of 1904 found their ultimate materialization in 1911 Grey could make no protest when the Italians exacted their price. In point of fact, at the end of July 1911 he promised British " moral support " to the Italian action, only expressing the desire that Italy should secure a sufficiently strong legal ground for the intended step and should maintain the " open door " in Tripoli. (175)

But although British public opinion was outraged at the unprovoked Italian raid and the Italian atrocities in Tripoli, (176) there was heard, as one of the most distinguished British historians points out,

> no word of protest or rebuke from the Minister who had so sharply condemned the far less serious offence of the annexation of Bosnia. (177)

Since 1902 Italy had stood with one foot in the camp of the Entente, and her more or less openly expressed aspirations for Austrian territory justified the hope that in a general European war she would give play to her proverbial sacro egoismo : ground enough for sparing her as far as possible. That was plainly the national British policy in 1911. But when Viscount Grey of Fallodon, who was anxious to write the truth, is so casual in his reference to Tripoli, a further and peculiar light is thrown on the moral indignation which moves him so continually when he writes of Austria-Hungary's action in 1908.

Germany, with her ally Italy at war with her friend Turkey, was in a difficult situation. For months she had been working for an accommodation between the two countries. The result was that, while London was taken into Italy's confidence as early as July 26, 1911, and Russia a month later, Italy deliberately left her own ally in the dark as to her decisions until the last moment, in order " to save Germany from the unpleasantness of useless efforts at mediation "—and this although Berlin had repeatedly asked to be informed in good time of Italy's intentions. (178)

The other gap in Grey's account brings us back to the Bosnian crisis. Grey seems to have no knowledge of the Serbian

documents published in Berlin in 1919 and in London a year later by Dr. M. Boghitschewitsch, formerly Serbian Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin. (179) The reader of "Twenty-five Years" learns nothing of the fact that Isvolsky and other Russian notables held out to the Serbs in 1908–09 definite hopes of Austrian territory, or of the fact that in November 1908 even the peace-loving Tsar Nicholas II said to Pashitch, the Serbian Prime Minister, that "the question of Bosnia-Herzegovina will only be decided by war." (180) Nor does he learn of the fact that this same peace-loving Tsar spoke in March 1912 in this comforting style to the Crown Prince of Serbia after the conclusion of the Serb-Bulgar Secret Treaty :

> Now Serbia's aspirations in regard to Austria-Hungary will soon proceed to their fulfilment. (181)

Quite recent revelations have provided further evidence of the important part played by Russian diplomacy in the formation of the Serb-Bulgar Alliance. The Russian Ministers in Sofia and Belgrade took a leading part, and during the negotiations the idea of aggression against Turkey repeatedly found quite open expression. That the game was dangerous was perfectly well realized. (182) Sazonov's attitude was peculiar. The Tripolitan War was in progress, and as it proceeded the appetites of the Balkan States naturally grew keener. Sazonov was, therefore, "very pessimistic" in December 1911 "about the dangers to peace in the Balkan peninsula," and in January 1912 the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg was convinced that Sazonov "would be glad to prevent the outbreak of hostilities in the Balkan peninsula at any price." There are various witnesses to Sazonov's desire for peace at this time. (183) On the other hand we have the following facts. On February 14th Sazonov handed a questionnaire to the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, expressing a desire to agree with France as to joint action in various eventualities, among which definite mention was made of that of an armed conflict between Turkey and a Balkan State. The questionnaire disturbed Poincaré a good deal. On March 12, 1912, the day before the signing of the Serb-Bulgar Treaty, a decree was issued in St. Petersburg that Russian orders for mobilization were to be construed as "orders for the commencement of hostilities against Austria and Germany"

—an order which was communicated on September 30th, when the Balkan States were mobilizing, to the sixth army corps in Warsaw, and probably to other army corps. Finally there are indications that Montenegro's precipitate declaration of war on Turkey on October 8th, which was the signal for the general outbreak of war in the Balkans, was prompted by certain Russian authorities. (184)

The explanation of these inconsistencies may be that Sazonov really believed that the formation of the Balkan Alliance had put him in control of the little Slav brothers, but that there were powerful influences in Russia which did their best to force his hand—an instructive prelude to the critical days of 1914. In any case, Sazonov's belief in the pliability of the Balkan peoples would throw into relief his incapacity as a statesman ; for to others it was only too clear that in the existing situation the Balkan Alliance was bound to provide a direct incentive to an attack on a Turkey internally in disorder and in difficulties with Italy. (185)

Grey cannot claim ignorance of the Russian patronage of the Balkan Alliance. It is not certain whether Gueshov, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, and the Serb Minister in Sofia kept the British Minister in that capital fully informed. But there is no question that at the beginning of April 1912 Grey was informed by Count Benckendorff that Serbia and Bulgaria had concluded an alliance, with Russian knowledge, and that Russia held in her hands the decision as to its application. (186) In the course of the Balkan Wars Russia's treaty-established patronage became generally known. Why, then, does Grey make no allusion to it ?

There are of course reasons why Grey may have remained unacquainted with the Serbian documents, but it is difficult to suppose him unacquainted with the three volumes " Les Affaires Balcaniques 1912–1914 " published by the French Foreign Ministry in 1922. (187) Poincaré published this collection of documents as evidence of his peaceful Balkan policy, and it has been given much attention in the Entente countries. The object of publication was to defend the French Balkan policy of 1912–14, and must certainly have awakened Lord Grey's sympathy. Why has he not mentioned this publication ? He would have found in it that Poincaré wrote down the following after a

conversation with Sazonov in August 1912, during his visit to St. Petersburg :

> The (Serb-Bulgar) treaty thus contains the seed not only of a war against Turkey but of one against Austria. It also sets up Russian hegemony over the two Slav kingdoms, as Russia is made arbiter in all questions.
>
> I remarked to M. Sazonov that this agreement did not at all correspond with the account of it that had been given to me ; that, to put it bluntly, it was a war agreement, and that it not only revealed unexpressed designs in the mind of the Serbs and Bulgars, but gave reason to fear that their hopes appear to be encouraged by Russia and that this eventual partition is a bait for their greeds. (188)

Sazonov, whose concealment of the essence of the treaty, denounced by Poincaré, sufficiently reveals his bad conscience, (189) tried in vain to reassure his guest by pointing out that the parties to the treaty had bound themselves " not to declare war or even to mobilize " without Russia's assent ; Poincaré remained full of anxiety, and took energetic steps in the months that followed to prevent the flaming up of the Balkans. On October 15, 1912, when this was no longer possible, Poincaré unburdened his heart to Paul Cambon, described the whole affair, his impression in St. Petersburg, his protest against the " war convention," his view that Austria-Hungary would not tolerate the execution of the Serb-Bulgar Treaty, his fear of European complications ; and he charged Cambon with the secret communication to Grey of this " general information " " as to the intention and scope of the Serb-Bulgar Convention." In doing this Poincaré took pains to picture Sazonov and Isvolsky as blameless pacifists, but the whole of his long letter was virtually one long denunciation of Russia's secret policy, aimed at showing up his own ally ; and Cambon actually read in it that Poincaré had said to Isvolsky and Sazonov that though now they were trying to put a brake on the movement in the Balkans, it was Russia who " had started the motor." (190)

There came, however, a delay in communicating this to Grey. Some of Poincaré's colleagues felt that it was " perhaps not altogether right to betray a secret that Russia had confided to us." It was agreed to recall the instructions to Cambon and instead to ask Sazonov through Isvolsky to inform London as soon as possible, as otherwise France would have to do so. The

Russians, however, did nothing. It needed a sharp letter from Poincaré to Sazonov at the end of October to bring the latter to the point of telegraphing on November 3rd that he was at once giving instructions to the London Embassy as desired for Grey to be informed. Poincaré concludes this account, which reveals so much, with these words :

> M. Cambon had then full freedom himself to confide my impressions to the Secretary of State and Sir Arthur Nicolson. (191)

From this it must be assumed that Sir Edward Grey received at the beginning of November 1912 the news of the aggressive Balkan policy which the Russians had been pursuing behind the backs of their own friends—unless Benckendorff and Cambon preferred only to inform Sir Arthur Nicolson. (192)

The Balkan conflagration came, however, too soon to suit the purposes of the Russian Foreign Ministry. One or other of the Russian agents in the Balkans must have been stirring up trouble rather than damping it down, and have been pursuing a policy of his own. (193) But the important facts must not be ignored, as they are by Grey, that according to the French Foreign Minister (who was himself only dilatorily let into the secret) the Balkan Alliance which Russia promoted contained the seeds of war against Austria, that the Alliance assured to Russia hegemony over Bulgaria and Serbia, and that it was in reality Russia that " started the motor " in the Balkans.

The German Government, acting in unison with Austria-Hungary and the Powers of the Triple Entente, worked energetically to prevent the outbreak of the Balkan War. When this became hopeless Germany was the first Power to propose—on September 19, 1912—an exchange of views with the other Governments in order to localize the threatened conflict. The Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Berchtold, declared that the Dual Monarchy was satiated and that its main concern was for the safeguarding of its economic interests. Vienna's moderation was fully recognized in St. Petersburg and London. In contrast to Bülow's blank cheque of 1908–09 to Austria, Bethmann Hollweg and Kiderlen-Wächter continually urged restraint on their ally. Kiderlen had no desire to shield Turkey and was for allowing the Balkan States their triumphs. The Emperor William went still further along this path ; he had been against

the efforts to restrain the Balkan Alliance from going to war, and again and again most strongly opposed depriving the Balkan States of the fruits of victory. He was not prepared to move a finger if they cleared Turkey out of Europe, where her presence had been "over-prolonged." Even Raymond Poincaré admits that in 1912–13 Germany used her influence for peace. This fact was particularly deserving of recognition since, as Jules Cambon rightly held, the successes of the Balkan Alliance meant "the collapse of a Near East policy pursued by Germany for twenty years," and placed Austria-Hungary in a dangerous position. Poincaré's fear that Vienna would oppose the execution of the Serb-Bulgar War Treaty, and would demand the "compensations" usual in such alterations of the political equilibrium, was not realized. (194)

Even Grey, who by convoking conferences of Ambassadors did undeniable service to the localization and the shortening of the war, recognizes Germany's activity in mediation. (195) In regard to Albania, however, he shows himself insufficiently informed. He always mentions only that Austria desired an independent Albania, (196) whereas Italy pursued the same policy and the two Powers had been bound by treaty since 1901 to do so. (197)

As usual, Grey is particularly generous in his judgment of France:

> France did not want trouble to come upon her from a Balkan dispute in which French interests were not concerned. . . . France as an ally felt bound to support Russia; but she followed, and did not wish to lead. (198)

This is contradicted by several important documents. Before the outbreak of the Balkan War, it is true, Poincaré worked hard to prevent it. But after he had ascertained

> that the well-informed and responsible persons were very optimistic as to the prospects for Russia and France in the event of a general collision, (199)

and after the Balkan allies had won unexpectedly great victories over Turkey, Poincaré underwent a significant change. It is naturally not easily observed in the "Affaires Balcaniques" (compiled to justify his policy) or in his latest volumes of memoirs.

But it emerges from a study of the collection by Friedrich Stieve of Isvolsky's correspondence (" Der Diplomatische Schriftwechsel Iswolskis 1911–1914 "), which is quite indispensable. (200)

The new material recently published by M. Poincaré shows beyond dispute that a good deal of the charges made against him went too far. This applies, for instance, to the recall, at Sazonov's instance, of M. Georges Louis, the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg. The importance of this affair probably lies in the fact that in the midst of the Balkan crisis Louis was replaced by Théophile Delcassé, who was responsible for extending the scope of the Franco-Russian Alliance, and that Delcassé was also entrusted with a military " mission." The choice of Delcassé was, it appears, not mainly the work of Poincaré, though he had meanwhile become the President of France. Moreover, the personal relations between Poincaré and Isvolsky were anything but friendly. There is no doubt that Isvolsky was little loved in Paris ; he was distrusted, and Poincaré intended to move for his recall. It must even be considered as proved that many of Isvolsky's reports were coloured. Poincaré is also able to show that it was the Russians who took the initiative in connexion with the Franco-Russian Naval Convention of 1912. But much as he desires to show that he always pursued a policy of peace, he has not succeeded. (201) The essence of the matter is this : In the Bosnian crisis the French Government had declared to St. Petersburg with the utmost plainness that it was not ready to be drawn into a war for the sake of Russian interests in the Balkans. (202) Poincaré spoke in similar terms of warning to Sazonov in August 1912 when the latter informed him of the Balkan " war treaty," and he added emphatically :

> Do not count on our military assistance in the Balkans, even if you are attacked by Austria. We shall fulfil our duties as allies, but shall not go beyond them. We shall lend you armed support if you are attacked by Germany or by Austria supported by Germany, as you will lend us yours if we are attacked by Germany or by Italy supported by Germany. In the event prescribed we shall fulfil our duty, but do not ask more. (203)

That was an attitude entirely in conformity with the Russo-French military convention (an attitude from which France departed in 1914), and these grave words of warning came at a time when relative strengths in the Balkans had not been

tested. The general view in the European capitals was then that the young Balkan States would have no easy task in making a stand against Turkey. For this reason, and in order still to hold back the Balkan States from war if possible, the Great Powers announced that they would not permit any territorial changes. In October 1912, however, Serbia and Bulgaria astonished the world with their great victories, which led to the expectation of a revolutionary change in the map of the Balkans. Sazonov wanted the Powers to make a declaration of " complete disinterestedness," and Poincaré at once supported him. But he was bound to realize that Russia herself had by no means abandoned her aspirations in the Balkans, and that the Russian proposal had a patently interested motive—to prevent Austria-Hungary, who was at least as much interested in the Balkans as Russia and was suffering grave injury through the events of the war while Russia was correspondingly gaining, from making well-justified claims for compensation. The suggested declaration of disinterestedness so obviously worked against the interests only of the Dual Monarchy that in spite of their pacific feeling the Triple Alliance Powers rejected the proposal. It was on this occasion that Poincaré's change of attitude became evident. In striking contrast to his attitude of August 1912 he brought forward in November 1912, to Isvolsky's great satisfaction, an " entirely new point of view," that

> Territorial gains by Austria would jeopardize the general equilibrium and would so jeopardize France's own interests. (204)

Poincaré was " perfectly clear " that France might " in this way be drawn into military operations." He repeatedly gave Isvolsky pressing and unmistakable assurances that France would fulfil her duties as an ally as soon as Germany placed herself behind Austria-Hungary. (205) It is true that he always asked to be kept informed of Russia's intentions and to be consulted before any definite steps were taken. But in these consultations the French Government sometimes proved more Russian than the Russians. Thus Sazonov gave instructions for Belgrade to be informed that Britain and France had publicly declared that they had no intention of quarrelling with the Triple Alliance over Serbian expansion to the Adriatic. It can hardly be wrong to assume that Sazonov found this a welcome means of putting

pressure on Serbia. The French Cabinet, however, under Poincaré's leadership, was irritated at his doing so. Among other things it laid this down in writing for the Russian Government on November 16, 1912 :

> As regards the Government of the Republic, it reserves to itself the examination of the steps which the Imperial Government may consider it necessary to put before it, and until they are communicated to it it can neither agree with these steps nor discuss them in a friendly way. Meanwhile the Government of the Republic has made no statement and given no ground for supposing that it is withdrawing its support.

Poincaré now comments on this that the Cabinet wanted to protect itself from unjustified Russian reproaches, as in 1909, that the French had withdrawn their support. (206) But it is in this very point that there lies the enormous difference between the France of 1909 and Poincaré's France of the autumn (not the summer) of 1912. The foregoing protest against Sazonov's move in throwing France's name with Russia's into the scale in favour of peace could only be regarded in Russia as encouragement. For this reason it was said even in French diplomatic circles that Poincaré's Balkan policy was to feed the Russo-French Alliance on Austro-Russian rivalry. (207)

This tendency found striking expression in December 1912. On the 4th Paul Cambon had sent a long letter to Poincaré full of hostility towards the Dual Monarchy and attributing the most aggressive plans to it, although Vienna had repeatedly issued official reassuring statements. It is true that certain military preparations were going on in Austria-Hungary, but these only about balanced the Russian measures already adopted, and had occasioned no excitement in Russia. Not so in France. The French military and other authorities were (sincerely ?) greatly disturbed at Russia's indifference, and in the middle of December 1912 M. Millerand, the Minister of War, discussed the matter with the Russian Military Attaché. Taking as established the alleged warlike intentions of Austria against Serbia, Millerand said finally :

> In that case you will have to abandon Serbia to her fate. That, of course, is your affair ; all we want is that it must be clear that we are not to blame for it ; we are prepared, and that fact must be borne in mind. (208)

Preparatory military measures had, in fact, been adopted in France. And on December 12th the German Ambassador in Paris reported :

> From the beginning of the Balkan crisis public opinion here showed unmistakable aversion to the idea of France being involved in a dangerous situation for the sake of Russian interests. . . .
>
> For some days there has now been a certain change ; virtually the whole of the Press is refraining from criticism of Russian policy and instead is strongly denouncing Austria-Hungary's " mysterious and threatening " attitude. This may in part be due to influence from the Quai d'Orsay. But I hear from a trustworthy source that the principal pressure is being applied to the papers by the rolling rouble. I am told that the Russians have begun a campaign on a big scale to influence the Press, and not without the knowledge of M. Poincaré. (209)

The rumours here reported by Baron von Schoen have since been confirmed, and in this connexion the letter from Paul Cambon mentioned above, which Poincaré praises to-day, gives the impression that it aimed at arousing warlike feeling in Paris and among the Triple Entente Powers. There is further evidence as to this.

Grey brought away from the Conferences of Ambassadors the impression that Paul Cambon was not entirely pleased with Grey's neutral attitude. (210) Count Benckendorff, however, saw much deeper. Recalling his talks with Paul Cambon and taking Poincaré's attitude into account, he expressed at the end of February 1913 the conviction

> that of all the Powers France alone, I will not say wants war, but would see it without much regret. (211)

He was undoubtedly right, so far as those in power in France were concerned.

Lord Grey evidently knows something of the famous " Livre Noir." He writes that

> I was told on good authority upon the outbreak of war that Isvolsky, when it seemed as if the unexpected resistance of Belgium might upset German plans, said in Paris, " C'est ma guerre." It was some time since Isvolsky had been Foreign Minister at St. Petersburg : Foreign Ministers, when they leave their foreign offices and go to Embassies, cease to control general policy. Isvolsky's boast, had it been true, would have been criminal ; as it was vain and empty, it was merely disgusting. (212)

That is all there is about Isvolsky's activities in Paris. Lord Grey says no more ; not even a word as to the extent to which Poincaré has been compromised by Isvolsky's diplomatic correspondence. These are grave omissions. Nor does Grey say anything about the fresh Russian promises to Serbia. Sazonov believed, as is well known, after the Serbs' great successes that they " would smash Austria " ; the future belonged to them. (213) And when the Balkan allies threatened to fall out with one another he telegraphed to Belgrade :

> Serbia's Promised Land lies in the territory of the Austria-Hungary of to-day. . . . Time is working for Serbia and for the destruction of her enemies, who already show plain signs of dissolution. (214)

Of all this there is not a trace in " Twenty-five Years."

The Powers did not interfere in the Treaty of Bucharest of August 10, 1913, between the reduced Balkan allies. Grey, looking back, regards this as a mistake. For the settlement " was not one of justice but of force " :

> Any future Balkan peace was impossible as long as the Treaty of Bucarest remained.

And the very care of the Great Powers to prevent falling out among themselves " was, in fact, going to render peace more precarious in the year that followed." (215)

It will be remembered that Austria-Hungary wanted to go to arms against Serbia before Bulgaria was annihilated ; she was energetically restrained by Berlin and Italy in the interest of the general peace. (216)

The second Balkan War destroyed the original Balkan Alliance, but on the other hand Roumania, a much more important accession, had come into the Russian group. Russia's prestige in the peninsula had grown considerably and that of the Dual Monarchy sunk. The humiliation of 1908–09 had more than been wiped out. The French Chargé d'Affaires in St. Petersburg wrote on September 10, 1913 :

> Since the beginning of the Balkan crisis Russia has been seeking above all the humiliation of Austria in the Balkans in revenge for the humiliation which Count Aehrenthal inflicted on Russia in 1908. . . . In this respect Russia has completely satisfied her desires. . . . (217)

So also thought Count Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador in London. (218) And this should not be lost sight of in considering the crisis of July 1914.

Further Gaps—The British-Russian Naval Convention—Denials—An Untruth.

Viscount Grey passes over the Liman von Sanders affair with a few words that say nothing. (219) Yet this crisis and its solution is extraordinarily instructive. At first Sir Edward joined Russia and France in protesting against the German general's military mission to Turkey; subsequently he found himself crippled by the representation made to him that for years past the Young Turks had confided the reorganization of their navy to a British admiral. Grey began then to hold Russia back. Paris took a different line. At a special conference on January 13, 1914, Sazonov informed his colleagues in the Ministry that

> So far as France is concerned, the Russian Government may count on the most active support.

Delcassé, the French Ambassador, had assured Sazonov

> in the name of the French Foreign Minister that France would go as far as Russia may wish. (220)

This was a French blank cheque for war. The Foreign Office had cooled off and plainly held Sazonov back; for the rest, Germany gave way without hesitation.

Nor has Grey anything to say of the Conference on the Straits at St. Petersburg in February 1914. As is well known, it resolved to work out a programme for the seizure of Constantinople and the Straits; the participants in the conference clearly realized that this was only possible in the course of a general European war. (221) Russia had so exhibited a definite war aim.

Grey makes up for these gaps by giving a long account of his negotiations with Russia for the conclusion of a naval convention. In the latter part of April 1914 King George visited Paris and Grey went with him. On the last morning he was asked to go to the Quai d'Orsay and there informed by the French of a desire expressed by Sazonov:

Russia knew of the conversations between the British and French General Staffs, and, in order to make Russia feel that she was not kept at arm's length, it was very desirable that there should be something of the same kind with Russia.

There was no reason for the general staffs to communicate, for the part to be taken by the British force was already settled ; but why not " consultations " between the naval staffs ?

The French did not themselves attach great importance to this from the point of view of strategy ; they did not estimate very highly the value of the Russian Fleet in a war against Germany. But they did attach great importance to it for the purpose of keeping Russia in good disposition, and of not offending her by refusing. (222)

This sentimental argument at once touched the loyal spirit of Sir Edward. He was unable to see much, if any, strategic necessity in the suggestion ;

but the difficulty of refusing was obvious. To refuse would offend Russia by giving the impression that she was not treated on equal terms with France ; it might even give her the impression that, since we first agreed to military conversations with France, we had closed our minds against participation in a war. To give this impression might have unsettling consequences, as well as being untrue.

There was, of course, no question of a *pledge* to take part in hostilities, any more than there had been in the earlier negotiations with France ; but the British Cabinet resolved to begin the communications desired by Russia on the basis of the Grey-Cambon letters of November 22 and 23, 1912. (223)

What was the French Government's motive ? Certainly it was that " the Russo-British naval conversations were to be further provision for a war with Germany." Grey admits this : " That, of course, is true." But, he writes of the French,

I felt sure at the time that they had no thought of aggression ; I feel sure of it still. The idea of the revanche—of retaking Alsace and Lorraine—though not publicly disowned, had been tacitly given up. . . .

What, then, was their motive ? I took it at the time, and I believe it now to have been, simply a desire to reassure Russia and to keep her loyal. (224)

How kindly and innocent !

And Grey has only a faint doubt whether perhaps the political value of the Franco-British military " conversations " had been

magnified in telling the Russians of them, or whether they had magnified it themselves. He refers in this connexion to the Siebert documents—so that he at least knows something of them. (225)

In this account Grey shows remarkable, almost incredible naïveté. If he is expressing his deepest conviction—and most of those who know him, even his political opponents, credit him with good faith—he gives here striking evidence of his great defects as a statesman, his diplomatic short-sightedness, his political incapacity.

In connexion with the Haldane mission Grey wrote that " good relations between Britain and Germany ought to make things more, and not less, pleasant for France." (226) Poincaré's veto on the German formula of neutrality should have inspired him with more caution in forming this opinion. For it was mistaken. In February 1914, for instance, the French Ambassador in Berlin viewed

> very apprehensively the continual rumours of an improvement in British-German relations, as he admits the possibility of some sort of approach between the two countries in the future. (227)

So also in St. Petersburg. Sazonov telegraphed to Count Benckendorff on February 12, 1913, that he felt

> that we must see a disturbing symptom in the efforts of German diplomacy to secure an approach to Britain,

and he wanted to know " to what extent such intrigues " might " find favourable soil in London." (228)

It was this concern in France and Russia, and not the sentimental ground advanced by Grey, that led the two Powers to bind Britain yet more closely, in order to parry the continued British-German negotiations. At the beginning of 1914 Sazonov repeatedly telegraphed to the Russian Ambassadors in Paris and London that

> the further strengthening and development of the so-called " Triple Entente " and if possible its development into a new Triple Alliance

seemed to him an urgent task. As an approach to it the French should recommend to Grey in Paris " a closer agreement between Russia and England." (229) Isvolsky reports on April 29, 1914,

how well this succeeded. Those present were themselves astonished

at Sir Edward Grey's clearly and definitely expressed readiness to tread the path of a closer approach to Russia, (230)

from which it is evident that their bait succeeded beyond expectation. Sazonov expressed himself " with the utmost satisfaction " as follows :

Apart from the fact that such an agreement is desirable from the specially military standpoint, we attach great importance to it from a general political point of view. (231)

Of course the *political* side of the matter was incomparably the more important. Count Benckendorff recognized this at once ; he wrote to St. Petersburg :

I doubt whether any better guarantee for joint military operations in the event of war could be found than the spirit of this Entente, as it now reveals itself, strengthened by the existing military agreements. (232)

That was the very realistic basis of the Russo-French move which Grey finds so harmless and innocent. But was Grey really this happy and credulous dupe ? To judge from a new piece of evidence from the British archives, it does not seem easy to suppose it. We knew already from the Memoirs of Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, that on April 3, 1914, the Tsar, in conversation with him, used the phrase " an alliance of a purely defensive character " and advocated arrangement " for the co-operation of the British and Russian Fleets." Now we have the essential passages in the report which Buchanan sent on the same day to Sir Edward Grey on this audience. According to this the Tsar complained that it was impossible to get the Concert of European Powers to work together :

This led His Majesty to say that he would like to see a closer bond of union established between England and Russia, such as an alliance of a purely defensive character,

and on Buchanan remarking that he feared " that this was impracticable at present,"

the Emperor said that we might at any rate conclude some arrangement similar to that which existed between His Majesty's Government and the Government of the French Republic.

Following out this line of thought the Tsar said that " it might be advantageous to arrange beforehand for the co-operation of the British and Russian Fleets," and, according to Buchanan's report, added these significant words :

> At present our understanding was confined to Persia, and he was strongly of opinion that that understanding ought to be extended, either by some sort of arrangement such as he had suggested, or by some written formula which would record the fact of Anglo-Russian co-operation in Europe.

The Ambassador personally welcomed the idea, but pointed out that Great Britain might be of more service to Russian interests as " only a friend who might be turned into an ally " by the attitude of other Powers ; the Tsar held to his idea :

> He would nevertheless prefer to see our present understanding assume a more precise and definite character. (233)

Nicholas II was known to be diffident and lacking in self-reliance. Everyone knew that he would not make proposals of this sort on his own responsibility but would first have agreed on them with his advisers, and it was bound, therefore, to seem significant that he should hold so firmly to his idea. Sir Edward Grey could have no doubt of this when he read the report, which reached London on April 7th. Grey's mind was bound to be occupied with this report, and he was bound to be reminded at once of the desire expressed by the Tsar himself for an alliance (the British archives now being published should furnish further documents as to this) when, scarcely a fortnight later, the French communicated to him in Paris the Russian desire for a naval convention, the very means through which the Tsar wanted " to record the fact of Anglo-Russian co-operation in Europe." Is it conceivable that Grey did not notice this, that amid the festivities in Paris he had entirely forgotten Buchanan's report on his important audience ? It is incredible. Grey himself admitted to Prince Lichnowsky at the end of June 1914 that Sazonov was

> sometimes anxious . . . as to whether the Triple Entente was not contrasting unfavourably with the Triple Alliance, and proving to be a less solid force in diplomacy. (234)

This is one more instance in which it is impossible to believe in Grey's good faith. He may have had shortcomings and

defects as a statesman, but he was certainly not as naïve as he paints himself here.

Grey's astonishing readiness to follow the Russo-French decoy birds must also be considered in connexion with the British-German negotiations concerning African colonies. These showed a broad spirit of accommodation in London and produced an undoubted improvement in British-German relations. (235) But, as we have seen, Grey was heart and soul with the Entente and it must have cost him a struggle to approach the Germany he so distrusted, as happened in the colonial negotiations, and to pave the way to substantial advantages for the feared Germans. It would have been in accordance with his views and inclinations if he had said to himself that this politically advantageous rapprochement to which his own convictions were opposed required balancing by a strengthening of the Entente. This may explain why Grey had no hesitation in grasping with both hands the proposal made to him in Paris (without revealing the real intentions of Russia and France) of a British-Russian Naval Convention.

In any case, here again Grey omitted to seek any information as to the result of the British-Russian naval negotiations. (236) They were, it is true, not to bind him. But in writing his Memoirs he should have paid some attention to them. He would then have had to relate that the Russians were very seriously concerned about landing in Pomerania in the event of war ; they had not adequate means of transport. In the view of the Russian Admiralty the British Government could give " substantial " help

> if before the beginning of warlike operations it would give facilities for a certain number of merchant vessels to be sent to our Baltic ports, in order that the lack of means of transport might so be made good. (237)

Naturally Count Benckendorff was greatly disturbed at this undiplomatic revelation of secret aims ; he advised the Russian Naval Attaché to use " great prudence " in the matter, (238) and to all appearance the British heard nothing of the matter at the time.

But what did the plan mean ? It was a question of a landing of troops on a large scale, and it was out of the question for the many transports required to be brought unnoticed in a few days from Britain to the Baltic. No doubt the idea of the Russian

wire-pullers was to get Britain to accumulate suitable merchant vessels as secretly as possible in the Baltic during a certain period, so that Russia might be " ready for any emergency." We are involuntarily reminded of the resolutions of the Straits Conference of February 1914, aiming at the realization of Russia's " historic mission " in the course of a general war. Lord Grey would have been able to see that in this case Russia's armaments were certainly not to be regarded as the " precautionary measure " that he imagined them to be, but as express preparation for a war of aggression.

It is significant that in the spring of 1914 not only Russia but France pressed for rapid progress with the British-Russian negotiations. (239) But the matter got into the papers and Berlin naturally showed serious concern about it. Questions were put in Parliament. Mr. King asked

whether any naval agreement has recently been entered into between Russia and Great Britain, and whether any negotiations, with a view to a naval agreement, have recently taken place, or are now pending, between Russia and Great Britain.

Sir William Byles asked Grey

whether he can make any statement with regard to an alleged new naval agreement between Great Britain and Russia ; how far such agreement would affect our relations with Germany ; and will he lay papers ?

Grey replied :

The Hon. Member for North Somerset asked a similar question last year with regard to military forces, and the Hon. Member for North Salford asked a similar question also on the same day as he has again done to-day. The Prime Minister then replied that, if war arose between European Powers, there were no unpublished agreements which would restrict or hamper the freedom of the Government, or of Parliament, to decide whether or not Great Britain should participate in a war. That answer covers both the questions on the paper. It remains as true to-day as it was a year ago. No negotiations have since been concluded with any Power that would make the statement less true. No such negotiations are in progress, and none are likely to be entered upon, as far as I can judge. But, if any agreement were to be concluded that made it necessary to withdraw or modify the Prime Minister's statement of last year, which I have quoted, it ought, in my opinion, to be, and I suppose that it would be, laid before Parliament. (240)

On the face of it this reply contains grave inaccuracies, and Grey has frequently been charged with this in Britain. Let us hear his defence :

> The answer given is absolutely true. The criticism to which it is open is, that it does not answer the question put to me. That is undeniable. Parliament has an unqualified right to know of any agreements or arrangements that bind the country to action or restrain its freedom. But it cannot be told of military and naval measures to meet possible contingencies. So long as Governments are compelled to contemplate the possibility of war, they are under a necessity to take precautionary measures, the object of which would be defeated if they were made public. . . . If the question had been pressed I must have declined to answer it, and have given these reasons for doing so. Questions in the previous year about military arrangements with France had been put aside by the Prime Minister with a similar answer. (241)
>
> Neither the Franco-British military nor the Anglo-Russian naval conversations (242) compromised the freedom of this country, but the latter were less intimate and important than the former. I was therefore quite justified in saying that the assurances given by the Prime Minister still held good. Nothing had been done that in any way weakened them, and this was the assurance that Parliament was entitled to have. Political engagements ought not to be kept secret ; naval or military preparations for contingencies of war are necessary, but must be kept secret. In these instances care had been taken to ensure that such preparations did not involve any political engagement. (243)

Thus Grey failed entirely to answer Mr. King's and Sir William Byles's questions. This is clear on examining his reply. But with his carefully calculated reply he not only gave the impression of having answered both questions but said expressly in the Commons : " *That answer covers both the questions on the paper.*" In declaring to-day that his reply was " absolutely true " but " did not answer the questions put to me," he admits, by implication, apparently without noticing it, that on June 11, 1914, *he told a direct untruth to the House of Commons on an exceedingly important matter.* Without the sentence " That answer covers both the questions on the paper " it would not be possible to make this grave charge against Grey. For in his reply he expressly referred only to agreements " which would restrict or hamper the freedom of the Government, or of Parliament, to decide whether or not Great Britain should participate in a war." In this sense Grey had also spoken of the negotiations with Russia for a naval convention which had shortly before been

begun but temporarily suspended owing to their coming to public knowledge. He felt justified in giving this account, relying on his letter to Cambon, which had been communicated to the Russians, since express provision was made in this letter for the freedom of action of the two Governments. Yet—when on August 3, 1914, Grey made his famous speech in the House of Commons, a large section of the British public regarded the denials of obligation which had preceded it as misleading, even as deliberately misleading. Thus the " Manchester Guardian " wrote on August 4, 1914 :

> Sir Edward Grey's speech last night . . . showed that for years he has been keeping back the whole truth.

Anyone who turns over the pages of the second chapter of this book will see in these denials, at the best, misleading half-truths. (244)

In addition to the evidence it gives of a direct untruth, Grey's defence of his camouflaging reply contains a quite indefensible subtlety in his contention that the people must be told nothing of military and naval measures, as otherwise their purpose would be defeated. A simple admission that the general and naval staffs have had " conversations " does not reveal anything whatever of *what* the conversations were about. Obviously the *details* of the " conversations " had to be kept from the House of Commons and the public. But the *fact* of the " conversations " could have been admitted quite safely and with no sacrifice of any military secret. On the contrary, the public announcement that " conversations " had taken place and were continuing, but that they were not binding on either Government and that their results were only to be applied if France or Russia were plainly attacked without provocation, would have healthily cleared up the situation and helped to maintain world peace. Grey's defence also fails because he himself remarks that the Germans were bound to know of the intimate relations between the two staffs, and also that the redistribution of the fleets was " evidence that there was some arrangement between British and French naval authorities." (245) It is impossible not to feel some doubt whether Grey himself believes in the soundness of his defence.

Grey also touches on the question whether Secretary of State von Jagow was in fact misled by his declaration of June 11,

1914. (246) This, so far as the German Government is concerned, may be denied. (247) Grey, however, felt called on to say to Prince Lichnowsky on June 24, 1914, that he did not wish to mislead him

> by making him think that the relations that we had with France and Russia were less cordial and intimate than they really were. Though we were not bound by engagement as Allies, we did from time to time talk as intimately as Allies. (248)

These statements plainly reveal a certain discomfort of Grey's over the ambiguity of his statement to Parliament, and over his position in view of the half-truths that masked it. This was evident four weeks later, on July 23, 1914, when he dined with Albert Ballin at Haldane's. Von Jagow had asked Ballin, who was Managing Director of the Hamburg-Amerika-Linie, to ascertain through his British connexions the position in regard to the British-Russian Naval Convention. (249) Grey " readily " told him that

> no such naval convention exists, and that it is not Britain's intention to agree to such a convention. (250)

Ballin's report is entirely unqualified. Did Grey make any qualification ? Did Ballin omit to report it ? Or did Grey feel justified in telling a political untruth to a private person ?

As Foreign Minister, Grey was convinced of the absolute desire for peace of France and Russia. He had written in the autumn of 1910 of treading on " French corns " with regard to Alsace and Lorraine, but in the certainty that the idea of revanche had been tacitly given up. (251) He also writes :

> In 1914 the French did not desire war with Germany—they feared it, and every preparation made was a precaution against a great peril which they desired to avoid, but which they feared might be inevitable. (252)

Even Russia, in his opinion, was preoccupied by this fear of a war with Germany. (253)

A long communication from Grey to Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador in Berlin, reporting a conversation with Prince Lichnowsky on June 24, 1914, gives further expression to these views of Grey's. He said that France was " most peacefully disposed," and Russia, about whose intentions there was

anxiety in Germany, "was not pursuing an aggressive anti-German policy, or thinking of making war on Germany." Lichnowsky entirely shared this view. (254)

Lord Grey holds still to his judgment of France at that time as "certainly right"; "her whole conduct in 1914, up to the very outbreak of war," proved it so. But, he asks himself,

> What about Russia? I know of nothing to alter the opinion, expressed in this conversation, about the Tsar, Sazonov, and Benckendorff (pursuing no aggressive policy against Germany); but it may fairly be thought, in the light of after-knowledge, that more allowance should have been made for the inherent instability in Russian government; for the possibility that, in a moment of great crisis and excitement, the Tsar might be rushed into some imprudent act. It needs more than good will to preserve peace in a crisis; it needs steadiness and strength. The Tsar was not strong, and the Kaiser was not steady, and in each country there was "a military element." (255)

We shall be concerned in the next chapter with the attitude of the Great Powers at the outbreak of the war. Here we will only consider Grey's view of his Entente friends in 1914. There is no question of his real conviction of their desire for peace, Russia included—not till later did he have doubts of Russia. He wrote, therefore, sincerely in his Memoirs:

> Our own relations with France and Russia made it certain that they would not enter upon an aggressive or dangerous policy. (256)

But the world of Grey's imagination was very different from the real world. It is not true that revanche had been abandoned. At the beginning of the century it seemed to be gradually dying out; but since the Entente with Britain it had revived, it was promoted by German policy, it gained fresh life from the British-Russian Entente, and with the growing cohesion of the Triple Entente and the growing isolation of the Central Powers it nurtured definite hopes which in diplomatic circles were only discussed entirely in private but in the French Press and literature were given eloquent expression. (257) Certainly the broad masses of the French people were anxious for peace and had no desire for a war for revanche; but not so a number of the prominent persons in power. Among the latter first place belongs to Delcassé, Poincaré, and Paléologue. They and those who thought with them naturally took care not to give public expression

to their secret desires, hopes, and aims. Poincaré also admitted that there was no direct way out; for this reason he fed the Russo-French Alliance "on the Austro-Russian rivalry in the Balkans," fixing his gaze always on "the hole in the Vosges." A close friend of Poincaré, M. Maurice Colrat, has borne witness to it:

> Metz and Strasbourg recovered are not simply the brilliant work of our soldiers . . . they are the result of a policy—

and he considers that generations to come will give Poincaré front rank "for the admirable continuity of his policy." (258) Delcassé, too, himself told Isvolsky in October 1914 that, when he was French Ambassador in St. Petersburg in 1913, he "very often and very thoroughly" discussed with Sazonov France's war aims in Alsace-Lorraine, and found in the Russian Foreign Minister a sympathetic and understanding listener. The significance of these "negotiations" of 1913, in which the two parties satisfied themselves "that the aims pursued by Russia and France are identical," (259) can scarcely be weakened by the fact that Delcassé was not officially authorized to carry them on, as Poincaré had it announced. For no less a person than Poincaré himself bore witness after the war that

> During my school years my spirit, oppressed by the defeat, unceasingly crossed the frontier which the Treaty of Frankfurt had imposed on us, and when I climbed down from my castles in the air I saw no reason for existence for my generation but the hope of recovering the lost provinces. (260)

Finally we recall the readiness of France, under Poincaré, for war during the first Balkan War, as is attested in the Russian documents, we recall Poincaré's pressing assurances of armed assistance, and Delcassé's blank cheque given to the Russians at the opening of 1914 "in the name of the French Foreign Minister"—and Grey's gross error in imagining that an absolute desire for peace inspired the responsible French leaders lies clearly exposed.

So also with the alleged French fear of war with Germany. This again applies to the mass of the French people but not to those in power. We made acquaintance through Poincaré himself, before the beginning of the first Balkan War, with the

optimism of the military experts in regard to a general conflict. So it was also in 1914. Lord French saw Poincaré in Paris on August 15, 1914, and wrote :

> I was much impressed by the optimistic spirit of the President. I am sure he had formed great hopes of a victorious advance by the Allies from the line they had taken up. (261)

Delcassé said in the lobbies of the Chamber at the outbreak of war :

> Victory is certain . . . in a month or six weeks the Russians will be in Berlin. (262)

The truth is that all the belligerents counted on a rapid and successful campaign. At the beginning of 1913 the French Government had replaced the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Georges Louis, by the anti-German Delcassé, primarily " in order to develop there the spirit of preparedness for war " ; (263) while France, in consequence mainly of the impossibility of continuing permanently the re-introduced three years' military service, had the advantage over Germany in effective strength only in 1914. (264) The Triple Entente relied especially on the " Russian steam-roller " ; and it was this that Germany feared. The Russian Ambassador in Berlin reported this repeatedly in March and April 1914, and expressed the kindly hope

> that we shall in fact take all possible steps to strengthen our army, a strengthening that must compel Germany to shirk neither money nor energy in pushing on to secure the completest possible preparedness for war. (265)

Russia actually did this, with French millions lent for the express purpose, and openly boasted of her preparedness. Grey is not only grossly in error in crediting the Russian Government with having had entirely peaceful intentions (it had, as we have seen, been elaborating its programme for the conquest of the Straits), but is also wrong in supposing that it was afraid of war with Germany. Far from it—in the conference of January 1914 over the Liman von Sanders appointment the Russian Minister of War and the Chief of Staff

> categorically declared that Russia was entirely ready for a struggle with Germany, to say nothing of a struggle with Austria, (266)

and Suchomlinov, the War Minister, further emphasized this readiness in two articles which he inspired in the " Birshevya Vyedomosti " of March and June 1914, and which aroused widespread interest.

So it came that France and Russia entered the war in 1914 " with a clearly defined programme, France bent on recovery of the Rhine provinces, Russia on the conquest of Constantinople," while Germany and Britain had to construct their programme as they fought. (267)

Placed alongside these facts, the distortions of Grey's picture of the political world in 1914 are evident. Was his picture sincerely drawn ? Many question it, and there is much to say in their support. His assurances that Britain had a " free hand " have been shown to be worthless in at least one important point, the effect of the Anglo-French Naval Convention, by Grey himself in his speech in the House of Commons on August 3, 1914. As we have shown, he grossly deceived the public in this, and it was preceded in June 1914 by a direct falsehood in the effort to mislead Parliament as to the existence of military and naval agreements. In addition there was the year-long unclear policy that clung close to France and Russia and yet half took up a standpoint midway between the two European groups. In all this many have seen Machiavelli and even Mephistopheles.

Then there are the remarkable gaps in his knowledge. Grey, as we saw, knew something of the German documents, of the " Livre Noir," and of the Siebert documents. But his knowledge seems to be one-sided and defective. Here one is completely in the dark, as for years he has been able to read little himself and we do not know what new material has been placed before him and what kept from him.

Yet Viscount Grey pledged himself to disclose the truth as to the origins of the war. This makes the yawning gaps in his knowledge so painful. Did J. A. Spender fail him, and omit to draw Grey's attention to all these points ? If so, he did him an evil turn ; for in view of the claim which Grey makes in his introduction to " Twenty-five Years," he will in the end himself be held responsible for the grave misconstructions and omissions of which documentary evidence can be brought.

But we must delve once more into the world of ideas and beliefs of this complicated character. In the prelude to his

activities as Foreign Secretary we became acquainted with the political predilections and prejudices which so extraordinarily clouded his vision. During his tenure of office these gained such a hold over him that as early as 1908 he believed in the inevitability of war with Germany, and in 1910 he was convinced of the absolute desire for peace of all the Great Powers except Germany, who in his view was aiming at the hegemony of Europe. He was continually in the grip of this bogey ; it made him anti-German against his will ; it led him to load fetter after fetter on the Central Powers, to hem in Germany's economic development, to arrange for plans for joint operations in the event of a general war to be worked out by the British general and naval staffs with France and Russia, and to come more and more closely into association with these Powers. He was so unable to see clearly that to this day he is outraged at the annexation of Bosnia and is blind to the worse violations of treaties of his own group ; so that he gives the impression of a complete hypocrite. From fear of Germany he follows Russia's trail, and yet clings to the tenuous fiction of being a free agent. And around him and behind him there are other forces which without his knowledge influence and warp his course.

Meanwhile almost all the European Powers were industriously raising a gigantic pyre. The Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, Tangier, Algeciras, Persia, the German battle-fleet, Bosnia, Agadir, Tripoli, the Balkan Wars, universal competition in armaments, the Russian promises to Serbia, the newly awakened desire for revanche in France, Pan-Germans, Chauvinists, Pan-Slavs, Jingoes, fear on all sides, the Russian lust for Constantinople, and the Serbian aspirations for Austrian territory—all were faggots heaped one after another on the European pyre. On either side of the pyre stood, in two groups, a few men with torches in their hands, torches that from time to time, as in 1905, 1908, 1911, 1912, 1913, flamed up dangerously. Sir Edward Grey, with eyes only for the group on the other side, imagined that nothing worse was glowing on his side than pipes of peace.

So he sees the outbreak of the war. After it he asked himself in sleepless nights whether the war could have been prevented by anything that he could have done in the preceding years. (268) He is not conscious of evil intentions—far from it ; it is his conviction that he did all that was possible. And yet—conscience

knocks at the door. No wonder, if one thinks of the many millions of dead, the mutilated, the countless widows and orphans, all the infinite misery of the world since 1914. And in despair Grey asks himself again and again, was he in some way to blame? His is not a strong nature. He is no Machiavelli, to say, "Yes, of course I contributed to it, but what of it? My group won, the Empire is greater than ever!" This idea does not enter into his head. He thinks of the misery, the dead, the chaos. And again and again tormenting doubts assail him. He feels that they would be his destruction if he admitted them to have any serious basis. His whole nature revolts against that; the doubts *must* be laid to rest. He no longer sees what he does not want to see. For self-protection he lives in a world of make-believe; just as from 1906 to 1914 he allowed himself to believe that he had kept his country free from all commitments. He is helped by his capacity absolutely to believe whatever fits in with his conceptions and absolutely to dismiss everything that does not. Beneath this protective assurance of sincerity and honesty he keeps his doubting soul at rest.

Blunt regards Grey as a man without imagination. This is only partly true. His infinite trust of the Entente and mistrust of Germany, his belief in the "free hand" and other things are clear evidence of his uncommon gift of imagining. But it was very limited and one-sided. The statesman and diplomat should be able to place himself in another's position, in his opponent's as well as his ally's. Of this type of imagination, which is certainly what Blunt, the ex-diplomat, was thinking of, Grey had hardly a trace. Hence the distorted picture which he sees on either side.

Gentle in personal life, full of good will and good feeling. A thoughtful, true, and loyal friend; a harsh and bitter enemy. No Machiavelli, and subjectively no hypocrite; nor the hawk-headed evil spirit with rapacious clawed fingers that many Germans imagined during the war. No true statesman. A man with a narrow insularity of outlook, his view dimmed by strong predilections and deep prejudices; unconscious of the enormous encouragement which his Entente policy gave to the nationalists in power in Russia and France. Accessible to suggestion and greatly under the influence of auto-suggestion. A man who came unwillingly to his post; who imagined that he was

steering his ship with a sure hand, unaware that other hands were also on the wheel; who imagined himself free and saw nothing of the thousand threads of his own spinning that had combined into an unbreakable tow-rope and towed him in the course of others. A well-meaning, peace-loving nobleman whose heart longed for the simple joys of communion with nature. An upright man of the true British pattern, earnest but humourless. A man with two sets of human values, two standards and a double morality. Not a great man, and not a strong man. A man with a kink in his soul. A man whom a policy of unintentional ambiguity stamped with some involuntary and, in his heart, detested features of Machiavelli; unworthy features, which will never disappear from his melancholy brow. An unhappy figure, not without elements of innate tragedy.

This was the man who in the last resort held in his hand during the crisis of July 1914 the decision between peace and war.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. Bernard Shaw, "Peace Conference Hints," London 1919, pp. 22, 25.

2. Literature on Morocco: "Die Grosse Poutik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871–1914," edited by Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, Friedrich Thimme (here quoted as "G.P."), Vol. 17, Berlin 1924, ch. cxiii; Vols. 20 and 21, Berlin 1925; Vol. 24, chh. clxxix–clxxxii; and Vol. 29, Berlin 1925. "Belgische Aktenstücke 1905–1914," Berlin 1915; "Zur Europäischen Politik 1897–1914," edited by Bernhard Schwertfeger, Vols. I–IV, Berlin 1919. "Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires du Maroc 1901–1911," Paris 1905–1911. "Carnets de Georges Louis," Paris 1926, Vol. I, pp. 9, 133, 193, 199, 203–06, 211, 217, 220–24, 241; Vol. II, pp. 103–04, 110, 217. B. von Siebert, "Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Ententepolitik der Vorkriegsjahre," Berlin 1921. "Der Diplomatische Schriftwechsel Iswolskis 1911–1914," edited by Friedrich Stieve (here quoted as "S.I."), 4 vols., with a commentary on this collection by Dr. Stieve in his "Iswolski und der Weltkrieg," Berlin 1924 (English edition, "Isvolsky and the World War," George Allen & Unwin, London 1926). Popular edition of Isvolsky's letters, "Im Dunkel der Europäischen Geheimdiplomatie," edited by Fr. Stieve, Berlin 1926, Book I, ch. iii. "Kiderlen-Wächter, der Staatsmann und Mensch," edited by Ernst Jäckh, Stuttgart 1924, 2 vols. Erich Brandenburg, "Von Bismarck zum Weltkriege," Berlin 1924. Veit Valentin, "Deutschlands Aussenpolitik 1890–1918," Berlin 1921. Also a large number of historical works by J. Caillaux, R. Pinon, A. Tardieu; Sir Thomas Barclay, Hamilton Fyfe, G. P. Gooch, E. D. Morel, F. Neilson, J. H. Rose, Bertrand Russell; A. Bullard, J. S. Ewart, R. H. Fife, E. F. Henderson, etc.

3. " Notre Politique extérieure," p. 224 (note by Gooch).

4. *Ibid.*, Introduction. (Note by Gooch.)

5. Gilbert Murray, " The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey," pp. 55–56. When the secret clauses were revealed, the criticism was renewed. Baron d'Estournelles de Constant condemned them as a double game, and statesmen so far apart as Ribot and Jaurès denounced the contradiction between public professions and private aims. (Note by Gooch.)

6. " The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783–1919," Vol. III, Cambridge 1923, p. 340. Cf. Gooch, " Revelations of European Diplomacy," pp. 139–40, 176, 179–80; G. Lowes Dickinson, " The International Anarchy," pp. 118–54, 186–215; John S. Ewart, " The Roots and Causes of the Wars," pp. 746–877; S. B. Fay, in K.F., December 1926, p. 902.

7. Vol. I, p. 50. Cf. also Gooch, " Revelations," pp. 179–80.

8. Ewart, pp. 764 *sqq.*; Gooch in " Cambridge History," pp. 339–40; Dickinson, pp. 114–15, 122–23, 131, 143–44, 152, 186.

9. Vol. I., pp. 79–81. Cf. " Cambridge History," p. 348.

10. Vol. I, pp. 104–12.

11. Vol. I, pp. 117–18. On March 17, 1906, the British Ambassador in Paris reported to Grey that, as instructed, he had told Delcassé in April 1905 " that if the German Government asked for a port His Majesty's Government would be prepared to join the French Government in offering strong opposition to such a proposal (' Pour s'opposer fortement à une telle proposition '),' and he had then begged " that if the question were raised M. Delcassé would give full opportunity to His Majesty's Government to concert with the French Government as to the measures which might be taken to meet it (" les mesures qui pourraient être prises pour aller à l'encontre de cette demande "). Grey, Vol. I, p. 110; parentheses as in report. According to J. A. Spender, Cambon thereupon wrote to Lansdowne on May 24, 1905, " that M. Delcassé was highly satisfied with the offer of assistance made by our Government," and Lansdowne replied suggesting that " the two Governments should treat one another with the utmost confidence and discuss all likely contingencies " (" The Life of The Right Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman," 2 vols., London 1923, Vol. II, p. 248). It was evidently these steps of Lansdowne's that, in conjunction with the " conversations " already begun between the naval staffs, misled Delcassé into the belief in a British defensive and offensive alliance. Cf. Footnote 25 to Chapter II.

12. Ewart, p. 795, points out that the stipulations of the Act of Algeciras prevail over those of all prior treaties, etc. So too, Dickinson, pp. 152, 186.

13. " Carnets de Georges Louis," Vol II, pp. 72–73.

14. Ewart, pp. 818, 840. Similarly Pichon in the Senate, January 1912, G.P., Vol. 29, doc. 10793; had Pichon been Foreign Minister he would have prevented the march on Fez: Vol. 39, doc. 15642.

15. Vol. I, p. 219.

16. Ewart, p. 866; see also pp. 839, 863. Cf. G.P., Vol. 29, doc. 10570, 10572; Raymond Poincaré, " Le Lendemain d'Agadir," Paris 1926, p. 108.

17. Gooch in " Cambridge History," p. 440.

18. G.P., Vol. 29, doc. 10585, 10586, 10624, 10650.

19. Vol. I, p. 236.

20. The whole of ch. xiii of " Twenty-five Years," in which Grey describes the Agadir crisis, producing important documents, is a significant example of his manner of writing history and his antipathy towards Germany. Cf. Gooch, " Revelations," p. 180.

21. The ineffectiveness of the step was sufficiently shown by the result of the crisis. See also G.P., Vol. 29, doc. 10585, 10586, 10595, 10608, 10638, 10642; F. Hartung, "Die Marokkokrise des Jahres 1911" in "Archiv für Politik und Geschichte," July–August 1926, pp. 54–117; Gooch, "Revelations," p. 30.

22. Vol. I, pp. 221–22. G.P., Vol. 29, doc. 10578, 10579, 10581, 10588, 10592.

23. Vol. I, pp. 222–23.

24. Ewart, *op. cit.*, pp. 842–43. Cf. G.P., Vol. 29, doc. 10549, 10572, 10578, 10579, 10593, 10598, 10604–05, 10613, 10618.

25. Ewart, p. 849; Gooch in "Cambridge History," p. 443.

26. Vol. I, pp. 219–20, 233, 236; Churchill, p. 45.

27. Vol. I, p. 234; see also p. 239, and G.P., Vol. 29, doc. 10549, and page 153, footnote †.

28. Vol. I, pp. 239–41.

29. Vol. I, p. 223; Lloyd George was of the same opinion, p. 224.

30. Cf. Gooch, "Cambridge History," p. 442; G.P., Vol. 29, doc. 10603, 10604.

31. Siebert, p. 429.

32. Vol. I, p. 232. Cf. Ewart, p. 849; G.P., Vol. 31, doc. 11449, 11453.

33. Gooch in "Cambridge History," p. 443. According to the German documents Grey seems to have been equally apprehensive lest the German-French negotiations should upset the Entente, and in his support of the French he was more French than they themselves. See doc. 10588, 10592, 10617, 10628, 10636, 10653.

34. Gooch in "Cambridge History," pp. 444–45. G.P., Vol. 29, doc. 10617, 10618; R. Poincaré, pp. 231–33, and generally concerning Agadir, pp. 62 *sqq.*

35. Vol. I, pp. 224–26. Gooch writes on this, in "History of Modern Europe," pp. 477–78 (cf. "Cambridge History," pp. 446–47): "The Foreign Secretary, who must bear the chief responsibility for the decision, seems to have been unaware that he was launching a high explosive. It was precisely the same claim to be considered that the Kaiser had championed at Tangier, and it provoked the same explosion in Germany as the Tangier declaration had provoked in England."—Gooch mentions that more than one of the Ministers had resented the taking of a step of such importance without reference to the Cabinet. Dickinson points out, *op. cit.*, p. 200, that a Cabinet meeting was held on July 21st. It is worth noting that Paul Cambon said in 1919 to Lloyd George: "It was your speech of July 1911 that gave us the certainty that we could count upon England." Quoted by Count Max Montgelas in K.F., June 1926, p. 338.

36. Siebert, p. 447. Cf. G.P., Vol. 29, doc. 10615, 10618, 10628.

37. Ewart, pp. 843–44. G.P., Vol. 29, doc. 10607, 10613. The claim for the whole of French Congo was not advanced from the outset as a conditio sine qua non; and the idea was to secure it in exchange for some German colonial possession. The claim for the whole Congo was, indeed, dropped as early as August 4. Doc. 10607, 10612, 10613, 10682, 10685, 10716.

38. Churchill, p. 176; Ewart, p. 846. G.P., Vol. 31, doc. 11558.

39. See Grey's account in November 1911, in Gooch, "Cambridge History," pp. 444–45. Count Metternich said plainly to Grey on July 21, 1911, that he "seemed to have two measures, one for France and another for Germany." G.P., Vol. 29, doc. 10617; cf. Vol. 39, doc. 15849. Gooch writes of Grey's Memoirs in general: ". . . he has different weights and

measures for the Central Powers and the Triple Entente."—" Revelations," p. 180.

40. Churchill, p. 48. Grey said the opposite to Count Metternich in November 1911 : " he had had no belief at any time during this summer in any near danger of war."—G.P., Vol. 29, doc. 10660 ; see also doc. 10662.

41. Vol. I, pp. 226–31. Grey's descriptions are in conflict with the documentary evidence, G.P., Vol. 29, doc. 10623–26 ; Siebert, *op. cit.*, p. 430.

42. On December 2, 1911, Keir Hardie spoke publicly of the " morbid state of mind of some persons in the Foreign Office. . . . "—G.P., Vol. 29, doc. 10668.

43. For British preparations see G.P., Vol. 29, doc. 10657, 10665, 10670, 10671, 10673 ; Vol. 31, doc. 11313, 11316, 11321, 11405, 11434 ; K.F., January 1927, p. 37, footnote 22.

44. Siebert, p. 435. G.P., Vol. 29, doc. 10548, 10562, 10607, 10609, 10726.

45. Vol. I, p. 233.

46. Grey, pp. 231–32, touches on this charge, which had been brought against him, especially in Britain. Cf. Gooch," Cambridge History," p. 454 ; William Harbutt Dawson, " The German Empire, 1867–1914," London 1919, Vol. II, p. 452 ; " Fortnightly Review " of June 1 and October 2, 1911, and January 1912.

47. Vol. I, p. 241. The inflammatory effect of the Entente policy in Morocco was prophetically denounced by E. D. Morel at the end of the crisis in the spring of 1912 : " The Morocco problem is not settled. In one sense it may be said to be only beginning. It will loom largely on the horizon during the lifetime of the present generation." Concluding words of Introduction to " Morocco in Diplomacy," London 1912, p. xxii (now " Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy," London 1915, p. xxxiii). Cf. G.P., Vol. 29, doc. 10791 ; Vol. 31, ch. ccxlvi.

48. " The Making of an Optimist," London 1921, p. 44. See also p. 41.

49. Vol. I, p. 120. Siebert, p. 435.

50. Ewart, pp. 852–53. Words in brackets Ewart's. Ewart writes further, on page 876, that the Moroccan crises may be regarded as the transition from an Entente to a " practical military alliance," " from a static to a dynamic condition " of Anglo-French relations.

51. Gooch, " Franco-German Relations, 1871–1914," London 1923, p. 56. See also pp. 40–47, 56–57, and Gooch's " History of Modern Europe," pp. 340–68, 490. Cf. also, in addition to the works already mentioned in this chapter, Dawson, Vol. II, pp. 404–30, 443–54 ; Bertrand Russell, " Justice in War Time," pp. 129–62 ; E. F. Henderson, " The Verdict of History : The Case of Sir Edward Grey," privately printed 1924, pp. 67–114, and Dickinson, p. 125.

52. Vol. I, p. 154.

53. Vol. I, pp. 156–57.

54. Vol. I, pp. 159–65.

55. Vol. I, p. 154.

56. Ewart, p. 881, counts no fewer than five official British-Russian declarations between August 31, 1907, and February 17, 1908, of intention to respect the independence and integrity of Persia. Cf. Gooch, " Cambridge History," pp. 358, 413–14 ; E. F. Henderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 115–76 ; Russell, pp. 163–71.

57. Vol. I, p. 167.

58. " My Diaries," Part II, London 1920, pp. 191, 339, 342, 383, 388–90.

59. Quoted by Ewart, p. 881.

60. Blunt, p. 213.

61. *Ibid.*, pp. 213, 321.

62. Bertrand Russell, "Justice in War Time," p. 171. See also Chapters III and IV.

63. Vol. I, p. 166.

64. Russell, p. 177.

65. Russell; Ewart, pp. 906–07; Dickinson, p. 280.

66. "Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Ententepolitik der Vorkriegsjahre," Berlin 1921, chh. 4, 5.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 243. Cf. Ewart, pp. 882, 905.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 219. Dickinson, pp. 273–74.

69. *Ibid.*, p. 215. See also Ewart, p. 891.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 206.—"Sir Edward made complete submission": Ewart, p. 892 (see in general pp. 877–911). Cf. Gooch, "Cambridge History," pp. 420–24; Russell, p. 180.

71. Siebert, pp. 223, 239, 244. Ewart, pp. 897, 898, 901–04, 907–08.

72. It is true that many Russian diplomats and agents followed a personal policy (see, for example, G.P., Vol. 38, doc. 15361, 15368; Vol. 39, doc. 15885; Carnets, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 8); the Asiatic Section of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also thoroughly independent. But in the last resort policy was decided by the Foreign Minister, and Grey's effort to whitewash Isvolsky and Sazonov goes *much* too far.

73. G. P. Gooch, "Cambridge History," p. 366.

74. Vol. I, pp. 160–65.

75. Vol. I, p. 178.

76. Vol. I, pp. 181, 184. Cf. G.P., Vol. 26, doc. 9182.

77. Vol. I, p. 185.

78. Vol. I, p. 186.

79. "Kriegsursachen," Zurich 1919, ch. ii. Heinrich Friedjung, "Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus 1884–1914," Vol. 2, Berlin 1922, chh. xxiv and xxv. Conrad, "Aus meiner Dienstzeit 1906–1918," Vol. I, Vienna 1921. B. von Siebert, *op. cit.*, ch. 1. "Un Livre Noir. Diplomatie d'Avant-Guerre d'après les Documents des Archives Russes," Vol. II, Paris 1923, pp. 457–70. G.P., Vol. 26 (Vol. 22, doc. 7383–86, 7721). K.F., April 1926, pp. 238–49. Freiherr von Schoen, "Erlebtes," Stuttgart 1921, pp. 70 *sqq.* Fr. Stieve, "Deutschland und Europa 1890–1914," Berlin 1926, pp. 83 *sqq.* "Carnets," Vol. I, pp. 29, 57, 66–70, 77–78, 81–82, 111, 131; Vol. II, pp. 30, 175, 177, 180.—Among English accounts should be noted: Ewart, pp. 912–48; Gooch, "Cambridge History," pp. 402–12; Dickinson, pp. 155–85.

80. Vol. I, p. 175.

81. Vol. I, pp. 175–76.

82. Written at the end of 1925.

83. *Op. cit.*, p. 192. Cf. Gooch, "Cambridge History," p. 411.

84. Vol. I, pp. 175, 176–77, 186.

85. Vol. I, p. 187.

86. Vol. I, p. 187.

87. G.P., Vol. 26, doc. 9460. Dickinson, p. 180.

88. Vol. I, p. 188–89. Cf. Schoen, p. 212; B.D., 216; G.P., Vol. 39, doc. 15855; G. Frantz, "Russlands Eintritt in den Weltkrieg," Berlin 1924, p. 35.

89. Vol. I, pp. 192–93. Ewart, pp. 939–40, draws a different parallel between 1908 and 1914 to Grey's. See also p. 948.

90. Vol. I, pp. 189–91, 239. Ewart, p. 943, showed here again Grey's submissiveness to Russia. (See also pp. 933–34.) For the position taken up

by Sir Arthur Nicolson in St. Petersburg and Sir Fairfax Cartwright in Vienna, see G.P., Vol. 25, doc. 8718, 8725, 8727 ; Vol. 26, doc. 9142, 9196, 9387, 9400, 9401, 9409, 9493, 9502, 9503, 9507, 9562 ; Vol. 27, doc. 9796, 9954, 10020, 10100, 10108 ; Vol. 28, doc. 10320, 10364, 10367 ; Vol. 30, doc. 10850, 11221 ; Vol. 34, doc. 13080.

91. G.P., Vol. 25, doc. 8820 ; see also p. 503, footnote.

92. G.P., Vol. 26.

93. Cf. " Kiderlen-Wächter," Vol. 2, pp. 189 *sqq.* ; Johannes Haller " Die Aera Bülow," Stuttgart 1922.

94. G.P., Vol. 26, p. 154.

95. See Bülow's criticism, in Grey, Vol. I, p. 192. Also Schoen, pp. 70 *sqq.*

96. Grey, Vol. I, p. 183 ; Boghitschewitsch, p. 159 ; G.P., Vol. 33, doc. 12402, 12487.

97. Vol. I, p. 151.

98. Vol. I, pp. 151, 202–09.

99. " Belgische Aktenstücke 1905–1914," Berlin 1915 ; Siebert collection in many places (see, for example, pp. 449–50 for the impression made on Italian statesmen by statements of Edward VII in 1909 at Baiae) ; G.P., Vol. 21, doc. 7215 ; Vol. 24, doc. 8165, 8209, 8216 ; Vol. 25, doc. 8521, 8801, 8817, 8821 ; Vol. 27, doc. 9864 ; Vol. 29, doc. 10650 ; R. Poincaré, " Les Origines de la Guerre," Paris 1921, p. 68 ; R. Poincaré, " Le Lendemain D'Agadir," p. 200 ; " Carnets," pp. 105, 135 ; Sir Sidney Lee, " King Edward VII," London 1925 ; J. A. Farrer, " England under Edward VII," London 1922.

100. Freiherr von Musulin, " Das Haus am Ballplatz," Munich 1924, p. 167 ; G.P., Vol. 24, doc. 8242 (8230) ; Vol. 25, doc. 8874 ; Grey, Vol. I, p. 202 ; Gooch, " Cambridge History, p. 390. See also, on the other hand, Conrad, " Aus Meiner Dienstzeit 1906–1918," Vol. I, Vienna 1921, p. 55 ; Margutti, " Vom alten Kaiser," pp. 319, 321, 351–53, 355 ; Freiherr von Werkmann, " Archiv für Politik und Geschichte," November 1925, pp. 535 *sqq.*

101. Grey, Vol. I, p. 89. Cf. R. Poincaré, " L'Europe sous les Armes," Paris 1926, p. 254.

102. *Op. cit.*, pp. 33–34, 68, 182–83, 213, 317, 320, 322, 488.

103. Quoted from " Europäische Gespräche," August 1925, pp. 404–05.

104. Aehrenthal said in April 1906 that Hardinge was " now the real leader of British foreign policy."—G.P., Vol. 25, doc. 8506 ; see also Vol. 21, doc. 7218 ; Vol. 27, doc. 9714.

105. Siebert, p. 782 ; Grey spoke in exactly similar terms to Benckendorff. —*Ibid.*, p. 782.

106. G.P., Vol. 36, doc. 14242 (cf. Vol. 38, doc. 15483) ; also Vol. 32, doc. 11706 ; Vol. 34, doc. 13196 ; Charles-Roux, pp. 728–29, 740 ; Barnes, p. 471 (310).

107. G.P., Vol. 21, doc. 7218–19 ; Vol. 25, doc. 8647, 8780 ; Vol. 26, doc. 9132 ; Vol. 28, doc. 10418 ; Vol. 34, doc. 13254 ; C. J. O'Donnell, p. 28.

108. Vol. I, pp. 203–04, 210–17. Cf also G.P., Vol. 25, ch. clxxxix.

109. Siebert, pp. 777–79.

110. Vol. I, pp. 212 *sqq.*

111. Siebert, p. 778.

112. G.P., Vol. 25, doc. 8809–10, 8818. Cf. Vol. 26, doc. 8935 ; Stieve, " Deutschland und Europa," p. 75 (80) ; Blunt, p. 225.

113. Vol. I, pp. 297–99. Cf. G.P., Vol. 33, doc. 12256.

114. Vol. I, pp. 151, 202–03.

115. Vol. I, p. 203.

116. In August 1910—before the "Balkanizing" of the Russo-French Alliance—the "peace loving" French Ambassador, Georges Louis, pointed out that: "In the Alliance Constantinople and the Straits form the counter-consideration for Alsace-Lorraine. This is not laid down in any written agreement, but it is the ultimate aim, kept in mind though not openly mentioned." "Carnets," I, p. 136 (139, 163, 212). R. Poincaré mentions that P. Deschanel had expressed a similar view—"Le Lendemain D'Agadir," pp. 334–35; naturally he repudiates the idea that any French Government would seriously have entertained any such idea. On this point see also Fr. Stieve, "Isvolsky and the World War," and H. E. Barnes, *op. cit.*, in numerous places.

117. Gooch, "History," p. 47.

118. Italy was the only dissatisfied party in the Alliance, and her aims came repeatedly to the fore; they were even defined in Articles, which, however, never came into operation. Cf. S. B. Fay, in K.F., December 1926, p. 901.

119. Dickinson, p. 113: ". . . Sir Edward Grey plainly intended and desired to keep the peace. But . . . the fact remains that, from the date of the formation of the Entente, crisis after crisis supervened, that Europe was again and again on the verge of war, that armaments increased and military and naval conventions multiplied, until at last it is hardly paradoxical to say that the European War came of itself, although nobody at that moment wanted it." Cf. pp. 71, 76; W. H. Dawson, "Richard Cobden," pp. 264, 274, 290.

120. Siebert, *op. cit.*, pp. 728, 743. G.P., Vol. 27, doc. 9907.

121. "Les Accords Franco-Italiens de 1900–1902," Paris 1920; Siebert, pp. 475, 793; G.P., Vol. 30, doc. 11236; Dickinson, p. 222, footnote; cf. p. 230.

122. "Belgische Aktenstücke," doc. 24, 26, 30; G.P., Vol. 24, doc. 8219; Vol. 25, doc. 8809, 8830; Vol. 27, doc. 9907, 9910, 9923, 9930–31, 9939; Vol. 34, doc. 12561; Vol. 39, doc. 15651. Dawson, "Cobden," p. 274; Dickinson, p. 306; Ewart, pp. 494, 716–17; B. E. Schmitt and Chas. S. Allin, in two articles in the "Mid-West Quarterly," New York, April 1915, pp. 210, 247; R. Poincarè, "Le Lendemain," pp. 132, 135; Ahmed Djemal Pasha, "Erinnerungen eines türkischen Staatsmannes," Munich 1922, pp. 110 *sqq.*

123. Vol. I, pp. 120–21, 134, 225, 303.

124. Vol. I, pp. 110, 117–19.

125. Lord Fisher, "Memories" and "Records," London 1919.

126. Vol. I, p. 117; II, p. 44.

127. Vol. I, pp. 161–62. Cf. G.P., Vol. 22, doc. 7362, 7364, 7366–67, 7375–77, 7379; Vol. 24, doc. 8210; Vol. 25, doc. 8505, 8517, 8532, 8537, 8543–44, 8572, 8574, 8576, 8580, 8585, 8587, 8589, 8591–93, 8597, 8638, 8649, 8711, 8733, 8802; Vol. 27, doc. 10069, 10072, 10102, 10106, 10111, 10114, 10138, 10140–41, 10146, 10155, 10186, 10216–17; Vol. 28, doc. 10417, 10431; Dickinson, pp. 261–80.

128. Siebert, pp. 200–01.

129. *Ibid.*, p. 202.

130. *Ibid.*, p. 348.

131. *Ibid.*, whole of ch. 4, especially pp. 158, 180, 188, 193, 198. Ewart, pp. 877–911, especially pp. 882, 887–88. Dickinson, p. 268: "The attitude of Germany . . . must appear to an impartial observer singularly moderate and conciliatory." Cf. pp. 37, 264–65, 268–70. As to the effect of the Agreement in *Europe*, see G.P., Vol. 25, doc. 8536–37.

132. Vol. I, p. 121.

133. Vol. I, p. 225. Cf. Blunt, p. 394; O'Donnell, pp. 29, 30; Ewart, p. 181.

134. Edward Mead Earle, " Turkey, the Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway," New York 1923, p. 194.

135. *Ibid.*, pp. 176 *sqq.* Cf. Ewart, pp. 729–45 ; Dickinson, pp. 239, 243–48.

136. Earle, pp. 264–65. Cf. Ewart, p. 744.—As regards the Bagdad Railway, see G.P., Vol. 14, ch. xciv ; Vol. 17, ch. cxiv ; Vol. 25, ch. clxxxvi ; Vol. 27, chh. ccxvi, ccxviii, ccxix ; Vol. 31, ch. ccxlv ; Vol. 37, chh. cclxxxv–vi, cclxxxviii ; Siebert, *op. cit.*, chh. viii and ix ; S.I.V., Book I., ch. i ; " Carnets," I, p. 208. As regards British opposition, see especially G.P., Vol. 22, doc. 7610, 7613, 7621, 7656 ; Vol. 24, doc. 8212, 8655, 8656, 8791 ; Vol. 27, doc. 9971, 9978, 9981, 10018–19 ; Vol. 28, doc. 10443. Dickinson, who deals with the Bagdad Railway question on pp. 234–60, found no evidence that Germany regarded the " great and beneficent " undertaking from any but an economic standpoint (pp. 259, 268 ; cf. G.P., Vol. 25, doc. 8614).

137. Siebert, pp. 743–46. Count Benckendorff was considered anti-German.—" Carnets," I, p. 221. Cf. Sir Harry Johnston, " Common Sense in Foreign Policy," London 1913, p. 61 ; Dickinson, p. 346 ; G.P., Vol. 28, doc. 10441, 10443 ; Frederick Bausman, " Facing Europe," New York 1926, p. 58.

138. Ewart, pp. 677–92 ; see also p. 144. O'Donnell, pp. 14, 93.

139. See G.P., Vol. 32.

140. Vol. I, pp. 91–92, 301 ; Vol. II, p. 52.

141. Vol. II, pp. 30, 271.

142. Ewart, pp. 479–572 ; Dickinson, pp. 368–409 ; E. D. Morel, " Military Preparations for the Great War," London 1922 ; Hans Harzfeld, " Die deutsche Rüstungspolitik vor dem Weltkriege," Bonn 1923. All these works contain numerous references to the literature of the question.

143. Johannes Haller, " Aus dem Leben des Fürsten Philipp zu Eulenburg-Hertefeld," Berlin 1924, pp. vi, xi, 108–09, 130, 244 *sqq.*, 248, 380, etc. ; Prof. A. Mendelssohn Bartholdy in K.F., February 1925, p. 94, footnotes 4 and 5 ; R. Zedlitz-Trützschler, " Zwölf Jahre am deutschen Kaiserhof," Stuttgart 1924, pp. 36, 65, 133, 160. P. Slosson, in " American Historical Review," January 1927. On the question of militarism every foreigner may be depended on to point to the Zabern affair. See, for instance, Poincaré, " L'Europe sous les Armes," pp. 332–36, 356–57. Count Benckendorff wrote on February 25, 1914, to Sazonov : " The Zabern affair did much more harm to Germany in Britain than all Berlin's efforts at hegemony."—" Livre Noir," Vol. II, p. 309. Cf. G.P., Vol. 39, doc. 15658–60. The affair was censured in the Reichstag by 293 votes against 54.

144. *Op. cit.*, pp. 486, 554 ; see also pp. 508–09.

145. Walter Roch, " Mr. Lloyd George and the War," London 1920, pp. 13–14, 77–79. On the other hand, Grey considered (Vol. II, p. 31) that Russia's militarism was justified by that of Germany.

146. *Op. cit.*, pp. 489–90 ; see also pp. 500, 504.

147. " History," p. 428 ; " Cambridge History," p. 304 ; " Germany " (London 1925), p. 59.

148. Winston Churchill, pp. 111–12, 114–15. Cf. Grey, Vol. I, pp. 249–50 ; II, pp. 272–73.

149. G.P., Vol. 23, doc. 7785. Captain Widenmann wrote two years later in very similar terms—Vol. 28, p. 171, footnote † ; Sazonov a little differently —Vol. 26, doc. 9574.

150. G.P., Vol. 31, doc. 11314, 11316. " Permanent " italicized by Widenmann.

151. G.P., Vol. 31, doc. 11317. On the naval question see, in addition to Vols. 28 and 31 of the German Documents, Vol. 21, doc. 7204–06, 7210, 7214, 7218; Vol. 23, doc. 7931; Vol. 24, chh. clxxiv to clxxvii, especially doc. 8199, 8213, 8215–16, 8219, 8223, 8227, 8237, 8244, 8248; Vol. 25, doc. 8820; Vol. 26, doc. 8937; Vol. 34, doc. 12561; Vol. 37, doc. 14697; Vol. 39, ch. ccxcii; Metternich's Memorandum in "Europäische Gespräche," February 1926. Cf. Grey, Vol. II, pp. 45, 265, 271–73; Dickinson, pp. 381–84, 397; Ewart, pp. 497, 565, 681, 682.

152. As shown above, this is contradicted by the documents.

153. Grey firmly believed in the absolute desire of these Powers for peace. On this point more will be said later.

154. Vol. I, pp. 254–55.

155. Ewart, p. 174 (171–80).

156. Vol. I, pp. 143, 190, 248; II, p. 50. On the distrust of Grey, see G.P., Vol. 23, doc. 7931; Barnes, p. 565; Henderson, pp. 20, 183, 209.

157. G.P., Vol. 25, doc. 8809.

158. Vol. I, pp. 255–56. Grey, in Vol. II, p. 29, again refers to Germany's alleged efforts to achieve world predominance. Ewart describes this view as "fantastic and foolish."—*Op. cit.*, p. 504; see also 475, 477, 478. "Livre Noir," II, p. 314. In April 1914 the "Novoye Vremya" wrote about German hegemony; William II commented, "Ach! Du lieber Himmel! so ein Blech!" ("Heavens! what bosh!")—G.P., Vol. 39, doc. 15867.

159. "The European Anarchy," London 1916, pp. 78–81.

160. Ewart, p. 1001, footnote 1. For the Haldane negotiations see G.P., Vol. 31; Erich Brandenburg, ch. xv; Bernhard Huldermann, "Albert Ballin," Oldenburg 1922; Stieve, "Deutschland," pp. 106 *sqq.*; Metternich's Memorandum, in "Europäische Gespräche," February 1926; A. von Tirpitz, "Der Aufbau der deutschen Weltmacht," Stuttgart 1924, and article "Warum kam eine Flottenverständigung mit England nicht zustande?" in "Süddeustche Monatshefte," 23rd year, pp. 125 *sqq.*; Haldane, "Before the War," London 1920.

161. Vol. I, p. 253; II, p. 51. In the conversation between Grey and Sazonov at Balmoral in September 1912, already mentioned, Grey said, according to his own account (Vol I, p. 298): "Germany had shown a desire for some agreement with us to ensure that we should under no circumstances take part against her if she was at war." Grey in this is grossly unjust. Asquith made use of the same plain distortion during the war, in order to bring Germany under suspicion (see Morel, "Secret History," p. 25, and a similar statement of Asquith's in Ewart, p. 173, footnote 221). Asquith's distortions may be dismissed as a weapon of war. But that Grey in the autumn of 1912 should so have misrepresented the German neutrality formula is further evidence of his deluded state in regard to everything concerning Germany.

162. Vol. I, p. 116. Cf. Poincaré's "Le Lendemain," p. 212; G.P., Vol. 37, doc. 14689, 14699, 14700.

163. Vol. I, p. 251. In September 1915 the Press Bureau of the Quai d'Orsay made the statement that Sir Edward Grey had kept M. Cambon informed concerning every phase of the negotiations, and that M. Cambon had had considerable influence in securing the failure of the mission: see "Der Tag," Berlin, September 3, 1915.

164. Poincaré, "Le Lendemain D'Agadir," pp. 165 *sqq.* Nicolson tried to prevent the mission. See S.I., doc. 608. Ewart too, pp. 173–74, is of the opinion that Grey considered the final German formula to be an acceptable

proposal, and that his main reason for not accepting it was regard for French feelings.

165. *Op. cit.*, pp. 103–04.

166. G.P., Vol. 23, doc. 7874, 7972.

167. G.P., Vol. 15, ch. c ; Vol. 23, Parts 1 and 2. Stieve, " Deutschland," pp. 63–64, 90–91 ; Dickinson, pp. 356–67 ; Stanley Leathes and Sir Frederick Pollock, in " The Cambridge Modern History," Vol. XII, Cambridge 1910, pp. 56, 724–25. E. J. Dillon wrote in " The Eclipse of Russia," London 1918, p. 254 : " Isvolsky . . . knew perfectly well that the Hague Conference was a shameful fraud which Muravieff and the Tsar were practising on the world " ; quoted by Bausman, p. 92. For the Right of Capture see G.P., Vol. 23, doc. 7961, 8803, 8809 ; Gooch, " Cambridge History," pp. 353–54.

168. Vol. I, pp. 300–01. G.P., Vol. 39, ch. ccxcii. Lichnowsky was against the proposal, and even Sir E. Goschen considered it inacceptable.—Doc. 15568–69, 15574, 15580, 15583, 15596, 15600 ; Siebert, *op. cit.*, p. 775.

169. *Op. cit.*, p. 37. Cf. G.P., Vol. 31, doc. 11318.

170. Quoted by E. D. Morel, " Truth and the War," London 1916, p. 157. The German Documents, Vol. 28, ch. ccxxi, place the British authorities in a very evil light. Cf. Henderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 28–29, 33–34 ; Hirst, " The Six Panics."

171. *Op. cit.*, pp. 29–30.—Cf. Gooch, " Cambridge History," p. 431 ; Ewart, pp. 506, 516, 687–90, 992 ; Grey, Vol. II, pp. 64, 271.

172. Vol. I, p. 260.

173. *Op. cit.*, p. 471.

174. G.P., Vol. 30 ; S.I.V., Book 2, ch. vi ; Bülow, " Deutsche Politik," Berlin 1916, Volksausgabe, p. 94 ; Poincaré, " Le Lendemain," pp. 30, 34, 36–37, 42 ; Giolitti, pp. 257 *sqq.* ; Gooch, " Cambridge History," pp. 454–55.

175. Giolitti, pp. 263 *sqq.* ; Dickinson, pp. 216–33 ; Gooch, " Revelations," p. 158.

176. Blunt, pp. 380–82, 384–87, 389, 393, 396, 399, 471 ; G.P., Vol. 30, doc. 10909.

177. Gooch, *op. cit.*, p. 487 ; " Revelations," p. 180.

178. G.P., Vol. 30, doc. 10841, 10880 ; Giolitti, p. 267 ; Siebert, p. 492. Among the German documents the following should also be mentioned : doc. 10829–30, 10833–34, 10837, 10840–41, 10844, 10848, 10853, 10860, 10870, 10880, 10893, 10896, 10901–02, 10905, 10910, 10912, 10920, 10941.

179. " Kriegsursachen," Zurich 1919 ; " Causes of the War," London 1920 ; French revised edition " Les Causes de la Guerre," Paris 1925.

180. " Kriegsursachen," p. 150.

181. *Op. cit.*, p. 36. Ewart, p. 287.

182. See the documents published by the Soviets and reproduced in German translation in the December 1925 issue of K.F., pp. 789–818.

183. G.P., Vol. 30, doc. 11008, 11017, 11021, 11033, 11133 ; Vol. 33, doc. 12058, 12072, 12083, 12115, 12148–49, 12168, 12251, 12256 ; also Vol. 33, p. 8, footnote †† ; Poincaré, " Les Balkans en Feu," pp. 20, 232, 234, 243 ; " Evolution," March 15, 1927, p. 23 (30).

184. For the questionnaire, see Poincaré, " Le Lendemain," p. 362 ; " Les Balkans," pp. 24, 33, 60.—For the decree that mobilization = war, see G. Frantz, pp. 46 *sqq.* For the declaration of war by Montenegro, see G.P., Vol. 33, doc. 12261, 12282, p. 105 ; footnote †.

185. Poincaré, " Les Balkans," pp. 182, 195–96 ; Siebert, pp. 538 *sqq.*

186. Siebert, p. 154. See in general the whole of ch. iii : " Bildung des Balkanblockes," pp. 137 *sqq.* Cf. Poincaré, " Les Balkans," p. 34.

187. Paris 1922.

188. " Affaires," Vol. I, doc. 57. Words in brackets Lutz's. Cf. doc. 24.

189. Originally Sazonov misled London too ; see Siebert, pp. 154, 561. Cf. Poincaré, " Les Balkans en Feu," pp. 34, 56, 264–65 ; Gooch, " Revelations," p. 143.

190. " Affaires," Vol. I, doc. 184.

191. Poincaré, *op. cit.*, pp. 263–65.

192. The suspicion is justified ; for there is no document that tells us how Grey was put in possession of Sazonov's disclosures and especially those of Poincaré. The collection " Les Affaires Balcaniques " maintains silence on the subject. We read there, however, in a report by Cambon of October 16th (it should be borne in mind that Poincaré's long despatch was dated the 15th), that Cambon had " an intimate and confidential interview " with Sir Arthur Nicolson (*op. cit.*, Vol. I, doc. 188). Did Cambon, then, tell Nicolson in confidence of Poincaré's fears ? It seems likely. Cf. " Evolution," March 15, 1927, pp. 23–24. For the rest, the evident omissions in the collection " Les Affaires Balcaniques " should be noted. See as to this point G. Demartial, " L'Evangile du Quai d'Orsay," Paris 1926, p. 39.

193. E.g. " Affaires," Vol. I, doc. 24, 191 ; " Belgische Aktenstücke," doc. 94. This applies especially to von Hartwig, Ambassador in Belgrade ; see G.P., Vol. 33, doc. 12261, 12270, 12338, 12363, 12417, 12428, 12467 ; Poincaré, " Les Balkans," pp. 327, 345.

In Russia the feeling was that for a general war the country was not sufficiently armed. This was the chief reason for Russia's comparatively cautious attitude. G.P., Vol. 33, doc. 12258, 12414 ; G. Frantz, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

194. G.P., vols. 33–36 ; S.I., Vols. II and III ; S.I.V., Book 2, chh. i, v, vii, viii ; Book 3, ch. iii ; Stieve, " Deutschland," pp. 115 *sqq.* ; Siebert, III, chh. xiii–xvi ; Conrad, *op. cit.*, Vols. II and III ; Poincaré, " Les Balkans en Feu " and " L'Europe sous les Armes " ; " Carnets," I, pp. 95–96, 238, 241 ; II, pp. 47–48, 51–53, 58, 148, 164 ; Dickinson, pp. 302–45 ; Ewart, ch. xxiv.— In February 1913 Jagow gave this definition : " Our policy is . . . absolutely one of the maintenance of peace in Europe."—G.P., Vol. 34, doc. 12854.

195. Vol. I, pp. 273, 275 ; B.D., 4. The conference idea was Poincaré's.

196. Vol. I, pp. 264, 266, 275. Italy shared to the full Austria-Hungary's opposition to Serbia having an outlet on the Adriatic. Dickinson, pp. 321–22.

197. Dr. Alfred Francis Pribram, " Die politischen Geheimverträge Oesterreich-Ungarns 1879–1914," Vol. I, Vienna 1920, pp. 83 *sqq.*, 240 *sqq.*

198. Vol. I, p. 273.

199. S.I., Vol. II, doc. 429. Poincaré disputes this statement, but his argument is not convincing : " Les Balkans," pp. 202–03. For with his anxiety, since his visit to Russia, concerning the events in the Balkans, it was only natural and to be expected that the French Foreign Minister should explain the situation to the military authorities and ask their opinion as to possible developments. It is not of any great importance who made the statement to Isvolsky. What matters is that Poincaré must have been aware of the optimism of the military authorities.

200. Vol. IV, together with the valuable summary of these documents by Dr. Stieve, in " Isvolsky and the World War," Allen & Unwin, London 1926. See also the popular edition now issued of Isvolsky's correspondence.

201. On the points mentioned, see Poincaré, " Le Lendemain," pp. 295–98, 301–02, 317 *sqq.*, 358 *sqq.* ; " Les Balkans," pp. 83, 122 *sqq.*, 128–29, 199, 205 ; " L'Europe," pp. 115 *sqq.* ; G.P., Vol. 30, doc. 11285 ; Vol. 31, doc. 11565 ;

ch. ccxlviii ; Vol. 33, doc. 12346 ; Vol. 34, doc. 12649 ; S.I.V., Book 2, chh. ii and iii ; " Carnets," II, pp. 54, 160, 185, 246 ; Ernest Renauld, " 1914–1919," Paris 1923, p. 73.

202. Siebert, p. 74.

203. Poincaré, " Les Balkans," p. 117.

204. S.I., Vol. II, doc. 554.

205. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, doc. 567, 569, 574, 608. Cf. Demartial, " Evangile," p. 28.

206. See Poincaré's defence in " Les Balkans," pp. 117 *sqq.*, 355 *sqq.*, and the reply by August Bach in the K.F., July 1926, pp. 471 *sqq.*—Poincaré declares emphatically that Isvolsky twisted his words to suit Isvolsky's own purpose in reporting to Moscow, and in two cases Poincaré is in fact able to bring proof of incorrect reports by Isvolsky. In the matter of military aid from France, however, Poincaré showed remarkable indifference. He states, *op. cit.*, pp. 339–40, that on November 18th he " protested energetically " against Isvolsky's version of the assurance of French military aid if required and insisted that the Ambassador should correct Poincaré's words in St. Petersburg in the sense of the Franco-Russian Agreement ; to make sure of this he telegraphed himself to Georges Louis, asking him to take " a suitable opportunity " to define the position of the French Government to Sazonov. The matter at issue was exceedingly important : provision for the event of war. If Poincaré really so distrusted Isvolsky, in the autumn of 1912, as he now suggests, it seems remarkable that he did not instruct Louis to explain matters *at once* to Sazonov.

207. Cf. " Affaires," Vol. I, doc. 37 ; A. Fabre-Luce, " La Victoire," Paris 1924, p. 261.

208. Stieve, " Isvolsky and the World War," p. 124. Cambon's letter in Poincaré, " Les Balkans," pp. 359 *sqq.* Poincaré admits, p. 375, that the military authorities showed nervousness about the Russian indifference ; he is silent, however, about the passage quoted from Stieve, although he knows the work well.—Cf. G.P., Vol. 34, p. 29, footnote †, doc. 12558, 12603, 12605, 12607.

Concerning the military measures taken by Russia, Austria and France, see G.P., Vol. 33, doc. 12359–60, 12393, 12404, 12411–12, 12434, 12436, 12438, 12446, 12455, 12462, 12464, 12480, 12488, 12495.

209. G.P., Vol. 33, doc. 12491. At the end of January 1913, when Poincaré had just been elected President of France, he said to Isvolsky that it was " of the greatest importance to the French Government to have the opportunity of preparing French public opinion in advance for participation in any war which might break out over the Balkan question." This was secured by the distribution of large sums of Russian money among the French Press, under the supervision of Poincaré and Klotz themselves. S.I., Vol. III, doc. 705, 731 *sqq.* ; S.I.V., Book 3, ch. ii ; " Carnets," II, p. 57 ; Demartial, " Evangile," p. 184. Poincaré, in " L'Europe sous les Armes," pp. 98 *sqq.*, 317 *sqq.*, sets out to prove that the initiative for these subsidies was entirely Isvolsky's.

210. Vol. I, p. 274.

211. " Un Livre Noir. Diplomatie D'Avant-Guerre D'Après les Documents des Archives Russes," Vol. II, pp. 303–04. For Cambon's attitude in London see also Poincaré, " Les Balkans," p. 395. In " The International Anarchy " Dickinson clearly defines the significance of Poincaré's attitude : " It might have been equally open to France, " if war came, " to decide either that Russia or that Germany was the attacking party. The importance of

M. Poincaré's decision was that he determined this moot point in the sense that France would fight. Possibly M. Caillaux or M. Combes or M. Monis might have decided otherwise, and, so deciding, might have prevented the Great War ; for Russia would hardly have fought if she had not been assured of French support. That is the exact importance of M. Poincaré's decision " (pp. 331–32 ; cf. pp. 334–36). Cf. G.P., Vol. 33, doc. 12432, 12425, 12491 ; Vol. 34, doc. 12588, 12957, 13350 Anlage ; Fay, in K.F., December 1926, p. 902.

212. Vol. I, p. 171 ; Vol. II, pp. 267–68. Cf. " Carnets," I, pp. 57, 76, 93 ; II, pp. 15, 18, 27, 58–59, 63, 81–83, 93–94, 99, 112–13, 143, 148, 154–55, 156–57, 162, 179, 205, 235 ; G.P., Vol. 39, doc. 15872. Isvolsky certainly influenced his successor at St. Petersburg, Sazonov ; this is plainly evident from many documents in Stieve's collection. (See also Poincaré, " Le Lendemain," pp. 295–98, 301–02, 317 *sqq.* ; " Les Balkans," pp. 199, 205.) And in Isvolsky's " boast " there was, as every well-informed student knows, a good deal of truth. Note here again Grey's inclination to represent Isvolsky's inconvenient declaration as an idle boast.

213. " Kriegsursachen," p. 128 ; see also p. 129.

214. " Deutschland Schuldig ? Deutsches Weissbuch über die Verantwortlichkeit der Urheber des Krieges," Berlin 1919, p. 99.

215. Vol I, p. 263. As to Britain's possible participation in a war following the Balkan crisis, see Siebert, *op. cit.*, pp. 583, 588, 601–02 ; G.P., Vol. 34, doc. 12512–18.

216. Brandenburg, pp. 365 *sqq.* ; G.P., Vol. 35, doc. 13483, 13490, 13520, 13750 (cf. 13700). Poincaré states in " L'Europe," p. 231, that it was at Italy's request that Germany restrained Austria in 1913. This has long been disposed of as an error.

217. " Affaires," Vol. III, doc. 72.

218. Siebert, p. 594.

219. Vol. I, p. 302.

220. Stieve, " Isvolsky and the World War," p. 224. See the principal documents, G.P., Vol. 35, ch. ccxc (esp. doc. 15445, 15448, 15479, 15481, 15492, 15531–32) ; also doc. 15303 ; Vol. 39, doc, 15859 ; " Schriftwechsel Iswolskis," Vols. III and IV, and popular edition Book 3, ch. v ; Siebert, *op. cit.*, pp. 639 *sqq.* ; Dickinson, pp. 348–49 ; Gooch, " Revelations," p. 98. French statesmen and diplomatists unquestionably made mischief in the Sanders affair : G.P., Vol. 38, doc. 15477, 15483, 15498–99, 15501–02, 15523, 15525 ; Vol. 39, p. 242, footnote * ; cf. " Affaires Balcaniques," Vol. III, doc. 152.

221. Stieve, " Isvolsky and the World War," pp. 230 *sqq.* ; German White Book, 1919, pp. 169 *sqq.* ; S.I.V., Book 1, ch. iv, and Book 3, ch. vii ; Stieve, " Deutschland," pp. 81 *sqq.*, 113 *sqq.* ; G. Frantz, in " Deutsche Rundschau," Feb. 1927 ; G.P., Vol. 39, doc. 15817 ; Gooch, " Revelations," p. 97 ; Dickinson, pp. 78, 231–32 ; Ewart, pp. 58, 410–11. For Russian plans for gaining possession of the Straits in 1896–97, see Comte de Witte, " Mémoires," Paris 1921, pp. 165–67 ; K.F., March 1926, pp. 175–81 (December 1925, pp. 805–06) ; Gooch, " Cambridge History," p. 330.

222. Vol. I, pp. 283–84.

223. Vol. I, pp. 284–85.

224. Vol. I, pp. 285–86. Cf. p. 288.

225. Vol. I, p. 287. Grey here justly criticizes an inaccurate and tendencious note in the American edition of the Siebert documents as to the alleged political position of Prince Louis of Battenberg. Siebert, however, is not in any way responsible for the British and American edition.

226. Vol. I, p. 251.

227. Siebert, pp. 775–76.

228. *Ibid.*, pp. 771–72. For French and Russian concern at the possibility of a British-German understanding, see also G.P., Vol. 37, doc. 14697, 14700, 14711 ; Vol. 39, doc. 15564, 15576, 15583–84, 15600, 15609 ; B. J. Hendrick, " The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page," Vol. I, pp. 283 *sqq.*, 298.

229. S.I., Vol. IV, doc. 1310 ; Siebert, *op. cit.*, pp. 805–07 ; G.P., Vol. 37, doc. 14710 ; Vol. 39, doc. 15862–63, 15866–67, 15884 ; " Berliner Tageblatt," May 22, 1914 (" Ein russischer Vorschlag ") ; " Neue Preussische (Kreuz-) Zeitung," May 27, 1914 (Schiemann) ; " Livre Noir," II, pp. 307 *sqq.*, 314 *sqq.* A statement prepared by Sazonov for the Liman von Sanders Conference contained this sentence : " At the same time efforts must be made on our part to prepare France and Great Britain for the necessity of pursuing to the end any action initiated in the common interest."—" Isvolsky and the World War," pp. 219–20.

230. S.I., Vol. IV, doc. 1327.

231. *Ibid.*, doc. 1353 ; Siebert, pp. 817 *sqq.* Dickinson also (p. 404) draws special attention to this statement of Sazonov's.

232. Siebert, pp. 813–14. Ewart also, pp. 72, 76, 180, considers that in Paris Grey yielded a great deal to the Russians and French.

233. B.D., 125 ; Sir George Buchanan, " My Mission to Russia and other Diplomatic Memories," London 1923, Vol. I, p. 184 ; cf. p. 139.

234. Vol. I, p. 306 ; B.D., 4.

235. G.P., Vol. 31, chh. ccxliv–ccxlv ; Vol. 37, ch. cclxxxiv.

236. Vol. I, p. 285.

237. Siebert, pp. 817–20.

238. German White Book 1919, pp. 200–01, from an article by M. Pokrowski.

239. Siebert, pp. 820–21, 825.

240. Vol. I, p. 289. The " Manchester Guardian " was dissatisfied with Grey's statement.—G.P., Vol. 39, doc. 15881–82.

241. Asquith had already said in the House of Commons in November 1911 : " There is no secret arrangement of any sort or kind which has not been disclosed, and fully disclosed, to the public." (Morel, " The Great Betrayal," p. 16.)

This was only true if the qualification *political* was added ; for there can be little doubt that military agreements had already been made between the British and French general staffs to cover any joint war operations. Lord Hugh Cecil asked on March 10, 1913, whether there was foundation for the general belief that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary " have entered into an arrangement, or, to speak more accurately, have given assurances which, in the contingency of a great European war, would involve heavy military obligations on this country ? " He added the statement that " there is a very general belief that this country is under an obligation, not a treaty obligation, but an obligation arising owing to an assurance given by the Ministry in the course of diplomatic negotiations, to send a very large armed force out of this country to operate in Europe." Asquith replied : " I ought to say it is not true." Quoted by E. D. Morel in " Truth and the War," p. 278. Similar questions were given similar answers by Asquith and Grey on March 24, 1913, and April 28, 1914. Cf. G.P., Vol. 39, doc. 15615 ; British public opinion would have rejected the conventions.—Doc. 15863–64.

242. It will be observed that Grey here makes no mention of the Anglo-French *naval* " conversations." Deliberately or by inadvertence ? Perhaps deliberately, since Grey himself admitted the political commitment involved in the Anglo-French Naval Convention in the House of Commons in 1914.

On the other hand, as we have seen, Grey holds to the fiction that this naval convention left his hands free.

243. Vol. I, pp. 289–90.

244. I will refer here once more to the principal sources: Earl Loreburn, "How the War Came," London 1919; E. D. Morel, "Truth and the War," London 1916, chh. xxxiii and xxxiv, and "The Secret History of a Great Betrayal," London 1923. Ewart refers repeatedly to Grey's "deceptions"—pp. 137, 540–41. Cf. W. H. Dawson, "Cobden," p. 274; Dickinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 406–09.

245. Vol. I, p. 295.

246. Vol. I, pp. 293–96.

247. D.D., Vol. I, doc. 6; Bethmann Hollweg, "Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege," Part I, Berlin 1919, pp. 66 *sqq.*; Bernhard Huldermann, "Albert Ballin," Oldenburg 1922, pp. 299–300. See also G.P., Vol. 39, doc. 15881 *sqq.*; S.I.V., Book 3, ch. viii; B.D., 4–7, 32, 39, 41; Grey, Vol. I, pp. 293–94; Gooch, "Revelations," p. 180.

248. Vol. I, pp. 296, 304; cf. Siebert, pp. 823–24; D.D., Vol. I, doc. 5.

249. Huldermann, pp. 299–300.

250. D.D., Vol. I, doc. 254.

251. Vol. I, pp. 255, 285; Vol. II, pp. 22, 124. This repeatedly expressed conviction does not tally with Grey's own account of a conversation with Clemenceau at the end of 1908: "I asked M. Clemenceau whether Alsace and Lorraine were not still a bar to any real rapprochement between France and Germany. He said they were a bar, and more so than ever." So long as this remained so "there could be no settlement" between France and Germany "which would be definitive."—Grey, Vol II, pp. 291–92.

252. Vol. I, p. 286. Another passage in Grey, Vol. II, p. 156, conflicts with this. He writes that he had himself feared an initial German success, and continues: "Such a success would not be in accordance with what British or French military authorities had told us." Cf. Vol. II, pp. 65–66.

253. Vol. I, p. 276.

254. Vol. I, pp. 304–06.

255. Vol. I, pp. 306–07. Words in brackets Lutz's.

256. Vol. I, p. 302. See also Gooch, "Revelations," p. 180.

257. See, for example, René Pinon, "France et Allemagne 1870–1913," Paris 1913; Marcel Sembat, "Faites un Roi sinon faites la Paix," Paris 1913; Agathon, "Les jeunes gens d'aujourd'hui," Paris 1913; André Mevil, "La Paix est malade," Paris 1914; also many books by military officers—Arthur Boucher, General Cherfils, Commandant de Civrieux, Lt.-Col. A. Grouard, General E. Palat, Colonel Biottot, etc. German works: E. R. Curtius, "Maurice Barrès und die geistigen Grundlagen des französischen Nationalismus," Bonn 1921; Dr. J. Kühn, "Der Nationalismus im Leben der dritten Republik," Berlin 1920; P. Rühlmann, "Die französische Schule und der Weltkrieg," Leipzig 1918; Aloys Schutte, "Frankreich und das Rheinufer," Stuttgart 1918, and other works.—G.P., Vol. 13, doc. 3550–51; Vol. 15, doc. 4471, 4486–87; Vol. 21, doc. 7273; Vol. 39, doc. 15572, 15617, 15629, 15657, 15667; Schoen, *op. cit.*, pp. 154 *sqq.*; Demartial, "Evangile," p. 185; "Temps," October 6, 1913, "Les Rapports Franco-Allemands"; "Belgische Aktenstücke," p. 129; "Carnets," I, p. 136; Herzfeld, *op. cit.*, p. 134; S.I., doc. 207; Stieve, "Deutschland," pp. 4, 25–26, 32, 50–51, 117; K.F., November 1924, pp. 479–80; Bausman, p. 301; Churchill, pp. 14, 53–54; Gooch, "Cambridge History," p. 337; Gooch, "Revelations," p. 209.—Ewart, pp. 573–676, comes to the conclusion that France was responsible for the root of the

wars lying in Alsace-Lorraine (1173). Dickinson considers that French statesmen always held the future in reserve and that the desire for revanche was never extinguished—pp. 49, 51, 79, 105, 117, 129, 479. Barnes takes this view still more strongly—pp. 61, 74, 77, 84, 88, 147, 381–8, 436, 700.

Poincaré disputes the increase in French Chauvinism in 1912–13.—" Les Balkans," p. 137, " L'Europe," pp. 136 *sqq.* See, however, G.P., Vol. 31, ch. ccxlvi and doc. 11435, 11533, 11587 ; Vol. 33, doc. 12331, 12356, 12436 ; Vol. 39, doc. 15629, 15639–43, 15650–65, 15671, 15674–75, 15692, 15705, 15772 ; " Belgische Aktenstücke," pp. 121 *sqq.*, 127 *sqq.*, 133 *sqq.* Cf. C. E. Playne, " The Neuroses of the Nations. The Neuroses of Germany and France before the War," London 1925. For the Pan-Germans, see Mildred S. Wertheimer, " The Pan-German League 1890–1914," New York 1924 ; Paul Rohrbach, " Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern," 5th edition, Stuttgart 1921, p. 219.

258. " Opinion," December 14, 1918.

259. Stieve, " Isvolsky and the World War," pp. 247–49 ; " Iswolski im Weltkriege," pp. 224–25.

260. " L'Université de Paris," October 1920, No. 223, p. 4. Quoted in Mathias Morhardt, " Les Preuves," Paris 1924, pp. 135–36. Cf. Poincaré to Jules Cambon, March 1912, in " Rapport de la Commission d'Enquête sur les Faits de la Guerre," Bourgeois-Pagès, Paris 1919, pp. 363–64 : Poincaré writes that a Franco-German rapprochement is only possible through a " réparation complète du passé." It is significant that in his book " Le Lendemain d'Agadir," p. 126, Poincaré suppressed this sentence !

261. Viscount French of Ypres, " 1914," London 1919, p. 33.

262. " Carnets," II, p. 247 ; cf. pp. 139, 209 (I, pp. 21, 161) ; Bausman, *op. cit.*, p. 112 (General Sir F. B. Maurice, on French confidence in victory).

263. Quoted in Ewart, p. 552.

264. For the Three Years' law and the German Defence Bill, see G.P., Vol. 39, ch. ccxciv ; " Belgische Aktenstücke," doc. 101, 115 *sqq.* ; H. Herzfeld, " Die deutsche Rüstungspolitik vor dem Weltkriege," Bonn 1923 ; S.I.V., Book 3, ch. vi ; Stieve, " Isvolsky and the World War," ch. vi ; " Carnets," II, pp. 60, 113–14, 132, 178 ; Poincaré, " Les Balkans," pp. 78, 138 ; Poincaré, " L'Europe," pp. 145 *sqq.*, 210 *sqq.* (Poincaré still makes use of the alleged Ludendorff memorandum, long known to be a forgery !) The German Defence Bill was drawn up to meet the great change in the balance of power brought about by the Balkan wars and the fact that in December 1912 Italy had denounced her treaty obligation to furnish auxiliary troops. In view of the circumstances French authorities, including Poincaré himself, admitted that the Defence Bill must not be regarded as provocative ; there is also clear evidence that the French Three Years' law, Poincaré's personal work, was not made necessary by the German Defence Bill.—G.P., Vol. 39, doc 15626–27, 15633, 15646, 15648, 15652, 15657, 15661, 15665, 15671, 15674–75, 15861 ; Dickinson, pp. 371–72 ; S. B. Fay, in " New Republic," New York, January 6. 1926 ; K.F., June 1926, pp. 388–89 ; Ewart, chh. xvi, xvii.

265. Siebert, pp. 713–15. G.P., Vol. 39, doc. 15840, 15842 *sqq.*, 15883–84, 15886 ; Frantz, " Russlands Eintritt," pp. 165–67 ; J. W. Gerard, " My Four Years in Germany," New York 1917, p. 92 ; Bausman, pp. 123, 128.

266. " Isvolsky and the World War," p. 226. G.P., Vol. 39, ch. ccci, especially doc. 15839, 15843 *sqq.* ; Frantz, " Russlands Eintritt," pp. 11, 76 ; Frantz, " Russland auf dem Wege zur Katastrophe," Berlin 1926, pp. 69, 252 ; " Zur Europäischen Politik," Vol. IV, No. 96 ; B.D., 52, 66, 69.

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267. G. P. Gooch, " Germany," London 1925, p. 116. Many Frenchmen regarded the war as inevitable ; Poincaré appears to have expected it definitely within two years.—" Carnets," I, pp. 21, 160, 208 ; II, pp. 26, 94, 108, 111, 129 ; E. Judet, " Georges Louis," Paris 1925, pp. 231, 233 ; Paléologue in " Revue des deux Mondes," January 15, 1921, p. 229 ; G.P., Vol. 39, pp. 320–22, footnote * ; " Lokalanzeiger " (Berlin), December 21, 1918, on negotiations between the French Military Attaché in Berne and the Swiss Government.

268. Vol. II, pp. 47 *sqq.*

CHAPTER IV

THE WORLD CONFLAGRATION

> His public statements on the one hand that he was a free agent, and his private assurances to France on the other, encouraged both Continental groups to gamble, the one on British neutrality, the other on British support.
>
> BERNADOTTE E. SCHMITT. (1)

THE SITUATION IN THE SPRING OF 1914.

IN the summing up of Grey's character at the end of the last chapter I went rather ahead of events. This seemed desirable in order to give before coming to the crisis of July 1914 as complete a picture as possible of the man who was entrusted with enormous power, a power with which a real statesman of a stature equal to the occasion would actually have decided the issue of peace or war.

Apart from Albania, Europe in the spring of 1914 was comparatively calm. For a while there had been danger of a new Turco-Greek War, which might have reopened the whole Balkan question; in the end, however, the two Powers declared their readiness to negotiate and it was possible to regard the danger as over for the time being. As summer approached, a calm set in which had hardly been known since the French marched on Fez in 1911. But the calm was only apparent and superficial. In reality there ruled in all the Foreign Offices of the European Great Powers and in Government quarters in most of the smaller States of the Continent dissatisfaction, mistrust, fear, and an ill-concealed state of tension that sprang from the realization that for decades no such store of inflammable material had been heaped up as in this early summer of 1914.

Europe was divided into two camps, both bristling with armaments, which sought to preserve a balance between them, though the Triple Entente clearly overweighted the other group. For since the British-German rivalry began the Triple Alliance had given up relying on Italy. The Central Powers found themselves in an isolation which was anything but "splendid."

The Danube Monarchy was inwardly rotting, and since the Balkan Wars its external situation had become substantially worse : Serbs, Czechs, Roumanians, Italians, and Russians laid more or less open claim to Austro-Hungarian territories, and the country was especially threatened both from without and within by the " Slav peril." (2) Germany also was within the reach of this peril ; since 1909 Russia's military strength had increased to a really alarming extent. Thus Sir Horace Rumbold, the British Counsellor of Embassy and Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, wrote on July 18, 1914 :

> Whatever confidence the Germans may have in the efficiency and quality of their army, the enormous masses of men at the command of Russia are a constant source of preoccupation to them. (3)

No wonder if in Germany's precarious situation many foreign visitors and observers noted in certain quarters, especially in military circles, an excited and aggressive tone. At the end of May 1914 Colonel House had this impression strongly ; after a short stay in Berlin he wrote of " militarism run stark mad." (4) This, if applied only to Germany, was an exaggeration, and the impressions and reports of this American envoy contain other faulty judgments. But even the Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, spoke at the beginning of June 1914, in a conversation with the Bavarian Minister, Count Lerchenfeld, of " the preventive war demanded by many military authorities." Both, however, considered that the right moment had been missed, and Lerchenfeld reports the Chancellor as adding :

> But the Emperor William has not begun a preventive war and will not do so. There are, however, circles in the Reich who hope for the improvement, i.e. in a conservative direction, of internal conditions in Germany through a war—

a view which Bethmann Hollweg did not himself share ; he feared from a war an enormous increase in the power of the Social Democrats, which " might overturn a good many thrones." (5)

Bethmann Hollweg and others have admitted, and there is no denying, that in Germany in 1914 there were officers who talked of a preventive war. The same is true of Austria-Hungary, where Conrad von Hötzendorf, who had retired from

the post of Chief of Staff in November 1911, had returned in December 1912 to the same influential position. This very capable officer had for years been urgently advocating a preventive war against Serbia and Italy, and his reappointment was therefore of special importance. (6) It has to be observed, however, that these advocates of preventive war believed their countries to be in a very dangerous situation and that their aggressive plans were based on this conservative consideration. On the other side the position was very different.

France had much the same reason to fear a German attack as Germany to fear the Russian "steam-roller"; (7) it was known in France that in a general European war Germany's only chance of victory lay in first crushing France—through Belgium. As years passed the feeling changed, especially under the influence of the steady support of the Entente by the British Government under Sir Edward Grey and the rapid increase in Russia's military strength; in place of fear of Germany, there came in official quarters substantial confidence in victory, which found eloquent expression in the works of many French military writers. And with this feeling of advantage of position there was renewed, almost inevitably, the strong desire for revanche, for the recovery of the lost provinces—an aspiration which had never been entirely abandoned. It is thus not surprising that responsible leaders in France considered, at all events in private, the question of the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine and that their dealings were influenced accordingly, (8) especially as the reintroduction of three years' military service offered a further inducement in this direction in view of the impossibility of maintaining it for any length of time. On May 8, 1914, the Belgian Ambassador in Paris reported:

> One of the most dangerous factors in the present situation is France's return to the three years' military service law. It was irresponsibly pushed through by the military party, but the country cannot support the burden of it. Within two years it will be necessary either to abandon it or to go to war. (9)

Like Germany, Austria-Hungary, and France, Russia had her aggressive military party. Not only that, but, as we have seen, at the beginning of 1914 the Russian Government resolved deliberately to work for the conquest of the Straits; in addition to this, it offered its Balkan advance guard, Serbia, the tempting

prospect of acquiring the South Slav territories of the Danube Monarchy, so that Russia's aims were aggressive in two directions. (10) The Russian officers felt the need of wiping out the disgrace of 1904–05. We made acquaintance in Chapter III with the confidence in victory of the Russian Minister of War and Chief of Staff. According to a Belgian report, a Japanese military mission which visited various Russian cities in the spring of 1914 was

> struck by the anti-German feeling with which the Russian officers are filled to-day. In regimental messes the Japanese officers heard open talk of an early war against Austria-Hungary and Germany. It was said that the army was ready to go into action, and the moment was as favourable for the Russians as for their French allies. (11)

The hot-headed dreams of war that filled the heads of military men in Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Russia, and Serbia, were dreamed in Great Britain mainly by naval officers. Colonel House found that Britain and Germany had " one feeling in common, and that is fear of one another," and Sir Edward Grey remarked to him that " the great cause of antagonism between nations was the distrust each felt for the other's motives." (12) Many of Grey's compatriots shared his deep mistrust of Germany, and it was natural that British naval circles should dwell fondly on the idea of destroying the German Navy, and, in addition, German trade.

Thus, under the apparently calm surface of Europe there glowered three immense nuclei of a possible explosion. The first was the product of Franco-German enmity ; the second of Russo-Austrian rivalry in the Balkans ; and the third of the British-German naval competition, itself the product of economic rivalries and fears. In this situation the ideas of preventive war current in certain military circles were undoubtedly dangerous ; but still more dangerous were the appetites of the Powers that were trying to extend their European territories by resort to force.

Colonel House wrote at the end of May 1914 that apart from his bad impression of " militarism run stark mad " there was in Europe " too much hatred, too many jealousies " ; and he added the significant words :

> Whenever England consents, France and Russia will close in on Germany and Austria. (13)

The Serajevo Murder.

On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the heir apparent, and his consort, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were shot at Serajevo, after a bomb attempt had failed earlier on the same morning.

It appeared, years later, that two groups had independently arrived at the decision to remove Francis Ferdinand from their path ; these were certain young Bosnians and the Head of the Intelligence Division of the Serbian General Staff, Colonel Dragutin Dimitriyevitch. An adherent of the latter, the Serbian Major Voja Tankositch, brought the Bosnians to him, and then Dimitriyevitch and Tankositch took in hand the preparations for the murder. They procured the necessary weapons, drilled the young men in their use, and arranged for the plotters to be secretly smuggled over the frontier to Serajevo. The guilt of the assassination rests therefore primarily on the Serbian officers Dimitriyevitch and Tankositch. Both were known in Serbia as born plotters. In 1911 Dimitriyevitch had founded the secret society " Union or Death," which numbered among its members numerous holders of high offices. The Serbian Government was in touch with the " Black Hand," as the society was popularly called, through various channels, and we know now that the Prime Minister, Pashitch, became aware at the end of May or beginning of June 1914 of the preparations for the outrage, and informed several Ministers, if not the whole Cabinet. These gentlemen decided to issue orders to the frontier authorities to prevent the passage of the conspirators into Bosnian territory, but the frontier officials themselves belonged to the " Black Hand," and took no notice of the instructions from the Minister of the Interior. This secret society had by then attained great power, and constituted a government within the government, even enjoying at the time the support of the influential Russian Minister at Belgrade, Von Hartwig. Whether and to what extent he himself may have been aware of the conspiracy is not known. On the other hand, it is asserted that the Russian Military Attaché at Belgrade, Artamanov, had not only received consent from St. Petersburg (but from whom ?) to the accomplishment of the outrage, but had actually handed over to Dimitriyevitch a considerable sum of money on that account. (14)

The kingdom of Serbia still needed repose after the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 ; moreover, its rulers knew that Russia's military preparations would not be complete until 1916 or 1917. It must therefore not be assumed that the Serbian Government furthered the outrage ; it is much more probable that premature complications were inconvenient to the Government. On the other hand, Pashitch did not venture to take energetic measures against the dangerous activities of the " Black Hand." The country was in a ferment. Moreover, adequate protection from Russia was known to be assured. Pashitch and his Cabinet therefore, after a half-hearted effort to check the evil, allowed things to take their course, without informing the Austrian authorities.

In this behaviour, in contravention of international law, lies the *direct* responsibility of the Serbian Government for the Serajevo murder. In a French historical work we read :

> According to international law, it is only the acts of the Government or of the authorities which engage the responsibility of the State. The private acts of officials do not engage it. But, should such acts of officials be punishable or criminal, the Government is under obligation to proceed against the persons primarily answerable. (15)

The Serbian Government also bore an *indirect* responsibility for the crime, a responsibility which must be shared with Serbia by Russia on the one hand and by Austria-Hungary on the other. The Serbian aspirations in the territory of the Danube Monarchy were of old date. With the annexation of Bosnia the reciprocal relationship underwent a thorough change for the worse. Hungary's oppression of minorities and her agrarian policy were an offence to the Serbians. Serbian organizations swarmed in the South Slav provinces of the Monarchy. The Balkan Wars increased the national self-consciousness of the Serbians and deepened their hatred for Austria-Hungary, who barred their longed-for access to the Adriatic. And Russia stood behind Serbia. (16)

It is only when we consider this atmosphere, produced by faults on both sides, that the Serajevo murder can be understood. There is, however, one more point which requires special mention. The heads of the young conspirators were haunted with anarchist revolutionary ideas ; masonic influences were also present. (17)

The main impulse, however, sprang from the nationalist Chauvinism of the Serbians. Now Francis Ferdinand was rightly looked upon as the protector of the South Slavs ; why then must he of all men fall by the hand of Serbians ?

Francis Ferdinand aimed at counteracting the power of the Magyars by setting up a South Slav State within the Monarchy, in which the Catholic Croats would be dominant. The realization of this idea meant, however, the annihilation of the " greater Serbian " dream of the orthodox Serbs ; Agram, and not Belgrade, would have become the capital of the Serbian people. The adherents of the Karageorgevitch dynasty, the Russophil, orthodox Serbians, therefore hated and feared Francis Ferdinand as their worst enemy. These were the motives which in the main influenced the organizers of the plot. (18)

When the news of the murder came, Ljuba Jovanovitch, who had for weeks been aware of what was planned, had " not a moment's doubt that Austria-Hungary would make war on Serbia over this." This filled him with anxiety. (19) Unquestionably the other members of the Cabinet were oppressed with the same feelings. Then numerous hints and warnings were directed to Serbia, culminating in the more or less pressing advice that, by a spontaneous investigation in her own territory, she should lay hold of the threads of the plot, which led to Belgrade, should call the guilty to account, and should so break the force of a pending step on the part of Austria-Hungary. The " Westminster Gazette " and even " The Times " wrote warning articles to this effect. (20) The Pashitch Government, however, exerted itself to efface all traces of the plot in Belgrade, to deny indignantly both to friend and to foe all responsibility for the crime, to play the perfect innocent, and to act as though there were no possibility of doing anything on its own initiative, until it had learned from Vienna the result of the investigation at Serajevo ; an attitude which our present knowledge shows to have been thoroughly hypocritical. (21) The fact that the Serbian Government did not dare to take measures against the powerful " Black Hand " may serve as an explanation, but not as an excuse ; for there is no doubt that it was still more afraid of the disastrous effect everywhere abroad if the truth came to light. The Serbian Government, therefore, through its passivity after the murder, laid itself open to a serious charge of negligence.

In this attitude it was supported by Russia and by the representatives of other Entente Powers, who, it is true, may have believed in the innocence of the Serbian Government. (22)

The British representative at Budapest reported on July 14, 1914, to Sir Edward Grey :

> It is surely the irony of fate that the future ruler who was commonly regarded as a champion of Southern Slav rights should have fallen a victim to the criminal propaganda of Pan-Servian agitation. . . .
>
> It was indeed evident from the first to anyone acquainted with the political conditions of the Monarchy that the crime was more probably nationalist than anarchist in its nature and had its origin in the Greater Servian propaganda, an anti-dynastic and irredentist movement ; but up to the present nothing has been made public . . . which could in any way associate the Servian Government with the crime. The most one can say at present is that the moral responsibility for the senseless outrage falls on the violent agitation which has been carried on against the Dual Monarchy from Servia, partly through the Press, and partly through political associations, especially since the events of 1908, and that the Servian Government share the responsibility inasmuch as they have failed to check the excesses of this nationalist Pan-Serb movement. (23)

Even before the receipt of this report, Grey had regarded it as possible " that the murder of the Archduke was planned in Servian territory " and that the Serbian Government had shown negligence. (24) But one fails to find in the British documents any evidence that Grey thought it necessary to tender to the Serbian Government so much as that obvious advice which even " The Times " considered to be needed. On the contrary—when the British Ambassador in Vienna announced that his Russian colleague there feared that the article in the " Westminster Gazette " of July 17th would encourage the Austro-Hungarian Government " to take severe action against Servia," and would be interpreted as a warning to Serbia from an organ of the British Government, Grey minuted the report to the effect that the article did not admit of the interpretation placed upon it by the Russian Ambassador : " It was not inspired by us at all." (25)

Sir Eyre Crowe went still further. He commented on the unquestionably well-justified warnings of the German Government to Serbia :

All they are doing is to inflame the passions at Belgrade and it looks very much like egging on the Austrians when they openly and persistently threaten the Servian Government through their official newspapers. (26)

It must, of course, be borne in mind that at that time little was known of what lay behind the murder, though enough in any case to make warnings like those of " The Times " and " Westminster Gazette " appear entirely in place, and in fact necessary. The people who surrounded Sir Eyre Crowe were, however, constantly haunted by the bugbear of a breach between Great Britain and Russia. (27)

The manner in which Grey handles the Serajevo murder in " Twenty-five Years " is characteristic of his writing of history. He introduces his chapter on " The final crisis " with the words :

The world will presumably never be told all that was behind the murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. Probably there is not, and never was, any one person who knew all that there was to know. (28)

Lord Grey says that British sympathy, and certainly his own, was with Austria-Hungary ; but " when it began to be presumed that the Serbian Government was itself responsible for the crime," sympathy paused, for this theory " did not seem to be probable ; it was even improbable," and could not be accepted without evidence. Quite right ; but it must be pointed out that Austria-Hungary never held the Serbian Government directly responsible for the Serajevo murder. It must be admitted that the *whole* of what lay behind the outrage has not yet been cleared up ; but we might have expected, in a work intended to serve the cause of truth, to hear something more about it than the sentences quoted. Some years ago the uncomfortable discovery was made that an officer of the Serbian General Staff was the actual organizer of the crime. Then, in the spring of 1925, a sensation was created by the revelation that the Serbian Government had knowledge of the intended outrage. The " Journal " of the Royal Institute of International Affairs published in March 1925 an English translation of Ljuba Jovanovitch's article. Grey is a member of this Institute ; had he no knowledge of the article ? Is it conceivable ? Why does Grey omit to make admissions which must influence the judgment of every honest searcher after truth as to the causes of the world catastrophe ? Because, like Dr. Seton-Watson, he is determined to go on

believing in the entire innocence of the Serbian Government? Because the revelation is inconvenient to him? Or because he feels in his heart of hearts that Bernard Shaw may have been right, when he wrote in 1914:

> The real tragedy was that the violent death of a fellow-creature should have raised so little (horror). (29)

Vienna's Decision and the German Blank Cheque.

The issue of the Balkan Wars had shown the Austro-Hungarian Government the danger of its situation. It is true that the Balkan Alliance was disrupted by the secession of Bulgaria, but, to set against this, Roumania had effected so definite a rapprochement with the Russians that Vienna rightly ceased to feel confidence in her continued loyalty to the Triple Alliance. Moreover, Russia was working for a new Balkan Alliance. The Monarchy meant to meet this by *diplomatic* methods by means of a closer approach to Bulgaria, and had already prepared a memorandum on the subject to lay before Germany, when the Serajevo murder compelled other decisions. For the fact that the outrage was connected with Serbian intrigues was from the first beyond doubt for all acquainted with the existing conditions. And now it seemed as though counsellors like Conrad von Hötzendorf, for many years leader of the War Party, (30) had been right in holding that the existing relations between the Monarchy and Serbia could not continue, and that the sword alone could remove the Serbian peril. Emperor Francis Joseph wrote in forwarding to the Emperor William the memorandum mentioned above:

> The efforts of my Government must in future be directed to the isolation and reduction of Serbia;

Serbia, who formed "the cardinal point of pan-Slav policy," must be "eliminated as a political force in the Balkans." (31)

Unquestionably Serbia's aspirations, under Russian protection, threatened the integrity of Austria-Hungary. (32) We now have fresh and striking testimony to this. The British Ambassador in Vienna telegraphed on July 29, 1914:

> French Ambassador is reporting to French Government that he is convinced by admissions of Servian Minister, with whom he was in close contact till Minister departed 26th July, that growing condition of unrest in Southern Slav provinces of Dual Monarchy was such that

Austro-Hungarian Government were compelled either to acquiesce in separation of those provinces or make a desperate effort to retain them by reducing Servia to impotency. Servian Minister always said that time was working for Servia, and he told French Ambassador that within three years Southern Slav provinces would be ready to rise against Austria-Hungary without Servia having to raise her little finger. Austria-Hungary realizes she could wait no longer, and determined on war. . . . (33)

When even the Serbian Minister in Vienna, who must have been fairly well informed as to the position, took such a serious view of the immediate future of the Monarchy, some past judgments of the steps it took against Serbia will have to be modified. It was always difficult for Western Europeans, accustomed to different circumstances, clearly to realize the Balkan danger to Austria-Hungary. It remains to be considered whether the Vienna decision to reduce and isolate Serbia, and to eliminate her as a force, was a suitable means of preserving the Monarchy. For several reasons, the answer must be in the negative. Even if in 1914 Russia's lack of preparedness for war had forced her to put up with the execution of Vienna's purposes, after the humiliation of 1908–09 she would certainly have had but one desire—to take the first opportunity to wipe out this new and still more severe humiliation as soon as she was ready to strike, that is, in two or three years' time. A further consequence would have been the still closer welding of the Entente, probably with the addition of Italy ; and, finally, the dismembered Serbia would have become more than ever a focus of danger to European peace ; for a nation numbering millions, with a strongly marked national feeling, cannot be kept down by force of arms. The gain to Austria-Hungary in power and prestige would have provided no adequate compensation. Vienna's plans were no more than a makeshift, promising momentary improvement but no real salvation ; the cause of the trouble was left untouched. This lay deep in the form, the structure, the composition, in all the circumstances of the Dual Monarchy itself. Its recovery and rejuvenescence could only come about *from within*. This had been clearly recognized by Francis Ferdinand and a little group around him. So long, however, as nothing in that direction was achieved, the State was constantly threatened with disruption from its own nationalities. It was

the tragedy of the Central Powers that the one man who would have had the influence and the capacity to guide the development of the Monarchy into safe paths fell prematurely by the hand of an assassin. Austria-Hungary so lost her chance of fulfilling a high mission, that of forming the germ of a federation of European States. (34) Instead of this, Vienna began what Conrad called at the time " a va-banque game." (35)

In the absence, however, of constructive statesmanship, Vienna's decision to have a reckoning with Serbia will be found comprehensible. But the decision could not be fully carried out without the agreement of Berlin.

The Emperor William was bound to be deeply affected by the murder, since he had only just paid a visit to his friend Francis Ferdinand at Konopischt. Germany was horrified, and gravely concerned about the future of Austria-Hungary. (36) The German Government saw itself, too, in a delicate position. It had for years advocated a conciliatory policy towards Serbia, and had repeatedly warned Vienna against military measures. Now its earlier counsels of moderation seemed to be put thoroughly in the wrong ; public opinion in Germany, as elsewhere, immediately traced the outrage to Pan-Serb intrigue. Misinterpreting the international position, the German Government shortsightedly regarded the moment as favourable for strong measures from Vienna : neither Russia nor France was believed to be inclined or prepared for war ; Britain seemed to be on the verge of a civil war, and had made with Germany the colonial agreement already mentioned, which promised a lasting amelioration of British-German relations ; it was expected that in case of need, Britain and France would hold Russia back, and confidence was felt that monarchist sympathies would prevent the Tsar from drawing the sword for the assassins of a prince. (37) Accordingly on July 5th and 6th the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor indicated to Austria that it was for her to take such measures as she might consider fitting, and that she could count on German support. As the German White Book, 1914, expressed it, with unusual openness, Austria was allowed " an entirely free hand in her action against Serbia."

Was Germany under an obligation to assume this attitude ? Secretary of State von Bülow wrote in a despatch dated January 8, 1898 :

Austria cannot and never could count on assistance under the alliance *in a provocative Balkan policy.* (38)

As we saw, Prince Bülow departed from this attitude in the Bosnian crisis ; then, however, armed intervention by Russia was out of the question. Thus, during the Balkan Wars there was no question of a blank cheque for Austria-Hungary. The following extracts may be made here from two noteworthy memoranda of Emperor William's, dating from the autumn of 1912 :

If on the outbreak of war I was determined to avoid and did avoid the casus fœderis being admitted on account of the Serbians in the Sandjak or Uskub, still less am I inclined to let it be admitted on account of the Serbians in Durazzo or Albania. So extensive an obligation is not in keeping with the spirit of the Triple Alliance, which was intended a limine to guarantee the continued hold of *existing possessions* ; nor do the actual vital needs and conditions of existence of the Austrian Monarchy seem to demand this. Certainly many of the changes in the Balkans brought about by the war are very inconvenient for Vienna, and also undesirable, but none is so radical that we ought to expose ourselves to the danger of warlike complications on account of it ; that responsibility I could take neither before my people nor before my conscience. . . .

. . . The casus fœderis of course arises if Austria is attacked by Russia. But even then only if Austria *has not provoked* Russia to the attack. Here, then, such a situation might arise in regard to Serbia. (39)

The Serajevo murder had thus radically changed the situation. The Danube Monarchy seemed now to be forced on the defensive, and *its vital needs and conditions of existence were, clearly, seriously threatened.* As far back as August 1913 Count Berchtold, in a review of the Pan-Serb aspirations, intended for Germany, had stated :

Austria-Hungary is pursuing no aggressive plans as regards Serbia, and does not seek to gain Serbian territory for herself. If the Pan-Serb intrigues should force a conflict on her, she would be in the position of the attacked party, no matter from which side the last step to a warlike decision might be taken. (40)

Nevertheless the blank cheque was a great blunder. It is true that many assert that Berlin had no choice, and that had it stood aside the alliance would have been destroyed. That was, however, by no means the case. Where else would Austria-Hungary

expect to find a sincere ally ? It was at all times much easier for Germany to come to an understanding with Russia, for example, at the expense of Austria-Hungary, than the other way about. This was set down in writing in the autumn of 1910 by Bethmann Hollweg, Count Pourtalès, and Tschirschky, and was known in Vienna. (41) Certainly Germany had to shield and support her one faithful ally. But it was not necessary unreservedly to follow Bülow's " dependence " policy of 1908–09, about which Kiderlen-Wächter had already complained, and voluntarily to abandon leadership to Vienna. (42) A statesmanship adequate to the occasion would not have neglected to leave open a safe way of escape in case it should prove that the situation had been wrongly gauged. The confidence which Berlin showed in Vienna was ill-placed, and was to recoil terribly on it. As a matter of fact, Vienna did not at first in the least count on the full support of Berlin ; strong representations from that quarter would, as during the Balkan crisis, have found a hearing, albeit a reluctant one. Vienna took action only after receipt of the German blank cheque. (43) In this fact lies Germany's share of responsibility for Austria-Hungary's acts.

However, the carte blanche given called for definition and accompanying comment. Berlin advised Vienna to hasten to lay its evidence against Serbia before the Powers, and not to mobilize in Galicia, in order not to provoke Russia to a counter-mobilization ; to come to an understanding with Italy, and to push on with the operations against Serbia, should Vienna determine to act—the assumption being that while indignation at the murder was still fresh the world would be the more likely to look complacently on a fait accompli. (44) In addition, the German Government intended to offer mediation as soon as the conflict came to a crisis, which would not have been possible if it had taken part in Austria-Hungary's plans against Serbia. The possibility that these plans might bring about a war with Russia and the rest of the Entente was taken into consideration in Berlin and Vienna. The events, however, which gave rise to the altogether distorted legend of the " Potsdam Crown Council " show that the Emperor and the Government did not seriously believe that Russia would interfere. The military chiefs were not consulted, and no military preparations were made. The German general staff was, as ever, ready. In Berlin it was

honestly considered probable that the expected conflict could be localized. (45)

The Preparation of the Austrian Note.

Assured of German assistance, Vienna now began to prepare for action against Serbia. Count Berchtold had been Foreign Minister since early in 1912, but considered himself ill-adapted to the post. He was by no means warlike by nature, a gentle, undecided, easily influenced man, with perfect manners and great personal charm. His weak and hesitating attitude in the Balkan Wars had been harshly criticized. But as early as the autumn of 1913 he had been won over to the idea of war against Serbia. After the murder he fell completely under the influence of the strong-willed Chief of the General Staff, Conrad von Hötzendorf. (46) There was also at the Ballplatz, as Head of a Section, Count Forgach, a bitter Serbophobe, who was accused of all kinds of intrigues at the time of the Bosnian crisis ; lastly we must not omit to notice the influence of the German Ambassador in Vienna, von Tschirschky, who, in the crisis of July 1914, went beyond his instructions from Berlin in stiffening Count Berchtold's attitude. (47)

The investigation undertaken by Vienna into the facts of the murder soon established the following : The perpetrators of the outrage were without exception Bosnians, and therefore subjects of Austria-Hungary ; the plot was hatched, however, in Belgrade, with the active assistance of the Serbian Major V. Tankositch and a Serbian railway official, Milan Ciganovitch—the latter also a Bosnian. These two had procured the weapons ; the bombs came originally from the Kragujevatz Arsenal, but had in all probability remained in the possession of leaders of armed bands from the time of the Balkan Wars ; and Serbian frontier officials had helped the young plotters, with their weapons, surreptitiously over the Bosnian frontier. On July 13th Sektionsrat von Wiesner telegraphed from Serajevo that there was " slender " but " sufficient " evidence that the propaganda directed against Austria " is fed by organizations in Serbia, which are tolerated by the Serbian Government." He also reported, however, that

> There is nothing to prove or even to justify suspicion that the Serbian Government had knowledge of the organization of the outrage or prepared

it or supplied weapons. On the contrary, there are good reasons for regarding this as out of the question. (48)

Potiorek, Master of the Ordnance, contested this view of Wiesner's, and it would appear that the Bosnian military authorities in general and a section of the political administration of Bosnia were firmly convinced that the crime was perpetrated with the knowledge and consent of the Serbian Government. (49) As a matter of fact, the Serbian Government did have knowledge of the coming attack. We must, however, proceed from the assumption that nobody was aware of this at the time. (50) As already stated, Vienna never accused the Serbian Government of cognizance of or promotion of the outrage ; the charges were directed generally against the anti-Austrian propaganda which was tolerated if not secretly assisted by the Serbian Government ; the murder was regarded as the result of this propaganda, and Vienna further complained, with justice, that the Serbian Government had not kept earlier promises to cultivate neighbourly relations. (51)

Now although Vienna was not aware in 1914 of the main counts in the charge—the organization of the crime by two Serbian officers, one of them in a high position on the General Staff, and knowledge of the affair on the part of the Serbian Government—yet it must be recognized that those in authority in Austria-Hungary had a well-founded suspicion of what lay behind the outrage. If in July 1914 the whole truth about the Serajevo murder had come out, there is no doubt that the collective public opinion of Europe would have recognized the justice of a punitive expedition against Serbia. (52) As matters stood, however, in 1914, and particularly in view of the above quoted document of Wiesner's, the severity of Austria's action (which was generally considered excessive), and her intransigence, cannot be regarded as fully justified.

During the Balkan Wars, Russia had repeatedly declared that she would intervene if Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia. Germany knew this. (53) The situation, however, was entirely abnormal, and we have seen why Berlin hoped and expected that Russia would not proceed to extremes. It is evident that at first not quite the same optimism existed in Vienna. Conrad reckoned at once on Russia, and Roumania, as antagonists. (54) Count Berchtold seems to have been less certain. On July 7th

a Cabinet meeting took place in Vienna. At this, Berchtold, according to the minutes, said that it " was clear to him that war with Russia was very probable, in the event of our invasion of Serbia " ; but later he toned this down, in writing, to the statement " that a passage of arms with Serbia might have as a consequence a war with Russia." (55) Possibly Berchtold was influenced by the more confident attitude of Berlin. However this may be, at the Cabinet meeting in question Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, was the only one who did not consider war with Serbia necessary. On July 8th he gave a further warning :

> An attack of this kind on Serbia would, as far as can humanly be foreseen, mean Russia's intervention and a world war. (56)

All the rest, however, believed that the moment had come to make Serbia " harmless for ever," and to win over Count Tisza Berchtold called special attention to the German Government's unconditional support. (57) This shows clearly the curse of Germany's incautious assurance of a " free hand." Tisza's objection, which he fully substantiated, could not have failed of its effect in Berlin, where a Crown Council and a meeting of the Federal Council would have been necessary, and this must have strengthened Tisza's resistance to rash steps on the part of Vienna. On July 14th, however, Tisza agreed with his colleagues, with certain reservations. He gave this as the main reason for his change of opinion :

> . . . Every day had strengthened his feeling that the Monarchy must take energetic action to demonstrate its vitality and to make an end of the impossible conditions in the south-east. The language of the Serbian Press and of Serbian diplomats was intolerably offensive. (58)

The British Ambassador in Vienna, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, was, indeed, also of opinion that " the Serbian Press . . . is behaving shamefully." (59) This again shows the beneficent effect that a timely concession by the Serbian Government might have had. . . .

Count Tisza declared himself opposed to any annexation of Serbian territory ; Count Berchtold wanted to extend the borders of Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, and possibly even Roumania, at Serbia's expense, so that that country " might be no longer

dangerous." Tisza insisted, with an eye on Russia, that the Monarchy should abstain from annexations. He was unable, however, to get his own way entirely; for on July 19th the joint Ministerial Council decided

> that immediately on the outbreak of war foreign Powers should be informed that the Monarchy is not carrying on a war of conquest, and does not aim at the annexation of the kingdom [of Serbia]. Of course, strategically necessary rectifications of frontier, as well as the diminution of Serbia in favour of other States, . . . are not excluded by this decision. (60)

This declared intention of the Vienna Cabinet must be borne in mind.

Count Berchtold, who had already neglected to communicate to the German Government the " slender " result of the investigation at Serajevo, also gave inadequate information about this decision of the Ministerial Council. It cannot, however, be said that Jagow, the Secretary of State (Bethmann Hollweg was then on leave and little in the office), allowed himself to be materially deceived. There is plenty of evidence to the contrary; suffice it to mention that on July 15th he sent the following telegram to the German Ambassador in Vienna :

> It is . . . of *the greatest* importance that Vienna should discuss with the Rome Cabinet the objects at which she will aim in Serbia in case of a conflict, and keep Rome . . . on her side. Italy has a right under her agreements with Austria to compensations for any alteration in the Balkans in favour of the Danube Monarchy. . . .
>
> I may point out in strict confidence that the acquisition of the Trentino would probably be regarded in Italy as the only fully adequate compensation. This would, indeed, be such a toothsome morsel that it might even stop the mouth of Austrophobe public opinion. (61)

We see from this that Jagow was considering the concession to Italy of the Trentino (Valona would not suffice), that is, of an old Austrian possession. It is obvious that he could only make this remarkable proposal if he was assuming that Vienna's plans would entail a considerable change in the Balkans in favour of Austria. It must be mentioned, however, that on July 20th Berchtold declared that the question of compensation (which will occupy our attention later) did not yet arise, since the Cabinet had resolved

to abstain from all permanent annexation of foreign territory. This disposes of every sound reason why Italy should claim compensation. (62)

In Berlin this was quite correctly interpreted, according to a report from Herr von Schoen, of the Bavarian Legation, to mean that Vienna was unwilling to have her hands tied prematurely. (63) But Berchtold's communication of the 20th left Berlin insufficiently acquainted with Vienna's secret intentions. (64)

Apart from the intention to demand that the price should be paid for the Serajevo murder, the Vienna Cabinet was beyond question filled with the idea of preventive war, (65) and undeniably a similar conception was present even in the utterances of German statesmen. Prince Lichnowsky, for example, returned very disquieted from Berlin to London at the beginning of July ; as he confided to the British Foreign Minister, there was great anxiety in Germany on account of Russian armaments and of the possibility (in spite of all dementis) of an Anglo-Russian Naval Agreement ; there was consequently in Germany some feeling

that trouble was bound to come, and therefore it would be better not to restrain Austria and let the trouble come now, rather than later. (66)

Count Szögyényi reported from Berlin on July 12th to the same effect, (67) and Jagow wrote in the course of a despatch to Prince Lichnowsky on July 18th :

We must see to the localization of the conflict between Austria and Serbia. . . . The more determined Austria shows herself, the more energetically we support her, the more likely is Russia to remain quiet. . . . If localization cannot be attained, and Russia attacks Austria, the casus fœderis arises, and we cannot sacrifice Austria. . . . I do not want a preventive war, but if a struggle comes we cannot back out.

I still hope and believe that the conflict can be localized. (68)

The evidence which we possess (some of which will be adduced later) leaves no possibility of doubt as to the sincerity of this last sentence. Jagow would, however, have done well not only to remember his remark to Sir Edward Goschen on June 16th that the majority of Russians hated Germany, (69) but especially to adopt the prudent attitude of Von Bülow, Secretary of State, who wrote with sound sense in January 1898 :

One knows where a war begins, but one never knows where it ends. (70)

In those days not a few warnings from various quarters reached Berlin and Vienna, and deserved serious attention ; the essence of them was that Austria-Hungary could not interfere with the integrity and the political independence of Serbia, and could not attack the country, without producing European complications. (71)

It is important to bear in mind that at that time war passed for a quite legal means for States to attain political ends. (72) As already pointed out several times, Germany and Austria-Hungary saw themselves threatened from more than one side. In Germany the enormous Russian armaments, above all, had produced serious alarm as to the future. How justifiable these fears were is made clear in the Memoirs of the Russian War Minister, W. A. Suchomlinov, in which we read :

> Two more years of peace, and Russia, with her hundred and eighty million souls, would have had an army so powerful in numbers, training, and equipment, that she would have been in a position to manipulate the solution of all problems of Continental politics to her own advantage. (73)

As early as the end of March 1914 Suchomlinov had given the German Military Attaché a plain hint to this effect, (74) and Germany was justifiably anxious about this prospective " Russian peace." Apart from this, there existed in Berlin no *set purpose* of preventive war. And those who, like the writer of these lines, condemn preventive war, must nevertheless admit that the other Governments were no better in this matter. Of this we have a classical example, which cannot fail to impress. The German Ambassador in Paris, Count Münster (formerly for many years in London), was staying at Cannes after the Fashoda incident, and wrote from that place on March 13, 1899 :

> The warlike mood in England is by no means over. Very intelligent Englishmen, of cool judgment, complained bitterly to me about Lord Salisbury, who had pledged his word to the Queen, and had promised her, so long as she lived, to avoid war. Those who want war while they are still in a dominating position at sea, say that no Minister has the right to miss the crucial moment and to sacrifice the country's interests. Such a favourable moment may never recur. (75)

We know too that Admiral Fisher and his circle for years advocated a preventive war against Germany. The British

Government did not follow their advice ; but it was in a quite different position from the Central Powers.

This is not the place to follow out in detail the diplomatic negotiations during the crisis of July 1914. We are concerned to show the considerations which influenced the various Powers, and broadly to indicate the main lines of the conditions which led to the catastrophe. At the same time we must not lose sight of the fact that the crisis of July 1914 was only the culmination of a development lasting for decades, and in some respects for centuries, and that the responsibility for the accumulation of the different kinds of explosive material during that period is a heavier one than that for the sparks which hurled the European powder-cask into the air. The shots fired at Serajevo belong, however, rather to the deeper causes of the war.

For Berlin and Vienna the following facts may be recapitulated in connexion with the preparation of the ultimatum to Serbia :

The heads of the German State knew Vienna's purpose of isolating and diminishing Serbia, and of eliminating her as a political force in the Balkans ;

They wanted rapid action by Austria in order to exploit the general indignation at the assassination, and so to avert the danger of a world war ;

They expected, therefore, energetic action by Austria, and encouraged her in it ;

They took a general war into account, just as Vienna did, but had no desire for it ;

Like Vienna, they wanted no conciliatory move from Serbia ; for they believed that war against Serbia was necessary to the preservation of the Danube Monarchy ;

Being imperfectly informed by Count Berchtold, they believed in the existence of " sufficient " material, with which Vienna would be able amply to justify the intended step before world opinion ;

In consequence of the " free hand " given to Vienna, they took no part in the formulation of the ultimatum, although they knew several of its principal stipulations, as well as Vienna's intention to make it unacceptable ;

Again partly as a consequence of the " free hand," they were, in spite of repeated inquiry, not informed as to Berchtold's ultimate aims ;

They nevertheless accepted without protest the clearly recognizable aims of Vienna, which tallied with Francis Joseph's autograph letter, and consisted in raising the prestige and increasing the power of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, aims of which the *accomplishment* conjured up the danger of a world war ;

They exerted themselves to persuade Vienna in good time to grant compensations to Italy, in order to hold this uncertain ally to the Triple Alliance by a " toothsome morsel " ;

They were informed, however—misleadingly—by Berchtold on July 20th " that Austria-Hungary . . . did not contemplate any extension of territory for herself, " which implied a certain curtailment of the former programme of the Monarchy ; and, in presenting the blank cheque on July 5th–6th, they hoped to localize the expected conflict. (76)

When matters had progressed so far, and before the delivery of the ultimatum, Count Berchtold closed a fairly long letter to his Ambassador in Rome with these words :

> Just now I have a feeling that I have been chosen by Providence to join the ranks of the Ministers, from Cardinal Fleury to Lamsdorff, who wanted to pursue a policy of peace and had to carry on a policy of war—let us hope with more success than the last exponent of this course ! (77)

The Attitude of the Powers to the Austrian Ultimatum.

The Note was handed in at Belgrade at 6 p.m. on July 23rd. It had reached Berlin on the afternoon of the 22nd, and was, as Bethmann Hollweg, Jagow and Zimmermann declared after the war, " considered on all sides as being too harsh." (78) Berlin, however, made no representation against it in Vienna, and did not attempt to stop the delivery of the Note. After the blank cheque and all that had gone before, that could not well be done, and moreover time pressed. It would, however, amply have sufficed for a circular which was sent to the Ambassadors in St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, to have been so amended as to convey Berlin's impression of the harshness of the ultimatum ; this too was not done by Berlin. The circular went off on July 21st and 22nd, and was to be acted on by the German Ambassadors in those cities on July 24th. It stated that Germany looked upon the action and the demands of her ally " as

reasonable and moderate " ; that on a refusal from Serbia Vienna would take up arms ; that the whole quarrel concerned no one except the two immediate participants ; and that Germany urgently desired localization because otherwise, in consequence of the commitments under the various alliances, " unforeseeable consequences " would occur, i.e. world war would threaten. (79) In this the German Government took a further fateful step on the path on which it had entered ; with its circular, drawn up before knowledge of the ultimatum and not modified after that knowledge, it quite unquestionably accepted joint responsibility for what was done and for the Danube Monarchy's aims and demands, which were still unknown in detail and were in fact more far-reaching than was supposed ; it took up the position of protector between its ally and the rest of Europe ; and in thus proclaiming its position to the world it naturally curtailed the freedom to mediate which still remained to it after July 5th–6th. (80)

Berlin doubtless imagined that this firm attitude would be the readiest means of frightening off the others. The French Ambassador in Berlin at once, and rightly, inclined on July 24th to the assumption

> that the Austro-Hungarian and German Governments are playing a dangerous game of bluff, and believe they can carry the matter through with a high hand. (81)

The Note itself was at once declared on all sides, even by leading organs of the German Conservative Party, to be unacceptable. (82) Comparisons with later ultimatums are in various respects misleading. (83) The Note had the effect which was intended.

Count Berchtold had previously taken some trouble to conceal the truth about the position, (84) but without much success. London, Rome, and Paris had in different ways learned in advance of the expected step, and knew almost as much as Berlin ; and Rome had given St. Petersburg the needed hints. (85) It must, nevertheless, have been with some surprise that the Powers learned of the harshness of the demands made. In any case, everyone was soon clear as to the objects lying behind the Note.

Serbia, as at the time of the Balkan Wars, was counting on a generous measure of Russian protection. A lively interchange

of telegrams at once took place between Belgrade and St. Petersburg. (86) Russia's attitude was, in fact, the controlling factor in the development of the crisis ; but Russia's attitude in turn was greatly influenced and even determined by that of Britain.

On July 20th, in accordance with a programme fixed months previously, the President of the French Republic, Raymond Poincaré, and the French Foreign Minister, René Viviani, arrived in St. Petersburg on a visit. Berchtold had given instructions for the Note to be handed in at Belgrade so late that its contents could not become known in St. Petersburg before the departure of the French statesmen ; (87) if this was done with a view to localizing the conflict, it failed entirely to serve that end, since by that time a good deal had already leaked out about Austria-Hungary's intentions.

Poincaré was by far the stronger personality of the two. In Chapter III we pointed out that his chief significance in Russo-French relations—and for Europe—lay in the fact that, in marked contrast to the attitude of the French Government during the Bosnian crisis, he exerted himself as Foreign Minister to use Austro-Russian rivalry in the Balkans in the service of the Franco-Russian Alliance. He was the spokesman in St. Petersburg, although this rôle would have been much more proper to Viviani, the Foreign Minister. What was said remains unknown, but may with some confidence be surmised. As Foreign Minister in 1912–13 Poincaré had again and again impressed upon the Russians that under the Alliance they must do nothing calculated to produce European complications without *prior* agreement with France. The object of this was partly that France should not be in Russia's tow, but also that she should not be left out of Russia's plans. And Poincaré had always been violently excited on occasions when the Russians acted without first coming to an understanding with France. (88) St. Petersburg was now apprehensive as to Vienna's impending step ; what was more natural than that there should at once be a discussion of the attitude to be taken up ? Paléologue reveals as much when he mentions that Poincaré said to him, speaking of Serbia :

> Sazonov must stand firm, and we must support him. (89)

The Tsar, too, remembered long after the outbreak of war Poincaré's " emphatic words " to him. (90) And there are

various other unmistakable indications that Poincaré and Viviani, as even Renouvin surmises, entered into " certain obligations " during their visit to St. Petersburg. (91)

That this was so was shown at once in a conversation at the French Embassy at noon on July 24th between Sazonov, Paléologue, and Sir George Buchanan, towards the end of which the Roumanian Ambassador was also present. According to Sazonov, Austria's step meant war ; he believed that " Russia would at any rate have to mobilize," and the " only chance " of averting war lay in Great Britain acting " firmly and unitedly " with Russia and France. Paléologue held out the prospect of French assistance, and his language appears to have been more decided than that of Sazonov. Buchanan, pressed by the others, refused to commit his country ; English public opinion would never approve a war on Serbia's account ; he admitted, however, that the case might well be different if a general war came. Sazonov held that it would be more likely to come if Britain did not act with Russia and France from the outset ; Britain would be drawn in in the end (Sir Eyre Crowe, on reading Buchanan's report, agreed in this)—and she would " not have played a beau rôle ! " (92)

In the afternoon of the same day a Cabinet meeting in St. Petersburg confirmed Russia's readiness for war, and when in the evening the Committee of the General Staff met it regarded war as already a settled thing. (93) About the same time Sazonov declared to the Serbian Ambassador

> that Russia could in no case permit aggressive acts by Austria against Serbia. (94)

This policy of Russia and France became still more clearly evident in various respects on the following day. On the afternoon of the 25th another discussion took place between Sazonov, Paléologue, and Buchanan. Sazonov stated that at a Cabinet meeting in the morning the Tsar had approved the draft of a ukase ordering the mobilization of 1,100,000 men. It was not to be published until Sazonov considered that the moment had come for putting it into force. But Sazonov added the significant words :

> Necessary preliminary preparations for (the) mobilization would, however, be begun at once. (95)

This was a reference to the " war preparation period " which began early on the 26th, and enabled Russia to take extensive preparatory measures for mobilization throughout the Empire, including preparations against Germany. (96) In reply to this announcement of Sazonov's, Buchanan expressed the earnest hope that " Russia would not precipitate war by mobilizing " until Sir Edward Grey had had time to use his influence in favour of peace. Sazonov gave his assurance that Russia " would take no action until it was forced on her." Paléologue then remarked—and this again is important—that " he was in a position to give his Excellency formal assurance that France placed herself unreservedly on Russia's side." (97)

Once more the same arguments as on the 24th were brought forward on both sides. Sazonov thought that Germany had an unfortunate conviction that she could reckon on British neutrality. " With the exception of ' The Times,' nearly the whole of the English Press was on the side of Austria." The Russian Foreign Minister " did not believe that Germany really wanted war "; her attitude would be decided by that of Great Britain. If Britain stood resolutely at the side of France and Russia, there would be no war ; otherwise " rivers of blood " would flow and in the end the English would still be drawn into the war.

The firm Franco-Russian cohesion, and particularly Sazonov's announcement as to mobilization, had made a strong impression on Buchanan, who could not be unaware of the influence of the Russian military party. He therefore, as he telegraphed to London, did

> all I could to impress prudence on Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him, if Russia mobilized, Germany would not be content with mere mobilization, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but unless Germany can restrain Austria I can regard situation as desperate. Russia cannot allow Austria to crush Servia and become predominant Power in Balkans, and, secure of support of France, she will face all the risks of war. (98)

This gives a clear outline of the attitude of Russia and France (though not of Great Britain). As a matter of fact, on this same July 25th, the French Foreign Minister, Viviani, said to the Russian Ambassador in Stockholm :

> If that is war for you, then of course it will be for us as well. (99)

Buchanan afterwards wrote to Nicolson concerning this time :

> The language held by the French Ambassador showed plainly enough that Russia could count on the support of France. Sazonov's anxiety has been what England would do, as he has always held that the British Fleet alone can inflict a mortal wound on Germany. (100)

This standpoint had already been taken up by Sazonov in the Liman von Sanders Conference, (101) and it shows conclusively what critical importance Great Britain's attitude had for Russia and France.

Lord Grey writes in his Memoirs :

> Even if the Austrian demands on Serbia went beyond what facts, as known hitherto, justified, it was better that Serbia should give way than that European peace should be broken,

and he gives under the following four heads the considerations and convictions that were dominant in his mind at that time :

> 1. A conviction that a great European war under modern conditions would be a catastrophe for which previous wars afforded no precedent . . . and that, if once it became apparent that we were on the edge, all the Great Powers would call a halt and recoil from the abyss.
>
> 2. That Germany was so immensely strong and Austria so dependent upon German strength that the word and will of Germany would at the critical moment be decisive with Austria. It was therefore to Germany that we must address ourselves.
>
> 3. That, if war came, the interest of Britain required that we should not stand aside, while France fought alone in the West, but must support her. . . .
>
> 4. A clear view that no pledge must be given, no hope even held out to France and Russia, which it was doubtful whether this country would fulfil. One danger I saw so hideous that it must be avoided and guarded against at every word. It was that France and Russia might face the ordeal of war with Germany, relying upon our support ; that this support might not be forthcoming, and that we might then, when it was too late, be held responsible by them for having let them in for a disastrous war.
>
> All four combined to lead to one conclusion and to point one moral. War must, if possible, be prevented. Every one of these considerations worked in me to concentrate all my work on that one object ; that was, and till the last moment remained, the motive of my action. (102)

No doubt this statement is correct. Grey did not want the war, and honestly wished to avoid it. (103) Moreover, in the

crisis of July 1914 he took a number of steps to avert the danger of war. But to his four points two further ones must be added: The fear of the world hegemony of Germany and the fear of a breach with Russia. This double fear played a critical part in deciding his action in 1914.

We have already seen on p. 161 that in 1910 Grey credited the Germans with "ambitions for the hegemony of Europe." Added to this was his rooted distrust of Germany, which meets us everywhere in this book. Naturally this was no secret to the representatives of the Entente Powers. Count Benckendorff was therefore able on July 26th to write very appositely to St. Petersburg:

> What frightens England is less the hegemony of Austria in the Balkans than that of Germany in the world. (104)

The new British documents offer plenty of evidence of this. Thus, Sir Eyre Crowe remarked on July 25th that the fight was not about Serbia, but was concerned with "Germany aiming at a political dictatorship in Europe"; (105) and Grey does not omit even in his Memoirs to note the possibility "that Germany was deliberately aiming at world predominance," (106) which John S. Ewart, in the Conclusions of his almost excessively documented work, calls "a very ridiculous assertion." (107)

The other obsession of the Foreign Office was the fear that Russia might be discontented with the British attitude. The Russophil Nicolson wrote, before the crisis, under a report from the Paris Embassy on an article in the "Matin" of July 18th, which laid cheerful stress on the enormous development of Russia, and especially on her military preparations:

> Russia is a formidable Power and will become increasingly strong. Let us hope our relations with her will continue to be friendly. (108)

And he minuted on July 25th:

> Our attitude during the crisis will be regarded by Russia as a test and we must be most careful not to alienate her,

a note which Nicolson, Crowe, and Buchanan were constantly striking, and which was entirely agreed in by Sir Edward Grey. (109)

Sir Roger Casement considered in September 1915 that Grey had " in all seriousness " looked upon himself as the " guardian of European peace." (110)* The two volumes of " Twenty-five Years " produce the impression that Grey believes this to this day. Let us see, then, what Grey did in 1914 to prevent the war, and what he may have done to hasten its outbreak.

We have read in Grey's Memoirs that his sympathies were with Austria-Hungary. (111) Count Berchtold, when taking action, built strongly on these sympathies, and as regards the British Press he was not mistaken in his opinion that of the Entente Powers Britain could " most readily " be won " to an objective judgment " of the Austrian measures. (112) Further, Grey says that he felt that it was better that Serbia should give way " than that European peace should be broken," even on the ground of the facts then known. (113) Let us now look at Grey's one despatch on this subject, sent off to Belgrade on the evening of July 24th :

> It seems to me that Servia ought certainly to express her concern and regret that any officials, however subordinate, should have been accomplices in murder of the Archduke, and promise, if this is proved, to give fullest satisfaction. For the rest, I can only say that Servian Government must reply as they consider the interests of Servia require.
>
> I cannot tell whether anything short of unconditional acceptance will avert military action by Austria on expiration of time limit, but the only chance would be to give a favourable reply on as many points as possible within the limit of time, and not to meet Austrian demand with a blank negative.
>
> . . . Servian Minister here implores us to give some indication of our views, but I cannot undertake responsibility of giving more advice than above, and I do not like to give that without knowing what Russian and French Governments are saying at Belgrade. (114)

Admitted that the Austrian ultimatum had turned out to be unexpectedly harsh, and had made a very bad impression on Grey, (115) does this cautious message harmonize with the desire that Serbia should rather give way " than that European peace should be broken ? " Does not its very first sentence plainly convey a doubt whether in reality Serbian officials, " however subordinate," were implicated in the murder ? Did not the expression, that the Serbian Government must reply in such

* Retranslated.

manner " as they consider the interests of Servia require " further reduce the rest of the advice offered almost to nothing ? And let us notice finally in the concluding sentence Grey's anxiety lest even with this faint hint to Belgrade he should be doing more than was perhaps pleasing to his two friends. Moreover, Grey unfortunately declared stubbornly throughout the whole crisis that the Austro-Serbian dispute did not concern him, this dispute from which from the first moment he saw arise the spectre of a general war. Can anyone seriously assert that, as regards Serbia, Grey in 1914 did what was needed, or what he could, to avert the war ? Was it not the business of the " guardian of European peace " to take immediate and impartial action in regard to the starting-point of the threatened world-conflagration, the Austro-Serbian conflict ? (116) And the question arises for Lord Grey : How would he have dealt with Serbia with our present knowledge of what lay behind the Serajevo murder ? Does not he himself feel very distinctly what he failed to do in this respect in 1914 ? And is not that uncomfortable feeling one of the reasons why Grey passes over the whole of our new knowledge of the responsibility of Belgrade ?

Among Grey's four points one is struck by his conviction that Germany was the deciding factor. Evidently it never occurred to him that it might also be necessary to make energetic representations in St. Petersburg. (117) On the contrary, he impatiently rejects the suggestion that it was his business " to influence or restrain Russia." (118) Naturally—was he not convinced of the Russian love of peace !

Even before the crisis Prince Lichnowsky had shown remarkable anxiety in London, (119) and had asked Grey in case of need to exercise a moderating influence on Russia. Grey had agreed, and had said to Paul Cambon that, if Austria found herself forced to take action against Serbia, Britain and France would have to do " all we could to encourage patience in St. Petersburg." (120) In view of the harshness of the Austrian Note, Grey felt he was no longer in a position to do this. That is comprehensible, although even so a real guardian of European peace would certainly have acted differently. Grey, however, did not content himself with this negative attitude ; *as early as July 25th he took a positive step out of which he knew that " the great danger of a European war " would " arise."*

On July 24th the British Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin said to his Russian colleague, clearly with a view to conciliation, that

> Russia was so great and so important that she could afford not to consider the question of prestige in dealing with Slav opinion. (121)

The British Ambassador in Paris went still further in this direction. He telegraphed on July 25th to Grey :

> I expressed to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon the opinion that in democratic countries such as England and France war could not be made without support of public opinion, and I felt sure that public opinion in England would not sanction a war in support of Russia if she, as protector of Slavs, picked a quarrel with Austria over Austro-Servian difficulty. He admitted, but not as Minister, that it would be difficult to bring French public opinion to fighting point in such a case as present one. (122)

Bertie underlined this on the same day in a private letter to Grey, and wrote further to him on July 27th :

> I am sure that the French Government do not want to fight and they should be encouraged to put pressure on the Russian Government not to assume the absurd and obsolete attitude of Russia being the protectress of all Slav States whatever their conduct, for this will lead to war. (123)

Mention has already been made of the pressing warnings which Buchanan repeatedly addressed to Sazonov on the 25th not to mobilize prematurely. And Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador in Vienna, subsequently wrote :

> Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies. (124)

But the Foreign Office was not in agreement with these views of the British representatives in Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Vienna ; nor with the British Cabinet, (125) nor with the public opinion of the country. And one may note a remarkable change in Grey from the 24th to the 25th. Grey spoke on the 24th of " mediation by the four Powers "

> if Austria *did move into Servia* and Russia *then* mobilized, (126)

which entirely corresponded with Sazonov's original conception from the beginning of the threatened Russian partial mobilization

against Austria. (127) That meant a material gain of time between the Austrian mobilization against Serbia and the Russian against Austria, a gain which Grey and Nicolson could well appreciate. (128) Grey's plan of July 24th might well be defended as matters then stood. If it had been kept to, then, humanly speaking, as we shall see, the outbreak of world war in 1914 would have been prevented. Grey, however, changed his standpoint on July 25th (Sazonov on 28th). On the 25th he " entirely " (129) approved Buchanan's prudent attitude of the previous day, the 24th, and one would have thought that he would identify himself with Buchanan's warnings of the 25th as to the Russian mobilization, especially as on the 24th he had expressed himself as " very apprehensive " of the view Russia would take of the situation. (130) Instead of this, Grey declared *repeatedly* on the 24th that in the event of an *Austrian mobilization against Serbia* (he quite clearly meant Serbia, not Russia), (131) he expected a Russian mobilization against Austria ! Count Benckendorff was in a position, and made it his business, to telegraph this to St. Petersburg twice on the 25th. (132) Grey, of course, destroyed the effect of Buchanan's warnings against mobilization (of which Grey was unaware). Buchanan, however, certainly had good reasons for his warnings ; but Grey actually encouraged Russia to mobilize.

During the Bosnian crisis, in February 1909, Sir Charles Hardinge had said to Wilhelm von Stumm, speaking of Russia :

> . . . even if she is not in a position to carry on active war, the demonstrative mobilization of a few army corps will suffice to create a thoroughly dangerous situation. * (133)

Was not Grey aware of this in 1914 ? A despatch from him to Sir George Buchanan on July 25th throws much light on his attitude. Incidentally it is the one document which Grey ordered to be omitted from the collection which was laid before him in 1914 by his subordinates for publication. Grey reproduced it in his Memoirs. (134) According to this, Count Benckendorff was afraid that Grey's proposal of the " mediation of the four Powers " might arouse in Germany an impression " that France and Britain were detached from Russia," and he pressed Grey to make it known to Germany that Britain " would

* Retranslated.

not stand aside if there was a war." To this Grey, according to his own account, replied,

> . . . I had given no indication that we would stand aside. I had said to the German Ambassador that, so long as there was only a dispute between Austria and Serbia alone, I did not feel entitled to intervene; but that, directly it was a matter between Austria and Russia, it became a question of the peace of Europe, which concerned us all.
>
> I had furthermore spoken on the assumption that Russia would mobilize, whereas the assumption of the German Government had hitherto been, officially, that Serbia would receive no support; and what I had said must influence the German Government to take the matter seriously. In effect, I was asking that if Russia mobilized against Austria, the German Government, who had been supporting the Austrian demand on Serbia, should ask Austria to consider some modification of her demands, under the threat of Russian mobilization. This was not an easy thing for Germany to do, even though we should join at the same time in asking Russia to suspend action. I was afraid, too, that Germany would reply that mobilization with her was a question of hours, whereas with Russia it was a question of days; and that, as a matter of fact, I had asked that, if Russia mobilized against Austria, Germany, instead of mobilizing against Russia, should suspend mobilization and join with us in intervention with Austria, thereby throwing away the advantage of time, for, if the diplomatic intervention failed, Russia would meanwhile have gained time for her mobilization. It was true that I had not said anything directly as to whether we would take any part or not if there was a European conflict, and I could not say so; but there was absolutely nothing for Russia to complain of in the suggestion that I had made to the German Government, and I was only afraid that there might be difficulty in its acceptance by the German Government.

These remarks of Grey's, so pointedly against the Central Powers, hardly need commentary. They meant a big step in favour of Russia, and that, too, before Grey had knowledge of the Serbian reply and the Austrian counter-move. They also show clear unfairness to Germany; she was to call upon Austria to limit her demands "under the threat of Russian mobilization," and Germany herself was thereby to sacrifice her advantage in time—the well-known advantage which Germany, so inferior in point of numbers, had in the rapid execution of her mobilization; for Russia, on the other hand, time was to be gained for mobilizing; a demand with which, as Grey himself evidently felt, it would be "not an easy thing" for Germany to comply.

In his Memoirs, Grey records his belief at the time that the German preparations for war were " much more advanced " (135) than those of France and Russia. But the British archives, so far as they have been published, do not, in regard to Germany, include *a single document of those days*—up to July 30th—giving the least ground for this belief. Yet Great Britain had her representatives in Germany, her military and naval attachés, her consuls in all the larger cities ; evidently none of these had made any report up to July 30th on any sort of war preparations in Germany. It is remarkable, too, that in Grey's minutes and despatches of that time no word is to be found on the subject. Can his statement now of this belief in Germany's " much more advanced " preparations obtain serious credence ? Does it not, on the contrary, convey the impression of a pretext adopted to justify his open partiality, his approval of the Russian partial mobilization ?

Some may see Machiavelli again here. It seems to me to be more to the point to ask how Grey, more Russian than the Russians themselves, came to change his view between the 24th and 25th of July—at first supporting a Russian partial mobilization on Austria's invasion of Serbia, and then a partial mobilization immediately on the Austrian mobilization against Serbia—and how he arrived at his belief in Germany's early preparations for war. Grey tells us himself that in the crisis of July 1914 he consulted daily with Sir Arthur Nicolson. (136) That should bring us on the right scent. Only we must incriminate Sir Eyre Crowe as well. These two almost outbid one another at that time in their distrust of Germany, in their indulgence towards the Entente Powers, in their fear of disappointing Russia. (137) We have already had instances, and shall come across others. It must, however, be made clear here that the fresh material at our disposal does not reveal any desire on the part of these two influential men, Nicolson and Crowe, for a war with Germany. (138) They, however, as well as Grey, seem to have allowed themselves to be guided by their predilections and prejudices, by British interests as they conceived them, and by the determination in no case to endanger their relations with Russia and France. And in addition they light-heartedly took grave risks.

On the morning of the 25th, Crowe, in a long and remarkable minute, recorded the view that

It is clear that France and Russia are decided to accept the challenge thrown out to them. (139)

Grey did not contradict this, and was evidently of the same opinion. According to his Memoirs, he was animated through the whole of the crisis by " dread of the mortal error " of awaking French and Russian hopes of British support which might not be fulfilled. (140) But it was just this hope which Grey, as has been shown, quite unmistakably aroused in the Russians on this critical 25th of July. . . .

To be sure, Grey was thinking only of the Russian partial mobilization against Austria. He wanted to use this to bring home to the Central Powers the gravity of the situation and to induce them to repent in time. Doubtless he had in mind a stage in the Balkan crisis of 1912–13, when Austria-Hungary and Russia had similarly " mobilized " against one another. Mobilization, however, was then, if only in technical respects, a very different matter. Moreover, Grey could not know that the Russian military authorities were from the beginning of the crisis pressing towards a general mobilization, or that at a day's notice they would turn the partial mobilization into a general one. Yet he clearly recognized the position when he said to the German Ambassador on July 25th that, if the Austrian mobilization brought about a Russian one—on which he " definitely " counted—

in that case the great danger would arise of a general war. * (141)

This great danger Grey actively helped to promote.

The majority of the British Cabinet would quite certainly have rejected his attitude of the 25th ; they would certainly not have been of Crowe's opinion—apparently shared by Grey—when, as early as July 25th, he considered (without adequate reason) that the moment was past when it " might " still have been possible " to enlist French support in an effort to hold back Russia." (142) For that is just what Lord Morley, for example, demanded as late as August 1st, (143) and it is known that even then Grey's group was still decidedly in a minority. (144)

Grey was conscious of his responsibility to the Cabinet. (145) But his proposal to Russia, as he told Benckendorff, was made on his own responsibility ; " and I had no doubt it was the best proposal to make in the interests of peace." (146)

* Retranslated.

' The best proposal to make in the interests of peace " ! It was a proposal which accepted in advance Russia's partial mobilization against Austria, a measure which Pierre Renouvin, in agreement with other foreign investigators, called " an act incurring grave responsibility," an act which gave " to the Austro-Serbian conflict the character of a European one." (147) And that is just what Sazonov had aimed at from the first day. (148)

Now the Great Powers—Italy will be spoken of later—had taken up their positions. Austria-Hungary, with the German blank cheque in her pocket, was determined on war with Serbia. The Central Powers hoped for the localization of the conflict ; they regarded a general war as improbable, but reckoned with the possibility and carried on a " dangerous game of bluff." Russia, for her part, had no intention of leaving Serbia in the lurch. France ranged herself " unreservedly " on Russia's side. And Great Britain encouraged Russia to force the Central Powers to yield " under the threat " of a partial mobilization.

If the Great Powers adhered to their standpoints, a European war was inevitable.

The First Days of Negotiation.

Against Grey's serious mistakes exposed in the foregoing section must be set off the fact that from the beginning of the crisis he made a series of suggestions for its solution : (1) he tried, like Sazonov, to secure a longer respite for Serbia ; (2) he advocated mediation by four Powers—Britain, France, Germany and Italy—if Austro-Russian relations became threatening ; (3) developing this idea, he suggested a conference in London of the Ambassadors of these four Powers, none of which was directly interested ; and (4) when an incomplete forecast was received of the Serbian reply, he asked Berlin to induce Vienna to accept the reply as sufficient.

In the question of giving Serbia further time Herr Jagow misled the British Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin early in the morning of July 25th ; he stated that he had at once transmitted the proposal, which he received at 10 a.m., and had requested Tschirschky to discuss it with Count Berchtold. Actually Jagow contented himself with communicating the proposal at 4 p.m. As the time allowed expired at 6 p.m. and Berchtold was in

Ischl, the transmission of the proposal was clearly no more than a pretence. (149) London was not deceived. (150)

Jagow's attitude, virtually of refusal, did not influence Vienna, where a similar proposal from Russia had already been rejected on the ground that the Note to Serbia had only been communicated to the Powers as a courtesy, for their information, and not for any remarks. (151)

The German Government accepted the proposal of mediation under reservation of its duties as an ally ; mediation was a means of attempting localization. (152) The fourth proposal was outpaced by events before it reached Berlin, but it was passed on to Vienna. (153)

Grey spent his week-ends in the country. Before leaving on Sunday, July 26th, he had agreed with Nicolson on the proposal of a conference in the event of the situation becoming more critical. (154) On the afternoon of the 26th, in view of a message from Buchanan reporting a conversation with Sazonov, Nicolson transmitted this proposal to the Powers, first obtaining Grey's approval. The Ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy were to discuss with Grey the means for a peaceful issue, and Austria-Hungary, Serbia, and Russia were to bind themselves to abstain until the end of the conference from military *operations* (as distinct from mobilization measures). In London the situation was regarded as Grey had described it on the 25th to Count Benckendorff : Germany would be negotiating against three opponents in London and under the pressure of the Russian partial mobilization ; she would be negotiating through an Ambassador whose prejudice against the Danube Monarchy was well known ; and if the conference broke down she would have lost her supposed advantage in time. Grey writes :

> I believed German preparations for war to be much more advanced than those of France and Russia ; the Conference would give time for the latter Powers to prepare and for the situation to be altered to the disadvantage of Germany, who now had a distinct advantage. (155)

As already shown, Germany's " distinct advantage " lay only in Grey's imagination, stimulated by his absolutely morbid mistrust of Germany. He had not a scrap of evidence of it : this makes his case worse. The proposal was therefore an unfair one. Lord Grey does not seem to feel that this was so. It is

true that Berlin did not know the intention that lay behind the proposal of the Foreign Office when, with Vienna, it declined it; but its partisan purpose against the Central Powers gleamed through it unmistakably, and Berlin's attitude was therefore entirely comprehensible. There is, moreover, good reason for denying that there was any real purpose to be served by a conference at that time; in an acute crisis, and especially in the event envisaged by Grey of a mobilization of several Powers, only an *immediate* decision could offer a way out. The only statesmanlike proposal came, as we shall see, from the Marquis di San Giuliano.

Germany's disinclination for a conference dates back to the Balkan Wars. In July 1913 Roumania tried to get a European conference called to deal with the existing issues, but the German Government offered definite opposition to the idea. Jagow rightly considered that such a conference worked

> as experience has shown and as is now being shown once more by the London Reunion, so slowly and with such difficulty that the tension from which we are all suffering might grow infinitely and again and again introduce the risk of a conflict between the Powers. (156)

This applies still more to the crisis of July 1914. It is also worth noting that in February 1913 there was great disappointment at the Quai d'Orsay with Grey's "helpless" attitude at the reunion. (157)

Grey, however, insists that the conference would have been a panacea for the crisis. When he learned of Berlin's refusal he had the impulse to say that he could do no more,

> and that it was on Germany that the responsibility must rest if war came;

remembering the precedent of 1870 and the advantage of the time of year to Prussian militarism, he felt that Bethmann Hollweg "would not be allowed to make a peaceful end to the negotiations." (158) Grey forgets to mention that Sazonov too at first wanted the conference postponed to give an opportunity for the direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg advocated by Germany, a procedure which Grey himself described at the time as "the best of all." (159) Nicolson, however, expressed with satisfaction on July 26th the curious view that

London had done its "utmost" to avoid a conflict with the conference proposal, which, as we have seen, was bound up with the dangerous encouragement given to Russia to mobilize partially against Austria. (160)

Meanwhile, just before the expiry of the ultimatum, the Austrian Note was replied to by Serbia. There are indications that the Russian Government had advised the Serbian to accept the demands of a judicial nature made by Austria but to reject everything that would affect the country's independence, and if necessary to call for the decision of the Hague Court of Arbitration or of the Powers. Paris had given similar advice. (161)

At 3 p.m., before sending the reply, Serbia mobilized. In view of the Note Belgrade must have been prepared for the worst; the Serbian Government, in fact, expected an immediate attack. It moved its seat to Nish and withdrew the bulk of its troops from the frontier, sending them back only some days later when the expected attack failed to come. (162) Under the circumstances the Serbian mobilization was a legitimate defensive measure.

Serbia's reply was very cleverly worded, and gave the impression of an extraordinary readiness for conciliation; but closer examination revealed expressions which amounted to considerable reservations. (163) In the light of our present knowledge of the background of the Serajevo assassination—a knowledge which was in the possession of the Serbian Government at the time—some of the statements and assurances in the Serbian reply give strong impression of insincerity and hypocrisy. Apart from this it contained reservations, and on the evening of the 25th the Austrian Minister, under instructions, left Belgrade. (164) A few hours later, at 9.30 p.m., Austria-Hungary issued orders for the mobilization of eight army corps against Serbia, a figure which was regarded as necessary in 1912. No measures were taken against Russia. (165)

The bad effect of the ultimatum almost throughout Europe and even in Conservative circles in Germany, and the reports from various quarters, especially from London, of the gravity of the situation, were bound to make the Wilhelmstrasse doubtful whether the existing programme of localization could really be carried out without endangering the peace of Europe. The same effect was bound to be produced by the news of military steps

taken by Russia and her announcement that she would mobilize against Austria-Hungary if she attacked Serbia. (166) But Berlin remained optimistic—a fact only to be explained by a gross miscalculation of the situation. (167) Its optimism was based on the Government's belief that Britain would remain neutral—this will be examined later—and that Russia would consequently, if she were really in earnest, be compelled to exercise caution. As we saw, however, from the beginning of the crisis London adopted a different attitude. Berlin, however, proceeding along the path indicated, made yet further blunders.

As early as July 22nd Vienna had been considering how the declaration of war should be conveyed to Serbia ; it was significant that there was a desire to obtain Germany's assent, but Jagow refused. (168) Tschirschky telegraphed on July 26th that Berchtold had read to him a telegram from Szögyényi that

> it was considered in Berlin that operations should be pushed forward as rapidly as possible and war declared as early as possible, in order to avoid the danger of the interference of third parties. (169)

Berlin's advice, in fact, as is now known, was that Vienna should face the world with a fait accompli, not in order to provoke a general war but to localize the Austro-Serbian conflict. (170) Conrad von Hötzendorf, however, refused to enter on the campaign with inadequate forces ; he declared that he could not begin a general attack on Serbia until August 12th. Berlin was informed of this, at latest, on the morning of the 27th. (171) In the afternoon Tschirschky telegraphed that in Vienna it had been

> resolved officially to declare war on the morrow, or at latest the next day after, mainly in order to remove the opportunity for any attempt at intervention. (172)

Jagow expressed to Count Szögyényi at the same time his regret that Austria-Hungary should have delayed military intervention so long. (173)

This was some hours before the news of the Serbian reply reached the German Foreign Ministry. But even after perusing it Berlin did nothing to dissuade Vienna from declaring war, knowing that war would come " on the morrow, or at latest the next day after."

In the period immediately following the Serajevo murder there was justification for the advice to Austria to march into Serbia as soon as possible. Viviani declared on July 5, 1922 :

> It would have been understood if on the day after (the murder) Austria, in a moment of excitement, had sent an ultimatum, even a brutal one, to Serbia. (174)

Meanwhile, however, weeks had passed. The breaking off of diplomatic relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia had deepened the bad impression created everywhere by the ultimatum of the 23rd. There had then followed, as Berchtold stated, a lessening of the tension, and the breaking off of relations was not immediately followed by military operations but at first only by preparatory measures. (175) In view, therefore, of Russia's attitude and the many telegrams reporting the gravity of the situation, it was a very irresponsible step to advise rapid operations and the earliest possible declaration of war against Serbia if it was desired to avoid complications. Vienna should, especially after the arrival of the Serbian reply on the evening of July 27th, have been urgently warned to postpone declaring war. Berlin's silence implied assent to Vienna's plans. The German Government cannot, therefore, be absolved from a share of the responsibility for the declaration of war on Serbia. (176)

It would, however, be wrong to infer that Germany wanted war. General von Moltke, Chief of Staff, wrote after a long conversation with Bethmann Hollweg at noon on July 27th :

> The situation continues to be thoroughly obscure. It will not clear up very quickly ; it will be a fortnight or so before anything definite can be known or stated. (177)

Von Stumm, Dirigent in the Foreign Ministry, spoke in similar terms to Embassy Counsellor von Schoen on the 27th : the situation would not become " critical " until the Austro-Hungarian army marched into Serbia, i.e. not until August 10th " or perhaps the 12th." (178) That was the view of the Wilhelmstrasse at the time, as I have personally been assured from an entirely reliable source. But it was entirely overlooked that the other countries (except Britain) knew nothing of this respite but expected the declaration of war to be followed at any moment by an attack on Serbia. Berlin unfortunately omitted to give

St. Petersburg an indication of the actual military situation. It must also be borne in mind that although Berlin realized that with the Austrian march into Serbia the situation would become critical, it agreed on July 26th and 27th to the creation of this situation and, with remarkable short-sightedness, regarded it as "useful"—as a bluff: a line of action which deeply involved one of the vital interests of the German people, and which it is impossible not to condemn. The Belgian Ambassador in Berlin wrote with justice that the declaration of war on Serbia on July 28th was

> generally agreed to be an event of great danger to the maintenance of peace in Europe. (179)

We shall see what its reactions were.

The responsibility that rests on Berlin for failing to inform St. Petersburg of the delay in the military operations against Serbia (it would have been contrary to Berlin's then existing programme to do so), rests yet more heavily on London. London learned on the morning of the 27th from the British Military Attaché in Vienna that August 5th was "considered earliest day on which general advance possible," and Sir Maurice de Bunsen pointed this out again in a second telegram sent on the same day. (180) The importance of this news was recognized in the Foreign Office; for Sir Arthur Nicolson mentioned the report from the military attaché and expressed satisfaction that "we have a few days ahead of us." (181) But clearly it did not occur to anyone in Downing Street that the news should be availed of to reassure Russia. The gravity of the omission is increased by Sir Eyre Crowe's admission on the same day that

> the real difficulty to be overcome will be found in the question of mobilization (182)

—a question in regard to which, as related above, London had strongly taken Russia's part as early as the 25th. We learn from Crowe why London said nothing about the delay in the Austrian attack. He continued:

> Austria is already mobilizing. This, if the war does come, is a serious menace to Russia who cannot be expected to delay her own mobilization, which, as it is, can only become effective in something like double the time required by Austria and by Germany.

If Russia mobilizes, we have been warned Germany will do the same, and as German mobilization is directed almost entirely against France, the latter cannot possibly delay her own mobilization for even the fraction of a day.

From Sir M. de Bunsen's telegram just come in, it seems certain that Austria is going to war because that was from the beginning her intention.

If that view proves correct, it would be neither possible nor just and wise to make any move to restrain Russia from mobilizing.

Sir Eyre Crowe thus considered that if a general war came the Austrian mobilization of *eight corps against Serbia* would be a " serious menace to Russia " ! Can this possibly be taken as a sincerely held opinion ? It is entirely justifiable to doubt it ; but there is evidence, already mentioned, that it may have been. We still have too little knowledge of Crowe's unseen activities to be able to pass a final judgment on him. But the remarks of Crowe's quoted in this book make it possible to assert without fear of error the considerable influence which this double of Holstein's exercised over Sir Edward Grey's decisions. The new British documents on the origins of the war, indeed, give the impression that Crowe led even more than Nicolson. In any case it is quite characteristic of him to find that on a very pessimistic report on July 27th from Vienna he wrote :

The outlook is bad. All now depends on what line Germany may be prepared to take. (183)

In this report Bunsen had stated that in the view of the Russian Ambassador in Vienna Germany's effort to localize the conflict was doomed to fail, " as he believes that Russia will be compelled to act." Instead of making everything depend on Germany, was there not urgent reason for sending without delay a serious word of warning to Russia ? Instead of this we find Sir Eyre Crowe on this same July 27th actually regarding the Russian general mobilization as justified ! (184) At the same time, at the end of the minute quoted above Crowe made it plain that if the case should call for it Great Britain would be ready within twenty-four hours openly to take sides with France (and Russia).

A further plain hint came from London on the 27th : the resolution arrived at on the 25th and published on the 27th not to disperse the British Fleet after the manœuvres. Crowe

had recommended this—to frighten Germany. (185) And when on the 27th Count Benckendorff, in conversation with Grey, complained that German and Austrian circles believed that Britain would " stand aside in any event," Grey pointed out that the order

> to First Fleet, which happens to be concentrated at Portland, not to disperse for manœuvre leave ought to dispel this impression. (186)

On the following day, July 28th, Nicolson wrote privately to Buchanan in the same sense, (187) and Paul Cambon also expressed to Sir Edward Grey his " great satisfaction " at the announcement in the Press with regard to the British Fleet. (188)

Russia and France could indeed be thoroughly satisfied with the attitude so far of Grey and his advisers. So also could Vienna be with Berlin's attitude. Of this the evening of July 27th furnishes further evidence, which has attracted much adverse comment, in Szögyényi's telegram referring to the British efforts at mediation :

> The German Government gave the most *convincing* assurance that it *did not in any way* identify itself with the proposals, that indeed it was even definitely opposed to their being considered, and that it was transmitting them only in order to comply with the British desire. (189)

The effort has been made to discredit this report by attributing it to a misunderstanding on the part of the old and failing Austro-Hungarian Ambassador. Szögyényi made mistakes in his reports and parts of them are obscure. But the passage quoted corresponds exactly with Berlin's attitude until the *afternoon* of July 27th. A further passage in the same report states in effect that Germany reserved her freedom to inform Vienna in any particular case whether she supported the British recommendation or not. This too was entirely in accordance with Berlin's later attitude. (190)

The acts and omissions of the German Government which have been condemned in this section have this to be set against them—that Berlin was supporting the plan of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, proposed on July 26th by Count Pourtalès to the Russian Foreign Minister, conversations which Sir Edward Grey had already envisaged and which, with Nicolson, he called the " best method of all." (191) It has

also to be said in favour of the German Government that it received the Serbian reply on the afternoon of July 27th, through the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, long before Tschirschky, who did not receive it until the last hour of that day. (192)

In these first days of negotiation Poincaré and Viviani were hurrying home and Philippe Berthelot was in control at the Quai d'Orsay. He had the assistance of Paul Cambon, the experienced French Ambassador in London, who had gone to Paris on the evening of the 24th and remained there until the 27th—a secret journey at a time when all the other diplomatists were rushing back to their posts.

Sir Francis Bertie, who was no admirer of the men in power in Russia, considered on the 25th that public opinion in France would not be "in favour of backing up Russia in so bad a cause." He thought therefore that France would be likely to put pressure on Russia, and wanted London to encourage France to do so. (193) He also considered that M. Berthelot was "not sufficiently "coulant" with the German Ambassador in Paris. (194) Baron von Schoen was working hard for conciliation, as during the Agadir crisis and the Balkan Wars. (195) When on the 26th Berthelot expressed surprise that Vienna had rejected the Serbian reply (of which the full details were not then known), Schoen and Count Szecsen, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, who also was working for peace, shared his astonishment at the fact. (196)

On the 26th Berthelot was inclined to believe that the Central Powers were aiming at "a brilliant diplomatic victory" but were not intent on war "in any event," though they would not shrink from it "in the last resort." (197) Bienvenu-Martin was acting Foreign Minister (he was personally inclined to yield to others, and only played a secondary part), and on this day he promised the German Ambassador that he would "give instructions for Russia to be advised to keep calm." (198) The documents contain no evidence, however, that this was done; on the contrary, we know that on the 25th France placed herself "without reservation" on Russia's side (London at the same time encouraging Russia in partial mobilization), and we know that on the 27th Sazonov telegraphed to Paris and London that if there was any question "of urging restraint on St. Petersburg, he rejected the

advice in advance " ; (199) to which Paris replied that Bienvenu-Martin

had not for a moment admitted the possibility of a restraining influence in St. Petersburg. (200)

The British Foreign Office received Sazonov's despatch without the sentence concerning St. Petersburg's intransigent attitude. (201)

This exchange of telegrams plainly shows France in tow of Russia. And even at this time Germany was suspected in Paris, St. Petersburg, and London of urging on Austria-Hungary. (202)

Berlin Changes its Attitude.

About the same time as the " notorious " Szögyényi telegram was sent off, there began at the Wilhelmstrasse an important change of attitude. On the morning of the 27th Lichnowsky had found Sir Edward Grey very grave and displeased at Vienna's rejection of the Serbian reply. In Grey's view the reply was a reasonable basis for peaceful negotiations, and he now appealed to Germany to urge this on Vienna. (203) A few hours later Lichnowsky, in a new warning telegram, stressed the importance of his conversation with Grey and added that

if under these circumstances war comes, we shall have Britain against us. (204)

These telegrams at last made an impression on the unintelligible optimism of the Wilhelmstrasse. Shortly before midnight on the 27th Bethmann Hollweg sent Lichnowsky's first telegram mentioned above to Vienna, adding that as the proposal of a conference had been rejected it was impossible

also to reject this British proposal a limine. If we reject every offer of mediation we shall be held responsible by the whole world for the conflagration and represented as the actual instigators of war. This would also make our position at home impossible ; we must appear in our country as forced into war. Our situation is made more difficult by the fact that Serbia appears to have made large concessions. We cannot therefore reject the rôle of mediator and must therefore transmit the British proposal for the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet, especially as London and Paris are continuing to put pressure on St. Petersburg. Please ask Count Berchtold's view as to the British proposal, and also as to M. Sazonov's desire for direct negotiations with Vienna. (205)

The Chancellor was mistaken in believing that London and Paris were continuing to put pressure on Russia. The communication is, however, important as showing that the German Government had now abandoned the contention that no one should interfere in the " internal " Austro-Serbian affair. This was a recognition that the conflict had acquired European importance. When, however, we recall that Berlin was aware at this time of Austria's intention to declare war on Serbia on July 28th or 29th, we miss in the telegram quoted any advice to Vienna to hold its hand. Moreover, Bethmann Hollweg—as he had written, against the advice of the Foreign Ministry, to the Emperor William, who was hastening back from his usual journey northwards—held still to the view that it was for Austria to decide her attitude to the British proposal and to the question of direct negotiations between Vienna and St. Petersburg. (206) For this reason he only asked Berchtold's " view." London was at once informed of the action taken, and the Chancellor considered that in doing this he was going " very far " to meet Britain. (207)

It is evident from Bethmann Hollweg's telegram that he was as yet unacquainted with the details of the Serbian reply. It was placed before the Emperor William on July 28th, and he wrote at the foot of it :

> A brilliant effort for only 48 hours ! That is more than might have been expected ! A great moral success for Vienna ; it does away with every reason for war, and Giesl ought to have stopped quietly in Belgrade ! On this *I* should never have ordered a mobilization ! (208)

At the same time (10 a.m.) the Emperor sent to Jagow an autograph letter saying that the requests of the Danube Monarchy had broadly been met ; the Serbs' few reservations could probably be cleared up by negotiation ; the reply amounted to " a capitulation in the humblest style," and with it there disappeared " *all reason for war*." (209)

The Emperor William thus took up the same position as Grey, with the difference, however, that he considered that a guarantee was needed for the execution of the demands, and also a visible " satisfaction d'honneur " for the Austrian Army ; Austria should temporarily occupy Belgrade as a pledge. In view of the attitude of the Serbian Government for years before,

this may be considered reasonable. In another passage in his letter the Emperor once more emphasized that there was " no longer any reason for war." (210) and we must infer that on the 27th at least *he*, after learning the details of the Serbian reply, would have advised against a declaration of war.

In the Dual Monarchy, however, people were " wild with joy " at the prospect of war with Serbia ; (211) it was believed, as Bunsen reported, that the country

> had before it only the alternative of subduing Servia or of . . . mutilation at her hands,

and the country considered its cause so just that it regarded it as inconceivable that anyone could intervene on the strength of " questions of mere policy or prestige." War was declared in consonance with this mass feeling, and the war against Serbia was unusually popular. (212) Unfortunately, against Berlin's advice, Vienna omitted to communicate in good time to the Powers the " dossier," of which it had announced the compilation, of Serbian intrigues against the Monarchy, and it also delayed too long with its remarks on the Serbian reply. (213) Both documents thus virtually failed to have any effect in Austria's favour before the decision.

On the afternoon of July 28th Berlin learned that Count Berchtold regarded the British proposal that Serbia's reply should be treated as a basis of negotiations as " too late " : (214) " hostilities had been begun against Serbia "—another misleading statement of Berchtold's (215)—and war had been declared at 11 a.m. This refusal was certainly not desired by Bethmann Hollweg. Vienna showed by it that she had no intention of budging an inch, and in consequence the next warning telegram to Vienna, late on the 28th, had to be worded much more sharply to have the effect in Vienna that the Emperor William desired. It contained, however, the Emperor's ideas, and its opening passages were fairly energetic. Its conclusion, however, cancelled much of what had gone before, the Chancellor advising Tschirschky that

> You will have to take care to avoid giving the impression that we want to hold Austria back. The question is simply one of finding a means of enabling the Austro-Hungarian aim of cutting the vital nerve of Pan-Serb propaganda to be attained, without letting loose a world

war, and if in the end a world war proves inevitable, of doing all that is possible to improve for us the conditions under which it must be waged. (216)

It will be seen that the Chancellor had no desire for war, but envisaged its possibility with surprising fatalism. It is true that at the same time as he sent the message to Tschirschky quoted above he assured the British Ambassador of " his intention to do his utmost to maintain general peace," and his last words to Sir Edward Goschen were : " A war between the Great Powers must be avoided." (217) But though these words were certainly spoken with sincerity they were not consistent with Bethmann Hollweg's action at the time. For no one will suggest that the message to Tschirschky was the " utmost " that could and should have been done in the existing situation. The telegram to Tschirschky had a sort of leit-motiv : " If Russia intervenes, war is on us." (218) The inconsistency between the instructions to Tschirschky and the words spoken at almost the same moment to Goschen is explained by Bethmann Hollweg's loss of freedom through the blank cheque to Vienna and his desire to avoid a general war. It was also impossible for him to know that the German Ambassador in Vienna was further watering down his message, as it is evident that he did. (219)

In the night of the 28th the first telegrams between the Emperor William and the Tsar Nicholas II crossed one another. (220)

If on the evening of July 28th Bethmann Hollweg did not do " his utmost " for world peace, there is no denying that his change of attitude, which had begun on the evening of the 27th, was accentuated on the 28th. In order to minimize the harm done by the declaration of war on Serbia he telegraphed on the evening of the 28th to St. Petersburg, London, and Paris :

> We are continually endeavouring to induce Vienna to engage in an open discussion with St. Petersburg, with a view to exposing the purpose and scope of Austria's action in Serbia in an unequivocal way and, we hope, to Russia's satisfaction. The declaration of war now made makes no difference in this respect. (221)

Bethmann Hollweg had " great hopes " of these direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg. (222) But the telegram plainly revealed doubts as to the aims of Germany's

ally ; here we come to the central point in the diplomatic negotiations of those days before the war—the question of Serbia's integrity and sovereignty.

The Compensation Negotiations with Italy.

For years Italy had been partial to excursions outside the Alliance. It must, however, be borne in mind that when she joined the Central Powers in the spring of 1882 she declared that her agreements with them must not be directed against Britain. Italy's long coast line and insular situation, with her frequent recurrences of friction with France, made good relations with Great Britain advisable. In 1896, when British-German relations were strained, Italy made it clear that she would take no part in a war against France and Britain jointly. (223) From 1902 onwards Italy concluded treaties with Powers belonging to the rival group, which enabled her to play a convenient game of see-saw between the two groups, until " neither the Triple Entente nor the Triple Alliance could count on Italy's loyalty." It was, indeed, assumed in Paris that if war came Italy would adopt a waiting attitude and come in on the side that proved to be winning. (224)

Relations with Austria-Hungary were very precarious owing to the Italian Irredenta in Austrian territory. Baron Conrad and the Archduke Francis Ferdinand for years advocated a preventive war against Italy. It had thus been of special importance for Vienna to come to an agreement with Rome as to its intended action, especially as under Article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty Italy had a clear claim to be informed beforehand, and in the event of an extension of Austria-Hungary's sphere of influence in the Balkans an equally clear claim to compensations. (225) As we saw, Berlin held this view as early as the middle of July (Trento). Count Berchtold differed. Disturbing news reached Berlin from Rome, where there was a good deal of knowledge of Vienna's intentions. (226) Jagow accordingly directed Tschirschky on July 18th to tell Berchtold " with emphasis " that he, Jagow, considered that it was

> urgently desirable that the Vienna Cabinet should come to an early agreement with the Rome Cabinet,

as an Austrian attack on Serbia would " probably meet with direct opposition " from Italy. (227) Berchtold cut short this inconvenient pressure with the insincere statement that the question of compensations would " not become of any immediate importance at present " because the Cabinet had resolved (on the 19th) " to dispense with any permanent incorporation of foreign territory." (228) He had this statement repeated in Rome, and instructed Herr Mérey, the Austrian Ambassador, to refuse to enter into any discussion as to compensations. (229) The Italian Government, however, refused to be deceived in this way ; the meaning of Austria's note to Serbia was too plain. It contained, indeed, stipulations which beyond question involved an infringement of Serbian sovereignty ; Vienna fully intended to bring Serbia into a state of dependence. (230)

At once, on July 24th, the Marquis di San Giuliano laid it down emphatically

> that Austria's action against Serbia was aggressive, that in consequence no amount of Russian and French intervention, if it took place, would turn the war into a defensive one, and that the casus fœderis would therefore not exist. (231)

At the same time the Italian Government put forward its claims for compensation. (232) Berlin was plainly disturbed at Italy's attitude. On the 26th Bethmann Hollweg telegraphed to Tschirschky that Moltke also regarded it as

> urgently desirable to hold Italy tightly in the Triple Alliance. An agreement between Vienna and Rome is therefore essential. Vienna must not wreck it by doubtful interpretations of treaties but must keep in view, in making her decisions, the gravity of the situation.

Jagow telegraphed in similar terms on the 27th in the name of the Emperor William, and on this Tschirschky used as decided language at the Ballhausplatz " as is at all possible." (233)

On the 28th Count Berchtold made this minute :

> Yesterday and to-day the German Ambassador made urgent representations to me at the personal command of His Majesty Emperor William and under instructions from the Chancellor and Minister of State, asking me " for Heaven's sake," in view of the gravity of the situation and the imminent dangers, to come to a clear understanding with Italy as to the interpretation of Article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty. . . .

> Herr von Tschirschky . . . made a solemn and earnest appeal to me to clear up this situation as quickly as possible, as the whole military action of our German ally would be affected if Italy were to refuse to admit the casus fœderis. (234)

These documents belong to the stage before the change of attitude in Berlin which has been referred to had begun. Contrast the energy of these urgent representations with Bethmann Hollweg's notes quoted in the last section, those of the 27th and 28th, when the Chancellor transmitted a British proposal for mediation " for consideration," but wanted care taken " to avoid giving the impression that we want to hold Austria back." In the present case the main concern was to retain an uncertain ally with the Triple Alliance in the event of war ; in the former case it was to prevent a very grave situation from developing into disaster. In the present case the German Government authorities, including Tschirschky, pursued a commendable course ; in the earlier case, where the peace of the world was much more closely concerned, they contented themselves *until the evening of July 28th* with half-hearted representations, which, in view of the blank cheque already given, were mainly ineffective. In the question of compensations, on the other hand, the pressure from Berlin succeeded at all events in breaking down Berchtold's fundamental opposition on July 28th. These are big differences which in an honest survey must not be left out of account.

The documents here quoted show that as early as July 26th and 27th Berlin and Vienna clearly realized " the gravity of the situation " and " the imminent dangers." Tschirschky, moreover, showed in his pressure on Berchtold an eloquent persuasiveness that was lacking later on, when it was desired to induce Vienna to change its course. It is plain, too, from Tschirschky's report of his representations in the question of compensation that at least he was not deceived by Berchtold's empty declaration of disinterestedness. Tschirschky pointed out to Baron Macchio, Head of Section, that

> San Giuliano must not be blamed if he does not rest content with the Austrian declaration of absence of intention to acquire new territory, as this has not been made in binding form. (235)

On July 28th the Italian Ambassador in Vienna asked for a binding declaration ; Berchtold replied that this could not be given

as it is impossible to foresee at present whether we may not be brought in the course of the war into a position in which we may have to occupy Serbian territory against our will.

If that should happen otherwise than transitorily, Berchtold was prepared

in this event to enter into an exchange of views with Italy as to compensation.

Berchtold decided on this measure of accommodation

because the contest is at present for large stakes, and presents such formidable difficulties that without close accord between the Triple Alliance Powers it would be quite impossible to carry through.

In order to prevent Berlin from repeating its suggestion with regard to Trento Count Szögyényi had then to declare " most emphatically "

that the question of a cession of any part of the Monarchy must not even form the subject of discussion. (236)

Berchtold was not unjustified in this, so long as his contest for " large stakes " had not actually begun.

But it is neither necessary nor possible to expose here all Vienna's ambiguities in regard to Serbian integrity and sovereignty—they will crop up again, more or less, in the negotiations with Russia—it is enough to remark that at the beginning of August 1914 the Italian Government semi-officially based its neutrality partly on the impossibility

of securing binding engagements from the Austro-Hungarian Government to respect Serbia's independence as regards her territorial integrity and sovereignty. (237)

Italy was then occupied with the conquest of Libya, was not ready for a European campaign, was diplomatically entangled on all sides and was also in fear of suffering injury to her interests from Austria's action. It may therefore be said that the Italian Government was more closely interested in the maintenance of peace than any other. (238) San Giuliano, who was well acquainted with Vienna's intentions, said repeatedly that he did not believe that Austria-Hungary would give way. Accordingly, on July 27th, on the strength of statements by the Serbian Minister in Rome,

he made the proposal that Serbia should reconsider her action on advice from the Powers and accept the whole of the ultimatum in deference to *Europe*. This would have robbed Berchtold of all pretext for war, and enabled the Powers to guarantee to Austria-Hungary the due execution of the terms of the ultimatum on the one hand, and on the other to prevent injury to Serbia's integrity and sovereignty. "An amazingly simple way out," as L. Bergsträsser rightly says. (239) The acceptance of this proposal, which admirably fitted the situation, would have settled the crisis at once; it was a far better proposal than Grey's offer of mediation, which envisaged Austro-Hungarian and Russian mobilizations which would have been very serious dangers to peace. But San Giuliano's proposal did not receive the attention that it deserved. It reached Berlin in an incomplete form on the 27th; France and Britain also had details of it on the 27th and Britain again on the 28th. On the 29th Lichnowsky reported it to Berlin on Grey's suggestion, and Bethmann Hollweg sent this section of Lichnowsky's telegram to Vienna, adding that

> if Serbia will agree to this we regard it as a suitable basis for negotiations on the basis of an occupation of Serbian territory as a pledge.

Berchtold did not agree. His obstinacy and the Russian mobilization wrecked San Giuliano's "truly statesmanlike idea." (240)

Sazonov's Optimism Destroyed.

In August 1910, when Sazonov was succeeding Isvolsky as Foreign Minister, Count Pourtalès gave this estimate of him:

> M. Sazonov's political views are dominated by a glowing patriotism bordering on Chauvinism. When he comes in the course of conversation to cases in which he considers that Russia has been wronged, his expression becomes almost fanatical and he is hardly able to conceal his emotion. (241)

One such wrong, which considerably influenced Sazonov's attitude from the beginning of the crisis of July 1914, was the Bosnian affair, which still rankled in his soul; and he was determined that Russia should not again be subjected to a humiliation of that sort. (242)

When Sazonov's first excitement at the news of the ultimatum had died down a little it was succeeded in the days that followed by a visible optimism. Pourtalès, who, like his Austro-Hungarian colleague Count Szápáry, was working for peace, gained the (mistaken) impression from Szápáry's remarks that it was possible that Austria would modify her demands. (243) This made Sazonov hopeful, and on the 26th he expressed satisfaction at the absence of military operations against Serbia. (244) He was also reassured by the news which reached him from various sides (but was not accurate) that Austria-Hungary had no intention of acquiring territory in Serbia. (245) On the 27th, in a conciliatory conversation with Pourtalès, Sazonov said

> a way must be found of administering a deserved lesson to Serbia, while respecting her rights of sovereignty. (246)

Here we reach the kernel of the problem: as Renouvin expresses it, the question of Serbian sovereignty was for Sazonov "le fond du débat." (247)

The "deserved lesson" to Serbia was an important concession on the part of the Russian Foreign Minister. On the other hand, in the face of the general situation at the time it is impossible to contest Russia's right to be concerned for the protection of Serbian sovereignty—and integrity. (248) At first Sazonov still hoped to be able to secure both with Germany's assistance, and this confidence and inclination for peace lasted until July 28th. (249)

Then, however, came disappointments. Szápáry was only able to announce Austria's territorial disinterestedness on the 28th, and the mere announcement made no great impression on Sazonov; (250) Berchtold refused to enter into direct conversations on the main point, negotiations concerning the Note; (251) and instead of the expected pressure from Berlin on Vienna there came Austria's declaration of war on Serbia, which Sazonov knew would mean a further turn of the screw in Austria's demands; this was in fact Vienna's intention. (252) Sazonov was now inclined to believe that Germany was encouraging the Danube Monarchy in its unyielding attitude. (253) And the very fact that he had been lulled for several days by delusive hopes added to the ill effects of the disappointment of this impressionable man: at the news of Austria's declaration of war on Serbia his

optimism deserted him at once and he was convinced " that a general war was inevitable." (254)

Until then Sazonov had declared that mobilization would be ordered against Austria if she crossed the Serbian frontier, if she attacked Serbia, if she marched into Serbia, and so on. He had spoken in this sense to the British Ambassador on the 28th. (255) In this, as we saw, Crowe, Nicolson, and Grey were more Russian than Sazonov himself, as they expected a Russian mobilization as soon as Austria mobilized. Sazonov, however, contented himself with the " period of preparation for war " instituted on the 26th. Had he kept to his attitude of mobilization *when the frontier was crossed*, more than a week could have been gained for negotiations. The declaration of war was not the same thing as the invasion of Serbia, and the British were aware that Austria was quite unable to march before August 5th. (256) At this crucial point London's heavy responsibility in connexion with Russia's decisions becomes plainly visible. If London had supported Buchanan's urgent warnings instead of running counter to them ; if it had not encouraged the Russian partial mobilization, or if it had only encouraged Sazonov in a partial mobilization if Austria crossed the Serbian frontier, since the declaration of war might be merely bluff ; and if it had informed St. Petersburg that the Austrians were unable to begin their advance before August 5th—it may safely be assumed, in view of Russia's dependence on Great Britain in the event of a European war, that Sazonov would have curbed his zeal as Bertie advised, and the peace of the world might in all probability not have been destroyed. Apart from this, Russia's strategical position would have been better if she had waited for Austria to march into Serbia. (257)

The evil effect, however, of the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia now began to show itself. Sazonov decided on a partial mobilization against Austria. The breach was, however, still not to come until Austrian troops entered Serbian territory. Sazonov stressed the fact that he was not recalling the Ambassador in Vienna, and he urged the plan of mediation by four Powers, in order not to allow Austria time to smash Serbia. (258)

When partial mobilization was decided on Sazonov had not gone over entirely to the war party. But this was the first

mobilization of a Great Power against another : the conflict had become European. (259)

Britain the Deciding Factor—Berlin Determined on Peace.

In dealing in his Memoirs with the Fashoda affair, Lord Grey mentions how important and indeed essential it is that in crises a Government should determine its position in good time, in order to let its opponent know beforehand what it has to meet. (260) In 1914, however, Sir Edward did not act on this principle. Sazonov telegraphed to London on July 25th that Britain's attitude was regarded as " of the greatest importance," (261) and many telegrams from all the European capitals expressed the same view in Entente countries and in Italy. In these July days Grey was inundated with requests for information as to his attitude, as that would have had a restraining influence on the Central Powers. (262) He contested this view in 1914 and does so still. (263) But his reasons do not at all convince. He makes no mention at all of the real reason—his entanglement in the Entente, as exposed in Chapter II. This fettered him (as Bethmann Hollweg found himself fettered by the blank cheque), and Austen Chamberlain well described the situation when he said in the House of Commons on February 8, 1922 :

> If our obligations had been known and definite, it is at least possible, and I think it is probable, that war would have been avoided in 1914.

It was Grey's secret diplomacy from 1906 to 1914, his commitment to the Entente Powers, it was the fact, admitted by Sir Eyre Crowe as early as July 25th :

> that sooner or later England will be dragged into the war if it does come, (264)

it was the general feeling in Downing Street of the *necessity* of supporting France in a European war (265)—it was all these factors that prevented Grey from issuing to *both* sides the saving warning that " We shall take sides against the aggressor." Great Britain, with her enormous weight, had indisputably the controlling power. (266) Grey failed to use it as it could and should have been used for peace ; instead, as we have seen, he took sides with Russia from July 25th onwards.

It has been contended in Germany that Berlin did not really believe in British neutrality; the material available, however, gives the very definite impression, indeed the certainty, that the Wilhelmstrasse was actually of the opinion that if a general war came over the Serajevo murder Great Britain would remain neutral, at least at first. (267) And if Grey's undecided attitude must be regarded as a grave mistake and one that increased the danger of war, on the other hand that does not absolve Germany or the Central Powers from blame, as they were prepared at first to let war come with France and Russia. (268)

The fact must, however, be stressed that the German Government veered over to a peaceful course before it had any certainty that Great Britain would be among its opponents from the first. On the evening of July 29th it had this certainty, and it reinforced its new attitude. (269) We have followed the change of attitude up to July 28th. On the morning of the 29th the Bavarian Minister in Berlin reported:

> The policy of the German Reich is directed to the emergence of its ally from the affair with increased prestige, but so that world peace may be maintained. (270)

On the 29th Jagow regarded the Serbian reply as a possible basis for negotiations, and still had no belief that Russia "would strike" (271)—a remarkably optimistic view, considering that between the 26th and the morning of the 29th eighteen official reports of Russian measures of mobilization had reached Berlin. (272) In the afternoon, however, Jagow's illusions were torn away. On the 27th he had said to Jules Cambon that a Russian mobilization on the Austrian frontier would not compel Germany to mobilize. (273) Apparently Jagow still thought that Russia was merely bluffing. In any case, on the afternoon of the 29th, he read "with horror" Pourtalès's report of Russia's partial mobilization, and when the Russian Ambassador, with whom he had just been talking, confirmed it he replied

> in violent excitement that this unexpected news completely altered the situation, and that he personally saw now no possibility of escape from a European war;

for he considered, in contrast with his former views, that Germany would now have to mobilize too, although he was assured that

" nothing in the slightest was being done in Russia against Germany. (274) Jagow was not unjustified in having doubts as to that.

On this day, July 29th, there began a big struggle between the German Government and the military leaders in Berlin. Moltke, the Chief of Staff, had pronounced in 1909 in favour of a preventive war on the part of the Danube Monarchy against Serbia, and in regard to Germany also had been less in favour of peace since the Morocco crisis of 1911. He regarded a general war, in fact, as inevitable. On July 29, 1914, the Military Plenipotentiary for Bavaria in Berlin, reporting on the situation on the 28th and the morning of the 29th, stated that Moltke wanted more far-reaching military action than the Minister of War wanted, and he added in regard to Moltke :

> He is bringing all his influence to bear in favour of the use of this rarely advantageous situation for a blow ; he is pointing out that militarily France is in a condition of absolute embarrassment, that Russia is anything but secure ; in addition to this it is the best time in the year, with the crops mainly brought in and the new recruits' training completed.

This was Moltke's attitude *before he knew* that Russia had decided on mobilization against Austria ; thus it is perfectly clear that he was in favour of a preventive war ; there is also further evidence of this. (275) It was the current military view, and in the situation it is, from a military point of view, intelligible that it should have been.

For years Moltke, in his correspondence with Conrad, had held to the view that Germany would be involved under the terms of the alliance if Russia mobilized against Austria. The general staff still held this view in a pamphlet which it had issued on the political situation (" Zur Beurteilung der politischen Lage ")—a clear invasion of the sphere of the civil authorities. (276) The Government, however, held to the view that German mobilization should only follow a Russian general mobilization, as actually happened, and Moltke himself took up that position for a time. (277)

Lord Grey declares his belief that neither the Emperor William nor Bethmann Hollweg nor Jagow planned or desired war, (278) and that the mass of the German people had no desire for it. The military authorities, however, had, he thinks, the

deciding power, the civil Government was without influence, and so it was the military that forced the war. (279) This is an entirely false construction, long since exposed by the documents. In the report already mentioned the Bavarian Military Plenipotentiary wrote :

> The Chancellor is holding back these forward elements with all his strength, and is anxious to avoid anything that . . . might set the stone rolling. (280)

But the Government not only held back the military " with all its strength," but, a much more important matter, it did so *with entire success*. No less an authority than Moltke himself bears witness to this ; on August 2nd he wrote to Conrad that " in spite of every effort " he had failed " to hasten the work of the diplomats." (281)

The opinion of a good judge of the situation was that to all appearance Berlin " did not fully realize the gravity of the situation until July 29th." (282) Late in the evening, however, of the 29th Bethmann Hollweg made a grave psychological mistake in his unfortunate neutrality offer to Britain, which, as is understandable, was very ill-received, and perhaps exposes more clearly than anything else his incapacity as a statesman, his complete misunderstanding of British relations with France and Germany, and his continued belief in the possibility of keeping Britain neutral. (283)

Shortly after this abortive step the Chancellor received the first open warning from Grey that Britain would come into the war if the conflict became general. Lichnowsky's report of this contained also Grey's suggestion that after occupying Belgrade and other places Austria should publish her terms. The whole report reached Tschirschky the same night with the following alarmed comment :

> Thus, if Austria rejects all mediation, we are face to face with a conflagration in which Britain will be against us and to all appearance Italy and Roumania will not be with us, and we two Great Powers will be standing against four. With Britain against us Germany will bear the brunt of the battle. Austria's political prestige, the honour of her army, and her just claims against Serbia could be adequately secured by the occupation of Belgrade or other places. This would restore her, by humiliating Serbia, to a strong position in the Balkans and against Russia. Under these circumstances we must urgently and

emphatically recommend for the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet that mediation on the honourable terms suggested should be accepted. The responsibility for what would otherwise happen would be very heavy for Austria and for ourselves. (284)

Remembering Berlin's imperious language in regard to the negotiations for compensation, a notable difference is here to be observed. (285) But a few minutes later the Chancellor made this good. Pourtalès again reported Sazonov's complaint that Vienna had categorically refused direct conversations with St. Petersburg. This telegram was sent on to Tschirschky with the following addition :

We cannot ask Austria-Hungary to negotiate with Serbia, with whom she is now at war. But the refusal of any exchange of views with St. Petersburg would be a grave error, as it is actually inviting Russia to intervene by force of arms, which Austria-Hungary is closely interested in avoiding.

We are prepared to fulfil our duties as allies, but must decline to be irresponsibly dragged by Vienna into a world war, with no regard for our advice. In the Italian question also Vienna appears to be treating our advice cavalierly.

Please convey this at once emphatically and most seriously to Count Berchtold. (286)

Grey, who in the whole crisis did not send a single word of warning to St. Petersburg or Paris, has the coolness to write in his Memoirs that Bethmann Hollweg and Jagow spoke " only in whispers " in Vienna, when a decisive word was wanted. (287) This entirely unjustified remark recoils on Grey himself : instead of energetically restraining the Russians he encouraged them in steps against Austria that endangered peace. The truth is that no Government went so far as the Chancellor, who in this telegram gave a plain threat of the denunciation of the Alliance. In addition to this I will point out that now, in the night of July 29th–30th, the German Government unreservedly demanded the maintenance of peace. (288) On the other hand, the fact must be mentioned that Tschirschky did not at any time convey to Vienna the threat to denounce the Alliance, as he should have done. (289) For this, however, only the German Ambassador in Vienna is to blame, and not the German Government.

There is not room here for mention of all the communications which Berlin sent to Vienna after the 28th to induce it to change

its course. Suffice it to point out that the German pressure on Vienna went as far as the threat of a breach, but that Vienna obstinately held to its programme and only began to vacillate on July 30th, when St. Petersburg had made its decision. (290)

While Berlin was thus working for peace, it was being followed with suspicion in London. (291) The Foreign Office rejected on the 28th the proposal that pressure should be put on St. Petersburg, unless Vienna should show reasons for doing o ; (292) about the same time as Austria declared war on Serbia, the First British Fleet received orders to proceed to Scapa Flow, but not by the West Coast as was expected but by the East Coast, since

> our last news of the High Seas Fleet was that it was concentrated off the coast of Norway ; (293)

and on the 29th Nicolson noted with resignation that " the resources of diplomacy are, for the present, exhausted." (294)

Sazonov had announced on July 29th a partial mobilization against Austria, but general mobilization was at once organized on pressure from the military. Germany had given many urgent warnings but without result. (295) On receipt, however, of a telegram from the Emperor William the Tsar cancelled the general mobilization in the evening and sanctioned only the mobilization against Austria-Hungary. This was telegraphed at midnight. (296) Diplomacy thus began operating again, and Sazonov sent for the German Ambassador in the night and urged him to seek means through the German Government of

> putting friendly pressure on Austria to induce her to forgo demands affecting Serbia's sovereignty. (297)

Sazonov thus returned to the " fond au débat." Pourtalès pointed in vain to the Austrian assurance of territorial disinterestedness and suggested that there would be time enough at the conclusion of peace " to come to the question of the preservation of Serbia's sovereignty." The Russian Foreign Minister had stated on the 29th that he was satisfied as regards the territorial question, but had insisted on the incontestable fact that the imposition of the Austrian terms would mean " vassalage." (298) That was a strong word, but expressed Vienna's actual intention. And even in regard to Serbia's integrity, Sazonov was only

convinced so long as Serbia was not attacked. (299) Even without this reservation his mistrust would have been fully justified. In addition to the documents already quoted there are two interesting statements by Bethmann Hollweg of July 29th that bear this out. The Chancellor had taken note of Vienna's ambiguous and inconsistent declarations and was now indignant about them :

> We cannot give our support as ally to a policy with a shifting basis. . . . Otherwise we can no longer act as mediators in St. Petersburg and shall be caught up in Vienna's trail—

the consequence of the " free hand." He telegraphed to Tschirschky :

> I note with growing astonishment the attitude of the Vienna Government and its dissimilar methods with the various Governments. In St. Petersburg it declares its territorial disinterestedness, it leaves us entirely in the dark as to its programme, it puts Rome off with meaningless phrases in the compensation question ; in London Count Mensdorff makes presents of parts of Serbia to Bulgaria and Albania, which conflict with Vienna's solemn declarations in St. Petersburg. From these inconsistencies I must conclude that . . . the Vienna Government has plans in mind which it feels it must conceal from us, in order to assure itself German support in any case and not, by openly admitting them, to run the risk of our refusal.

This was refreshingly straightforward language, which the suspicion in St. Petersburg, Rome, and elsewhere undeniably justified. But Bethmann Hollweg's indignation was conveyed delicately " for the present " only for Tschirschky's " personal information " and never came to Berchtold's knowledge. (300) Evidently Bethmann Hollweg once more felt bound by the blank cheque given, and the Government made the grave mistake of leaving the question of Serbian sovereignty untouched and acting as if all necessary assurances had been given in regard to Serbian integrity. Yet this formed the central issue in the diplomatic negotiations, as Sazonov's two formulæ show at a glance. (301) Grey was therefore right in saying in a telegram of July 31st :

> The stumbling-block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances, and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the independence and integrity of Servia. (302)

Grey added a proposal which approximated to Italy's. Meanwhile, on the 30th, Vienna had at last begun to give assurances on both points which were calculated to remove the stumbling-block. I may sum up as follows the result of this part of the diplomatic negotiations up to July 31st :

1. All the Powers eventually recognized that Austria-Hungary had been offered provocation ; that she was entitled to demand satisfaction from Serbia ; and that Serbia deserved a lesson.

2. All the Powers eventually agreed to the temporary occupation of portions of Serbian territory by Austro-Hungarian troops, as guarantee for the execution of such demands as were compatible with the integrity and sovereignty of Serbia. (303)

3. Thus, so long as Vienna pursued no more far-reaching aims, peace was, humanly speaking, assured.

4. Vienna, however, wanted more. But on and after July 30th it assured St. Petersburg, London, Paris, and Berlin that it would respect Serbian sovereignty and integrity. These declarations, even if they were still not meant sincerely, gave the Great Powers a lever for holding the Danube Monarchy to them. Germany's attitude in the days following July 29th showed that she was honestly striving for peace and would certainly have gladly taken over the guarantee demanded, and Russia would then have had no further reason for suspicion.

General peace would thus have been assured, with a substantial gain in prestige for Vienna—if Russia had allowed time. (304) Here comes Russia's terrible responsibility. Negotiations were under way, but she did not allow time for them to bear fruit. Austria-Hungary was gravely to blame for contributing to Russia's violent intervention by her precipitate declaration of war on Serbia, her indefensible ambiguities, and the delay in her statements in regard to Serbia's sovereignty and integrity.

For the rest, be it said once more, it must always be borne in mind that the Serbian question was only a small fragment of much more comprehensive problems, the whole Balkan problem and in general the many differences that had broken up the Triple Alliance and had divided Europe into two hostile groups. All the statesmen were acting during July 1914 under the pressure of these much more important considerations, and the crisis was merely a point of culmination of developments of which some had been in progress for centuries.

The Russian General Mobilization.

We have made the acquaintance of the critical changes that occurred in Berlin and St. Petersburg on July 29th: Bethmann Hollweg going over entirely to work for peace and Sazonov for war. Shortly after the Tsar had stopped the general mobilization, Sazonov learned that the Austrians had bombarded Belgrade. He "foamed at the mouth" and wanted the Russian army to march straight on Vienna. (305) Count Pourtalès was right that night in fearing that the Foreign Minister was "working hard" to induce the Tsar to "stand firm." (306) His pliability had, indeed, not been to Sazonov's taste. (307)

As already mentioned, the Russian military party pressed from the first for general mobilization. (308) The decision as to this depended, however, on Russia's ally France and her friend Britain.

On the 27th Count Czecsen reported the impending arrival of Poincaré and Isvolsky in Paris, adding: "Now we shall probably hear sharper language." (309) On the 28th there was "delight" (310) at the French Ministry of War. On the same day Paléologue, for the second time, informed Sazonov "under instructions from his Government" that France was "completely ready" to fulfil her duties as an ally if necessary (311)—a statement that was "particularly valuable" to the Russian Government "under the present circumstances." (312) On July 29th the military elements in Paris were in "very good spirits," (313) and Poincaré and Viviani were welcomed with enthusiasm. (314) On the 30th the Paris morning papers were convinced that in case of war France could definitely count on British aid, and the Press was becoming bellicose. (315) Bertie wrote to Grey:

> The French instead of putting pressure on the Russian Government to moderate their zeal expect us to give the Germans to understand that we mean fighting if war break out. If we gave an assurance of armed assistance to France or Russia now, Russia would become more exacting and France would follow in her wake. (316)

Instead of this France had placed herself "unreservedly" behind Russia and had even encouraged the Russians in partial mobilization. In addition to this there were the British naval movements. On the 30th a Reuter telegram from St. Petersburg

reported that the sailing of the British Fleet from Portland had made " an enormous impression " (317), and at the same time the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires in St. Petersburg reported that certainty was felt there

> that Britain will stand by France. This support carries quite extraordinary weight and has contributed not a little to the success of the war party. (318)

The position was, in fact, that Sazonov could build on carrying France and Great Britain with him, especially as no official warning such as Bertie had advised had come from London. Paris, on the other hand, braced itself to deliver a very mild warning. Germany's urgent warning of the 29th (the so-called " ultimatum " !) that

> if Russian measures of mobilization proceed further they will compel us to mobilize, and then European war will be almost impossible to avert,

had greatly excited Sazonov. (319) He counted now on " the probable inevitability of war " and informed Paris and London that Russia was accelerating her preparations. (320) This could only mean the commencement of general mobilization. Mobilization orders had been telegraphed and mobilization had actually been in progress since the morning, but had been stopped by the Tsar, in spite of the " ultimatum." Paris knew nothing of all this, but knew what the acceleration of preparations meant. For the French Government replied to this telegram of Sazonov's with another assurance, on July 30th, that it was ready to fulfil " all its obligations as an ally," but considered

> that at the present moment, with negotiations still proceeding between the less interested Powers, it would be well if Russia, so far as is compatible with the measures of defence and precaution which she regards as necessary, would take no direct steps which could serve Germany as a pretext for ordering general or partial mobilization of her forces. (321)

Paris thus expressed the hope that Russia would not unnecessarily carry out general mobilization, but the suggestion was clearly greatly weakened by the clause " so far as is compatible," etc. The message was communicated at once to the British Foreign Minister; he made the astonishing inference that Viviani " has been urging Russia not to precipitate crisis." (322)

And as the faint suggestion to St. Petersburg seemed to Sir Edward Grey so urgent a request, he himself, in spite of the news transmitted direct to him by Buchanan of the Russian general mobilization, did nothing to avert this fatal step. (323) On the contrary, he said to the German Ambassador on the morning of July 31st that he did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend her military preparations " unless Austria would put some limit to her advance into Servia." (324) Thus Grey took up a more pro-Russian attitude than Russia's own ally !

The faint hint from the Quai d'Orsay was hurriedly followed by a second telegram from Isvolsky reporting the War Minister, M. Messimy, as having urged Russia to increase her preparations. (325) Russia had no need of this advice ; it is unknown, indeed, whether these telegrams reached St. Petersburg before its decision had been taken. Sazonov had been working from the evening of the 29th in entire accord with the military leaders —while Bethmann Hollweg had been doing the exact opposite— and they were resolved to recommence the general mobilization on the 30th. (326) For Sazonov, as he himself said, the work of diplomacy was ended, and the military had convinced him that if general mobilization became necessary at a later moment the partial mobilization would hinder it. So, as Renouvin expressly states, the men in power in Russia came to their fatal decision *purely on technical grounds*. (327) For there had been no fresh political developments.

The Tsar was considered to be a man of peace. That is not entirely true. He was ready in 1896 for the occupation of Constantinople by a coup ; (328) in 1904 he allowed himself to be driven into war with Japan ; during the Balkan crisis in 1912 he showed himself to be accessible to pro-war influences, (329) and in the spring of 1914 he approved the warlike conclusions of the Conference on the Straits. (330) During the crisis of July 1914 he was, according to Suchomlinov, under the influence of his uncle, the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevitch, who was anything but a pacifist. (331) The Grand Duke's right-hand man, General Yanushkyevitch, Chief of Staff, went daily to the Tsar —Sazonov usually went only on Tuesdays (332)—and Nicholas II was " very angry " at Austria-Hungary's action, so that, as the Russian Ambassador in Vienna considered on July 28th, the least thing might precipitate the conflict. (333) Less doubtful

than the Tsar's love of peace was his weakness, and yet it required strong pressure to induce him to renew the order for general mobilization. It took Sazonov a good hour at least to persuade him on the afternoon of July 30th. Sazonov used the argument of the soldiers and said, among other things, that it was better fearlessly " to bring about war by our war preparations " than " to be taken unawares by war " from fear of giving an occasion for war. (334) An argument that probably had more effect on him than this strange theory was that the partial mobilization might be represented as a failure in Russia's duties as an ally towards France, (335) in the event of European war proving unavoidable, since Russia would then, for technical reasons, only be able to carry out her general mobilization with great difficulty. So the Tsar gave way, with a heavy heart, having apparently been persuaded that his decision did not irrevocably mean war. (336) To make sure that there should be no fresh cancellation of the order, Yanushkyevitch, in argreement with Sazonov, made sure that he should be inaccessible for the rest of the day. (337)

At 6 p.m. on July 30th the orders for general mobilization were sent out by telegram. It was

> the moment of the beginning of the great epoch. . . . The prologue of the great historical drama had begun. (338)

The Russian general mobilization did, in fact, mean war. Lord Grey is unprepared to admit that. (339) But the evidence from Russian sources and the views of the best informed foreign historians is overwhelmingly against him, so that there is really nothing to gain by spending more words on the subject. (340)

When on July 30th Sazonov persuaded the unwilling Tsar he was aware, as the words above quoted show, of the full meaning of the decision. He wanted, therefore, as did the Tsar, to keep it secret. (341) But this quickly proved impossible. Instead, resort was had to other devices : the critical Russian step was, with French and British help, disguised as much as possible and defended with untrue statements, especially statements confusing the order of the mobilizations (342)—a proceeding giving the plainest possible evidence of a bad conscience.

Pashitch wrote, in an interesting report on the situation on July 31, 1914 :

The reports from our Minister at St. Petersburg declare that Russia is now talking and dragging out the negotiations in order to gain time for the mobilization and concentration of her army. When that is complete she will declare war on Austria. (343)

This was in agreement with a Russian resolution of November 1912, under which pretended negotiations, adapted to the situation, must " absolutely " be carried on " in order to lull the opponent as far as possible into a feeling of security." (344) Russia's diplomatic negotiations from July 30th onwards must be judged in the light of this. In the present compressed account they may therefore properly be passed over. (345)

A further question is whether those in power in Russia were prematurely carried away by the public opinion of their country. This was certainly not so. On July 29th M. Maklakov, the Minister of the Interior, said :

The war cannot be popular in the hearts of the masses of our people ;

and General Dobrorolsky comes to the conclusion that it

might have been postponed to a more favourable time for us. (346)

Vienna and Berlin on July 30th and 31st.

On July 25th Count Berchtold had sent a revealing message to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg. In the action against Serbia, he writes, " we were aware of the possibility " of the development

of a conflict with Russia. But we could not let this possibility affect our attitude towards Serbia, as fundamental considerations of policy made it necessary for us to put an end to the situation in which Russia had given Serbia carte blanche, enabling her permanently to threaten the Monarchy without punishment or possibility of punishment.

Should Russia consider that the moment has come for the great settlement with the European Central Powers, and accordingly be determined on war from the outset, the following instructions to your Excellency appear to be superfluous.

It may, however, be possible that Russia is feeling that the existing opportunity is an embarrassment, that she is not so itching to attack or so ready for war as the " Novoye Vremya " and the " Birsheviya Vyedomosti " would like to make out, and as MM. Poincaré and Isvolsky would perhaps wish.

It is conceivable that if Serbia rejects our demands, and in view of the necessity that will then arise for us to resort to arms, Russia may think twice before acting rashly and may even be willing not to allow herself to be carried off her feet by the rising wave of Slav solidarity.

This situation which might " however " be " conceivable " was the basis of instructions which followed, and on which Szápáry was to act at the proper moment. (347) The quotation plainly reveals Berchtold's scepticism as to the avoidance of war with Russia. This and other evidence of this period, his obstinate pursuance of the policy he had adopted, in spite of many warnings that there was no localizing the conflict in this way, (348) his refusal of all mediation proposals in spite of Berlin's plain change of course, give the impression that Count Berchtold alone among the statesmen of the Central Powers had all along believed in the probability of war with Russia. (349) Yet even he ultimately became undecided on July 30th, under the pressure from the German Government. (350)

With Russia's partial mobilization Austria-Hungary was outnumbered three times over. (351) She was therefore now fully justified in proceeding to general mobilization. (352) Vienna, however, where diplomats and general staff were working together, delayed. Tschirschky telegraphed on the evening of the 30th that it had not yet been decided " whether in the existing situation mobilization was yet called for." (353) On that day it was decided on in principle, but not definitely. Conrad von Hötzendorf was in touch with Von Moltke both directly and through the military attachés. Moltke's opinion was sought. On the morning of the 30th he had adopted the Chancellor's view, but he now advised that Austria-Hungary should at once mobilize against Russia and decline the latest British proposal, and he made it clear (also in a direct telegram to Conrad) that Germany would then consider that the terms of the Alliance came into play. (354) The advice to decline the British proposal was an unauthorized interference in the diplomatic negotiations and cut across Bethmann Hollweg's policy ; the Chancellor had urged acceptance of this proposal. Moltke at the same time, again in conflict with the view of the Wilhelmstrasse, returned to the contention that an Austrian general mobilization would involve Germany under the Alliance and that there was thus no reason to wait for the Russian general mobilization. When Conrad read

these telegrams on the morning of the 31st, Berchtold cried: "Has it come to that! Who is governing, Moltke or Bethmann?" Then, turning to Conrad, he said:

> I asked you to come because I had the impression that Germany is weakening; but now I have from the highest military quarter the most reassuring explanation—

and it was then "resolved to submit to His Majesty that general mobilization be ordered." (355)

From this Moltke's pressure on Vienna is plain. It may be assumed also to have affected the resolutions of the Cabinet on the morning of July 31st—before the Russian general mobilization had become known in Vienna—but this cannot be proved. For as early as the afternoon of the 30th it was resolved after discussion in the presence of the Emperor Francis Joseph to reply "with cordial thanks" to the British proposal "although it is impossible to take it into consideration" (356)—and this was arranged in the Cabinet, Berchtold again declaring that Austria's conditions to Serbia must be accepted "integrally" and there could be no entering into negotiations concerning them. (357) It is true that a situation had been reached in which, in Pashitch's view, European war could

> only be avoided by very great sacrifices on Austria's part. (358)

German opinion would gladly have it that Moltke's intervention had no influence on events since the Russian general mobilization of the 30th had already rendered European war inevitable. That is an incomplete version. For Moltke gave his advice to Vienna before he knew of the Russian step, and gave it against the policy of the Government. Not only that, but the German general staff held the view that the Russian partial mobilization should be followed by mobilization not only in Austria but in Germany and that it brought the Treaty of Alliance into operation. Thus Moltke's pressure would, on the evidence of his own attitude, have brought European war even without the Russian general mobilization. (359)

Vienna had other views. For Conrad the Austrian general mobilization in reply to the Russian partial mobilization did not necessarily mean war between Austria and Russia. (360) Berchtold also expressed this view repeatedly at the time. (361) In

this he was right, as will be seen later, so long as Russia did not open the attack. But Russia had already done this. (362)

Now the penalty began to be paid for the failure of Austria-Hungary and Russia to follow Bismarck's good advice and divide the Balkans into spheres of influence : Serbia would have fallen within Austria's sphere and Bulgaria within Russia's. The parts had been exchanged to the misfortune of both Powers. And the old Emperor Francis Joseph may have had a foreboding of coming events when, about this time, he said to Conrad von Hötzendorf :

> If the Monarchy is to come to destruction, it shall at least do it respectably ! (363)

The Franco-Russian Alliance not Involved.

The essence of the Franco-Russian Alliance lay in a military convention which came into force about the end of 1893 or beginning of 1894. (364) In the instructions to the French negotiators an isolated attack on Russia by Austria was dismissed from consideration as " absolutely improbable " ; the Russians, however, insisted that the Allies must mobilize even if Austria alone mobilized. (365) In 1899 Delcassé was able to make an " important " extension in the diplomatic alliance, (366) but the military convention, apparently from 1906 onwards, was restricted in scope. If Germany mobilized Russia and France were at once and simultaneously to mobilize without prior arrangement, but if Austria, or Italy, alone mobilized " partially or even generally," prior arrangement was " indispensable." (367) It was thus that in the summer of 1912 Poincaré was entitled to warn the Russians, as he did, that they must not count on French assistance " even if (they were) attacked by Austria." (368) He was equally right in telling the British Ambassador on July 30th (assuming that Russia did not attack Austria) that

> If war breaks out between Russia and Austria and Germany comes to Austria's assistance, France is bound under her Treaty to stand by Russia. (369)

Thus the Alliance only came into play if Germany mobilized first, if she gave active assistance to Austria against Russia, or, in any other event, if so agreed in advance. That no such

agreement had been made is clear both from Poincaré's words to Bertie and from a statement made by Paléologue on the 29th, when he was informed of Russia's decision on a general mobilization. Paléologue's reply was :

> The Russian general staff must take no steps without prior agreement with the French general staff. (370)

From this we must conclude that those in power in Russia were acting on their own initiative in this important point in reliance on the repeated assurances which they had had of French support. And we now understand why the French took so active a share in the camouflaging of the Russian mobilization, in giving false reasons for it, and in trying to mis-state the order in which the mobilizations took place, especially as between Austria and Russia. (371) On the evening of the 31st at latest Paris had accurate knowledge of the situation ; (372) yet M. Messimy, then Minister of War, declared to the Russian military attaché in Paris

> in cordial and enthusiastic tones that the Government was firmly determined on war (373)—

a war which had been let loose by Russia, who had gone over to an aggressive attitude during the crisis. No wonder Poincaré preferred " to avoid a public debate as to the application of the Treaty of Alliance." (374) For, as Poincaré himself stated in his speeches in 1921, the Alliance did not come into play. He alleged that it did not because Germany had declared war on Russia and France. (375) That this is an empty pretext was clear at the time to those familiar with the facts. On August 1st Poincaré wanted the declaration of war to come from Germany's side, (376) and when reports came on August 2nd that German troops had crossed the frontier, this, as Isvolsky reported, gave the French Government the opportunity of declaring to Parliament

> that France has been attacked, and of avoiding a formal declaration of war. (377)

This in itself destroys Poincaré's claim, and it is not restored to validity for those who know the facts by Germany's having played into Poincaré's hands by her declarations of war. The truth, as well-informed Frenchmen (excluding Poincaré) have

declared, is that there had been no case under the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance for bringing it into operation. (378) Conrad is thus right and Moltke wrong : the Austrian general mobilization did not necessarily mean European war. (379) The piquant circumstance may be pointed out that among the arguments used to wring from the Tsar the order for the general mobilization that let loose the war, was the statement that otherwise he ran the risk of violating his Treaty of Alliance with France—while Poincaré declared that this Treaty did not come into operation at all ! And we read that in June 1915 Paul Deschanel, then President of the Chamber of Deputies, said to Georges Louis :

> The majority of the men who were Ministers in July (1914) are saying openly that Poincaré brought about the war. (380)

Germany's Ultimatums and Declarations of War.

We have seen that after the Russian mobilization against Austria became known the German Government successfully withstood the pressure of the military element. One symptom of this struggle was the midday " extra " of the Berlin " Lokalanzeiger " of July 30th, reporting that Germany was mobilizing. (381) This false news was at once contradicted to all the embassies and legations concerned, and the " extra " was confiscated. It demonstrably had no influence on the course of events. (382)

In the evening the Chancellor learned from a telephone conversation with Tschirschky and Stumm that Vienna " declined to alter her course, and especially declined the latest proposal from Grey " ; on this he telegraphed at once to Tschirschky that in that case it was " hardly possible any longer to attribute to Russia the blame for the approaching European conflagration," and instructed the Ambassador " at once " to express to Count Berchtold and if necessary also Count Tisza the views already familiar to us. (383) These instructions were, however, suspended in the last hour of the day, because the general staff informed the Chancellor

> that military preparations by our neighbour countries, especially in the East, necessitate an early decision if we are not to run the risk of being taken by surprise. (384)

Once more consideration for military factors ? Capitulation to the military *before* the news of the Russian general mobilization ? Yes, but only for one moment. For the decree of mobilization was not issued. A telegram came from King George to Prince Henry that the British Government was doing " its utmost " to restrain France and Russia from further military preparations if Austria would content herself with a pledge. (385) This telegram was sent on to Tschirschky with instructions to communicate it at once to Berchtold and if necessary to ask for it to be placed before the Emperor Francis Joseph. (386) Thus Bethmann Hollweg once more stood firm against the pressure of the general staff at the flicker of a new ray of hope from England. There matters stood until the announcement shortly before noon on the 31st of the Russian general mobilization—which " completely surprised " the Emperor William (387)—necessarily making further opposition impossible. (388)

At this moment Sir Edward Goschen wrote to Nicolson :

> I have a stronger conviction than Cambon that both the Chancellor and Jagow would like to avoid a general war—whatever may be the opinion of the hot-headed division and the general staff. This is not only my opinion but the opinion of most diplomatists and many Germans. Cambon won't have this at all and considers, wrongly I think, Jagow to be a Junker of the most bellicose description. This is contrary to all I have ever heard of Jagow and contrary to my own opinion of him. As for the Chancellor, if he makes war it will be because he is forced into it. (389)

This testimony will go down in history as a just judgment.

As early as July 25th Buchanan had expressed the fear that the moment Russia mobilized Germany would declare war. (390) Jules Cambon held the same belief. (391) The Russian general staff expected Germany to mobilize " at latest on July 30th," (392) and the French Ministry of War on the afternoon of the 31st. (393) Germany contented herself at this period, however, with the proclamation of a " condition of imminent danger of war," which did not mean actual mobilization or necessarily lead to it. (394)

In the summer of 1912 the German Chargé d'Affaires in Paris had an interesting conversation with Maurice Paléologue, then Head of the political Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the possibility of things coming to a crisis between Britain

and Germany. Paléologue considered that in such an event it would be

> quite natural for Germany at once to present an ultimatum to France; equally as a matter of course it would be rejected, and Germany would have to mobilize her army against France. (395)

The case now for Germany was worse still. France was allied to Russia and Russia had taken the critical step. Yet, instead of replying with a counter-mobilization, the German Government gave Russia twelve hours to demobilize and "quite naturally" gave France eighteen hours in which to declare neutrality. Both demands were rejected. (396) On this, at 5 p.m. on August 1st, almost simultaneously with France, the Emperor William ordered general mobilization—two days later than Russia. On the same evening Germany declared war on Russia, and on the evening of the 3rd on France. Politically these declarations of war were very unwise, but as plenty of foreign authorities recognize they were only a formality. (397) The truth is that the moment Russia's general mobilization became known Europe's fate was sealed. It is true that, as Goschen reported, there was "intense enthusiasm in the streets" of Berlin; but there was "considerable depression at the Foreign Office," and Zimmermann said to Jules Cambon on July 31st:

> This is the most tragic day for forty years. (398)

Grey's Policy Gains the Upper Hand—Belgium.

We are familiar with the rooted suspicion of Germany at the Foreign Office. It found fresh food in Vienna's rejection of the Serbian reply, her refusal of all mediation, her declaration of war on Serbia, her bombardment of Belgrade, and—until July 30th—her intransigence; for it was said in London that Vienna would not take this line without the assurance of German support. We know also that until July 28th even appearances were not against Germany. Bethmann Hollweg's unfortunate neutrality offer of July 30th deepened London's suspicions, especially as there was no sign of Berlin's pressure on Vienna.

On the other side we have Grey's blind faith in France. Thus on the 30th he assured Prince Lichnowsky

that the French were bringing all their influence to bear at St. Petersburg in favour of a peaceful issue. (399)

But Sir Francis Bertie had not a word to report in these days of French pressure on St. Petersburg; far from it. (400) During the crisis the French Government played "a strangely passive part," (401) and not only a passive one. Lord Grey, however, likes to imagine to this day that France, from fear of war, "strove till the last moment to avoid it" (402)—France, who on learning of the Russian general mobilization, some sixteen hours before Germany's declaration of war on Russia, *officially announced her determination on war!* (403)

Grey goes on to write in tones of reproach:

Germany ceased to talk of anything but the Russian mobilization. (404)

Wedged in as Germany was, this was entirely natural. Russia and France had no danger in their rear; for Germany, exposed on both flanks, the mobilization of these two Powers irrevocably meant war, as Germany's mobilization must for them. Every military expert in Europe knew that. The British documents are full of these considerations. We saw that as early as July 27th Sir Eyre Crowe recognized that "the real difficulty to be overcome will be found in the question of mobilization." (405) The day before this Buchanan had reported the beginning of mobilization in Russia. (406) On the 27th and 28th three telegrams reported war preparations in Riga and Warsaw, which could only be aimed against Germany. (407) On the afternoon of the 30th London learned from a telegram from Buchanan that St. Petersburg had resolved, on the morning of that day, to begin simultaneously with the issue of the decree for partial mobilization preparations for general mobilization. (408) It is true that on this France made a shy suggestion to her ally to be cautious. Britain did not even do this. Why? Grey gathered from Viviani's telegram to Sazonov that he had "been urging Russia not to precipitate crisis"! (409) The Foreign Office, moreover, regarded the Russian preparations as entirely justified. On the 31st Goschen telegraphed Bethmann Hollweg's anxiety as to Russian mobilization on the German frontier. (Before the telegram left Berlin Pourtalès's report of the fatal step had reached

the Foreign Ministry.) On Goschen's wire Nicolson wrote this comment :

> Russia is taking very reasonable and sensible precautions, which should in no wise be interpreted as provocative. (410)

The general mobilization, which on the highest Russian authority meant war, and which was contrary to the terms of the Russo-French Military Convention, was " very reasonable and sensible precautions," " in no wise . . . provocative ! " When Nicolson wrote that he was, it is true, not aware that mobilization had actually taken place ; but he knew a day before that on the morning of the 30th Russia had begun preparations for it.—On the 31st Nicolson made a similar comment on a report from Bunsen that in view of the Russian partial mobilization Austria must complete her mobilization and that Jagow was " much annoyed " and threatened a German mobilization as a counter-move : " Surely it was Austria who mobilized before Russia did." (411) Quite so—but only against Serbia. London was on the whole quite well informed as to the Austrian military measures through the British Military Attaché in Vienna. In the night of July 30th–31st he had reported : " General mobilization is impending," (412) though he was only able to announce the actual order on the evening of the 31st. (413) Nicolson's note thus refers only to the Austrian mobilization against *Serbia* —a step which, it will be remembered, Crowe had described as " a serious menace to Russia " ! (414)

The encouragement, acceptance, and excuse which London had for the Russian measures of mobilization as " very reasonable and sensible precautions," were equalled by its suspicion of the German counter-measures. As already mentioned, until July 30th the Foreign Office had no news whatever from its representatives and agents in Germany of any military preparations there. On this day the Vice-Consul in Bremerhaven reported that " activity " was being shown by staff officers who had arrived there ; that the forts were being manned, and that submarine defences were being placed " along that whole North Sea coast and by Heligoland." Crowe added the note that " these are war preparations against England." (415) And on the 31st he wrote : " All our information " (in point of fact it was very meagre or indefinite)

shows that short of the issue of actual " mobilization orders " in set terms, German mobilization has for some time been actively proceeding on all three German frontiers. (416)

Nicolson and Paul Cambon held the same view. (417) These notes plainly served to influence Sir Edward Grey. The French were doing precisely as the Germans. (418) On July 29th the British Military Attaché in Paris reported by letter, summarizing the position (his first report—only received in London on July 31st : why did he not report the details he gives before ?) :

All precautions prior to a mobilization have been carried out and it now only remains for the button to be pressed for the necessary reservists to be called up. (419)

On this report, of course, no comment was made ; nor was any made on the telegram from Paris on the afternoon of the 31st that " The Times " correspondent—obviously with good reason—thought that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wished him to prepare public opinion in Britain for mobilization, " which may be ordered at any moment," and to " induce it to consider such a measure has been forced upon France." (420) How significant are these words ! But when Germany defended her steps on the ground of those taken by France and Russia, this in Crowe's view, and certainly in that of the Foreign Office in general, was a mere pretext put forward in order to shift the responsibility on to other shoulders. (421) The British Government was well informed as to the mobilizations in the various countries ; it is true that Buchanan's telegram of the afternoon of July 30th, reporting that St. Petersburg had resolved to issue the decree for general mobilization, was delayed for a curiously long time, and also reached London with the date July 31st ; (422) it was learned, however, in London on the afternoon of August 1st that in St. Petersburg the mobilization notices were " posted up at 4 a.m. on July 31st " ; (423) at the same time it was learned from the Military Attaché in Berlin that " as yet " (midday on August 1st) " many reserve officers but no men " had been called out. (424) On the evening of August 1st the news was received of the French mobilization, with the exact time (3.40 p.m.) ; (425) on the morning of August 2nd news came from Berlin that general mobilization had been ordered there on the afternoon of the first (and thus

about the same time as in France); (426) and, finally, three telegrams from Vienna left no possibility of doubt that the Russian general mobilization had preceded the Austrian general mobilization by several hours. (427) *It must therefore be expressly stated that the British Government could not but know that the various Russian and French attempts at the time and subsequently to invert the order in which the mobilizations took place were in conflict with the truth; and that, in spite of this, in Section 7 of its introduction, dated September* 28, 1914, *to the Blue Book of* 1914 *it plainly helped to conceal the facts as to the Russian general mobilization, to Germany's detriment.* (428) Moreover, even since the war British statesmen have not shrunk from continuing this dissimulation, though it was then a simple matter for anyone who was concerned to give a truthful account to ascertain the facts for himself. (429) This shows very clearly the weakness of their position in this matter.

From what has been said it would not be difficult to infer that at least Sir Eyre Crowe and Sir Arthur Nicolson were not such naïve believers in Russia's harmless military measures and Germany's wicked ones as they made themselves out to be. Beyond doubt many readers, and not only in Germany, make this inference, and many others contest it. Nicolson, especially, had been for several years British Ambassador in St. Petersburg. Could he be unaware that in Russia general mobilization meant war? It will further be pointed out that on July 31st Nicolson urged on Grey in writing that it seemed "essential" "that we should at once give orders for mobilization of the army," (430) while Crowe, at the same time, took the unusual step of submitting a memorandum to the Foreign Secretary, and urging that "our duty and our interest" lie in "standing by France in her hour of need." (431) In answering the questions here raised it would not be without importance to know whether Nicolson and Crowe knew that general mobilization had actually been entered on by Russia when they wrote to Grey.

In the third chapter we saw that Lord Grey distinguishes between military measures for defence and for preparation for an attack. (432) He makes the same distinction in connexion with the crisis of July 1914. (433) He writes that he "could do nothing to stop" the Russian mobilization; the rejection of a conference (we know, though not from Grey's book, that

Sazonov too, up to July 28th, was unprepared to agree to one) struck out of his hand " what might have been a lever." (434) But it happens that Grey had encouraged the Russians to mobilize against Austria *before* the refusal of a conference ; and he did this in the consciousness " that in that case the great danger would arise of a general war." * (435) This is entirely borne out by Count Mensdorff in his report of July 29th. Summing up his conversations with Grey since the 22nd he says, evidently in Grey's own words :

> He was only concerned with the possibility of Russian intervention, which might lead to results that could not be foreseen, and were bound to be fatal for the whole of Europe. (436)

Knowing this, he encouraged Russia, gave her free rein. On the morning of July 31st he said to Prince Lichnowsky that he did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend her military preparations unless Austria would put some limit to her advance into Serbia (437)—Serbia, who, according to Lord Grey, ought rather to give way than that European peace should be broken. (438) Where is the logic of all this ?

The fact of Russia's premature mobilization is thus a visible embarrassment for Lord Grey, as for other defenders of the Russian case. He tries to get out of it by declaring that it cannot " be fairly construed as evidence of a desire for war," and then asks the rhetorical question :

> After the veto of a conference, with Austria mobilized and Germany ready to strike, what counsellor could have honestly advised the Tsar that mobilization in Russia was a premature, unnecessary precaution ? (439)

This astonishing sentence is a faithful echo of Nicolson and Crowe, and in addition we have the devices, long recognized as baseless by all searchers after the truth, of representing Austria as mobilized before Russia, and Germany as " ready to strike," in other words as secretly mobilized, for only so could she be ready to strike ; a presentation of the facts which in its gross one-sidedness painfully—painfully for Lord Grey and his advisers—exposes the weak spot in the theory as to war guilt which the Entente Powers have advanced since 1914. And

* Retranslated.

here again we are compelled seriously to question Lord Grey's good faith.

London received the news of the Russian general mobilization from the German Embassy on the afternoon of July 31st, (440) and threw no doubt on its accuracy. According to Pierre Renouvin the news caused " some surprise " in London and had certainly not been anticipated by Grey. (441) This is contradicted by Grey's own account, and it would probably be nearer the truth to say that Grey now at last realized something of the terrible situation which he himself had helped to produce. (442) As to this, significant light is thrown by a conversation which Grey had on July 31st with Paul Cambon. The Cabinet had come to the conclusion that they could not give any pledge at that time ; Britain's standing aside might be the only means of preventing a complete collapse of European credit, in which Britain would be involved. That might be a " paramount " consideration in deciding her attitude. Cambon, naturally, was " greatly disappointed," and in defence of the Cabinet's decision Grey remarked :

> The latest news was that Russia had ordered a complete mobilization of her fleet and army. This, it seemed to me, would precipitate a crisis, and would make it appear that German mobilization was being forced by Russia (443)—

a most important sentence, which was suppressed in the White Book of 1914.* *For this sentence justifies the German mobilization as a reply to Russia's*, and it is important to note that *Cambon did not contest it* but instead " urged " that Germany had rejected all proposals that might have made for peace—which was not true—and that Great Britain should not repeat the " great mistake " made in 1870 in " allowing an enormous increase of German strength."

We have still further evidence that the British Foreign Secretary now began to realize the significance of the Russian

* In the face of these omissions—we have already noted several—Lord Grey has the courage to maintain in his " Twenty-five Years " (Vol. II, p. 114) that in the White Book of 1914 " nothing important had been concealed, and there was nothing important left to reveal " ! In Vol. I, p. 341, on the other hand, he says that " probably things that reached Berlin in this summer of 1914, private and secret as well as official, will never be published or known " —an allegation against the German documents in course of publication.

mobilization: King George's telegram to the Tsar, sent off in the early morning of August 1st. This contained the following passage:

> I cannot help thinking that some misunderstanding has produced this deadlock. . . . I therefore make a personal appeal to you to remove the misapprehension . . . and to leave still open grounds for negotiation and possible peace. (444)

This document contains unquestionably the admission that the general mobilization had left no more room for possible peace, and it only remains to note that Buchanan allowed a remarkable delay to take place in executing his urgent commission of communicating this to the Tsar, that he "virtually" dictated to the Tsar the reply to be sent, altering Sazonov's draft, and that the reply contained a series of incorrect statements in justification of the critical Russian move. (445)

At this time, partly through the delay in the Austrian declaration of war on Russia, Grey had the impression that Austria wanted to draw back, but that Germany refused to agree to this and precipitated war. (446) This conclusion is flatly in contradiction with what Grey had said on July 31st to Cambon on the Russian mobilization; but the impression that Austria wanted to draw back is intelligible, though her readiness for concession was more apparent than real. (447) It lay principally in Berchtold's repeated declarations on July 30th and 31st of willingness to respect Serbian integrity and sovereignty, and it might now have been possible for the Powers to hold him down to this. Only, owing to the Russian general mobilization, it was too late. . . . Sir Edward Grey telegraphed on August 1st to Berlin that he still believed that it might be possible to secure peace

> if only a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war. (448)

Having arranged some time before for the appeal to the Tsar through King George, it no doubt seemed to Grey to be as well now to advise Germany not to begin actual war. But that is a side issue. We are concerned here with the "little respite." If Grey, instead of encouraging the Russians, as early as July 25th, in partial mobilization, had warned them, like Buchanan, against it, and if he had, at least from July 28th, applied in St. Petersburg

the same pressure that Bethmann Hollweg had been applying in Vienna—would not the " little respite " then have been easily obtainable ? This, in view of the weight carried in Russia by Great Britain's attitude, is very probable. As things had, however, with Grey's help been precipitated, the German case, in Goschen's words, was,

> to put it in a nutshell, that while the Emperor, at the Tsar's request, *was* working at Vienna—Russia mobilized. . . . (449)

The Foreign Office was unaware at this time of the contents of the Russo-French Treaty of Alliance, but as early as July 27th Sir Eyre Crowe, in a minute, left no doubt that in a quarrel " imposed by Austria on an unwilling France " Great Britain must take sides. (450) Crowe naturally had in view the play of alliances. On the 31st he gave his opinion in favour of immediate British intervention on the outbreak of war. (451) Nicolson urged the same view. (452) There was no need for it with Grey. Cambon had reminded him on the 30th of the letter of November 1912, and Grey had admitted its relevance. (453) On the following day he said to Prince Lichnowsky that if France became involved Britain would be drawn in, (454) and Cambon wired to Paris on the evening of the 31st : " Sir Edward is in favour of immediate intervention " (455)—although the news of the Russian general mobilization had meanwhile reached London ! But the great majority of the British Cabinet disagreed with Grey, who, as already described, had to give Cambon a severe disappointment on the 31st. (456) There followed depressing days for Sir Edward. He felt bound to France (however much he talked of the " free hand "), and he was dishonoured if his colleagues failed him. In this event he was determined at once to resign. (457) Meanwhile everything possible had to be done for France. On August 1st he wired to Bertie that he would entertain no suggestion of a promise of neutrality unless it were on conditions that seemed " real advantages " for France, and he added :

> German Ambassador here seemed to think it not impossible, when I suggested it, that after mobilization on western frontier French and German armies should remain, neither crossing the frontier as long as the other did not do so. I cannot say whether this would be consistent with French obligations under her alliance. If it were so consistent,

I suppose French Government would not object to our engaging to be neutral as long as German army remained on frontier on the defensive. (458)

Bertie was sceptical; he could not imagine that in the event of Russia being at war with Austria and being "attacked by Germany" it would be consistent with French obligations towards Russia for the French to remain quiescent. With Grey's subsequent approval he did not raise the question with the Quai d'Orsay. (459) Berlin, on the contrary, moved at once (460)—proof that it did not want war with France. Grey now said to Cambon, on the afternoon of August 1st,

that Germany would agree not to attack France if France remained neutral in the event of war between Russia and Germany. If France could not take advantage of this position, it was because she was bound by an alliance to which we were not parties, and of which we did not know the terms. (461)

This was before Germany's declaration of war on Russia had been delivered or become known. But it was known that Russia had taken the critical step. We have also Poincaré's own statement that the Russo-French Alliance had not come into play. Instead, however, of acting as this situation, of which he must have been aware, demanded, the French Ambassador, who must certainly have known of his Government's determination on war, urged upon the British Foreign Secretary "very strongly" the British *obligation* to help France if she was attacked by Germany—an attack which Germany was ready to forgo! Grey does not seem to have felt the incongruity of this. He denied, however, the obligation to help France. Cambon refused to transmit such a message to Paris: "It would fill France with rage and indignation. My people would say you have betrayed us!" And he pointed out that the German Fleet could come through the Straits any day and attack the undefended French coasts. Grey replied that "that might alter public feeling here." (462) On the following day he gave an assurance that the French shores would be protected, and, as we saw in the second chapter, Cambon "was satisfied that the game had been won."

During the crisis of July 1914 Grey repeatedly expressed the view, which he still holds, that France was involved in the war through her treaty of alliance with Russia. (463) This, as we

know, is not true, unless, indeed, this treaty were to be interpreted in an aggressive sense. But we must touch on another misconstruction affecting that period. Shortly after the outbreak of war the German Government published Grey's proposal of neutrality, which Bertie had received with such scepticism and Paul Cambon had apparently rejected at once. On August 28, 1914, Sir Edward described the whole matter in the House of Commons as a " misunderstanding." It is true that there was a misunderstanding on August 1st, (464) but Grey's account contained more than one inaccuracy. He said that the suggestion came from Lichnowsky. This is not only contradicted by the German Ambassador's reports at the time, but by the new British documents. (465) Grey said also that he meant German neutrality also against Russia, not only against France. This again is contradicted not only by Lichnowsky's reports but by Grey's own words in his conversation with Cambon quoted above. (466) Finally, he said that French neutrality in the event of Germany's participation in an Austro-Russian war would, in his view, have been " in all probability incompatible with the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance." This, however, is in conflict with his telegram to Bertie. (467) Why these inaccuracies ? There was certainly no " misunderstanding " on Lichnowsky's part ; to all appearance it was a stage in the struggle between Grey's followers and the majority of the Cabinet and an attempt, born of necessity, to keep France out of the war in the event of the interventionists failing to carry the day. (468)

Meanwhile, in spite of Germany's declaration of war against Russia, the struggle in the Cabinet continued. Especially Churchill, Sir Edward's friend, was too precipitate in taking action on his own authority. (469) France and Germany charged one another with violations of the frontier, which happened on both sides, (470) and with premature military preparations, while France made shrewd use of the withdrawal of her troops ten kilometres from the frontier, " a propaganda move " by which Grey is taken in even now in his Memoirs. (471) And on August 2nd, the same day on which Grey took over the protection of the French shores under the naval convention, the Opposition in the House of Commons declared for active support of France—without a word about Belgium. (472)

Bethmann Hollweg was the first to raise the question of Belgium, with his indiscreet neutrality offer of July 29th. The question had certainly already been occupying the diplomats, for it had been common knowledge for years before that in a war on two fronts Germany would march through Belgium and, in the opinion of many foreign military authorities, *must* march through to have any chance of winning. The British Government had admitted this as far back as 1887. It did not now. In spite of Grey's contention, Britain was not bound under the guarantee treaties to give armed protection to Belgian neutrality. (473) But it was in her interest to do so. On July 31st Grey asked the French and German Governments whether they were prepared to undertake to respect Belgian neutrality. Paris said " Yes " at once—Berlin replied evasively. But on August 1st Grey declined to give Prince Lichnowsky a definite statement as to British neutrality in the event of Germany leaving Belgium untouched and even guaranteeing the integrity of France and her colonies ; Grey had to " keep our hands free." (474) The truth was that they had not been free for years. As shown in Chapter II, the Belgian question was not the decisive one for the British *Government* in regard to entry into the war ; (475) but it gave the British *people* enthusiasm for the crusade against the Central Powers. For the rest it must be pointed out that in a war on two fronts Germany would not have guaranteed Belgian neutrality ; for Moltke stated that

> even British neutrality would be bought too dearly at the price of respect for Belgium, since a war of aggression against France is only possible along the Belgian line. (476)

The march through Belgium was the violation of an international treaty, of which Prussia was one of the signatories, and which Germany had repeatedly recognized, and this breach of international law can only be defended on the score of Germany's precarious strategic position. (477) The British Government used it as the occasion for declaring war on Germany.

In those critical days Sir Edward Grey, as a good friend of his wrote, was

> plunged in his immense double struggle, (*a*) to prevent war and (*b*) not to desert France should it come. (478)

Grey failed in his first task because he had entangled himself inextricably in the net of the Entente, because he was filled with crude suspicions of Germany and her "plans of hegemony," because he was inspired by blind faith in the French and Russian love of peace, because he took Russia's part from the outset, and because his hands were no longer free to bring the decisive weight of Great Britain to bear for the preservation of peace. Yet, looking back, Lord Grey finds that he followed the only right course "that could have led to the entry of Britain into the war, immediately, whole-heartedly and with practical unanimity." (479) He has, however, to admit that without the German invasion of Belgium this would not have happened. (480) There would, indeed, then have been in the Cabinet, in Parliament, and among the whole population a division which might have postponed Britain's entry into the war (which ultimately was inevitable) perhaps for weeks. Apart from this, however, Lord Grey himself makes it clear that in 1914 he was primarily guided by Britain's interest. (481) That is every statesman's duty and is no reproach in itself. But it disposes of the claim to have placed European peace before all else.

Before the crisis Grey said to Prince Lichnowsky that Britain would never take part in a European war on the aggressive side. (482) In his Memoirs he gives as the real reason for Britain's entry into the war that she would have been isolated, discredited, and hated, and have been faced with a miserable and ignoble future, if she had not stood by France and stood up for Belgium against the German aggession. (483) (Note that even here Grey places France in the first and Belgium in the second place.) But France was not the real reason : it was, in Sir Eyre Crowe's words, the "honourable expectation" which Grey's policy since 1906 had raised in the Entente. (484) Otherwise it is inconceivable how Great Britain's failure to enter the war should have drawn upon her the ignominy and the consequences pictured by Grey. If Grey's supporters advanced once more at this point the theory of the responsibility of the Central Powers for the war, they would merely arouse derision with this long-exploded argument. For every day the number increases of those who, with Lord Rosebery, whose Under-Secretary of State Grey was once, and who so clearly foresaw the danger to peace created by the Entente, consider that

in the crisis of July 1914 it was Russia who was mainly to blame. (485)

No wonder that Sir Edward, after the outbreak of war, lay awake wondering whether the war could have been prevented by anything that he had omitted to do in the preceding years (486) —a mild expression for his active contribution to the bringing of the catastrophe. Lord Grey naturally arrives at a result which sets his doubts at rest. That is usual in works of self-defence. But his story will not stop there. And I may quote here this extract from a report sent to Sazonov on April 6, 1915, by Count Benckendorff :

> Grey is filled with a constant feeling, not without some justification, that it was he above all who, at a moment when public opinion in Britain and all Ministers were undecided, brought Britain into the war. (487)

Meanwhile the Triple or rather Quadruple Alliance had fallen apart. Italy declared neutrality on August 2nd, on the ground of Austria-Hungary's action ; Paris and London learned the news a day before the Central Powers. (488) Roumania followed Italy, observing outward forms better. On the other hand the German Government offered a treaty of alliance to Turkey, and this came into force on August 2nd. (489) In spite of Italy's defection the feeling in military quarters in Berlin on this day—unlike the feeling of the Foreign Ministry—was one of " absolute confidence " ; on August 5th, however, Moltke expressed concern at Britain's entry into the war. (490)

The feeling among the leaders in Paris was very different. The day on which Great Britain decided to enter the war was for Isvolsky the " proudest " day of his life ; (491) he boasted that " C'est ma guerre " ; (492) and the Spanish Ambassador in Paris has borne witness that he heard his Russian colleague say :

> Four years at my post have sufficed for me to reach my goal. (493)

Clearly Isvolsky could only talk in this strain if he and those in power in France counted absolutely on the success of their cause. And so it was. On August 10th Isvolsky reported that at the Quai d'Orsay there was " such entire confidence in our victory " that Ponceau, de Margerie's deputy, expressed the view that

> it would perhaps be an advantage to send Turkey into our enemies' camp, so as to be able to make an end of her. (494)

Poincaré was inspired with the same confidence. In the middle of August 1914 Lord French was "much impressed" in Paris "by the optimistic spirit of the President" and was sure that Poincaré

had formed great hopes of a victorious advance by the Allies. (495)

These testimonies also have their historic significance.

Conclusion.

In 1914 all the Powers placed their interests and selfish aims above world peace. Austria-Hungary had, however, at least the right of self-defence on her side; she had in this respect a better right to make war on Serbia than Russia had to make war on the Central Powers. (496) And Russia's deeper purpose was not the protection of Serbia but hegemony in the Balkans and the possession of the Straits. (497) That had already been for months her expressed war aim. France's case was similar, though not so openly expressed. She entered the war, as a British historian has written, "for the sake of the balance of power and to recover Alsace-Lorraine." (498) Had the French Government restrained Russia as in 1909, European war would have been avoided. (499) Russia's premature general mobilization prevented the treaty of alliance with France from operating. France, however, as Viviani said to Baron von Schoen in reply to the ultimatum, did "what her interests prompted." (500) The British Government under Sir Edward Grey, himself greatly under the influence of Sir Arthur Nicolson and Sir Eyre Crowe, was bound in honour to the Entente and took sides from the beginning of the crisis. Great Britain was the dominant factor for both sides, and was in control of the situation; had she immediately and clearly stated her position world peace would have been saved. But Sir Edward Grey had not the competence as a statesman or, in consequence of his predilections and prejudices, the personal inclination to use his power entirely in the service of peace. Finally, Germany, after Serbia's provocation, had produced the danger of war jointly with Austria by her blank cheque and laisser faire up to July 27th. Then, however, from July 28th, as soon as she clearly saw the danger, she put such pressure on her ally, so long as peace was still in the balance,

as no other Power applied. Had Britain and France brought similar pressure to bear on St. Petersburg, peace would have been preserved. In the final analysis the Austro-Serbian conflict grew monstrously into the world war through the inflexible system of alliances, " the curse of modern times." (501)

Any impartial examination of the crisis of July 1914 must thus come in the end to this result, that none of the belligerents except Belgium was guiltless and none was solely responsible. Each had had its part in the bringing of the world war. As, however, the Russian general mobilization amounted to a declaration of war on the Central Powers and was the actual unloosing of the European War, Fabre-Luce is justified in saying that

> Germany and Austria made war possible by their gestures ; the Triple Entente by theirs made it certain. (502)

The scale of responsibility may be expressed thus :

The first blow at world peace was the Serajevo murder (Serbia and Russia ; Austria-Hungary).

The second was the ultimatum and declaration of war against Serbia (Austria-Hungary and Germany).

The third and the critical one was the Russian general mobilization (Russia, France, Britain).

The Great Power principally to blame was thus Russia ; then Austria-Hungary ; then come the other three Powers. (503)

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. Bernadotte E. Schmitt, " Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 1901–1914." " American Historical Review," Vol. XXIX, No. 3, April 1924, p. 466. Gooch writes in similar terms in the " Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy," pp. 507–8.

2. The German documents contain ample material showing how seriously Austria-Hungary felt the Serbian peril since the Balkan Wars, regarding Serbia as the mortal enemy of the Monarchy : G.P., Vol. 33, doc. 12268, 12402, 12461, 12487, 12499 ; Vol. 34, doc. 12969, 12974, 13000, 13087, 13280, 13291–92, 13307 ; Vol. 35, doc. 13437, 13457, 13463, 13476, 13483, 13508, 13724 Anlage, 13749 ; Vol. 36, doc. 14137, 14144, 14196, p. 421, footnote † ; Vol. 38, doc. 15543, 15552 Anlage ; Vol. 39, doc. 15715, 15804, 15806. B.D., 56, 265, 677 ; Ba No. 22 ; Be II, No. 3 ; Introduction to the British

Blue Book 1914 ; Alcide Ebray, " A Frenchman Looks at the Peace," London : Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd., 1927, pp. 9, 10, 14 ; " Carnets," II, p. 178 ; Dickinson, pp. 412, 423, 477 ; Ewart, pp. 990, 1034, and ch. xxvi *passim* ; Ottokar Czernin, " Im Weltkriege," Berlin 1919, p. 40 ; Baron J. von Szilassy, " Der Untergang der Donau-Monarchie," Berlin 1921, p 223 ; Conrad, Vol. I, pp. 567–70, 578–79, 628 ; Vol. II, p. 24 ; Vol. III, pp. 231, 363, 373, 461–62, 729–31, 746, 782 ; Vol. IV, pp. 73–77 ; Feldmarschalleutnant A. Urbanski in the " Kriegsschuldfrage," February 1926, pp. 70 *sqq.* Austria-Hungary was also apprehensive in regard to the union of Serbia and Montenegro and, disagreeing with the German view, was unwilling to allow it—G.P., Vol. 38, ch. ccxci. For Russia's designs on Galicia and her intrigues there see Ewart, *op. cit.*, p. 990 ; K.F., March 1925, p. 167 ; V. Stepanowsky, " The Russian Plot to seize Galicia," London 1914 (published a few months before the outbreak of war), and Conrad, Vol. IV, pp. 331, 757, 869–70, 877.

3. B.D., 63. Cf. B.D., Nos. 4–7, 32, 39, 41, 52, 66, 69 ; G.P., Vol. 39, doc. 15844 (marginal notes), 15883, and page 190 above.

4. " The Intimate Papers of Colonel House," edited by Professor Charles Seymour, 2 vols., London 1926, Vol. I, p. 249 ; also pp. 267, 268, 285 ; G.P., Vol. 39, ch. ccxcii Anhang. Colonel House was apparently satisfied, however, with his conversations with the Emperor William and with Under-Secretary of State Zimmermann (though not with Tirpitz, whom he found an outspoken opponent of Britain). His mission was dealt with dilatorily in Britain, mainly, it would appear, because Grey was afraid of wounding French and Russian susceptibilities ! House was upset at this (p. 284), and President Wilson expressed the view that if London had gone to work more speedily the mission would have succeeded and the world war might have been prevented (p. 298) ; Seymour also thinks so—he writes :

> " If only the British had been less deliberate in their consideration of House's proposals, an understanding might have been reached before the murder of the Archduke " (p. 277 ; cf. p. 275).

5. Ba I. Cf. Siebert, pp. 713–15 ; Conrad, Vol. IV, pp. 277–78 ; " The Diary of Lord Bertie of Thame, 1914–18," 2 vols., London 1924, Vol. I, pp. 196–97, Vol. II, p. 60 ; B.D., No. 665.

6. See Conrad, Vols. I–V, Vienna 1921, 1922, 1923, 1925.

7. W. A. Suchomlinov, " Erinnerungen," Berlin 1914, p. 242.

8. See above, pp. 188–89.

9. " Belgische Aktenstücke, 1905–14," Berlin 1915, Nos. 101, 115 ; see above, pp. 189–90.

10. See above, pp. 167 *sqq.*, 178, 190.

11. " Zur Europäischen Politik," edited by B. Schwertfeger, Berlin 1919, Vol. IV, No. 88. It is of interest to note that the German naval attaché in Tokio wrote in a similar sense on June 10, 1914 : " I am struck by the certainty with which everyone counts on war against Germany at an early date . . . " ; quoted by Alfred von Tirpitz in his " Erinnerungen," Leipzig 1920, p. 235. Cf. K.F., December 1923, p. 129.

12. *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 248, 264.

13. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 249. Dawson, " Cobden," p. 264.

14. For the Serajevo murder see especially Professor Pharos, " Der Prozess gegen die Attentäter von Sarajewo," Berlin 1918 ; Dr. M. Boghitschewitsch, " Kriegsursachen," Zürich 1919 ; Boghitchevitch, " Le Procès de Salonique, Juin 1917," Paris 1927 ; Stanoje Stanojevic, " Die Ermordung des Erzherzogs Franz Ferdinand," German edition, Frankfurt-a-M. 1923 ; an article by

Ljuba Jovanovitch, formerly Minister of Public Instruction in the Pashitch Cabinet, in the Serbian collection " 1914–1924, Blut des Slawentums," Belgrade 1924 ; the same in German in K.F., February 1925, and in the same periodical, especially from April 1924 onwards, a series of articles by Dr. M. Boghitschewitsch, A. von Wegerer, Dr. F. von Wiesener, H. Lutz and others ; Prof. Sidney B. Fay in " Current History," October and November 1925 ; M. Edith Durham, " The Serajevo Crime," London 1925. Jovanovitch has since confirmed the accuracy of his revelations. Against the above accounts and testimonies Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson's book " Sarajewo. A Study in the Origins of the Great War," London 1926, is unconvincing. See A. von Wegerer's criticism in K.F., October 1926, pp. 767 *sqq.*, and the article by M. E. Durham in " Foreign Affairs," London, October 1926, pp. 104–05. For the influence of the " Black Hand " see also C. B. Thomson, " Old Europe's Suicide," London 1920, pp. 38–39, 55 ; M. E. Durham, " Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle," London 1920, p. 255 ; Conrad, Vol. III, pp. 475–76, 574.

15. Cp. Appuhn and P. Renouvin in their " Introduction aux Tableaux d'Histoire de Guillaume II," Paris 1923, p. lxii. Cf. Ewart, p. 1044–46 ; Oe 1914, No. 4 (Poincaré's view) ; Dickinson, pp. 410–14 ; Walter Schücking, " Die völkerrechtliche Lehre des Weltkrieges," Leipzig 1918, pp. 28 *sqq.* ; L. Bergsträsser, " Die diplomatischen Kämpfe vor Kriegsausbruch," Munich 1915, pp. 10 *sqq.*

16. We have already made acquaintance with Russia's support of Serbia ; see pp. 142 *sqq.*, 168 *sqq.* above. Cf. also B.D., 61, 80, 161, 221, 500. For the political activity of the " Narodna Odbrana," of which the Austro-Hungarian Government especially complained (it regarded the " Black Hand " as a group affiliated to the " Narodna Odbrana "), see K.F., March 1927, p. 192–225 ; D.D., 19a ; Oe II, 48 ; Count Czernin, p. 119 ; Dr. Hans Übersberger in " Der Weg zur Frieheit," June 15, 1926, p. 119 ; " Berliner Tageblatt," No. 158 of April 3, 1925 ; C. Oman, " The Outbreak of the War of 1914–18," London 1918, pp. 5 ff. ; Ewart, p. 1012, 1016–18 ; A. Fabre-Luce, " La Victoire," Paris 1924, p. 28 ; Pierre Renouvin, " Les Origines immédiates de la guerre," Paris 1925, p. 9 ; Pashitch himself has admitted the political activity of the " Narodna Odbrana " : M. E. Durham in " Foreign Affairs," October 1926.—For Hungary's guilt, see Wilhelm Schüssler, " Oesterreich und das deutsche Schicksal," Leipzig 1925, pp. 24–26, 37, 47, 71, 80, 82, 125, 129–31 ; Szilassy, p. 317 ; G.P., Vol. 34, doc. 12974.

17. See Pharos, various passages ; C. H. Norman, " A Searchlight on the European War," London 1924, pp. 23–24, 42–43 ; " Wochenschrift für Kultur, Politik und Volkswirtschaft," Vienna, August 9, 1924 ; on Freemasonry against the Habsburgs, see G.P., Vol. 20, doc. 6425 ; Conrad, Vol. III, p. 156. An extreme view is championed by Karl Heise in the book " Die Entente-Freimaurerei und der Weltkrieg," 2nd edition, Basle 1920 ; cf. " Carnets," I, pp. 50, 164 ; II, pp. 190, 236.

18. Schüssler, *op. cit.*, p. 132 ; cf. pp. 72, 77–79, 126 ; Ba, 3, 5 ; Fabre-Luce, *op. cit.*, p. 73. Hungary rejoiced at the death of Francis Ferdinand Ba, 3 ; Schüssler, p. 138 ; B.D., 70. In Italy his elimination was regarded " as almost providential."—B.D., No. 36 ; cf. Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 25. In St. Petersburg there was general relief " that so dangerous a personality should have been removed from the succession to the throne."—B.D., 49.

19. An article by Jovanovitch, K.F., February 1925, p. 70.

20. B.D., 58, 61, 73, 80, 156. Cf. " Carnets," II, p. 208. For other warnings and advice to Serbia, particularly from the German and Austrian

side, see Ba, 4, 6 ; D.D., 12, 38, 41, 55, 91 ; F., 9 ; Oe 1914, 2 ; B. W. von Bülow, " Die ersten Stundenschläge des Weltkrieges," Berlin 1922, p. 27 ; S., 1–4, 7–8, 12, 15–17, 19, 22–27, 30–31 ; Oman, pp. 14–15 ; B.D., 22, 27, 44, 65, 77, 158.

21. B.D., 27, 31, 35, 40, 45–47, 53, 55–56, 61, 74, 76, 80, 87, 156.

22. S., 14, 19, 26, 28 ; D.D., 120, 134 ; Oe I, 45 ; Oman, p. 18 ; B.D., 40, 53, 58, 60, 76, 156, 245. Renouvin, p. 12, considers the conduct of the Serbian Government after the murder as making matters worse for Serbia cf. B.D., 245.

23. B.D., 70. Cf. 28, 39, 64–65, 81.

24. B.D., 67.

25. B.D., 58. Cf. G.P., Vol. 34, doc. 13080 : Grey on the political morality of the Serbian Government.

26. B.D., 77, Minute.

27. More as to this later.

28. Vol. I, pp. 308–09.

29. " Common Sense about the War " (supplement to " New Statesman " of November 14, 1914). P. 26.

30. Conrad, Vols. I–IV. Szilassy, pp. 233–35, 265.

31. Oe I, 1, I Beilage ; Dr. Roderick Gooss, " Das Wiener Kabinett und die Entstehung des Weltkrieges," Vienna 1919, pp. 3 ff. ; D.D., 13, 14. Cf. Alexander Hoyos, " Der deutsch-englische Gegensatz und sein Einfluss auf die Balkanpolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns," Berlin 1922, pp. 39–40.

32. Ebray, pp. 9–10, 14 ; Ewart, ch. xxvi ; Fabre-Luce, pp. 92, 100–01 ; Renouvin, p. 252 ; Affaires Balcaniques, Vol. III, No. 156. Cf. also the literature quoted in Notes 2 and 16.

33. B.D., 265. Cf. 40 ; G.P., Vol. 36, doc. 14137, and p. 421, footnote *.

34. The thoughtful book of Prof. Dr. W. Schüssler, " Österreich und das deutsche Schicksal," Leipzig 1925, should be read on this subject. Francis Ferdinand repeatedly spoke with energy during the Balkan crisis against a war with Serbia ; internal problems were more important in his view ; with Russia, again, he aimed at a " Three Emperors' Alliance." Cf. G.P., Vol. 34, doc. 12788, 12793, 12905 ; Vol. 39, doc. 15732, 15736, app. ; Conrad, III, pp. 127, 157 (cf. I, pp. 247, 250) ; Brandenburg, p. 372.

35. Conrad to Baron Chlumecky : " In 1908–09 it would have been a game with cards on the table, in 1912–13 a game of chance ; *now* it is a va banque game."—Vol. IV, p. 72.

36. B.D., 26, 32, 39, 44 ; F., 30, 75c.

37. There is plenty of evidence that the Wilhelmstrasse did not anticipate active interference by Russia in an Austro-Serbian war arising out of the Serajevo murder : B.D., 122, 144, 150, 185, 249, 252, 301, 676–77 ; D.D., 72 ; F., 96 ; Fabre-Luce, *op. cit.*, p. 73 ; " Carnets," II, pp. 146, 211.

38. G.P., Vol. 14, doc. 3748. The italics are Von Bülow's.

39. G.P., Vol. 33, doc. 12339, 12349. The italics are the Emperor's.—Poincaré, in " L'Europe sous les Armes," Paris 1926, pp. 330–32, makes much, with others, of the conversation, made public by F., 6, which the Emperor had in the autumn of 1913 with the King of the Belgians, and from which a revulsion in the Emperor's mind in favour of war is deduced. We may confidently assume that the account contains a kernel of truth. In this case, however, the evident object of the Emperor and of Moltke was to frighten King Albert, and to make clear to him how wise of Belgium it would be to allow Germany to march through Belgium in case of a general war. Even Jules Cambon and Poincaré admit the possibility of this (cf. " Carnets," II,

pp. 95–96, 146–47). How little, however, any real revulsion in the Emperor's mind can be deduced is evident from Colonel House's remarks on his conversation with William II in June 1914, when the latter showed evident sympathy with the peace efforts of the American.—*Op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 261–62, 264, 267, 278–79, 283. Again in April 1915 House concluded : " It is clear to me that the Kaiser did not want war and did not actually expect it " (p. 287).—Cf. Fabre-Luce, pp. 184, 198–200, 270–71.

There is some evidence that in the autumn of 1913 the Emperor occasionally made warlike utterances.—See Conrad, Vol. III, pp. 469–70, 474, 486 ; G.P., Vol. 36, doc. 14172, 14176 R, p. 387, footnote * ; Vol. 39, p. 230, footnote * ; cf. A. Mendelssohn Bartholdy, in K.F., February 1925, p. 97.

40. G.P., Vol. 36, doc. 13724, Anl.

41. G.P., Vol. 27, doc. 9943, 9946, 9949 (cf. Vol. 17, doc. 5007) ; Vol. 39, doc. 15734 ; Hoyos, p. 28.

42. Tirpitz, p. 217 ; Crown Prince William, " Erinnerungen," published by Karl Rosner, Stuttgart 1922, p. 139. Schüssler, p. 177, heads a chapter : " Germany as a tool of the House of Habsburg." Cf. Stieve, " Deutschland," p. 141 ; Gooch, " Revelations," p. 28 ; Barnes, p. 185 ; Ba, p. 7 ; F., 41, 75c ; Seymour, p. 276 ; Victor Margueritte, " Les criminels," Paris 1925, pp. 206–07 ; " Recent Disclosures concerning the Origins of the World War," discussed by H. E. Barnes and B. E. Schmitt, Chicago 1926, p. 19.

43. Conrad, Vol. IV, pp. 34 *sqq.* ; Hoyos, pp. 79–80 ; Count Tisza in a letter of November 5, 1914, to Tschirschky, " Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung," February 15, 1925 ; Dr. A. Weber in K.F., December 1925, pp. 820, 825 ; Fabre-Luce, p. 202 ; Renouvin, pp. 17, 253 ; Schüssler, pp. 25–26, 148–49, 168, 172, 197–99.

44. Ba, pp. 8–9 ; Oe I, 15 ; Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 42 ; Hoyos, p. 80.

45. D.D., I, pp. xiii *sqq.*, No. 74 ; Ba, 8 ; B.D., 122, 147, 159, 665 ; Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 63 ; Ewart, pp. 94, 997, 1071, 1163 ; Renouvin, pp. 46, 253, 256.

46. G.P., Vol. 27, doc. 9896 ; Vol. 34, doc. 12593, 12788 (R.1), 12709, 12739, 12788 (R.1), 13000, 13002, 13119, 13139, 13203, 13225, p. 359, footnote *, 562 footnote *, 676 footnote *, 744 footnote *, 875 footnote * ; Vol. 35, doc. 13395, 13428 Anl., 13508, 13635, 13649, 13655, 13703 ; Vol. 36, doc. 13781, 14160, 14170, 14174, 14178, 14520 ; Vol. 38, doc. 15553 ; Vol. 39, doc. 15720, 15757, 15763 ; Conrad, Vol. III, pp. 113 *sqq.*, 479 ; Schüssler, pp. 79–80, 150, 153–54 ; " Affaires Balcaniques," Vol. II, doc. 44 ; B.D., 39, 676 ; Grey, Vol. II, p. 33 ; Alfred Dumaine, " La Dernière Ambassade de France en Autriche," Paris 1921, pp. 219 *sqq.* ; Szilassy, pp. 208, 223–28, 230–35, 265 ; Gooch, " Revelations," pp. 28, 69–70, 73, 75, 81–82, 139.

47. P.G. ; Czernin, pp. 12, 15–20, 40 ; Hoyos, p. 81 ; " Das Neue Reich," Vienna, June 28, 1923, pp. 991–92 ; Gooss, p. 40, note, p. 69, note ; B.D., 40, 56, 150, 160, 295, 307, 450, 459, 665, 676 ; F., 18, 20, 109 ; R.W., 52 ; Dumaine, pp. 131–33, 140, 210, 226–28 ; Fabre-Luce, pp. 43–45, 50, 106, 248 ; Renouvin, pp. 41, 250–51.

48. Oe I, 17. It is known that American members of the Peace Commission came into possession of the " Wiesner document " ; apparently, however, only the section quoted was put before them. Robert Lansing and James Brown Scott belonged to the victors' Commission for the Investigation of the Causes of the War ; they made much capital out of this unrepresentative passage from the Wiesner report. Public challenges to the two Americans named, to pronounce on the *whole* of Wiesner's report and on Ljuba Jovanovitch's revelations, seem up to the present to have been without

result. See Hermann Lutz, " The Serbian ' Black Hand,' " in " The Freeman," New York, May 2, 1923 ; Dr. Fr. Wiesner in K.F., October 1925, pp. 641 *sqq.* ; Bausman, pp. 204–05.

49. Conrad, Vol. IV, pp. 30, 67–68, 82 *sqq.*, 92 ; Wiesner in K.F., October 1925. See also " John Bull," July 11, 1914, and B.D., 47.

50. S. B. Fay, in " Current History," November 1925, p. 207, rightly emphasizes this. Renouvin, p. 10, adopts the same standpoint, though without knowledge of Jovanovitch's revelations. Cf. also p. 11.

51. See in particular Ewart, pp. 922–23, 948, 1046–47.

52. Thus in London, in 1925, I asked an English publicist, well known as a passionate opponent of the Central Powers, how Britain would have behaved on a full knowledge of the facts. " England," he said, " would not have given a single soldier for Serbia."

53. G.P., Vol. 33, doc. 12216, 12256, 12264, 12268–69, 12272, 12282, 12300, 12308, 12386–87, 12467, 12481, 12483 ; Vol. 34, doc. 12542, 12668, 12805, 12818, 12887, 12908, 12995, 13035, 13095, 13104, 13225, 13234, 13241, 13243, 13269 ; Vol. 35, doc. 13413, 13417, 13475, 13481, 13490, 13568, 13749 ; Vol. 39, doc. 15833, 15834 Anl., 15835 ; Conrad, Vol. III, pp. 113 *sqq.* ; Czernin, p. 117 ; Stieve, " Deutschland," p. 141 ; " Affaires Balcaniques," I, doc. 292, II, doc. 24, 31, 293 (but also doc. 111) ; Poincaré, " Les Balkans," pp. 232, 259, 323 ; Poincaré, " Sous les Armes," p. 84 ; B.D., 276, 459 ; " Carnets," I, p. 241 (but also p. 175) ; D.D., 41, 120, 129 ; Brandenburg, pp. 364, 406.

54. Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 30 ; cf. Vol. I, p. 380 ; Vol. II, pp. 344, 439 ; Vol. III, pp. 114, 758. See also, on the other hand, Vol. IV, pp. 121, 123–24, 156, 161, 164–65, 266, 308.

55. Gooss, pp. 52–53. For the belief of Austrian diplomatists, and of the Ballplatz, that Russia would not interfere, see B.D., 85, 173, 665, 676–77 ; F., 50 ; R.W., 76 ; Baron von Musulin, " Das Haus am Ballplatz," Munich 1924, pp. 226–27 ; Szilassy, p. 268. Cf. G.P., Vol. 38, doc. 15546 ; Vol. 39, doc. 15730, 15736 Anl. ; " Carnets," II, p. 225.

56. Oe I, 12 ; also 2, 8, 9 ; Gooss, pp. 29, 49, 53 *sqq.*, 62 *sqq.* ; Conrad, Vol. IV, pp. 34, 40, 44–45, 49–50, 57–61 ; cf. B.D., 51, 55, 65, 82, 85 ; Dickinson, p. 418. Cf. Dr. W. Franknoi, " Die ungarische Regierung und die Entstehung des Weltkrieges," Vienna 1919. Baron Szilassy also believed in Russia's active support of Serbia—*op. cit.*, pp. 247–48, 260.

57. Gooss, pp. 62, 65 ; Schüssler, p. 168 ; cf. Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 70 ; D.D., 49.

58. D.D., 49. Dr. A. Weber, in K.F., December 1925, p. 824 ; Gooch, " Revelations," pp. 62, 90.

59. B.D., 29 ; also 27, 44–45, 55, 58, 70, 81, 158, 161 ; Ba, 18 ; K.F., September 1925, pp. 618 *sqq.*

60. Oe I, 26 ; Gooss, pp. 87 *sqq.* Cf. Conrad, Vol. III, p. 463 ; Vol. IV, pp. 91–92 ; G.P., Vol. 34, doc. 12696 ; Schüssler, p. 171 ; Renouvin, p. 31.

61. D.D., 46. Cf. 61, 68, 87, 150. The italics are Jagow's.

62. D.D., 94 ; Oe I, 35 ; Ba, 18.

63. Ba, 18.

64. Renouvin, p. 67, Note 3 ; Schüssler, p. 157.

65. An examination of the Austrian and German documents, as well as Dr. R. Gooss' exposition, shows this unmistakably. Cf. K.F., December 1925, p. 826 ; Schüssler, pp. 35, 80, 120, 146–47, 188 ; Ebray, pp. 9–10, 14 ; Ba, 14 ; Veit Valentin, " Deutschlands Aussenpolitik 1890–1918," Berlin 1921, p. 234.

66. B.D., 32. Cf. 39.

67. Oe I, 15.

68. D.D., 72. Cf. B.D., 653, 665; F., 14; Fabre-Luce, pp. 184, 192, 201, 204–05; Renouvin, p. 254. Prof. A. Mendelssohn Bartholdy considers that the idea of preventive war existed in Germany and was justified: K.F., February 1925, p. 97. Cf. Herzfeld, pp. 81–82; Dr. Eugen Fischer, "Kriegsschuldfrage und Aussenpolitik," Berlin 1923. For views of the German General Staff on preventive war, see 230–31.

69. Grey, Vol. I, p. 294.

70. G.P., Vol. 12, doc. 3267.

71. D.D., 27, 30, 39, 41–43, 51–53, 55, 60, 64, 73, 76, 78, 86, 92, 109, 118, 120, 131, 134; Ba, 19; Oe I, 23, 25, 33, 35, 38, 40–41, 43, 45, 53; F., 10, 17, 19; S., 28, 30; B.D., 60, 164. Late warnings, D.D., 121, 124, 129, 135; Renouvin, pp. 48, 52.

72. Dickinson, p. 479; see also Dr. Fischer's work, mentioned in Note 68.

73. *Op. cit.*, pp. 350, 515. Cf. House's remark quoted above (p. 214), and articles in the "Matin" and "Temps" in B.D., 52, 66.

74. B. von Eggeling, "Die russische Mobilmachung und der Kriegsausbruch," Oldenburg 1919, p. 19.

75. G.P., Vol. 14, doc. 3940; cf. Giuliano's view in Vol. 36, doc. 14619; also doc. 14631. Sir Eyre Crowe, in his minute to B.D., 170, expressed himself quite unambiguously in favour of a possible preventive war by England against Germany.

76. A careful and impartial examination of the German, Bavarian, and Austrian records, and of the books of Conrad and Dr. R. Gooss, will confirm the correctness of these assertions. Note in particular D.D., Vol. I, pp. xiii *sqq.*, No. 7, 13–15, 18–19, 23, 26, 29, 31, 36, 44, 46, 48–50, 58, 61, 65, 67, 70, 72, 77, 83–84, 87, 94, 100, 104–05, 107, 112, 123, 127; Ba, pp. 6–11, Nos. 8, 11, 14, 18–19; Oe I, 1, 6–7, 10–11, 15, 19, 21, 23, 26, 35, 39, 41; Gooss, pp. 52–53, 58–59, 62, 65, 87 *sqq.*, 127; Conrad, Vol. IV, pp. 36–39, 57, 61, 63, 70, 79, 91–92, 109; "Beilagen," I, pp. 33, 119; B.D., 86, 91, 97, 100 Min., 106, 110, 122, 159, 175, 196, 227, 245, 579, 648, 676–77; Eggeling, pp. 22, 27 (47–48); Baron von Schoen, "Erlebtes," Stuttgart 1921, pp. 162, 216, 223–24; Schüssler, p. 172; Ewart, pp. 1043, 1071, 1163; Fabre-Luce, pp. 51, 232, 270; Renouvin, pp. 27, 253; Erich Brandenburg, "Von Bismarck zum Weltkriege," Berlin 1924, p. 416. Tirpitz at once considered the ultimatum unacceptable, and the war against Serbia not localizable, *op. cit.*, p. 212; cf. p. 228.

77. Gooss, p. 127.

78. These post-war statements cannot entirely convince, so far as the period up to July 24th is concerned (cf. Dickinson, p. 421; Renouvin, pp. 36, 40). After the effect of the Note began to show itself, it is true that Jagow admitted to the French Ambassador in Berlin—still on July 24th—that the Note was "too stiff," whereupon Cambon of course promptly expressed his surprise "that he could endorse such a document."—B.D., 103; F., 30. Jagow is reported as having admitted on July 25th to the British Chargé d'Affaires that the Serbian Government "could not swallow certain . . . demands."—B.D., 122, 176; Jagow has, however, emphatically denied this in his "England und der Kriegsausbruch," Berlin 1925, pp. 11–12.

79. D.D., 100.

80. Brandenburg, p. 417; Renouvin, p. 253; B.D., 307 Min.

81. B.D., 103.

82. Cf. the references under Note 76; also B.D., 159; R.W., 21; Be II, 6.

83. It is usual to make comparisons, in favour of the Austrian Note, with the Italian Note to Greece in 1923 and especially with the British ultimatum to Egypt in November 1924. Certainly both were in themselves almost as brutal as the Austrian Note to Serbia ; in particular points perhaps more so. But the Central Powers knew, in 1914, that a world war might arise from Vienna's step. The position was quite different in the other two cases. And as regards the British ultimatum to Egypt, the entirely different status of Serbia and Egypt is overlooked. Egypt was not only under Britain's suzerainty, but there was actually a joint Egyptian-British army in Egypt, at the head of which was an Englishman, Sir Lee Stack, who had been murdered. It is, therefore, only with considerable reservations that I can agree in the remarks of Prof. Fr. Kern in K.F., January 1925, pp. 38 ff. My dissent, however, in no way implies approval of the ultimatums of 1923 and 1924.

84. Oe I, 34 ; B.D., 156, 676 ; F., 55 ; R.W., 36 ; Beginn, pp. 5, 12 ; Conrad, Vol. IV, pp. 61, 63.

85. P.G. ; Oe I, 24, 26, 33, 35 ; Gooss, pp. 78, 79 Note, 84 Note 2, 88, 115, 117, 142, 201 Note ; B.D., 50, 55–56, 60, 72, 74, 76–78, 161–62, 653, 676 ; D.D., 44, 47, 54, 59 ; F., 14, 72 ; Senate Report, p. 80 ; R.W., 4 ; Beginn, pp. 3–5, 43 ; Renouvin, pp. 35, footnote 2, 49, 224 ; Barnes-Schmitt discussion, p. 32 ; Schoen, p. 164 ; House, Vol. I, p. 282 ; Henry Wickham Steed, " Through Thirty Years," London 1926, p. 400 ; Demartial, " Evangile," pp. 12–13. B.D., 648 cannot count as evidence to the contrary in the case of Italy, since she had an evident interest in justifying her attitude by claiming that she had received no information about the step taken by Vienna.

86. B.D., 61, 80, 93 ; Durham, in " Foreign Affairs," London, October 1926, p. 104 ; K.F., March 1927, p. 251.

87. D.D., 50, 93, 96, 103, 108, 112, 127 ; Ba, 14.

88. Poincaré, " Le Lendemain," pp. 315–16, 323, 335 ; " Les Balkans," pp. 27, 35–36, 38, 305–06, 321, 416–17 ; " Sous les Armes," pp. 32, 76, 78, 80–81, 316. Jonnart, Poincaré's successor as Foreign Minister, did the same. —Judet, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

89. Paléologue, " Revue des Deux Mondes," January 15, 1921. Paléologue there admits that as early as the middle of June he expressed the belief to Viviani in Paris " that war will soon be upon us and that we have to prepare for it "—naturally on account of the warlike designs of Germany. On Paléologue, see " Carnets," II, pp. 160, 164–66, 211.

90. Cruppi, in the " Matin," August 26, 1915.

91. Renouvin, p. 117. According to Fabre-Luce (pp. 209–10), Poincaré gave the Russians in St. Petersburg carte blanche ; cf. pp. 58, 163, footnote 1 ; Demartial, " Evangile," p. 26 ; " Carnets," II, pp. 143, 185, 192–93 ; Ebray, p. 13.

Indications of the understanding arrived at are

1. the result of the visit, in B.D., 101 ;

2. the official communiqué on the visit—B.D., 196 (cf. 373) ;

3. the speeches of Poincaré and the Tsar on July 22, 1914—" Beginn," p. 62 ;

4. notes of Baron Schilling's at the time about remarks made by Paléologue—" Beginn," p. 8 ;

5. a declaration by Sazonov some time after the outbreak of war, according to which France and Russia had determined " to break the pride of Germany at any price, and once for all to make her stop treading on the toes of her neighbours "—quoted by Ewart, p. 154 ;

6. Buchanan's view in B.D., 665 ;

7. F., 22, and " Livre Noir," II, p. 275.

92. B.D., 101 ; cf. " Beginn," p. 6.--F., 31 reproduces this conversation in a quite unsatisfactory manner.

93. General S. Dobrorolski, " Die Mobilmachung der russischen Armee, 1914," Berlin 1922, pp. 21 (read there 24th instead of 25th July), 37, 42, 50. Cf. Eggeling, p. 42 ; Frantz, " Russlands Eintritt," pp. 63–64. In the Russian General Staff British participation in a European war seems to have been fairly counted on.—Frantz, pp. 113, 118, 135 (Gooch, " Revelations," p. 109).

94. Novoye Vremya on December 23, 1914. Cf. B.D., 61, 80, 161, 221, 500.

95. B.D., 125. Word in brackets Lutz's.

96. Dobrorolski ; Frantz, " Russlands Eintritt," pp. 22–24, 46, 55–64, 189–200 ; Frantz in " Current History," New York, March 1927, p. 855. As early as July 26th Buchanan reported the " intending " mobilization.—B.D., 155.

97. B.D., 125. Paléologue communicated this on July 25th to the Italian Ambassador in St. Petersburg as well.—K.F., May 1924, p. 164. According to " Beginn," p. 15, the French support was not formally granted until July 28th ; this cannot, however, have been anything but a confirmation. Cf. R.W., 87 ; R.F., p. 30. The assurance to Paléologue from " France " onwards —R.F., p. 36—is missing in F.

In this conversation of July 25th Paléologue expressed the opinion that the " French Government would want to know at once whether our " (British) " fleet was prepared to play the part assigned to it by Anglo-French Naval Convention. He could not believe that England would not stand by her two friends, who were acting as one in this matter." On this subject, see above, p. 106.

98. B.D., 125. Important sections were omitted from this report in 1914.

99. Nekludof in " Souvenirs diplomatiques," quoted by Fabre-Luce, p. 210. Cf. B.D., 101 Min., 665.—On the evening of the 25th Paléologue parted from Isvolsky, who had come to St. Petersburg specially for Poincaré's visit, and was now hurrying back to his post as Ambassador, with the words : " This time it is war " (Paléologue, p. 251).

100. B.D., 665. A telegram of Sazonov's of the 25th began with the sentence : " In the present position of affairs the greatest significance attaches to Britain's attitude."—" Beginn," p. 44.

101. M. Pokrowski, " Drei Konferenzen," Berlin 1920, pp. 41, 45.

102. Vol. I, pp. 310–13 ; cf. pp. 302, 339.

103. Jagow, p. 55 ; A. von Tirpitz, " Der Aufbau der Deutschen Weltmacht," Stuttgart 1924, pp. 429–30. Of English and American critics of Grey's policy I may mention Barnes, " Genesis," pp. 452–53, 489–90, 537–38, 577 ; Dickinson, p. 465 ; Henderson, p. 185.

104. " Livre Noir," II, p. 330 ; Henderson, p. 190 (187) ; Barnes, pp. 565–66, 580 ; Ewart, p. 692.

105. B.D., 101 Min. Also Grey in B.D., 638, 656.

106. Vol. II, p. 29 ; cf. Vol. I, pp. 336–37.

107. *Op. cit.*, p. 477.

108. B.D., 66 Min.

109. B.D., 101 Min. (this fear of Russia crops up in three places in this Minute of Crowe's) ; also B.D., 33, 66 Min., 77 Min., 125, 153, 184 Min., 204, 239, 369, 490, 665. Russia naturally took advantage of this fear ; thus Grey told Lichnowsky and Mensdorff on July 27th that he had already been accused by Russia of putting himself too much on the side of the Central Powers.—Oe II, 91. St. Petersburg had employed the same procedure

already in the Liman crisis, and had made the case "a touchstone for the attitude of English policy towards Russia generally."—G.P., Vol. 38, doc. 15480 (cf. 15485, 15517, 15524). In reality St. Petersburg felt dependent on London, as already shown and as will appear again later; only St. Petersburg played very cleverly on the British fear. Sazonov, "a staunch friend of England" (Gooch, "Revelations," p. 181), was determined to hold on to the Entente (e.g. G.P., Vol. 39, doc. 15885; Affaires Balcaniques, Vol. III, No. 433); compare what is said in Chapter III about Russia's search for alliances. A new orientation of Russian policy would, however, only have been possible if Russia had dropped France and England, and Germany had dropped Austria-Hungary!

110. *Op. cit.*, p. 174.

111. Unquestionably the British Ambassador in Vienna, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, had these sympathies in a considerably higher degree than Sir Edward Grey. The Russian Ambassador in Vienna telegraphed on August 1st his objection to the members of the British Embassy in Vienna expressing "openly their sympathy with Austria."—"Iswolski im Weltkriege," doc. 13. Cf. B.D., 230, 676; Oe II, 90.

112. Oe I, 30, 61; II, 62, 90.

113. Vol. I, p. 310.

114. B.D., 102. In this Grey found himself hardly in harmony with public opinion in Great Britain, as expressed in the leading newspapers; Sazonov complained on the 25th: "with the exception of 'The Times,' nearly the whole of English Press was on the side of Austria . . ."—B.D., 125. Cf. B.D., 79, 98.

115. B.D., 86, 91; Oe II, 14.

116. During the Balkan Conferences Grey is said to have stated frankly on one occasion that Austria-Hungary could not ask that England, with her particular relations with Russia, should take up a quite impartial standpoint (Schücking, *op. cit.*, p. 99).

117. In retrospect, Grey seems to make a slight admission in this respect. —Vol. II, pp. 22–23.

118. Vol. I, p. 330. When, during the war, an American Senator told Grey he ought to have held Russia back, Grey wrote about it to Roosevelt: "This made me indignant."—Vol. II, p. 150.

119. B.D., 77 Min., 79, 239; F., 32. That Lichnowsky worked for peace is candidly recognized in England; e.g. Grey, Vol. II, p. 13. On Lichnowsky, see also Ewart, p. 1077.

120. B.D., 32, 38, 41, 68.

121. B.D., 160.

122. B.D., 129, 134.

123. B.D., 192. Bertie at that time wrote further: "Iswolsky is expected back here to-day or to-morrow and he is not an element of peace." See further advice of Bertie's of this kind and the view of the Foreign Office thereon, in B.D., 184, 184 Min., 193, 204, 216, 244, 270, 320.

124. B.D., 676.

125. This will be seen later.

126. B.D., 98. Italics Lutz's.

127. See p. 266.

128. B.D., 105, 116, 118, 171; F., 40; D.D., 236; "Livre Noir," II, pp. 329–30.

129. B.D., 112.

130. B.D., 99.

131. B.D., 112, 116, 132. See also especially Nicolson in B.D., 146.

132. R., 20, 22.

133. G.P., Vol. 26, doc. 9375, p. 599.

134. Grey, Vol. I, pp. 317–18; B.D., 132. The reason given for the omission is by no means convincing. Consideration for Count Benckendorff may have been a reason, but I am convinced that it was not the deciding one. This was, more probably, that Grey, as will appear later, recognized on July 31st the prematureness of the Russian general mobilization, and that apart from that he thought fit to conceal from the public his attitude of partiality towards Russia, especially since he had acted on July 25th on his own responsibility, that is, without consulting the Cabinet. On this, see pp. 295 *sqq.*

135. Vol. I, p. 315. Grey connects the "belief" with proceedings on July 26th. The 26th, however, was Sunday, and he was in the country, as usual, so that the "belief" must refer to the 25th.

136. Vol. I, p 314.

137. The new British documents provide impressive material on this subject—see the Minutes on 101, 175, 215, 249, 264, 298, 311, 315, 337 and 385; B.D., 369, 446; also Footnote to 109. A perusal of these documents reminds one that London was exactly informed as to the progress of the mobilization. On Crowe and Nicolson, cf. also Charles-Roux, pp. 728 ff., and Chapter III.

138. B.D., 171–72, 239, and Minutes on 174, 193, 199. In the Minutes a difference may be recognized between the attitudes of Crowe and Nicolson.

139. B.D., 101, Minute.

140. Vol. I, p. 339 (313); B.D., 318, Minute.

141. R., 22; D.D., 180.

142. B.D., 101, Minute.

143. Sir Almeric Fitzroy, "Memoirs," London 1924, entry August 1st.

144. This is clear from B.D., 367–69, 426, 447; Churchill, pp. 148, 168; Norman, p. 54; Grey, Vol. I, p. 334; II, p. 33. See also above, pp. 295 *sqq.*

145. Vol. I, p. 339.

146. B.D., 132.

147. Renouvin, pp. 115, 256. Fabre-Luce similarly recognizes the danger of the Russian partial mobilization—p. 219; Corrado Barbagallo, in K.F., July 1924, p. 253.

Grey's encouragement of the Russians to carry out a partial mobilization was plain at once from the documents available in 1914: Lutz ("Greys Mitverantwortung für die russische Mobilmachung"), in K.F., May 1925, pp. 315 *sqq.*; "Current History," New York, May 1925.

Grey's encouragement of the Russian mobilization against Austria produced the following military disproportion: Serbia mobilized, on the afternoon of July 25th, 11 to 15 divisions; Austria followed on the evening of the 25th with the mobilization of 22 divisions, and Russia, on the 29th, called 55 divisions to the colours, so that Austria with her 22 divisions saw herself opposed by a force more than three times as strong!

148. B.D., 101, 125 (367); R.W., 16; R.F., p. 30.

149. D.D., 157, 164, 171, 172; B.D., 93, 96, 101, 108 minute, 117–18, 122, 125, 166, 196; F., 41–43; R., 14.

150. B.D., 144, 149 minute, 239 (see also No. 122).

151. R., 4–5, 11–12; Oe, 27–30; F., 45, 50; D.D., 178.

152. B.D., 98–99, 112–13, 116, 122, 125, 132, 145, 174, 176, 190, 194, 223, 252 minute, 263; D.D., 179–80, 192; F., 37; Renouvin, pp. 54–56. For

the mediation by four Powers on July 28th see B.D., 223, 252 minute, 258, 263, 276, 285–86, 295, 301, 329.

153. B.D., 114–15, 120, 135, 149–50; D.D., 186, 191a; Oe II, 57.

154. Grey, Vol. I, p. 315.

155. Vol. I, p. 315.

156. G.P., Vol. 35, doc. 13510; also 13505, 13516, 13529, 13554. Lichnowsky repeatedly took up a position plainly against the interests of the Central Powers in 1912–13.—Doc. 12556–57, 12562, 12708, 12763, 12803, 12822, 12826.

157. G.P., Vol. 34, doc. 12890; cf. 12561 and p. 71, footnote *.

158. Vol. I, pp. 321–22, 324.

159. For the Conference, see B.D., 139–40, 146, 154, 183, 185, 189–90, 192, 194, 196, 198, 202, 206, 211, 215, 218, 223, 239, 242, 249, 252, 258, 263–64, 276, 281, 299, 459, 676; Grey, Vol. I, p. 276; II, pp. 314 *sqq.*; D.D., 236, 428, 304. Grey writes on Vol. II, p. 315, that Sazonov gave "prompt" assent; this gives a wrong impression; Sazonov was against a conference at first, as, for instance, Ewart has shown (*op. cit.*, p. 1076). Fabre-Luce, pp. 61–63, and Dickinson, p. 438, have recognized that the conference would have pronounced against the Central Powers (there was no room for doubt as to Italy's attitude); Renouvin also has no doubt as to this (pp. 71 *sqq.*). For the unsuitability of such a conference, see Blunt, *op. cit.*, p. 447; Shaw, "Common Sense," p. 7; Fabre-Luce, pp. 61–63; cf. also Jagow, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

160. B.D., 144.

161. B.D., 125, 153, 360; R.W., 44; Be, p. 47; F., 26; Oe II, 11; Poincaré, "Origines," p. 213. Report of the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires in St. Petersburg, "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," May 22, 1919. For the suggestion that Berthelot drafted the Serbian reply in Paris, see Renouvin, p. 60.

162. B.D., 107, 125, 221. In agreeing to abandon Belgrade and withdraw her forces, Serbia probably acted in agreement with Russia. R.W., 8; B.D., 125.

163. S., 39; Oe II, 47, 96; B.D., 171 minute, 239, Enclosure B; D.D., 271, 421 note 2; Ba, 47; Morhardt, *op. cit.*, pp. 70 *sqq.*; Renouvin, pp. 58–65.

164. Oe II, 1, 25, 26.

165. Conrad, Vol. II, p. 383; Vol. IV, pp. 266 *sqq.*; R. Kissling, in K.F., June 1926, pp. 365 *sqq.*; B.D., 136, 142, 290, 423.

166. From the morning of July 25th to the afternoon of July 27th the following warnings, some of them very urgent, reached Berlin: D.D., 152, 156–57, 160–61, 163, 165, 168–69, 177, 179–80, 184, 194, 204, 211–12, 216–18, 225, 230, 236, 238, 240, 242, 244, 252, 255. (Cf. Oe II, 14–19, 23, 34–36, 41, 49–50, 54, 56, 60–61, 63, 70–74, 77, 93; B.D., 109, 199.) As against these warnings there were but few reassuring telegrams.—D.D., 207, 217, 222–23, 235, 238.

167. D.D., 197, 245, and material in note 45.—Sir Arthur Nicolson minuted a report from Vienna of statements by Tschirschky, "How little can he grasp the real situation." This remark may well be extended to the authorities at the Wilhelmstrasse.

168 D.D., 138, 142, 206.

169. D.D., 213.

170. This is plain from Oe II, 32.

171. D.D., 213.

172. D.D., 257.

173. Oe II, 67. Jagow clearly did not say a word to suggest that it was better, as things were, to wait still before declaring war.

174. "Journal Officiel," July 1922, p. 2336. Words in brackets Lutz's. Cf. Charles-Roux, pp. 721–22.

175. B.D., 104–05, 116, 118, 172 (188); Oe II, 13; D.D., 180; F., 40; "Livre Noir," II, pp. 329–30; Gooss, pp. 192–93, 211, 213, 215.

176. Ewart, pp. 1097–98, 1106; Renouvin, pp. 79–80, 85, 118, 255–56; Fabre-Luce, p. 214. (Cf. Oe II, 95; R.W., 76; Gooss, pp. 217 *sqq.*)

177. H. von Moltke, "Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente," Stuttgart 1922, p. 381. I am unable, therefore, to attach to the circumstance that Moltke drafted the ultimatum which was sent later to Belgium as early as July 26th (D.D., 376, footnote 1) the importance assigned to it by Professor Schmitt in his controversy with Professor Barnes.—*Op. cit.*, p. 23.

178. Ba, 35, p. 148.

179. Be II, 14. Conrad was against declaring war before August 12th—Vol. IV, pp. 131–32, 136–37, 142, 145.

180. B.D., 165–66.

181. B.D., 171.

182. B.D., 170 minute. It would be of importance to know whether Crowe and the authorities at the Foreign Office were aware as early as July 25th of the difficulty in the question of mobilizations, or whether they only realized this some days later. If the former, their encouragement of Russia's mobilization against Austria would call for still more severe condemnation.

183. B.D., 175 minute. This report from Bunsen arrived shortly after No. 170. After deciphering, the two must have been sent forward almost simultaneously.

184. This is perfectly clear from the minute to B.D., 170.

185. B.D., 101 minute. Crowe had further advised "to mobilize the fleet as soon as any other Great Power mobilizes," and he considered that this decision should "be announced without delay," that is on July 25th, "to the French and Russian Governments." Grey, however, regarded a declaration to this effect as premature; it would certainly have been an encouragement to France and Russia of which the consequences would have been incalculable. Nicolson, on the other hand, seems to have inclined to Crowe's opinion. See also Gooss, p. 201, footnote.

186. Grey added that the Russian Ambassador "must not take my reference" (to the orders to the fleet not to disperse) "as meaning that we promised anything more than diplomatic action"—telegram to Buchanan, B.D., 177. But of what importance could this reservation be after Russia had been encouraged in partial mobilization? Cf. Charles-Roux, *op. cit.*, pp. 735–36.

187. The letter could not influence the course of events in St. Petersburg, as it certainly reached St. Petersburg after the Russian general mobilization; but it shows clearly the attitude which the Foreign Office took up towards the Russian Embassy, whence information must quickly have been conveyed to St. Petersburg.

188. B.D., 238; cf. F., 63, 66. For the preparedness of the British Fleet before the crisis, see Churchill, *op. cit.*, pp. 194 *sqq.*

189. Oe II, 68. Italics Szögyényi's.

190. This is shown in detail in P.G. Cf. Renouvin, pp. 91–95; Fabre-Luce, pp. 48–50; the statements by Bethmann Hollweg and Jagow in the German White Book, 1919, p. 60; Gooss, pp. 31 footnote 1, 173 *sqq.*, 248 note 3, 253 note 2 (here Gooss is in error).

191. D.D., 238; B.D., 67, 79, 86, 179, 185, 198–99, 203, 206–07, 215 footnote, 218, 223, 237, 239, 248–49, 263, 271, 276, 285, 311, 335, 676; Oe II,

95, III, 16, 19, 23, 44–45. Oman, pp. 18–19; Loreburn, *op. cit.*, p. 155; F., 54, 80; R.W., 30, 42, 48, 84, 86, 113. Sazonov, as Buchanan telegraphed to London on July 29th, did "not wish reference made to the fact that it was at suggestion of German Ambassador that he had proposed direct conversation with Austria."—B.D., 271; cf. 276.

192. Zimmermann had asked for it as early as the 26th and Jagow on the 27th. Vienna's delay gives the impression of having been intentional.—D.D., 226, 246, 271, 280; Oe II, 66. Cf. K.F., July 1925, pp. 455–56.

193. B.D., 129, 134, 184, 192. Cf. p. 241.

194. B.D., 192.

195. Poincaré has recognized this.—"Le Lendemain," p. 86; "Sous les Armes," p. 360.

196. F., 57; B.D., 174; Oe II, 54; R.W., 39.

197. R.F., pp. 18–19.

198. D.D., 235. Cf. B.D., 129.

199. "As we have already met all of Austria-Hungary's demands that could be admitted." R.F., p. 20.

200. R.F., p. 26; cf. p. 23.

201. B.D., 206. I am unable to agree with J. W. Headlam-Morley as to Count Benckendorff's motive for omitting the sentence; there seems to me to have been an intelligible motive. Cf. Grey, Vol. II, pp. 314–15.

202. D.D., 153, 166, 169–70, 215, 235, 240, 252, 289, 290, 350, 415, 485; minutes to B.D., 77, 80, 101, 149, 158, 159, 160, 174, 175, 185; F., 35–36, 42, 47, 50, 55–57, 61–62, 74, 76–78, 81, 83, 94–95; Paléologue, p. 251.

203. D.D., 258; B.D., 176.

204. D.D., 265.

205. D.D., 277.

206. D.D., 283.—For the Emperor William's return, see B.D., 147 and D.D., 182, 191, 197, 221. These German documents betray the entire failure of the German Foreign Office to appreciate the situation.

207. D.D., 278–79.

208. D.D., 271. "I" underlined by the Emperor.

209. D.D., 293. Italics Emperor William's.

210. D.D., 293. The Chief of Staff was also acquainted at once with the Emperor's view—letter to Moltke, "Deutsche Politik," July 18, 1919. Cf. D.D., 456; Grey, Vol. II, p. 25; Ebray, pp. 18–19. Ewart, with many others, considers that Austria should have accepted the Serbian reply—p. 117 (1043); Jagow, too, on July 29th, saw in the Serbian reply "a possible basis of negotiations."—F., 92. Cf. Musulin, pp. 240–41.

It may be objected that I have made no mention of a series of "incriminating" marginal notes by the Emperor William immediately after the Serajevo murder, with violent abuse of the Serbs. This has been done deliberately. These outbursts of the first moment were demonstrably without influence on the Government (Renouvin, p. 251). What is of more importance is that we do not yet know enough of the Emperor's mentality to be able to express a reliable judgment. It is well known that before his dismissal Bismarck discussed the question of the deposition of the Emperor William, pointing to the case of King Ludwig II of Bavaria (Bismarck to Heinrich von Poschinger, in "Deutsche Rundschau," November 1919). Holstein, too, had worked from the 'nineties onward for the Emperor's deposition (Johannes Haller, "Aus dem Leben des Fürsten Philipp zu Eulenburg-Hertefeld," Berlin 1924; "Aus 50 Jahren. Erinnerungen des Fürsten Philipp zu Eulenburg-Hertefeld,"

Berlin 1925). On the occasion of the " Daily Telegraph " affair the Committee of the Bundesrat for foreign affairs discussed the idea of moving the Emperor to abdicate (Schoen, *op. cit.*, p. 100) ; at the same time Conservative Deputies discussed an application for an enquiry into the Emperor's state of mind, and there is good authority for stating that at the beginning of 1918 similar action was discussed at a meeting of very highly placed officers. All these men had in view the good of their country.

After the collapse a great deal of contempt was thrown upon the Emperor. But he was the victim of constitutional ill-health, of his surroundings, and of thirty years of servility, over which only a strong character would have triumphed. This the Emperor had not ; he was a reed that sought strength in aping the oak ; his rhodomontades were not the expression of a bellicose nature but merely of a weak one. Further details are given, with indication of source, in P.G.

211. B.D., 175.

212. B.D., 676. Cf. B.D., 28–29, 34, 39, 40, 46, 55, 70, 81, 85, 90, 135, 152, 156, 182, 242, 312.

213. Oe II, 48. The circular note accompanying the dossier is dated July 25th (Saturday) ; clearly some copies only went out on the 26th or 27th. The dossier was handed in in Paris on the 27th (F., 75), in London on the 29th (B.D., 282) ; the date of receipt in St. Petersburg is not known. Cf. Oe III, 16. Among much that is of little value, the dossier contains some important material, and could not fail to have some effect ; cf. Schücking, p. 60, note 1. For the dossier, see also Oe II, 18–19, 73 ; Gooss, pp. 152–53, 161, 197, 202.

214. D.D., 311, 313.

215. Oe II, 78, 95, 97 ; III, 26 ; Gooss, pp. 217 *sqq.*

216. D.D., 323. This despatch is analysed in P.G. Berlin did not communicate to Prince Lichnowsky the news of its advice to Vienna to content itself with a pledge ; Grey learned of this only on the 29th, from Sir Edward Goschen. D.D., 282 note 2, 353 ; B.D., 264 ; Oman, pp. 74–75.

217. B.D., 249.

218. For the Chancellor's attitude on the 28th, see Dickinson, pp. 416, 444; the Barnes-Schmitt controversy, pp. 18, 23, 28 ; Fabre-Luce, p. 234 ; Renouvin, p. 90.

219. Compare D.D., 323, with Oe III, 24. The comparison is made in detail in P.G.

220. D.D., 332, 335. In a telegram of July 29th the Tsar made the proposal that the case should be submitted to the Hague Court of Arbitration. Germany declined this and Grey reproaches her for it (Vol. II, pp. 23, 25). In doing so Grey again shows himself to be very insufficiently informed. The Tsar had already instructed Sazonov to discuss the idea with France and Britain (R.W., 40). Sazonov had not done so, and thus had evidently regarded the Tsar's suggestion as impracticable. See Montgelas, *op. cit.*, pp. 177–78 ; Jagow, p. 43 ; D.D., 366, 391 (337) ; Demartial, " Evangile," p. 128.

221. D.D., 315.

222. B.D., 249.

223. G.P., Vol. 11, doc. 2809 ; cf. Vol 21, doc. 7050, and the Emperor's final note on p. 290 ; B.D., 579, 669.

224. S.I., doc. 608.

225. D.D., Vol. IV, Anhang II. G.P., Vol. 27, chh. ccxiii, ccxiv ; Vol. 30, ch. ccxxxviii and doc. 10857, 10863, 10874, 10878, 10934, 10938, 10961, 10964–65, 10967–69, 11233, 11240–42, 11246, 11261, 11264, 11273 Anlage I,

p. 549, footnote **; Hoyos, p. 56–57, 60–62; Conrad, Vol. I, p. 248; Vol. II, p. 175; "Carnets," II, pp. 135–36.

226. D.D., 42, 46, 51, 60, 61, 64, 68, 73, 75, 78, 87, 94; Oe I, 16, 23, 32, 34, 35, 42; Oe II, 46, 51–52.

227. D.D., 68; cf. G.P., Vol. 35, doc. 13493, 13568, 13744.

228. D.D., 94.

229. Oe I, 32, 42.

230. Oe I, 1, 26; D.D., 87. Cf. B.D., 122. Serbia's sovereignty was affected by demands 3, 4, and 5 and on some interpretations by demand 6. The intentions of the Vienna Cabinet are plain from, for example, the words of Stürgkh, the Austrian Prime Minister, at the Cabinet meeting of July 19th: without annexation it would "be possible by deposing the dynasty, by a military convention and by other corresponding measures to bring Serbia into a position of dependence on the Monarchy."—Oe I, 26. The incompatibility of points 5 and 6 with Serbian sovereignty and with international law have been convincingly shown by Schücking, pp. 41, 55, 57–58; cf. L. Bergsträsser, "Die diplomatischen Kämpfe vor Kriegsausbruch," Munich 1915, pp. 20, 24; Renouvin, p. 40.

231. D.D., 156, 244.

232. D.D., 211, 212; Oe II, 46, 50–51.

233. D.D., 150, 168, 202, 267, 269, 326, 328; Oe II, 63, 65; III, 126.

234. Oe II, 87; D.D., 326, 328.

235. D.D., 326.

236. Oe II, 50, 86–87; D.D., 328, 428.

237. B.D., 664, 668. It is quite impossible to quote all the documents dealing with Serbian integrity and sovereignty. Cf. Schücking, pp. 36, 41 *sqq.*, 54 *sqq.*, 84, 88–89, 103, 108, 115 *sqq.*, 130, 140, 171, 176–77, 189, 207; Ewart, pp. 1062, 1077–78, 1085–88, 1090, 1092–93 (1102–03, 1106); Fabre-Luce, pp. 41–42, 68, 235; Renouvin, pp. 56–57, 67, 88 note 3, 89 note 4, 120, 127, 134–35, 168, 170, 257, 267; Schoen, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

238. Cf. Pashitch, in K.F., October 1926, p. 732.

239. *Op. cit.*, p. 51.

240. Schücking, p. 85; B. W. von Bülow, "Die Krisis," 3rd edition, Berlin 1922, p. 4; Barnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 262, 503; Demartial, "Les Origines de la Guerre. Le conflit austro-serbe et le gouvernement italien," in "Rassegna Internazionale," Rome, November 1920; Fabre-Luce, p. 234; Morhardt, ch. vii; Renouvin, pp. 74–75. For the proposal, see B.D., 175, 202, 231, 276, 284, 328; D.D., 249, 357, 384; F., 72, 92.

241. G.P., Vol. 26, doc. 9574. Pourtalès described Sazonov as nervous and suspicious, but several German statesmen had a different impression — G.P., Vol. 27, doc. 9871, 10156, 10160, 10171, 10178; Vol. 38, doc. 15372. Cf. Jagow, p. 58; Hoyos, p. 77; Szilassy, p. 374; "Carnets," I, pp. 32, 227; II, pp. 35, 64.

242. Ba, 65, p. 171; B.D., 199, 248; Oe III, 42; Schoen, p. 212; Schüssler, pp. 181 *sqq.*; Ewart, pp. 912 *sqq.*, 990; Grey, Vol. I, pp. 332–33; II, pp. 23, 151.

243. D.D., 238. For Count Pourtalès's pacific intentions, see Be II, 17; Buchanan, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 198; Suchomlinov, p. 377 (363, 378).

244. D.D., 291.

245. The documents do not anywhere confirm that Berchtold had actually given a clear statement of his territorial disinterestedness in regard to Serbia; they rather show the opposite; but Germany made use of Berchtold's assumed consent on July 25th and the succeeding days to reassure the Powers.

Berchtold's attitude further deceived Berlin : cf. Oe II, 18, 23, 40 ; D.D., 155, 198–200, 219, 238, 279, 282, 300, 380 ; B.D., 97, 122 ; F., 62 ; S., 52 ; R.F., pp. 16, 22.

246. D D., 282.

247. *Op. cit.*, p. 135.

248. Bethmann Hollweg himself admitted this in 1913 and 1914.—See Brandenburg, p. 382 ; D.D., 307 ; cf. K.F., January 1926, p. 16 (from Russian documents).

249. For Sazonov's optimism and readiness for peace up to July 25th there are many witnesses : D.D., 238, 242, 282, 339 ; B.D., 198 ; Oe II, 73, 93, 95 ; III, 16, 46 ; Dobrorolski, pp. 22–23, 38 ; R.W., 30. Sazonov's optimism appears to have been based on his rooted conviction of Austria's dependence on Germany. In the Balkan crisis he had said to Pourtalès : " Germany can get whatever she wants from Austria-Hungary ; what would Austria-Hungary be without her ? "—G.P., Vol. 34, doc. 12851 ; cf. Vol. 36, doc. 14191 ; Vol. 39, doc. 15855 ; " Carnets " II, p. 245. Actually Germany found herself dependent on Austria—e.g. G.P., Vol. 34, doc. 12793 ; " Carnets," I, pp. 71, 93.

250. Oe III, 16 (the report is dated 29th and was made at 10 a.m. There is good reason to suppose that it referred to a conversation on the 28th).

251. Oe II, 95 ; IV, 23 ; D.D., 238 ; R., 25, 45.

252. Oe II, 27 ; cf. Oe III, 79 ; D.D. 432 ; Renouvin, p. 137.

253. B.D., 210, enclosure ; F., 95 ; R.W., 64.

254. Dobrorolski, p. 23. Sazonov had shown indecision and susceptibility to influence in earlier crises ; e.g. G.P., Vol. 34, doc. 12570, 12787, 13004, 13025, 13031, 13036 ; Vol. 35, doc. 13595 ; Vol. 38, doc. 15519–20, 15525 ; Vol. 39, doc. 15836, 15841, 15844, 15851, 15856, p. 39, footnote * ; Poincaré, " Les Balkans," pp. 322, 325, 348–49, 391–92.

255. B.D., 170, 173–74, 235, 239, 247 ; D.D., 160, 204, 230, 236, 242, 288, 337 ; R.W., 44, 82 ; Be, p. 50 ; F., 57, 61 ; Conrad, Vol. IV, pp. 136, 145 ; Eggeling, pp. 25–26 ; report of Pashitch, K.F., October 1926, pp. 730 *sqq.* ; Buchanan, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 197 ; Charles-Roux, *loc. cit.*, p. 730.

256. London learned from Nish about noon on the 30th that the Serbian frontier had not then been crossed.—B.D., 291 c.

257. Fabre-Luce has rightly drawn attention to this important point—p. 236.

258. R.W., 69–70 ; R.F., pp. 25, 27, 30 ; D.D., 357 ; Fabre-Luce, p. 214 ; Renouvin, p. 218 ; Pashitch's despatch of July 31st, K.F., October 1926, pp. 730–32.

259. Renouvin, pp. 97 *sqq.*, 115–18, 144, 256 ; Fabre-Luce, pp. 211, 219 ; C. Barbagallo, in K.F., July 1924, p. 253 ; Oe III, 40. The French and Russian Ambassadors in Vienna considered after the Russian partial mobilization that world war was almost inevitable.—D.D., 386. Sazonov wanted to explain the partial mobilization in a " *note explicative*," but this was not issued. —Oe III, 19.

260. Vol. I, pp. 20–21

261. Be, p. 44.

262. B.D., 101, 128, 132, 144, 170, 177, 216, 238, 247, 252, 318, 320, 367, 373, 677 ; F., 119a, 119b ; R.W., 16 ; report from Jules Cambon, K.F., May 1924, p. 142. Earl Loreburn gives emphatic expression to the view that an early declaration from Grey would have prevented war—pp. 17–18, 134–35, 176–77, 185, 189, 191–92, 200–01, 218 ; Barnes holds the same view—pp. 492, 565–66, 579–80 ; Ewart, pp. 151, 153 ; Fabre-Luce, pp. 67, 262 ; Renouvin, pp. 210, 221.

263. B.D., 352, 367 (459); Grey, Vol. II, pp. 41 *sqq.*

264. B.D., 101 minute (239, 373).

265. Grey, Vol. I, pp. 312, 341; B.D., 340. Cf. G.P., Vol. 33, doc. 12481, 12489; Vol. 34, doc. 12561.

266. The "Daily News" wrote * in the depth of the crisis: "Actually the Tsar holds the balance in his hand. But we hold the Tsar in ours. Thus ultimately it all depends on us whether Europe shall be inundated with blood" —quoted by Jagow, p. 36; see also p. 33, and G.P., Vol. 34, doc. 13252; Vol. 39, doc. 15566; Herzfeld, *op. cit.*, p. 124; Stieve, "Deutschland," pp. 28, 33, 75, 130; Metternich in "Europäische Gespräche," February 1926 (Gooch, "Revelations," p. 31); Fay, in K.F., December 1926, pp. 901–02; Charles-Roux, p. 736; Fabre-Luce, p. 232.

267. Dealt with fully in P.G. I may refer also to Stieve, "Deutschland," p. 139. British neutrality would have meant peace.—Jagow, p. 33.

268. Fabre-Luce, p. 232; Loreburn, p. 178.

269. Dickinson, p. 453.

270. Ba, 47, p. 159.

271. F., 92, 96.

272. D.D., 194, 216, 230, 242, 264, 274–76, 281, 291, 294–96, 327, 330–31, 333, 335a.

273. F., 67. The news was telegraphed on the same day to St. Petersburg from Paris by Isvolsky. See F.R., p. 24; B.D., 185; R.W., 49, 60, 90.

274. D.D., 343; Be. pp. 26–27, 64. Cf. B.D., 311; Fabre-Luce, pp. 216, 262.

275. Ba, pp. 220 *sqq.*; No. 71. See also "Der Weltkrieg 1914–1918," bearbeitet im Reichsarchiv, Vol I, Berlin 1925, p. 24; Conrad, Vol. I, p. 165; III, pp. 146–47, 294, 596, 670; IV, p. 319; Dickinson, p. 446; Renouvin, p. 122. Cf. Moltke, pp. 329, 362; Wolff, pp. 105, 115, 286–87.

276. D.D., 340 (dated 29th; in Moltke, pp. 3 *sqq.* the date is 28th); Conrad, Vol. I, pp. 379 *sqq.*; II, p. 56; Rudolf Kissling, in K.F., November 1926, pp. 820 *sqq.*; Renouvin, p. 159; Barnes-Schmitt controversy, p. 22.

277. Th. von Schäfer, in K.F., August 1926, pp. 514 *sqq.* For the Moltke-Conrad agreements of 1909 onwards see S. B. Fay, in "American Historical Review," January 1927.

278. Vol. II, p. 26. Count Pansa, who was Italian Ambassador in Berlin from 1910 to 1913, expressed the same view to Sir Francis Bertie in November 1916.—"The Diary," Vol. II, p. 59. Cf. Colonel House's view, quoted in note 39, above.

279. Vol. I, pp. 92, 240, 301, 324; II, pp. 23–24, 26 *sqq.*, 49, 139, 270. Cf. Ewart, p. 569.

280. Ba, p. 221.

281. Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 319. Cf. Fabre-Luce, pp. 218–19, 268; Renouvin, pp. 123–24; Dickinson, p. 247; Ba, p. 230; Jagow, p. 25; Schäfer, pp. 514 *sqq.*; Wilhelm II, "Ereignisse und Gestalten," Leipzig 1922, pp. 210–01; F., 105.

282. Bülow, "Krisis," p. 174.

283. D.D., 373, 497; B.D., 293, 303, 305, 369, 677; Grey, Vol. I, pp. 326–28; II, pp. 14–15 (cf. Be II, 102); cf. Jagow, p. 33. The last part of Grey's reply, in which he held out the prospect of an agreement with Germany once the crisis had peacefully passed over—which might perhaps have been inacceptable to France (Grey, I, p. 329)—amounted to an admission that Germany had had ground for fear of the Entente (cf. Schücking, pp. 144–45). For Bethmann Hollweg, see Gooch, "Revelations," pp. 2, 27.

* Retranslated.

284. D.D., 368 (357), 395. Grey intended openly to warn Lichnowsky, and characteristically informed Paul Cambon beforehand.—B.D., 283; F., 98. Jagow said to Goschen on the next day that Berlin would not have made the neutrality offer if it had had this telegram from Lichnowsky. Not until this warning came from Grey did Berlin have the certainty that Britain would enter the war—B.D., 331 (510); Oe, III, 52; Dickinson, p. 453.

285. Compare D.D., 202 (267), with 395.

286. D.D., 396; also 385.

287. Vol. II, pp. 26, 32–33.

288. After Fabre-Luce's investigations there is no doubt that on the 29th Berlin "sincerely" wanted peace—p. 222. Fay, in K.F., December 1926, p. 203: Germany "worked more effectively than any other Great Power, except England, to avert" a world war.

289. Fully demonstrated in P.G.

290. P.G. For details, see D.D., 277, 313, 323, 361, 377, 377 note 3, 384–85, 388, 395–96, 400, 427, 432–34, 437, 441, 448, 465, 468; Oe III, 25, 65; Gooss, p. 240, note; Dickinson, pp. 417, note 3, 441, 452 *sqq.*, 461–62, 479; Ewart, pp. 499, 569, 1110, 1117, 1156; Gooch, "Cambridge History," pp. 491–92, 497; Gooch, "Revelations," p. 71; Renouvin, pp. 91, 95. In the crisis of July 1914 London learned of German pressure on Vienna.—B.D., 307, 311 minute; it also learned of it after the outbreak of war, and it is significant that in the British White Book of 1914 the sentence referring to this—Germany's efforts, that is, to maintain peace between Austria and Russia—was omitted: B.D., 671. In a private letter to Nicolson, Goschen admitted that it was "certainly true" "that the Emperor & Co. have worked at Vienna." B.D., 510. The question is whether this letter was put before Grey.

291. Minutes to B.D., 158, 159, 215, 249, 252, 298; B.D., 369. According to Crowe (369) Germans produced a financial panic in the City; Goschen, however, stated that German financial and industrial classes were against war, (677) as also was British commercial and industrial opinion.—Grey, Vol. I, p. 335.

292. Oe II, 92; III, 14.

293. J. S. Corbett, "History of the Great War," Vol. I, London 1920, p. 26. This warning telegram, corresponding to the German "condition of imminent danger of war," went out as early as the afternoon of the 28th.—"Beilage," II, p. 17. For the effect of these steps on Berlin, see B.D., 281.

294. B.D., 252 minute.

295. D.D., 198, 219, 230, 242, 282, 338, 342–43, 359, 365, 378, 380, 401, 420–21, 445, 449; Oe II, 94 (61); III, 19 (45); cf. D.D., 199–200, 357, 409, 435. There was no German "ultimatum" on the 29th as is still frequently alleged. It is demonstrable, on the contrary, that the "ultimatum" on which so bad a construction is placed did not prevent the Tsar from suspending the general mobilization.—P.G.; Renouvin, p. 108.

296. Dobrorolski, pp. 18 *sqq.*; Be, pp. 17–20, 23; Renouvin, pp. 109–14. For various explanations of the partial mobilization, see F., 91, 100–01.

297. D.D., 401.

298. Oe III, 19; B.D., 309, 417.

299. Oe III, 74; B.D., 247, 264 minute.

300. D.D., 301, 340, 361.

301. D.D., 421, 439, 460; B.D., 302, 393.

302. B.D., 340; D.D., 496.

303. For the "stay in Belgrade," see, in addition to references already furnished, B.D., 281, 285, 305, 309, 676; F., 92, 112; Fabre-Luce, p. 64;

Renouvin, p. 130. Russia's concession of this is contested, in my view, wrongly : see R.W., 8 ; Be, p. 43 ; F., 50 ; B.D., 199 ; Dumaine, *op. cit.*, pp. 142–43 ; Sazonov's second formula implicitly contained this concession—R.W., 130 ; D.D., 421 (explained in P.G.). Renouvin therefore comes to the conclusion that Russia had permitted the occupation—pp. 135, 172, 263.

304. For the possibilities of peace at the conclusion of the negotiations, see Ewart, pp. 1115, 1123, 1172 ; Barnes-Schmitt controversy, p. 21.

305. Dobrorolski, in K.F., November 1923, p. 99 ; Oe III, 19 ; Be, p. 19 ; Renouvin, p. 116. The bombardment was not ordered by Vienna.—Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 277. On the bombardment, see B.D., 256, 291, 332, 388–89, 400, 421, 435, 485, 498, 532, 546.

306. D.D., 401. Cf. " Carnets," II, p. 154.

307. This is clear from Be, pp. 19, 27, before Sazonov had learned of the bombardment of Belgrade.

308. Dobrorolski, pp. 17 *sqq.* ; Suchomlinov, pp. 358–83, 514–17 ; cf. Oe II, 60 ; D.D., 291.

309. Oe II, 70.

310. " Beilage," II Anlage 33 ; K.F., July 1925, p. 457.

311. Be, p. 15. Until now this had been supposed to be the *first* assurance of this sort given by France ; but according to B.D., 125, Paléologue, as already related, gave as early as the 25th the " formal assurance " that France placed herself " unreservedly " on Russia's side ; accordingly I say " for the second time."

312. R.F., 30 ; Be, p. 19.

313. R.W., 94.

314. K.F., pp. 33–34 ; B.D., 647. It is stated that at Dunkirk on the morning of the 29th Senator Trystram asked the French President whether he thought that war could be avoided. Poincaré is said to have replied, " That would be very unfortunate. We shall never have better conditions." Quoted by Margueritte, *op. cit.*, p. 274.

315. D.D., 430 ; B.D., 320, 647 ; Oe III, 8 ; cf. Be, p. 24.

316. B.D., 320a. In 320b the Spanish Ambassador mentions that on the morning of the 29th Poincaré said to a friend " that he considers war inevitable."

317. Bülow, " Die Krisis," p. 160 ; Morel, " Tsardom's Part in the War," London 1917, p. 14 (giving further evidence of the effect of the British attitude on public opinion in Russia).

318. " Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," September 12, 1914.

319. D.D., 342, 378, 401 ; Be, p. 19. Cf. note 295, above.

320. R.F., p. 30 ; B.D., 294, 300.

321. R.F., p. 36 ; F., 101. Cf. Renouvin, pp. 154–55.

322. B.D., 294, 310.

323. B.D., 302 (309 does not contradict this ; compare 335).

324. B.D., 335.

325. R.F., p. 37. Cf. Fabre-Luce, pp. 212–13 ; Demartial, " Evangile," pp. 24–25 ; G.P., Vol. 39, p. 269, footnote *. De Margerie, Director of the Political Section at the Quai d'Orsay, also failed to keep within the terms of Viviani's telegram to St. Petersburg.

326. Be, pp. 19, 27 *sqq.*

327. Page 155. Gooch, " Revelations," p. 108.

328. See footnote 221 to Chapter III.

329. G.P., Vol. 32, doc. 11792 ; Vol. 33, doc. 12415 ; Vol. 34, doc. 12707, 12919 ; Vol. 39, doc. 15844 (R., 7, 14) ; Wolff, pp. 272–73 ; Eggeling, p. 12 ; Gooch, " Revelations," p. 183.

330. Pokrowski, p. 46.

331. *Ibid.*, pp. 227–28, 280, 348, 350, 358, 363, 373–75, 383, 391, 514–17. Cf. G.P., Vol. 34, doc. 12919, 13155; Vol. 38, doc. 15520; "Carnets," II, p. 47. The Russian military authorities had also exercised great influence in former years.—G.P., Vol. 32, doc. 11792; Vol. 33, doc. 12270, 12467; Vol. 34, doc. 12790, 12806, 12919; Vol. 38, doc. 15520. For the increasing power of Pan-Slavism, see G.P., Vol. 34, doc. 12874, 12919, 12956–57, 12959, 12979, 13025, 13036, 13093, 13119, 13139, 13155, 13213, 13280; Vol. 39, doc. 15844, 15855.

332. Oe III, 19.

333. B.D., 248.

334. Be, p. 29.

335. Dobrorolski, p. 28; Paléologue in "Revue des Deux Mondes," January 15, 1921; Demartial, "Evangile," p. 40.

336. The Russian accounts of the events of July 30th in St. Petersburg disagree in details: Be, pp. 28–30; Suchomlinov, *op. cit.*, pp. 343–45, 358–59, 361–62, 364–65; Dobrorolski, pp. 27 *sqq.*; Danilov, in K.F., January–February 1924, pp. 18 *sqq.*; M. W. Rodzianko, "Erinnerungen," Berlin 1926 (K.F., October 1926, pp. 803–04); cf. Renouvin, pp. 104–06, 112, 143 *sqq.*, 162, 257–59.

337. Be, p. 28; Dobrorolski, p. 28.

338. Dobrorolski, p. 29.

339. Vol. II, p. 23.

340. I will only quote Be, p. 29 (30, 36); Dobrorolski, pp. 10, 29; Baron Roman Rosen, "Forty Years of Diplomacy," 2 vols., London 1922, Vol. II, pp. 170–71, 187, 197; "L'Alliance Franco-Russe," Paris 1918, doc. 53; Ebray, pp. 13–14, 20; Margueritte, pp. 52–53, 148, 151, 267 *sqq.*; Fabre-Luce, pp. 52–57, 152, 154, 160, 214. Among French writers, see the works of G. Demartial, Alfred Peret, Gouttenoire de Toury, etc.; Dickinson, pp. 456–59; Ewart (who is not well acquainted here with the details), pp. 1113, 1115, 1119, 1123, 1136, 1139, 1144–45, 1147, 1153, 1166; Loreburn, pp. 169, 177; C. Barbagallo, K.F., July 1924, pp. 249 *sqq.* A number of contemporary documents give evidence that Russian general mobilization was equivalent to war.—D.D., 332; B.D., 125, 302a; F., 105.

341. Be, pp. 32, 36; the Tsar, in R.F., p. 39; see "Dokumente zur Kriegsschuldfrage," Heft 1: "Telegrammwechsel Berlin-Petersburg während der Julikrise 1914," issued by the Zentralstelle für Erforschung der Kriegsursachen, Berlin 1922 (?), p. 31.

342. B.D., 302, 347, 403, 407, 428, 450, 459, 482, 490, 532; R.W., 141–42, 145, 167; R.F., pp. 31, 39–43; F., 91, 100–02, 104–06, 114, 117–18, 120–21, 125, 127, 159; D.D., 459, 462, 473, 518, 528, 571, 576, 704; Oe III, 72, 91; Be II, 8, 20; Introduction to the British White Book, 1914, section 7; Renouvin, pp. 154–55; Fabre-Luce, pp. 55, 227; Demartial, "Evangile," sections 3–6. Paléologue and Buchanan took an active part in the work.—P.G. For criticism of Paléologue, see Renouvin, p. 113, footnote 6; p. 151, footnote 4; Renauld, p. 108; Buchanan continues to give the order of the mobilizations inaccurately in his "Memories."—Vol. I, pp. 199 *sqq.*

343. K.F., October 1926, p. 730. The declaration of war against Austria would, of course, have meant a simultaneous declaration against Germany.

344. Frantz, "Russlands Eintritt," pp. 236–37.

345. This applies especially to Sazonov's two formulæ: D.D., 421, 439, 460, 720; B.D., 302a, 302b, 309, 328, 342, 373–74, 393, 411, 417, 459; R.W., 102–03, 111, 129–30, 140; R.F., p. 36; F., 112.

346. Dobrorolski, p. 25; K.F., April 1924, p. 89; cf. Suchomlinov, pp. 350, 515. Also Oe II, 41; III, 16; D.D., 204, 339.

347. Oe II, 42.

348. Warnings after the ultimatum: Oe II, 14–19, 23, 34–36, 41, 49–50, 54, 56, 60–61, 63, 70–74, 77, 93.

349. Against this, it is true, must be set many passages in Conrad, Vol. IV, pp. 121, 123–24, 156, 161, 164–65, 266, 308, which go to show that Vienna hoped to avoid war with Russia.

350. Conrad, Vol. IV, pp. 137, 148, 151; Prof. J. Pekar, K.F., September 1925, p. 585. See further evidence on pp. 281–82, above.

351. Serbia mobilized 11 to 15 divisions on July 25th; Austria 22; Russia mobilized 55 on the 29th.

352. Renouvin, pp. 120, 156, 160.

353. D.D., 465.

354. Conrad, Vol. IV, pp. 151–53; Th. von Schäfer, in K.F., August 1926, pp. 514 *sqq.*

355. Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 153; Oe III, 50.

356. Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 151.

357. Oe III, 79. Cf. Renouvin, pp. 136 *sqq.*

358. *Loc. cit.*, p. 731.

359. Fabre-Luce, pp. 218–19, 235, 248; Renouvin, pp. 156–60.

360. Vol. IV, pp. 147–48, 151, 153, 156, 323–24 (also 62); Th. von Schäfer, *op. cit.*, pp. 539 *sqq.*; K.F., August 1926, p. 552.

361. Oe III, 45, 65, 78 (cf. D.D., 349); B.D., 311, 360, 420, 422; Be II, 19.

362. For the Austrian declaration of war on Russia, see Oe III, 124, 161; Conrad, Vol. IV, pp. 166–67, 173, 175; D.D., 772, 814, 860; B.D., 493, 661, 676; R.W., 203; "Iswolski im Weltkriege," doc. 20, 36.

363. Vol. IV, p. 162.

364. "L'Alliance Franco-Russe," Paris 1918, Nos. 71, 91–92.

365. Nos. 53 *sqq.*

366. Nos. 93–95. Cf. "Der Sinn der russisch-französischen Militärkonvention," by Dr. E. Fischer, in "Preussische Jahrbücher," April 1923; H. Lutz, "Revanche und Panslavismus," in "Hochland," July 1923; Otto Becker, "Das französisch-russische Bündnis," Berlin 1924.

367. General Staff protocols in S.I., doc. 117, 368, 1040. The decisions were binding on both Governments.

368. "Les Balkans," pp. 117–19, 201–02, 326, 340. See above, p. 173.

369. B.D., 373.

370. Paléologue, pp. 257–58; R. Recouly, "Revue de France," November 15, 1921.

371. See footnote 342. The Russian Government, as is well known, entirely omitted to inform its representatives abroad of the general mobilization, though it informed them at once of the partial one.

372. R.F., p. 41; confirmed by Jules Cambon in F., 116, and by Berlin telegram of Havas Agency in R.F., p. 40; Renouvin, p. 146.

373. R.F., p. 41. Messimy was aggressively inclined in 1911.—G.P., Vol. 31, doc. 11550. Cf. footnote 325.

374. R.F., p. 45.

375. "Les Origines de la Guerre," p. 60 (cf. p. 266).

376. R.F., p. 45.

377. R.F., p. 48.

378. Margueritte, pp. 53, 151, 342–44; Fabre-Luce, p. 227; Renouvin, p. 118, footnote 2; Demartial, "Evangile," pp. 28–29, 37–38, 42, 74, 118, 124, 174.

379. Demartial, "Evangile," pp. 181–82.

380. "Carnets," II, p. 193 (figure in brackets Lutz's); see also pp. 148, 154, 161, 178, 184–85, 192, 203, 211; E. Judet, "Georges Louis," Paris 1925, pp. 240–42, 246, 272, 276, 296–99. Jules Cambon admitted Poincaré's share of responsibility (246); Pichon also (240–41), who, with M. Louis, considered that Paléologue had egged on the Russians (241). Caillaux's view is well known (Demartial, in K.F., July 1926, pp. 430 *sqq.*), and Ebray also describes Poincaré's part in promoting the war (pp. 13–14).

381. Valentin, p. 216; Renouvin, p. 139; Margueritte, p. 302.

382. Montgelas, pp. 178 *sqq.* and in other places; e.g. in K.F., January–February 1924, pp. 18–19. Cf. Renouvin, p. 149. From Count Montgelas's researches it appears that Sir Edward Grey tried to suggest to the Russian Cabinet in December 1914 that the Russian general mobilization had been the result of the "Lokalanzeiger" report ("Leitfaden," pp. 178–79; "Deutsche Rundschau," May 1922; K.F., November 1925, p. 761). From the British documents it appears possible that Grey came upon the idea through a report of Goschen's.—B.D., 677. It should be added that the German Government considered the connexion possible. As Count Lerchenfeld was told in Berlin on the 31st, "the dice were probably set rolling by the Ambassador, Sverbeyer, telegraphing to St. Petersburg the false report in the 'Lokalanzeiger' that Germany was mobilizing, without verifying its accuracy. It is assumed that the contradiction which he afterwards transmitted was inadequate, as the Ambassador was unwilling to make a clean breast of it and admit his mistake."—Ba, 70.

383. D.D., 441.

384. D.D., 450, 451.

385. D.D., 452.

386. D.D., 464. Bethmann Hollweg now explained the cancellation of No. 441 on the strength of King George's telegram.

387. Oe III, 84. Cf. D.D., 474, 477.

388. D.D., 473, 479.

389. B.D., 677. The date is unknown; nor is it known whether this letter ever came to Grey's notice. For feeling in Berlin on the 31st, see also Ba, 70–71. Cf. Gooch, "Germany," London 1925, pp. 110 *sqq.*

390. B.D., 125.

391. F., 50.

392. Senate Report, pp. 122–23. Did the Russian general staff honestly believe this? Did it not intend it to be the excuse for its own premature mobilization and an incentive to France to do the same?

393. B.D., 363. Nicolson also believed that Germany was mobilizing on the 31st.—B.D., 339. The British documents contain no adequate reason for this supposition.

394. D.D., 341, 491; Montgelas, p. 199. France and Britain were informed of the meaning of this step.—F., 116; Senate Report, pp. 124–25; B.D., 346, 349; Be II, 18. Bethmann Hollweg said, mistakenly, at a sitting of the Prussian Ministry of State on July 31st, and also to the Bavarian Minister, that the declaration of imminent danger of war meant mobilization. —D.D., 456, Ba, 55. Germany's restraint is shown by D.D., 404, 410, 524.

395. G.P., Vol. 31, doc. 11588. Cf. Demartial, "Evangile," p. 77; Frantz, "Russlands Eintritt," p. 13. Paul Cambon said to Grey as early as July 29th that "he anticipated a demand from Germany that France should

be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not give ; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked." B.D., 283 (319). Note the obligation if Russia were " attacked."

396. D.D., 490–91, 528, 536, 542, 546, 553, 571, 598 (also 477, 480, 487 ; F., 125).

397. D.D., 554, 666, 734, 734a–c. For details see P.G. It will be remembered that after 1870 the French busily spread the theory that the real aggressor is not the party that declares war but the one that makes it unavoidable. Some time ago Poincaré and others again brought the dates of declaration of war into the foreground, but it is evident from the Franco-Italian negotiations of 1902 how impossible it is to maintain that the country declaring war is necessarily the aggressor (H. Lutz, Poincaré's " Verdrehungskünste," in " Münchner Neueste Nachrichten," October 18, 1925). Cf. Fabre-Luce, pp. 56, 264 ; Renouvin, p. 197 ; Ewart, pp. 1151–53, 1166. C. Barbagallo has shown that in the main question—the reply to the Russian mobilization by a declaration of war—Germany was right, and that the only reproach that can be made against her is that she " delayed a few days longer than was necessary."—K.F., September 1923, p. 47.

398. B.D., 510.

399. D.D., 435 ; B.D., 310.

400. B.D., 320a. See the quotation from the letter on page 275.

401. Gooch, " History of Modern Europe, 1878–1919," p. 547.

402. Vol. II, p. 22.

403. R.F., p. 41.

404. Vol. I, p. 330.

405. B.D., 170, minute.

406. B.D., 155. Without question this referred to the introduction of the " period of preparation for war."

407. B.D., 178, 228, 234.

408. B.D., 302a. It is strange that there are no telegrams from the British Military Attaché in St. Petersburg. Was he on leave ?

409. B.D., 294, 310. D.D., 435 should also be compared with B.D., 294. A comparison of B.D., 294 and 310 is instructive as showing what fairy tales, with a little ingenuity, can be built on a document.

410. B.D., 337 minute.

411. B.D., 311 minute.

412 B.D., 327. Note the correction in B.D., 361.

413. B.D., 387, 427. It was known in London on the morning of the 29th that Austria had not mobilized her Galician corps.

414. B.D., 170 minute.

415. B.D., 298 minute. Nicolson wrote under this : " Or for defence against an English attack." It is curious that under similar telegrams from Riga on the 27th and 28th reporting Russian measures there are no minutes.—B.D., 178, 228.

416. B.D., 337 minute. Cf. 315 minute. The British Military Attaché in Berlin telegraphed at midday on August 1st that no men had as yet been called out, B.D., 404.

417. B.D., 339. B. E. Schmitt comments in " Current History " for March 1927 (p. 849) : " The contrast is pointed between the indifference of the Foreign Office to the military preparations of Russia and its deep suspicion of similar, but later measures in Germany ; also between its complete unwillingness to exert pressure on Russia and its repeated requests that Germany restrain Austria."

418. B.D., 319 enclosure ; 339, 353, 358, 439.

419. B.D., 321 enclosure. This report contradicts the French account of the preparations on the two sides in B.D., 319 enclosure.

420. B.D., 353.

421. B.D., 337 minute, 358 minute ; cf. 341 minute.

422. B.D., 347. The editor's note offers an explanation of how the wrong date was probably put. This error in the date of so highly important a matter as the Russian general mobilization will naturally give rise to much comment. Compare the greatly delayed telegram from Warsaw, B.D., 405.

423. B.D., 410. The same telegram reports : " No movement of troops noticed in Germany on line of Berlin–Schneidemühl–Dirschau–Königsberg–Eydtkuhnen, but all bridges guarded." Cf. B.D., 390.

424. B.D., 404. So also Goschen in letter to Nicolson, August 1st : " Certainly up to the time of my writing this, no mobilization order has been issued by the Emperor." B.D., 510. Cf. B.D., 401.

425. B.D., 425 (647). The French Minister of War defended mobilization on the strength of the German " Kriegszustand " (declaration of state of war), alleging that this was equivalent to mobilization. De Margerie knew better ; he said to the Belgian Minister in Paris, with reference to the " state of danger of war " and to " important decisions " by Russia " concerning her railways " (!) : " All this is not yet actual mobilization, but we are getting near it."—Be II, 18. It is difficult to suppose that Messimy was less well informed than de Margerie about the " state of threatening danger of war."—For the French frontier defence, see B.D., 320b.

426. B.D., 457.

427. B.D., 361, 387, 427 (cf. 659).

428. P. viii. Oman, too, in his semi-official book, must surely have known the facts better. Pp. 87, 91.

429. Buchanan, in his " Memories," published in 1923, still maintains that Austria ordered general mobilization on July 29th ! (Vol. I, p. 200). Cf. Asquith's account in " The Genesis of the War," London 1923, p. 198. I shall come to Grey's account later.

430. B.D., 368 ; also on August 2nd, B.D., 446. The note of July 31st closed with the following sentence : " Mobilization is a precautionary and not a provocative measure—and to my mind is essential." As the note is concerned with British mobilization, this final sentence presumably refers only to that. It might, however, also be read as stating Nicolson's view in regard to mobilization in general.—Sir Edward Grey minuted that there was " much force in " Nicolson's note and that in his view the matter " should be considered early to-morrow," i.e. on August 1st.—Crowe also, in a minute on No. 318 on July 31st, advocated immediate intervention. Charles-Roux, p. 740, says that on July 31st Nicolson " poussait fortement à la roue " (" leaned heavily on the wheel ").

431. B.D., 369.

432. See above, p. 156.

433. Vol. I, p. 331 ; II, p. 23.

434. Vol. I, p. 330. Grey here brings up again the memory of 1870.

435. See above, p. 245.

436. Gooss, p. 276.

437. B.D., 335.

438. Vol. I, p. 310.

439. Vol. II, p. 23. Grey sees the French mobilization also in quite a different light to the German.—Vol. I, p. 331.

440. B.D., 344.
441. *Op. cit.*, pp. 173–74, 259.
442. Cf. B. E. Schmitt, in " Current History " for March 1927, p. 847.
443. B.D., 367.
444. B.D., 384.
445. B.D., 490, 665 ; Buchanan, pp. 204 *sqq.* The incorrect statements are analysed in P.G.
446. Vol. I, p. 332. Lord Grey modifies this in Vol. II, pp. 31 *sqq.*, where he says that Bethmann Hollweg was unable to control the Austrian Government, that Berchtold seems not to have counted at all, and that in the Danube Monarchy " there were sinister and reckless influences."
447. B.D., 422 ; Oe III, 65.
448. B.D., 411 ; D.D., 595. Bunsen shared this view.—B.D., 676.
449. B.D., 510. Italics Goschen's.
450. B.D., 170 minute.
451. B.D., 318 minute. Cf. B.D., 369.
452. B.D., 368.
453. R.F., p. 37 ; B.D., 319—here the admission is not recorded, F., 108.
454. B.D., 340.
455. F., 119d (from the Senate Report). On July 31st the head of the second section of the general staff of the French Army said to Major Collon, the Belgian Military Attaché, that " Britain has given the formal assurance that she will give France full armed support in the present conflict if Germany resorts to arms " (Report of the Belgian Minister in Paris, " Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," May 22, 1919).
456. B.D., 367. Nicolson's note and Crowe's memorandum of the 31st were clearly written in consequence of the Cabinet's decision.—B.D., 368, 369. For the division in the Cabinet at the time, see Grey, Vol. I, p. 334 ; Vol. II, p. 33 ; Churchill, *op. cit.*, pp. 199, 219 ; Norman, p. 54 ; Paul Cambon, in the " Revue de France " for July 1, 1921 ; " Carnets," II, p. 150. C. Benckendorff's reports at the time, published by M. Pokrowski in " Aus den Geheim-Archiven des Zaren," Berlin 1919, pp. 29 *sqq.*
457. Vol. I, p. 312.
458. B.D., 419.
459. B.D., 453, 460.
460. D.D., 562, 575, 578, 605.
461. B.D., 426.
462. B.D., 426, 447 (cf. 487). See details in Chapter II and its Addendum.
463. B.D., 283, 352, 426, 447 ; Grey's statement in the House of Commons on August 3, 1914 (Grey, Vol. II, p. 298) ; Grey, Vol. I, p. 336.
464. D.D., 612.
465. B.D., 419 (" when I [Grey] suggested it ") ; D.D., 562, 570. Lichnowsky's account also, in " My Mission to London, 1912–14," leaves no room for doubt that the initiative was Grey's.
466. B.D., 426 ; D.D., 562, 570.
467. B.D., 419.
468. D.D., 562, 631.
469. Churchill, *op. cit.*, pp. 211 *sqq.* ; K.F., July 1926, p. 448. Churchill had issued a war order against German vessels as early as July 30, 1914, four days before the German invasion of Belgium (H. Lutz, K.F., September 1925, pp. 608 *sqq*).
470. B.D., 338, 358, 364, 403, 446, 471, 473, 477, 481, 486, 505, 507, 519, 529, 531, 539–42, 553, 558, 575, 577, 579, 582, 608–09, 613, 628 ; D.D., 677,

682, 693, 713, 725. Note especially B.D., 446 (the document belongs to August 2nd). Cf. Renouvin, pp. 197 *sqq.*; "Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918," bearbeitet im Reichsarchiv, Berlin 1925, Vol. I, pp. 103–04.

471. B.D., 319 enclosure; 447, 452, 507; Grey, Vol. I, p. 331. (Grey bases on this "propaganda manœuvre"—Fabre-Luce, p. 57—his differentiation between the French and German mobilizations!) Renouvin, pp. 177–78; Demartial, "Evangile," pp. 79–86, 92–93, 175.

472. Grey, Vol. II, p. 10; B.D., 446; Barnes, p. 512; Gooch, "Revelations," p. 185.

473. Loreburn, ch. ix, especially 227–28; Ewart, pp. 131, 413, 429, 444; Gooch, "History," p. 548.

474. B.D., 448; D.D., 596. Grey would have had to report this conversation to the Cabinet, as he did not know that Lichnowsky had no official instructions; cf. Valentin, p. 223; D.D., 662.

475. Cf. Gooch, "History," p. 558.

476. Ba, 80, 83; cf. Oe III, 114. "War of aggression" is, of course, only meant here in a strategical sense.

477. For Belgium generally, see B.D., 243, 293, 303, 351, 367, 382–83, 404, 476, 521, 525, 562, 638, 666–67, 670; D.D., 373, 375, 376, 445, 505, 522, 581, 584, 596, 648, 662, 667, 695, 709, 735, 765, 779, 783, 791, 805, 810, 823, 837, 839, 845, 863; F., 110, 122–23, 126, 137; R.F., p. 48; Be I, 11, 25; II, 25. Ewart, pp. 131–41, 194–95, 413–50; Dickinson, p. 469; Grey, Vol. I, pp. 295, 337, 341; Vol. II, pp. 4 *sqq.*, 17, 46, 265; Churchill, pp. 148, 151, 164; Blunt, pp. 449–51; Barnes, p 540; Fabre-Luce, pp. 177–79, 229–30; Renouvin, pp. 191 *sqq.*, 196; Poincaré, "Le Lendemain," pp. 224–25, 227, 229–30; Schoen, *op. cit.*, pp. 190, 226–27; Dr. P. Dirr, "Belgien als französisches Ostmark," Berlin 1917; B. Schwertfeger, "Der Geistige Kampf um die Verletzung der Belgischen Neutralität," Berlin 1919; Bethmann Hollweg, "Betrachtungen," I, p. 180; "Beilage," II, p. 95; "Der Weltkrieg," I, p. 99; Dr. Osswald, K.F., July 1925, pp. 473 *sqq.*; Frantz, "Russlands Eintritt," pp. 136, 153–54; A. Mendelssohn Bartholdy, in the "Archiv für Politik und Geschichte," July–August 1926, pp. 193–99; A. von Tirpitz, "Deutsche Ohnmachtspolitik im Weltkriege," Hamburg 1926, p. 21; Bausman, *op. cit.*, p. 80; "Carnets," II, pp. 197–99, 201–02; Charles-Roux, p. 742.

Before the invasion of Belgium Germany had violated the neutrality of Luxemburg; see D.D., 486, 511, 602, 606, 619, 637–40, 642–44, 647, 649, 730, 807, 813, 822. Cf. K.F., February 1927, p. 143.

478. Churchill p. 200.

479. Vol. II, p. 41.

480. Vol. II, p. 46. Four Ministers had resigned before Germany marched into Belgium; when this occurred two of them withdrew their resignations; Lord Morley and John Burns definitely resigned.

481. Vol. I, p. 312 (cf. p. 6); Barnes, pp. 518, 522, 527; Ewart, pp. 199, 876.

482. B.D., 4; Grey, Vol. I, p. 305.

483. Vol. II, p. 15 (33 *sqq.*).

484. B.D., 369.

485. Oe III, 159. Cf. above, p. 37.

486. Vol. II, pp. 47 *sqq.*

487. K.F., September 1923, p. 52.

488. B.D., 365, 406; D.D., 534.

489. D.D., 45, 71, 81, 99, 102, 117, 141, 144, 147, 149, 243, 256, 285, 320, 405, 411, 508, 517, 547, 569, 586, 662, 726, 733, 795, 816, 828, 836, 852, 854 (Valentin, p. 228); B.D., 589; Renouvin, pp. 241 *sqq.*

490. Ba, 78 (71), 83 ; B.D., 510.

491. B. von Siebert, " Einkreisung," in " Süddeutsche Monatshefte," January 1922, p. 228.

492. Bertie, " Diary," Vol. I, p. 66. Cf. above, p. 176 ; also footnote 212 to Chapter III and footnote 123 to Chapter IV.

493. Stieve, " Im Dunkel der Europäischen Geheimdiplomatie," p. viii, from Boni de Castellane, " L'Art d'être Pauvre," Paris 1925, p. 188.

494. Stieve, " Das Russische Orangebuch über den Kriegsausbruch mit der Türkei," Berlin 1926, No. 22 ; " Iswolski im Weltkriege," No. 69.

495. See above, p. 189 ; but cf. Grey, Vol. II, p. 22.

496. Dickinson, p. 478, 480 ; Ebray, p. 14 ; Jagow, p. 47.

497. Ewart, pp. 58, 410–11. Cf. S.I., doc 1319 ; Bausman, " Facing Europe," pp. 33, 301.

498. Dickinson, p. 479. " Iswolski im Weltkriege," No. 33.

499. Dickinson, pp. 178, 332. Cf. Ebray, p. 19.

500. D.D., 571, 598 ; F., 125. Cf. Dickinson, pp. 462–65.

501. B.D., 510 ; Hoyos, p. 85.

502. *Op. cit.*, p. 232.

503. Ewart finds Russia and Austria-Hungary equally responsible—p. 1068. Dickinson sees as mainly responsible the statesmen of Austria, Germany, and Russia—p. 477. Barnes attributes " the sole direct and immediate responsibility " to France and Russia in equal shares ; after these, but a long way behind, comes Austria ; last of all, Germany and Britain—pp. 658–59. Cf. " Carnets," II, pp. 139–40, 147–48, 154–56, 159–60, 161–62, 172–73, 175–86, 191–94, 211, 219, 225 ; Dawson, " Cobden," pp. 264–65, 290.

CHAPTER V

WAR AND PEACE

The European problem is above all a moral problem.
FRANCESCO NITTI. (1)

IN THE WAR.

GREAT BRITAIN entered the world war in 1914 " better prepared for war than we had ever been." (2) Great Britain went in ostensibly in defence of the sanctity of treaties—that is, because of Belgium—and to protect small nations. We have learned her true reasons. Some will have missed a reference to the Balance of Power ; but it is not true that Britain went into the war for the sake of this. (3) The Entente had for years plainly enjoyed diplomatic and material preponderance, and Britain did not enter the war merely to maintain this preponderance but to increase it. It is well known that the Entente placed the most exaggerated hopes on the Russian " steam roller." Had these been realized, we should have lived to see Russia gain, with Great Britain's active assistance, hegemony over the whole of Eastern Europe ; a prospect that filled with the greatest alarm all clear-sighted politicians in the British Isles. The entire emptiness of the alleged British war aims is exposed when one recalls that Great Britain entered the war by the side of Tsarist Russia in the defence of small nations. (4) This noble aim is seen in detail in the secret treaties which Sir Edward Grey concluded.

First, the Straits. Britain, France, and Russia did their utmost to induce Turkey to remain neutral, and offered her in August 1914 a guarantee of her independence and integrity. (5) Beyond doubt the British Government meant it quite sincerely. But not its allies. We need only recall the Conference on the Straits in St. Petersburg, and its resolutions, (6) to be very sceptical as regards Russia. The French were quite open. We have already learnt the ideas of de Margerie and Ponceau. (7) On the very next day, August 11th, Isvolsky telegraphed to

Sazonov that Doumergue, the French Foreign Minister, had confirmed in conversation with him " the views expressed by M. Ponceau to our Counsellor of Embassy "

> that Turkey feared that we (Russians) should take advantage of the conditions and of any victory over Austria and Germany to gain possession of Constantinople and the Straits—and that it was very desirable to remove Turkey's fears in this connexion, by offering her, for instance, a guarantee of the integrity of her territory. In Doumergue's view this would not further hinder us in settling the question of the Straits at the end of the war on the lines desired by us (Russians). (8)

Such were the mental reservations of Paris and St. Petersburg ; such was the fraud to be practised on Turkey. Lord Grey writes in his Memoirs of " our most fair offer " of Turkish integrity, which " should never be forgotten " in connexion with the secret treaty about Constantinople. (9) How absurd are such arguments in the face of the documents suppressed in 1914 but now brought to light, and how ill a turn the noble lord's friends do him when they keep such material from him !

The Turkish Government placed no trust in this offer ; (10) it entered the war on the side of the Central Powers, and this reprehensible course provides Grey with the excuse for the secret treaty about Constantinople. He connects it up with the Dardanelles expedition, but forgets to tell his readers that he, Sir Edward Grey, had told Count Benckendorff as early as *the middle of November* 1914 that in the event of Germany's defeat the question of the destiny of the Straits and Constantinople could only be settled *in consonance with Russian desires*. (11) This was quite clearly before the Russians themselves were seriously putting forward this demand. They did not expressly make it until the spring of 1915, and then there was still a hard battle in British Government circles and with the Conservative leaders before Sir Edward, who had for months been firmly on the side of the Russians, gained his way. (12) So there came the British-Russian Secret Treaty of March 20, 1915, which delivered over the " neutral " zone in Persia to the British " sphere of influence " and allowed Russia to annex the Straits and Constantinople (13)—an area which, as is well known, had from of old been inhabited by Russians, or at least by Slavs. So did the British Government under Sir Edward Grey pursue its war of liberation for the self-determination of peoples.

Even more awkward than this for Grey is the secret treaty with Italy. Sazonov objected to it in March 1915, but Grey pressed it; he anticipated that Italy's entry into the war would probably, "in a comparatively short time," effect the collapse of the Central Powers. (14) And in excuse of the treaty he pleads the "most unfavourable" military situation of the Allies at the time. (15) This, however, does not convince, for the fighting at Gorlice began weeks before the conclusion of the treaty.

Italy had pursued since the outbreak of the war a policy of hard bargaining that will not be forgotten. Under pressure from Berlin, Austria-Hungary was ultimately prepared to give almost complete satisfaction to Italy's nationalistic demands. (16) The other side, however, was in a position to offer more at the expense of the enemy, and not only the enemy. Italy was demanding territory to which the Serbs had a better claim than the Italians. This was why Sazonov was against the whole transaction. The Treaty of London, concluded at Grey's instigation on April 26, 1915, between the Entente Powers and Italy, promised Italy not only, among other things, parts of neutral Albania (Great Britain had joined in guaranteeing Albania's neutrality in 1913), but, what was much worse, Tyrol, a German province from the earliest times, as far as the Brenner. (17) The Foreign Office could have no doubt as to the loyalty of the Tyrolese to the Habsburgs. It is also perfectly clear that the Italians would have contented themselves with less. Such deals are more excusable in war-time, but they brand the phrases of the Asquith-Grey Cabinet concerning the protection of small nations as disgusting hypocrisy. (18) And the treaty with Italy, which bears Sir Edward Grey's signature, is a special ornament for the man who, as we saw, was capable of such indignation over the annexation of Bosnia.—The matter does not end there. Everyone knows to-day how Fascism is oppressing German Tyrol. (19) The annexation in itself, and still more such treatment of the Tyrolese, has planted a seed of war for which, if it grows, the British Government and Lord Grey will have to bear the responsibility.

Roumania's entry into the war also came during Sir Edward's period of office. Both Italy and Roumania broke their treaties with the Central Powers (20) and declared war without being

in any way threatened by their old allies. This throws a peculiar light on the theory that the nation declaring war is the aggressor, which Italy and Roumania joined the other States in applying to the Central Powers in 1919.

Then there was the treatment of Greece by the Allies! It is true that Grey is able to point out that at the very beginning of the war Greece offered to join the Allies, and that he himself, later on, opposed a landing of troops. (21) But no one acquainted with international law will deny that Greek neutrality was again and again violated by the Allies, including Great Britain. (22)

There were also the British violations of international law at sea. The British Foreign Secretary benefited by the complaisance and encouragement of Mr. W. H. Page, the United States Ambassador, where a really neutral Ambassador would have had an opportunity not only to remove many of the hardships of belligerency on both sides but actually to shorten the war. (23) There are, however, many who contend with good reason that it was the secret treaties of the Allies, concluded by Sir Edward Grey before he left office in December 1916, that were mainly responsible for prolonging the war. (24) And though this will always be disputed there can be no possible denying that these secret treaties reduced to nought Wilson's promises to the German people, on the strength of which it laid down its arms, promises agreed in by the Allies with two exceptions; nor that *the secret treaties formed the basis of the fatal Treaty of Versailles.* (25)

An Appeal to Lord Grey and His Country.

It is doubtful whether Lord Grey quite realizes his share of responsibility for the treaties of 1919. (26) Certainly he is not entirely convinced of blamelessness; this is shown by his advocacy of the League of Nations, from which he is able to hope for the removal of so many of the injustices of the treaties. (27) But the League of Nations, that noble idea, worthy of the sacrifice of the best, will necessarily remain incomplete so long as the great question remains unsettled of the responsibility for the war, which the victors deliberately made the moral basis of the Treaty of Versailles. The argument that Germany did not admit sole responsibility in Article 231 of the treaty is disposed of at once by the Allied ultimatum of June 16, 1919, with

the accompanying note from Clemenceau, the President of the Peace Conference; (28) it is also contradicted by many statements made by leading Entente statesmen. Thus Lloyd George, as Prime Minister, pointed out to the German Foreign Minister on March 3, 1921, that for the Allied Powers " German responsibility for the war is fundamental " ; he declared that it was

> the basis upon which the structure of the treaty has been erected.

Poincaré spoke in equally plain terms as Prime Minister of France in the Chamber in July 1922 :

> The authors of the Treaty intended above all that it should rest not on victory but on a moral idea,

that of Germany's sole guilt for the war. (29)

Thus there is no doubt as to the meaning of Article 231. Nor is there any as to the importance of the problem involved. Lord Grey issues a warning against devoting too much attention to the question of war guilt. (30) That is all very well for the accuser, but the accused will not accept it so long as he feels a spark of national honour in himself. Lord Grey ought to be particularly well able to appreciate this. It is well known in England how greatly Sir Edward was embittered at finding himself misrepresented and abused in Germany and elsewhere after the outbreak of hostilities as the true author of the war. (31) We have testimony as to the importance which Grey himself attached to the question of responsibility during the war. Walter H. Page, the American Ambassador, to whom Grey pays so high a tribute, (32) had a conversation with the British Foreign Minister, of which Page made the following record :

> Among the conditions of peace that Sir Edward himself personally would like to see imposed (he had not yet discussed the subject with any of his colleagues in the Government) was this : that the German Government should agree to submit to an impartial (neutral) commission or court the question, Who began the war and who is responsible for it ? The German Chancellor and other high German officials have put it about and continue to put it about that England is responsible, and doubtless the German people at least believe it. All the Governments concerned must (this is his idea) submit to the tribunal all its documents and other evidence bearing on the subject; and of course the finding of the tribunal must be published. (33)

This is exactly what the German Government has again and again demanded since the autumn of 1918. Quite recently, on October 2, 1926, Dr. Stresemann, the Foreign Minister, declared in Cologne that

> We are prepared to go before any impartial court of justice that enquires into the origins of the war in order that the truth may be established. Mankind has a right to the truth in this question ; and no one will be able permanently to oppose this desire and right of humanity to an impartial arbitrament.

Indeed it is true that the German nation will never rest content with the misjudgment of Versailles. (34) The sooner that is recognized outside Germany the better. One must ask Lord Grey why in 1916, as Foreign Minister, he wanted to make the clearing up of the question of responsibility one of the conditions of peace, but now advises against devoting too much attention to it—*this question which, in the interval, was made the expressed basis of the treaty of peace?* Is it because Viscount Grey of Fallodon is not so sure of his case to-day as in 1916 ? Is he afraid to-day of what he then urgently desired—the judgment of an impartial tribunal ? (35)

We await an answer. We await his country's answer. The longer it delays giving its assent, the longer it shows disinclination to determine Europe's moral problem in association with German and international experts—and the mere opening of archives is not enough for this—the more it will itself suffer moral damage.

So long as the German demand for the most elementary justice is not completely satisfied, the longing of our best Europeans will remain unsatisfied. How can good come out of the lie of Versailles ? True peace between nations cannot be based on self-righteousness, only on universal righteousness.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

1. " Peaceless Europe," p. 12 (German edition).

2. Grey, Vol. II, p. 64. Grey spoke in similar terms in his speech in the House of Commons on August 3, 1914 (Vol. II, pp. 307–08).

3. For the emptiness of the conception of the Balance of Power, see W. H. Dawson's excellent book, " Richard Cobden and Foreign Policy," London 1926, pp. 95, 111, and in many other places.

4. Valentin wrote, p. 231 : " It will remain for all time an indelible stain on Britain's record that she gave Tsarism first moral and then material support in its struggle against Central Europe."

5. Grey, Vol. II, pp. 166 *sqq.* ; Be E, p. 10.

6. See above, p. 161.

7. See above, p. 300.

8. Stieve, " Das Russische Orangebuch über den Kriegsausbruch mit der Türkei," Berlin 1926, doc. 28. Brackets in quotation Lutz's.

9. Vol. II, pp. 168, 183. Sazonov, in his introduction to the English edition of " Der Beginn " (p. 10), has made a quite unsuccessful attempt to use this offer of a guarantee as evidence that Russia had no designs on Constantinople and the Straits. He quoted the Russian Orange Book on the outbreak of war with Turkey, with fatal results, as Dr. Friedrich Stieve shortly afterwards published the complete Orange Book (see Note 8 above) with a valuable introduction exposing the insincerity of the guarantee offer.

10. Grey, Vol. II, p. 176.

11. " Iswolski im Weltkriege," doc. 236.

12. The struggle in the Cabinet is easily seen in Grey's account, Vol. II, pp. 181–82.

13. F. Seymour Cocks, " The Secret Treaties," London 1918, pp. 15 *sqq.* Grey does not mention this treaty ; see, however, in Vol. II, p. 192, the decisive report from Buchanan, March 1, 1915.

14. Vol. II, pp. 206–07.

15. Vol. II, p. 208.

16. " Zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges mit Italien," Vienna 1915 ; the Italian Green Book, 2 parts, 1915.

17. See the treaty in " Iswolski im Weltkriege," doc. 292 ; Cocks, pp. 27 *sqq.*

18. Ewart has written well on this—pp. 142–43, 857.

19. I may recall the manifesto of the Bavarian Universities of the summer of 1926. Cf. Bausman, p. 37.

20. The Triple Alliance Treaty was renewed, before the due date, on December 5, 1912, and ran to 1920. Italy broke Articles I and IV. Roumania broke Article I of her treaty with Austria-Hungary, to which Germany had adhered on February 26, 1913, and which was also due to remain in force until 1920. D.D., IV, Anhang II and III.

21. " Iswolski im Weltkriege," doc. 121 ; Grey, Vol. II, pp. 172, 216, 231.

22. Ewart, pp. 323 *sqq.*, 330, 346, 374, 447. Ebray, " Chiffons de Papier," Paris 1926.

23. Grey, Vol. II, chh. xxi–xxiii ; Bausman, ch. xii ; Barnes, ch. ix.

24. Loreburn, pp. 305, 307. Cf. Dickinson, p. 485.

25. Dickinson, pp. 485 *sqq.* ; Nitti, " Peaceless Europe."

26. See, for instance, Vol. II, pp. 249, 274–75.

27. Note also in this connection Grey, Vol. II, pp. 274–75.

28. The two documents say in effect that

> Germany alone of all the Powers was prepared for a great war ;
>
> Germany, the only disturber of the peace, had for decades been preparing a war of aggression and conquest ;
>
> Germany let loose this war deliberately in 1914, in order to attain " dominance in Europe " ;
>
> The Allied Powers, on the contrary, were only concerned " to save the freedom of the world."

These charges, which culminated in the statement that Germany was alone responsible for the " greatest crime against humanity," are untrue and

of amazing one-sidedness. On the other hand, it is not true that Germany was altogether innocent of the world war ; that she was not should be clear to any impartial reader of Chapter IV.

29. Poincaré wrote in the " Temps " in December 1920 : " If the Central Powers did not actually bring about the war, why should they be condemned to pay for it ? If the responsibility were divided the cost of it should in fairness be shared." Cf. G. Demartial, " Comment on mobilisa les Consciences," Paris 1922, pp. 227–28, 239–40 ; Demartial, " Evangile," p. 169 ; Émile Doumergue, " Voici pourquoi l'Allemagne doit payer. La Paix par la Vérité." The contention of this last book is that Germany must pay because she was to blame for the war. Note also the statement by Mr. McNeill, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the House of Commons on March 14, 1923.

It is significant that leading organs of the French, British, and Serbian Press, in dealing with the speeches of Dr. Stresemann, the German Foreign Minister, at Geneva at the end of September 1926, once more confirmed the intimate connexion between the guilt theory and the Treaty of Versailles—" Temps," " Journal des Débats," and " Figaro," September 23rd ; " Times," September 28th ; " Samouprava," October 1st. Cf. Poincaré's speech at Bar-le-Duc on September 27th and the Havas report of October 3rd that Poincaré's statements had been discussed beforehand in the French Cabinet and expressed the view of the French Government.

30. Vol. II, p. 29.

31. Cf. Grey, Vol. I, p. xv.

32. Vol. II, pp. 97–98.

33. Burton J. Hendrick, " The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page," 2 vols., London 1924, Vol. II, pp. 162–63. Words in brackets Page's.

34. Evidence of this is the " Appeal to British Fair Play " signed by 120 Germans of all ranks, parties, and professions, Berlin 1924.

35. Lord Grey was reported in the Press as saying at a banquet of the British League of Nations Union on November 2, 1926, that if the League of Nations was to be a success, a close and fair investigation of the origins of the war was necessary.

Apart from the question whether the League of Nations is the proper body for an enquiry into the origins of the war, this statement of Grey's was at least a step towards the condition of peace that he himself wanted in 1916—a public assessment of responsibilities by an impartial (neutral) Committee.

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